

THE EVACUATION AND RELOCATION OF PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY
DURING WORLD WAR II: A HISTORICAL STUDY
OF THE MANZANAR WAR RELOCATION CENTER

Historic Resource Study / Special History Study, Volume One

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By Harlan D. Unrau

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CONTENTS

Preface xxiii

Introduction xxv

Establishment xxv

Geographic Location xxv

Purpose xxv

Significance/Background xxv

Historical Abstract — Significance of Manzanar War Relocation Center xxix

Chapter One: Historical Development of the Anti-Asian Tradition in the Western United States 1

The Chinese 1

The Japanese 2

Chapter Two: Exclusion of Persons of Japanese Ancestry from the West Coast of the United States — Historic Context for Executive Order 9066 11

Background of Exclusion and Evacuation Planning 12

Decision for Mass Evacuation 23

Mass Evacuation of Japanese in Perspective 32

Chapter Three: Evacuation of Persons of Japanese Ancestry from the West Coast of the United States — Implementation of Executive Order 9066 37

Congressional Acts 38

Initial Proclamations to Implement the Executive Order 42

Voluntary Evacuation 44

Establishment of the War Relocation Authority and the Wartime Civil Control Administration 47

Assembly Center Selection 50

Terminal Island Evacuation 52

Initial Evacuation to Manzanar 53

Commencement of Mandatory Evacuation: Evacuation of Bainbridge Island 54

Evacuees' Property Disposal 58

Second Stage of Evacuation 64

Completion of Evacuation 66

Treatment of German and Italian Aliens 66

Chapter Four: Assembly Centers under the Administration of the Wartime Civil Control Administration 69

Assembly Centers 69

Construction and Facilities 70

Administration 72

Security 74

Evacuee Experiences 76

Transfer to Assembly Centers 76

Housing and Facilities 78

Family Separation 80

Dehydration Plant	258
Rice Malt Room	259
Men's Latrine in Block 15	259
Duck Boards for Food Warehouses	259
Garbage Can Wash Rack	259
Hospital Incinerator	259
Utility Extension Construction	260
Staff Housing	260
Poultry and Hog Farms	260
Garage	261
Well 169	261
Reservoir Enlargement	261
Recreational Facility Construction	261
Remodeling Construction	263
Warehouse Reflooring	263
Interior Lining of Partitions in Evacuee Buildings	264
Relocation and Records Offices	265
Electrical and Plumbing Use of Warehouse 5	265
Hospital	265
Schools	266
Mattress Factory in Warehouse 25	267
Community Hostel	267
Warehouse 36	268
Appointed Personnel Recreation Building	268
Canteen and General Store	268
Motor Pool Office	269
Administration Building	269
Butcher Shop	270
Shoyu Factory	270
Equipment Shed 4	270
Evacuee Post Office	270
Engineering Office	270
Police Station	271
Conversion of Camouflage Factory Buildings	271
Warehouse 31	271
Guayule Lath House	271
Refrigeration	272
Land Improvements	273
Clearing and Developing	273
Irrigation and Drainage	273
Streets and Roads	274
Bridges	275
Fencing	275
Landscaping, Gardens, Parks, and Picnic Areas	276
Cemetery	279
Chapter Nine: Historical Background of the Evacuee Population at the Manzanar War Relocation Center	293
Japanese/Japanese American Communities of Origin	293

Historical Development of Japanese/Japanese American Communities of Evacuee

Origin 296

California 296

Settlement Patterns and Occupational Characteristics 296

Community Structure 301

Los Angeles County 303

1869-1930s 303

1940 310

Urban Settlement: Distribution 310

Urban Settlement: Occupational Structure 311

Rural Settlement 315

Summary: Pre-World War II Economic Trends in Los Angeles

County Japanese/Japanese American Community 317

Divisions in Japanese/Japanese American Communities of Evacuee Origin 318

Three Major Groups — Issei, Nisei, Kibei 318

Issei 318

Nisei 320

Kibei 322

Political Divisions 323

Conservatism and Pro-Americanism as Represented by the Japanese

American Citizens League (JACL) 323

Leftist Anti-Fascism as Represented by Communist-Affiliated Labor

Organizations 329

Prewar Japanese/Japanese American Communities and Evacuation Experiences of

Manzanar Evacuee Population 3312

Terminal Island 3323

Little Tokyo — East Los Angeles 33940

West Los Angeles 3456

Venice 3467

Pasadena 351

Burbank 352

San Fernando Valley 355

Florin 361

Stockton/French Camp Area of San Joaquin County 365

Bainbridge Island 371

Chapter Ten: Operation of Manzanar War Relocation Center — March-December 1942 375

Manzanar under the WCCA 375

Organizational Structure 375

Status of Center Operations on June 1 376

Manzanar under the WRA 381

Organizational Structure 381

Appointed Personnel 383

New Manzanar Administrator 384

Policies of Project Director Nash 385

Deteriorating Morale and Public Relations at Manzanar 386

Manzanar Camp Operations during 1942 390

Reports Division 390

Chapter Eleven: Violence at Manzanar on December 6, 1942 — An Examination of the Event, Its Underlying Causes, and Historical Interpretation	477
History	477
Events of December 5-6, 1942	477
Assault on Fred Tayama	477
Arrest of Harry Y.Ueno	479
Sunday Morning Meeting	480
Sunday 1:00 p.m. Mass Meeting	480
Merritt's Interaction with Evacuee Crowd	481
Merritt's Agreement with the Committee of Five	481
Dispersal of Crowd	482
Ueno's Return to Manzanar	483
Sunday Evening Mass Meeting	483
Hospital Incident	484
Police Station Incident	485
Casualties	487
Aftermath	489
Arrests	489
Protective Custody for Evacuees Whose Lives Were Threatened	491
Additional Military Assistance	493
Maintenance of Essential Center Services	494
Schools	494
Funerals/Memorial Services	495
Negotiations Between Evacuee Committees and WRA Administrators	495
Christmas Day	498
Causes	499
WRA Investigations	499
Togo Tanaka, January 25, 1943	502
Evacuee Perspectives as Documented by the Community Analysis Section	506
Robert L. Brown and Ralph P. Merritt, <i>Final Report, Manzanar</i> , 1946	512
Joseph Kurihara Statement in March 1944 and Merritt Interview with Kurihara, November 12, 1945	517
Military and Congressional Investigations	519
Historical Perspectives	521
WRA-JACL Perspective	521
Ethnic Perspective	521
Chapter Twelve: Operation of Manzanar War Relocation Center — January 1943 — November 1945	525
Administration Organization	526
Appointed Personnel	527
Evacuee Personnel	530
Center Photography	531
Community Government	536
Reestablishment	536
Peace Committee	537

Designations of "Mayor of Manzanar" and "Father of Manzanar"	538
"Peace of Manzanar"	538
Education	539
Recommencement of School	539
School Standards	540
Buildings/Facilities	542
Preschool Program	543
Elementary School Program	544
Secondary School Program	545
Adult Education Program	547
Libraries	548
Hospital Class	550
Summer Programs	551
High School Organizations	552
Elementary School Organizations	553
Adult Education Organizations	553
Special School Events	553
Visual Education Museum	554
Public Relations	555
Parent-Teachers Association	555
Fall 1945	556
Industries	557
Clothing Factory	557
Furniture Shop	558
Alterations Shop	558
Typewriter Repair	559
Sign Shop	559
Domestic Sewing Machine Repair Unit	559
Mattress Factory	559
Food Processing Units	559
Agriculture	561
Vegetable Production	561
Poultry Farm	562
Hog Farm	563
Beef Cattle	563
Guayule	564
Mess Hall Operations	565
Community Activities	570
Departmental Activities	570
Arts and Crafts	570
Athletic Activities	571
Entertainment, Social, and Club Activities	573
Music	573
Gardening	574
Youth	575
Community Activities Cooperative Association	576
Public Relations with Owens Valley Residents	578
Special Events	578
Closing Recreational Program During the Summer of 1945	579

Military Background of Program	667
WRA Administrative Background of Program	669
Program Implementation	670
Evacuee Reactions to the Registration Program	673
Loyalty Review	675
Participation in U.S. Armed Forces	676
Selective Service Milestones	676
100th Battalion/442nd Regimental Combat Team	677
Impact of Military Participation on Relocation Center Life	679
Congressional Investigations	680
Segregation Program	682
Manzanar Historic Context	690
Registration Program	690
Program Implementation	690
WRA and Army Investigations of Evacuee Reaction to Registration	694
Segregation Program	702
Program Implementation	702
WRA Investigations of Evacuee Reaction to Segregation Program	709
Cultural Perspectives on Segregation Program	723
Participation in the Armed Forces	725
Military Intelligence Service	725
Service in the U.S. Army	728
Evacuee Reaction	731
Chapter Fifteen: The Relocation Program at Manzanar, September 1942 — November 1945	739
National Perspective	739
Initial Relocation Program Plans of the War Relocation Authority	739
Commencement of College Student Relocation	742
Seasonal Agricultural Work in Western Sugar Beet Fields	744
Adoption of Basic Leave Regulations	745
Problems Associated with Implementation of Relocation Program	746
Establishment of Relocation Field Offices	747
Changes in Leave Procedures	747
Relocation in 1943	748
Seasonal Leave, 1943-44	750
Local Resettlement Committees	751
Relocation Work at the Centers	752
Progress of Relocation in 1944	753
Liquidation Program	754
Final Relocation Drive	756
Resettlement Patterns	758
Manzanar Perspective	760
Early Phase of Relocation Program (September 1942 — May 1943)	760
Commencement of Relocation Program	760
Early "Leave" Efforts	760
Seasonal Agriculture Furlough Work	761
FBI Clearance	763
Early Relocation Trends	763

First Relocations	763
Leave Office Established	765
Impact of "Manzanar Incident" on Relocation	766
Establishment of First Hostel	767
Reorganization of the Relocation Office, December 1942 — February 1943	767
Impact of Registration, Segregation, and Leave Clearance Programs on Relocation	768
Relocation Rates, 1943-44	769
Middle Phase of Relocation Program (June 1943 — January 1945)	769
Factors That Influenced Relocation Program	769
General	769
Fear	770
Pro-Japanese Influence	771
Uncertainty about the Future	771
Roots in California	771
Group Loyalties	771
Climate	771
WRA and Evacuee Staff Interpretation	774
Obstacles Posed by WRA Policies	775
WRA Organizational Relationships	775
Initiatives to Promote Relocation Program	776
Influence of Relocated Evacuees	776
Short-term, Trial and Seasonal Leaves	777
Use of the <i>Manzanar Free Press</i>	779
Visual Advertising	779
The Relocation Committee	781
Zadan Kai	782
Block Managers Involvement	783
Relocation Counseling Program	784
Staff Counseling	784
Promotion of Individual Employment Offers	784
Relocation Library	785
Use of Evacuee Counselors	785
Centerwide Relocation Counseling Program	786
Evaluation	786
Final Phase of Relocation Program (January to November 1945)	787
Reaction to Announcement of Impending Center Liquidation	787
Character of Residual Population on December 31, 1944	788
Preference for California	788
Major Obstacles	789
Housing	789
Employment	789
Exclusion Lists	790
Personnel Representatives	791
Publicity	791
Procedural Changes	792
Social Welfare and Institutional Cases	792
Permanent Dependency	792

- Photo 21: Manzanar War Relocation Center, camouflage net buildings on right; photo by Dorothea Lange, July 1, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration. 281
- Photo 22: Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Dorothea Lange, July 1, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration. 281
- Photo 23: Manzanar War Relocation Center from guard tower, 1943; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress. 282
- Photo 24: Barracks, Manzanar War Relocation Center, looking west; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California. 282
- Photo 25: "Ironing Room, Laundry Room, Women's Latrine, Men's Latrine," Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California 283
- Photo 26: Street scene, 1943, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress. 283
- Photo 27: Barracks, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California. 284
- Photo 28: Children's Village, looking west, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Studio, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California. 284
- Photo 29: Mrs. Nakamura and two children, 1943, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress. 285
- Photo 30: Hospital, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California. 285
- Photo 31: Monument in cemetery, 1943, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress. 286
- Photo 32: Military police camp, looking west, Manzanar War Relocation Center, 1942; David Kruse Photograph Collection. 286
- Photo 33: Administration Building, Manzanar War Relocation Center. 287
- Photo 34: Auditorium, ca. 1944, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California. 287
- Photo 35: Guard tower, looking west, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California. 288
- Photo 36: Pool in Merritt Park, 1943, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress. 289
- Photo 37: Guard tower, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California. 289
- Photo 38: Guard tower, looking west, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California. 290
- Photo 39: "Maintenance Crew," Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California. 290
- Photo 40: Three evacuee boys, guard tower, and barbed-wire fence on perimeter of residential area, looking west, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California. 291
- Photo 41: Reservoir Stilling Basin, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California. 291
- Photo 42: Sign on west boundary, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California. 470

- Photo 43: Camouflage net plant, Manzanar War Relocation Center, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration. 470
- Photo 44: Irrigation for Manzanar War Relocation Center farm; photo by Dorothea Lange, June 30, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration. 471
- Photo 45: Clearing land to south of residential area, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Dorothea Lange, June 30, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration. 471
- Photo 46: Guayule experiments, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Dorothea Lange, June 28, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration. 472
- Photo 47: Police station and evacuee police, Manzanar War Relocation Center, 1942. 472
- Photo 48: Mess hall interior at mealtime, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Clem Albers, April 2, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration. 473
- Photo 49: Japanese checkers, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Clem Albers, April 2, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration. 473
- Photo 50: Art school, artificial flowers, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Dorothea Lange, June 30, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration. 474
- Photo 51: Boy Scouts at Memorial Day service, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Francis Stewart, May 30, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration. 474
- Photo 52: Hospital latrines for patients between barracks, serving temporarily as hospital wards; photo by Dorothea Lange, July 3, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration. 475
- Photo 53: Evacuee gardens, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Dorothea Lange, July 2, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration. 475
- Photo 54: George S. Takemura, landscape artist, building and wishing well, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Francis Stewart, May 24, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration. 476
- Photo 55: Block 19, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection; Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California. 476
- Photo 56: Line crew at work, 1943, Manzanar War Relocation Authority; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress. 613
- Photo 57: Sumiko Shigematsu, foreman of power sewing machine women, 1943; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress. 614
- Photo 58: Benji Igushi driving tractor, 1943, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress. 614
- Photo 59: Potato field, 1943, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress. 615
- Photo 60: Guayule field, 1943, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress. 615
- Photo 61: Hog farm, 1943, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress. 616

- Figure 9: U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Evacuated People*, p. 17 102
- Figure 10: Typical Plot Plan, War Relocation Center U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 266 104
- Figure 11: Typical Housing Block, War Relocation Center, U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 267 105
- Figure 12: Typical Administration Group, War Relocation Center, U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 268. 106
- Figure 13: Typical Military Police Group, War Relocation Center, U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 269 107
- Figure 14: Typical Hospital Group, War Relocation Center, U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 270 109
- Figure 15: Typical Warehouse Group, War Relocation Center, U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 271. 110
- Figure 16: Table 32.—Summary of Transfers of Evacuees From Custody of the Army to Custody of War Relocation Authority U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 279 114
- Figure 17: Transfers from Assembly to Relocation Centers, U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 281 116
- Figure 18: The Town of Manzanar, August 1910 Townsite Plot, Eastern California Museum 173
- Figure 19: Table 37g — Age by Sex and Nativity, Manzanar, January 1, 1943 296

Maps

- Map 1: Boundary Map, Manzanar War Relocation Area, August 27, 1942. 835
- Map 2: Manzanar Farm and Irrigation Map, April 12, 1943. 837
- Map 3: Manzanar Relocation Area, September 13, 1943. 839
- Map 4: Other Investments, January 1945. 841
- Map 5: Sanitary Sewer System, February 7, 1945. 843
- Map 6: Electrical System and Fire Alarm Telephone, April 17, 1945. 844
- Map 7: Camp Layout, April 20, 1945. 845
- Map 8: Water Distribution System, May 6, 1945. 846
- Map 9: Land Improvements, May 6, 1945. 847
- Map 10: WRA Construction Plot Plan, March 14, 1946. 848

PREFACE

This historic resource study/special history study has been prepared to satisfy in part the research needs as stated in the task directive (approved by Patricia L. Newbacher for Stanley T. Albright, Regional Director, Western Region, in a memorandum dated August 1, 1994) concerning Manzanar National Historic Site, Historic Resource Study/Special History Study, under Package DEVA No. 003. The purpose of this study is the collection, presentation, and evaluation of historical research pertaining to the historic events that have occurred within the boundaries of the National Historic Site and its surrounding area. It is intended that the study will provide a data base for the National Historic Site's historic resources that will enable park administrators to formulate appropriate management policies to preserve, protect, and interpret those resources.

A number of persons have assisted in the preparation of this report. My special thanks extend to National Historic Site Superintendent Ross Hopkins and to Thomas D. Mulhern, Chief, Park Historic Preservation, and Gordon S. Chappell, Senior Historian, Pacific/Great Basin System Support Office for making historical materials available for research purposes, providing guidance on the nature of research and the scope of work required for the project, and making suggestions for repositories to consult during my research.

My thanks also go to Lisa Mighetto, Project Historian, and Ann Hubber of Historical Research Associates, Inc., Seattle, Washington, for conducting research in various repositories in the Los Angeles and San Francisco-Sacramento areas under Indefinite Quantities Contract No. 1443CX200092021, Task Order No. 63, let through Jones & Jones, Architects and Landscape Architects, of Seattle, Washington. Under the terms of this contract, subcontracts were let to Arthur A. Hansen, Professor of History and Director, Oral History Program, California State University, Fullerton, to prepare *An Annotated Bibliography for Manzanar National Historic Site* and to William H. Michael, Director, Eastern California Museum, Independence, California, to conduct research in repositories in the Owens Valley.

My thanks also go to Dr. Roger Daniels, Charles Phelps Taft Professor of History, University of Cincinnati, and Dr. Arthur A. Hansen for reviewing the draft manuscript of the study.

In addition my thanks go to the staffs of the various repositories with whom I personally consulted during research for this study. These staffs included those at the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington, D. C., College Park and Suitland, Maryland, and San Bruno and Laguna Niguel, California; the Library of Congress; the Department of Special Collections, University Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles; and the Manuscripts Division, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. Archie Miyatake, owner of the Toyo Miyatake Studio in San Gabriel, California, was most helpful in making available for research the extensive Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, consisting of more than 1,000 photographs of Manzanar.

My thanks also go to my supervisors at the Denver Service Center for providing encouragement and administrative oversight for the project. At the commencement of the project, these included David R. Laux, Chief, Branch of Planning, Western Team, and

117,000 persons of Japanese descent were excluded, removed, and detained as a result of this policy. Manzanar was the first of the permanent Japanese American relocation centers to open, receiving its first evacuees on March 21, 1942.

The 550-acre Manzanar National Historic Site includes much of the one-square-mile evacuee living area, the administrative housing section, and areas where factory/shop, warehouse, hospital, cemetery, and management support facilities were located. The national historic site, however, occupies only a small portion of the land included in the 6,000-acre Manzanar War Relocation Area which included outlying acreage for agricultural production, a reservoir, and water and sewage treatment plant facilities. The evacuee camp or center living area was surrounded by barbed wire fences and guard towers and consisted of 36 blocks each containing 16 wooden barracks divided into rooms or "apartments" for families. At its peak operation, more than 10,000 people were confined at Manzanar.

After the closure of Manzanar in November 1945, the site eventually reverted to its prewar "natural" state as most of the buildings and structures were removed from the site save for four surviving structures. These include two 1942 pagoda-like stone security posts at the camp's eastern or front gate entrance; a 1943 memorial obelisk ("Soul Consoling Tower") in the cemetery just outside the western boundary of the evacuee living area; and a 1944 large wood-frame auditorium near the eastern perimeter of the camp that was converted for use as a maintenance shop and garage for Inyo County highway department vehicles in the 1950s. In addition, the site retains scattered remnants of the war relocation center, such as numerous concrete foundations, portions of the water and sewer systems, and the outlines of the center's road system gridwork. Perhaps, the most evocative features of the site are the extensive remains of landscaping work — stone walkways, planting beds, walls, rock gardens, and modified landforms — constructed by the evacuees in an effort to beautify and make more comfortable the harsh desert environment. The entire site is owned by the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, which purchased the land during the 1920s for its water rights as part of the city's effort to provide a sufficient water supply to the growing metropolis in southern California.

Manzanar National Historic Site also contains a variety of cultural resources associated with the history of human activity in the Owens Valley prior to World War II. These resources include archeological sites associated with the prehistory and history of American Indians in the Manzanar area and those associated with early Euro-American agricultural settlement and land use during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Beginning in 1969, annual pilgrimages to the Manzanar site were sponsored by the Manzanar Committee, a Los Angeles-based community activist group. Manzanar was designated as California Registered Historical Landmark No. 850 in 1972, and a plaque was placed on the sentry post on June 14, 1973, by the State Department of Parks and Recreation in cooperation with the Manzanar Committee and the Japanese American Citizens League. On July 30, 1976, the Manzanar War Relocation Center was listed in the National Register of Historic Places, and in February 1985 it was designated as a National Historic Landmark.

The National Park Service studied the Manzanar War Relocation Center as part of several studies authorized by Public Law 95-348, which established the War in the Pacific

National Historical Park. In addition, a *Study of Alternatives for Manzanar War Relocation Center* was completed by the National Park Service in February 1989. This study identified Manzanar as retaining the most integrity of the ten relocation camps and offering the best opportunities for interpretation of the government's World War II evacuation and relocation program.

The wartime evacuation and relocation of 117,000 persons of Japanese ancestry at relocation centers such as Manzanar is a dramatic and significant event in American history. Manzanar is symbolic of this tragic episode and is a reminder that a nation of laws needs constantly to honor its commitment to the concept of individual liberty and the rights of its citizens. Despite the chilling effect of Executive Order 9066, many Japanese Americans participated in the defense of the United States during World War II. Some were trained at such sites as Camp Shelby, Mississippi, and Camp McCoy, Wisconsin. Others were given Japanese language instruction at the Military Intelligence Service language schools at the Presidio of San Francisco, California, and Fort Savage and Fort Snelling, Minnesota. The contributions of the highly decorated 100th/442d Regimental Combat Team and other Japanese American efforts during the war are deserving of further historical examination and interpretation.¹

1. Material for the Introduction was obtained from the following sources: 106 Stat. 40, Public Law 102-248, March 3, 1992; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Parks and Public Lands of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress, First Session, on H.R. 543, To Establish the Manzanar National Historic Site in the State of California, and for Other Purposes, H.R. 2351, To Authorize a Study of Nationally Significant Places in Japanese American History, Hearing Held in Washington, D.C., May 21, 1991* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 1-70; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Establishing the Manzanar National Historic Site In The State Of California, And For Other Purposes*, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., H. Rept. 102-125, 1991, pp. 1-10; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, *Establishing The Manzanar National Historic Site In The State Of California, And For Other Purposes*, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., S. Rept. 102-236, 1991, pp. 1-9; State of California, Department of Parks and Recreation, *Manzanar: Feasibility Study*, September 1974, pp. 1-11; U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, National Register of Historic Places Inventory — Nomination Form, "Manzanar War Relocation Camp," prepared by Erwin N. Thompson, August 12, 1984; U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, *Manzanar National Historic Site, California: Draft General Management Plan & Environmental Impact Statement*, December 1995; and *An Annotated Bibliography for Manzanar National Historic Site*, Prepared by Arthur A. Hansen, Debra Gold Hansen, Sue Kunitomi Embrey, Jane C. Wehrey, Garnette Long, and Kathleen Frazee, Prepared for the National Park Service, Denver Service Center, Manzanar National Historic Site, #5370000.094, Subconsultant Agreement with Jones & Jones, A Professional Service Corporation, Oral History Program, California State University, Fullerton, February 1995.

surrounded by barbed wire and overlooked by eight guard towers manned by military police, who were quartered a half-mile south of the Manzanar center.

Although relative peace generally prevailed within the center, evacuee resistance to unpopular administrative policies — manifested as work slowdowns and strikes as well as through cultural political action and non-compliance with regulations — was not uncommon. The most dramatic incident of resistance occurred on December 6, 1942. Sparked by the jailing of the Mess Hall Workers' Union's head (Harry Ueno) for beating an evacuee (Fred Tayama) prominent in the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), whose leaders were widely assumed by evacuees to be informers and collaborators with the WRA administrators and federal investigative and law enforcement agencies, the "Manzanar Riot" climaxed in the death of two evacuees and the wounding of ten others by military police-firearms. Its aftermath involved the roundup and ultimate imprisonment (without formal charges or hearings) of Ueno and other suspect "pro-Japanese" advocates and camp "troublemakers" in isolation centers in Moab, Utah, and Leupp, Arizona, and the "protective custody" consignment to the abandoned Cow Creek Civilian Conservation Corps camp in nearby Death Valley National Monument of JACL and allied "pro-American" spokespersons and their families.

A more pervasive and protracted show of resistance was set in motion two months later, in February 1943, when the Army and the WRA imposed a mandatory registration on the adult population of Manzanar and the other centers for the joint purpose of establishing eligibility for leave clearance and securing volunteers for a special Japanese American army combat unit. At Manzanar, only 42 persons (approximately 2 percent of the eligible citizen males) volunteered for military service, while approximately 50 percent of all male citizens and 45 percent of all female citizens either answered "no" to the so-called loyalty questions on the registration questionnaire or refused to answer the questions. The latter situation led to the transfer of nearly 2,200 evacuees from Manzanar to the WRA's newly-established Tule Lake Segregation Center in northern California during late 1943 and early 1944.

With the departure of its "disloyals" to Tule Lake (along with expatriates and repatriates to Japan) and an increasing number of its "loyals" entering the military (following the reinstitution of selective service for Japanese Americans in January 1944) and resettling throughout the United States as war workers and college students, Manzanar became a community largely of elderly and youthful residents. Notwithstanding limited self-government and an improved physical appearance and social ambience, Manzanar retained constant reminders of forcible confinement. Its residents were not free to leave, its newspaper (*Manzanar Free Press*) was censored, and its barbed wire boundaries patrolled by armed military police.

CHAPTER ONE: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANTI-ASIAN TRADITION IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES

Japanese immigrants did not begin entering the United States in significant numbers until the 1890s. By that time the western United States, and California in particular, had developed an anti-Asian tradition that had its roots in the 1849 Gold Rush. The Issei's first American legacy was the hate and fear of Asians which had been generated by the virulent anti-Chinese crusade centered in California where the majority of the Chinese immigrants had settled. First inspired by economic competition and restricted largely to organized labor, the anti-Chinese movement quickly developed racial overtones and received at least passive support from the overwhelming majority of the population in the western United States during the latter decades of the 19th century.¹

THE CHINESE

Following the discovery of gold in California in 1848, tens of thousands of Chinese coolies were brought to the western United States as contract laborers, or emigrated as regular migrants, to work in the mines and on the railroads and farms of the rapidly expanding frontier society that required the services of large numbers of common laborers. Chinese immigrant labor, totaling some 75,000 between 1854 and 1868, was largely employed on western transcontinental railroad projects, but in at least one case some were even contracted to work in a shoe factory in North Adams, Massachusetts. The majority of the earliest Chinese immigrants were from the laboring classes, and nearly all of them came from the six districts of Kwangtung Province, a heavily-populated area encompassing the coastal plain of southeastern China below the mouth of the Yangtze River.²

At first, the Chinese were received with enthusiasm because labor was in short supply, but soon American workers viewed them with hostility as competitors. The fact that Chinese were satisfied with low wages, and were willing to perform menial jobs, invariably put the white laborers at a disadvantage. Despite growing anti-Chinese sentiment on the Pacific coast where most of the Chinese immigrants had settled, however, the United States negotiated the Burlingame Treaty with China in 1868, giving the Chinese the right to emigrate to the United States. In 1869, to mark the completion of the transcontinental railroad link at Promontory Point, Utah, a golden spike was driven to hold the last rail, and some 10,000 Chinese were thrown out of work into a labor market that had become increasingly depressed — a development that would be exacerbated by the influx of some 160,000 Chinese laborers between 1868 and 1882. Because of the competition with American labor, anti-Chinese agitation on the Pacific coast intensified during the 1870s, among the most notable events being the "Sandlot Riots" in July 1877 in

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1. Roger Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, University of California Press, 1962), p. 106. For a historical overview of Japanese emigration and its attendant problems in California see Andrew F. Rolle, *California: A History* (2d ed., Arlington Heights, Illinois, AHM Publishing Corporation, 1969), pp. 389-394.
 2. S. W. Kung, *Chinese In American Life: Some Aspects of Their History, Status, Problems, and Contributions* (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1962), p. 30, and Richard B. Morris, ed., *Encyclopedia of American History: Bicentennial Edition* (New York, Hagerstown, San Francisco, London, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1976), pp. 654-56.

San Francisco, the city having the largest concentration of Chinese. As a result, President Rutherford B. Hayes appointed a commission to negotiate a new treaty with China. The result was the Treaty of November 17, 1880, permitting the United States to "regulate, limit or suspend" but not prohibit the entry of Chinese laborers.³

Throughout the 1870s the most outspoken opponents of unlimited Chinese immigration were labor spokesmen, primarily for economic but also for racial reasons. After the Supreme Court ruled in 1876 that the federal government had responsibility for immigration regulation, western leaders — notably Denis Kearny, the demagogic leader of the new California Workingmen's Party that thrived briefly on the basis of its single issue: "The Chinese must go!" — urged Congress to bar Chinese and invoked boycotts, claiming that the Chinese immigrants undercut the American wage structure. A Chinese Exclusion Act prohibiting the immigration of Chinese for ten years was passed in 1882. Immediately thereafter, anti-Chinese riots in rural districts drove the bulk of the Asians already in California to shelter in urban ghettos such as that in San Francisco, thus intensifying the potential for conflict between them and other American workers. As a result of the lobbying efforts of the Knights of Labor and other labor union groups, Congress passed the Contract Labor Act in 1885 prohibiting the importation of contract laborers into the United States. A new treaty with China in 1894 recognized a 10-year immigration exclusion period. Upon China's termination of this agreement in 1904, an exclusion act was reenacted without terminal date.⁴

THE JAPANESE

The overthrow of the feudal Tokugawa shogunate in 1868 and the return of power of the Meiji to the throne in Japan, generally referred to as the Meiji ("enlightened rule") Restoration, ushered in a period of rapid social, political, and economic change that would transform the country from a backward, agrarian nation to a modern industrial state. This period witnessed a rapid increase in population that exerted economic pressures within the still predominantly agrarian society. The rise of modern industry absorbed the bulk of this phenomenal increase, but the imposition of heavier taxes on the farmers to subsidize the development of the industrial sector caused considerable economic hardship, particularly in the crowded rural sections of the island nation.⁵

The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 suspending the immigration of Chinese laborers to the United States for ten years had the immediate effect of stimulating the flow of immigrant laborers from Japan to America. The act, which would be renewed in 1892 for ten more years and made permanent in 1902, remained in force until its repeal in 1943. Responding to the need for Japanese labor in the United States and the economic pressures in Japanese society, the Japanese Government Act of 1885 authorized nationals to emigrate as laborers

3. *Ibid.*, and William Petersen, *Japanese Americans: Oppression and Success* (New York, Random House, 1971), pp. 31-32.

4. *Dictionary of American History*, (Rev. ed., New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), III, p. 341-42; Morris, ed., *Encyclopedia of American History*, pp. 654-56; and Petersen, *Japanese Americans*, pp. 31-32.

5. Midori Nishi, "Changing Occupance of the Japanese in Los Angeles County, 1940-1950 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1955), pp. 13-14.

for the first time. In 1894, a treaty was negotiated between the Japanese and United States governments permitting citizens of both countries mutual free entry, although both governments were empowered to protect domestic interests by legislating against excessive immigration of laborers.⁶

Japanese emigration gained momentum in the 1890s, the largest percentage of departures being middle-class farm families from the increasingly overcrowded and impoverished rural areas that offered ever-diminishing economic opportunities for their residents. Studies indicate that about 80 percent of Japanese who left their homeland during the late 19th and early 20th centuries emigrated to the United States. More than two-thirds of the emigrants were from rural farming prefectures in southwestern Japan, including Hiroshima and Yamaguchi in Honshu and Fukuoka, Kumamoto, and Nagasaki in Kyushu.⁷

Although the Japanese immigrants were inclined to seek employment in agriculture in the western United States, many worked for railroad companies before drifting into farming. A report by the United States Immigration Commission stated:

. . . perhaps one-eighth of those [Japanese immigrants] gainfully occupied at the close of the year 1909 were on the pay rolls of the steam railway companies operating in the States comprising the Western Division, and chiefly in Washington, Oregon, Montana, Idaho, Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, and Colorado.⁸

The Immigration Commission attributed the increase of Japanese in this field of employment to three principal causes. First, the number of Chinese laborers had declined due to the Chinese exclusion acts, and many European laborers had left the railroads to pursue employment in other developing industries. Second, the Japanese were proving to be satisfactory workers, and, in addition, were willing to accept lower wages than some European competitors. Because they worked as families and were frugal, industrious, and better educated than the Chinese, they progressed more rapidly and were preferable to the Chinese workers they displaced. Third, they could be recruited through employment agents and were generally more accessible than other immigrant groups, because they tended to concentrate around San Francisco, their major port of entrance.

Unwilling to remain in railroad employment, the Japanese quickly shifted to agriculture and other more preferable occupations as soon as opportunities were available. Lumbering and mining provided employment for new arrivals, but, as with railroad work, the emigrants used these opportunities primarily as stepping stones to more highly skilled positions in farming and related industries, such as salmon canneries in the Pacific Northwest. By pooling capital, Japanese neighbors were soon able to rent and eventually purchase farmlands and small businesses.

6. Morris, ed., *Encyclopedia of American History*, p. 352, and Nishi, "Changing Occupance of the Japanese in Los Angeles County," pp. 17-18, 20-21.

7. Nishi, "Changing Occupance of the Japanese in Los Angeles County," pp. 14-16.

8. U.S. Bureau of Immigration, and Naturalization. *Reports of the Immigration Commission: Immigrants in Industries*, Part 25, Vol. 23 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1911), p. 37.

Agriculture held the greatest promise for the Japanese immigrants. Having come primarily from rural areas in their homeland, those who were skilled in intensive agriculture were in great demand throughout the western United States. Farms raising sugar beets, grapes, deciduous and citrus fruits, berries, vegetables, hops, and nuts took the bulk of the Japanese farm workers, although a few found employment on livestock ranches or in general farming. Agriculture in the western states provided employment for an estimated 40 percent of the Japanese population living in the United States in 1909.⁹

Although no significant Japanese immigration to the United States occurred until the 1890s, it increased greatly during the next two decades. During the 1890s, 25,942 Japanese entered the United States, a total that increased to a peak of 129,797 during the following decade.¹⁰ The growing numbers of Japanese in the western United States resulted in agitation from labor unions, politicians, and white supremacist organizations for restrictions and exclusion, because of the increasingly widespread belief that their lower standard of living, like that of the Chinese before them, was detrimental to the interests of American labor and agriculture. California, by virtue of its anti-Chinese tradition and frontier psychology, again led the way in this anti-Asian crusade, and the Japanese became the inheritors of California's persistent animosity toward Asians.¹¹

The first large-scale protest specifically against Japanese Americans took place in 1900. The site was San Francisco, the mecca of the anti-Asian movement and the home of the largest concentration of Japanese immigrants. The principal organizers and participants were trade unionists, and the main speaker was James D. Phelan, then mayor of San Francisco and later United States Senator from California. Until his death in 1930, Phelan would endlessly reiterate the theme that the "Japanese are starting the same tide of immigration which we thought we had checked twenty years ago." The Chinese and Japanese, according to Phelan, were "not bona fide citizens." They were "not the stuff of which American citizens can be made."¹²

In order to head off the demands for restrictive legislation aimed at the Japanese, President William McKinley, anxious not to offend the emerging industrial power, negotiated an agreement with Japan in August 1900 whereby the latter agreed to inaugurate a policy of voluntary emigration limitation through refusal to issue passports to emigrant laborers. This agreement, however, failed to halt the flow of emigrant laborers to Hawaii, Canada, or Mexico, whence entry to the United States could not be effectively controlled. Because of the ineffectiveness of this agreement, anti-Japanese sentiment intensified and labor unions raised the "old bogey" of coolie competition. On May 7, 1905, a mass meeting attended by delegates from 67 organizations with representatives of San Francisco's labor unions at the forefront established the Asiatic Exclusion League,

9. *Ibid.*, p. 61; Nishi, "Changing Occupance of the Japanese in Los Angeles County," pp. 18-20; and David Lavender, *California: A Bicentennial History* (New York and Nashville, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., and American Association for State and Local History, 1978, p. 189.

10. Morris, ed., *Encyclopedia of American History*, p. 657.

11. Daniels, *Politics of Prejudice*, pp. 106-07.

12. Petersen, *Japanese Americans*, p. 32.

sometimes called the Japanese Exclusion League, which soon became the principal locus of anti-Japanese agitation.¹³

The following year, on October 11, the San Francisco School Board ordered that Chinese, Japanese, and Korean children attend a separate Asian public school. The move turned out to be explosive, triggering heightened anti-American feeling in Japan. After winning an upset victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 that established the island empire as an emerging military power in the Far East and increased American fears of Japan as a nemesis to world peace (i.e., the "Yellow Peril"), the Japanese asked President Roosevelt to mediate the peace treaty. The terms that emerged from the meetings Roosevelt arranged at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, were less satisfactory than Japanese jingoists wished, and they blamed the American president. Thus, the Japanese government retaliated by charging on October 25 that the San Francisco school board's action violated the treaty of 1894. Faced with an impending international crisis, Roosevelt invited San Francisco Mayor Eugene Schmitz and members of the school board to Washington for a conference in February 1907. As a result of the conference, the board rescinded its action on March 13, 1907, with the understanding that the federal government would take action on the immigration question. The result was an amendment to the Immigration Act of 1907 authorizing the president to exclude from the United States immigrants holding passports to any country other than the United States, any insular possession of the United States, or the Canal Zone, and attempting to use such passports to enter the United States to the detriment of international "labor conditions." By executive order, Roosevelt put this authorization into effect on March 14.¹⁴

Further diplomatic efforts by the Roosevelt Administration during 1907-08 resulted in the so-called "Gentlemen's Agreement" between the United States and Japan. The essence of the agreement was embodied in a Japanese note on February 24, 1907, in which Japan promised to withhold passports from laborers intending to emigrate to the United States, and recognized the American right to refuse admission to Japanese immigrants using passports originally issued for travel to any other country. However, it was not until February 18, 1908, that a Japanese note provided the basis for the effective restriction of immigration. To offset any Japanese surmises that the concessions extended by the United States in the Far East signified a fear of Japan, Roosevelt sent the bulk of the United States Navy on a world cruise from December 16, 1907, to February 22, 1909, thus demonstrating that the United States was now the second ranking naval power in the world (Japan was ranked fifth). The successful implementation of this agreement temporarily satisfied the American advocates of restriction, and no restrictive legislation aimed at the Japanese was then adopted.¹⁵

Pursuant to the "Gentlemen's Agreement," Japan stopped issuing passports to laborers "skilled or unskilled except those previously domiciled in the United States, or parents,

13. Morris, ed., *Encyclopedia of American History*, p. 352, 657; and Petersen, *Japanese Americans*, pp. 32-33.

14. Morris, ed., *Encyclopedia of American History*, p. 352, and *Dictionary of American History*, VII, pp. 356-57.

15. *Ibid.*, and *Dictionary of American History*, III, p. 492.

wives, or children under twenty years of age of such persons."¹⁶ Because those domiciled in the United States could send for their relatives, in accord with the agreement, the decline in immigration was slight, temporary, and soon followed by another upsurge. Whereas Japanese immigrants had heretofore been primarily male (the 1900 Census indicates that only 958 of 24,326 Japanese in the United States were female), the renewed influx consisted largely of women, many of them designated "picture brides." Arranged marriage, often with the exchange of photographs, was the accepted mode of contracting marriages in Japanese society; this practice allowed male Issei immigrants in the United States to marry and to send for their brides to join them in this country.¹⁷

Thus, despite the apparent paper barrier posed by the "Gentlemen's Agreement," Japanese continued to enter the United States, and the Japanese American population steadily increased both through immigration of "picture brides" and the birth of Nisei children. To escape hostility in northern California where most of the earlier arrivals had settled, many Japanese began to settle in the Los Angeles area. As hired hands, they were welcomed. As leasers and purchasers of truck gardens and citrus groves, they were not. Feeling the pressures of economic competition, angry ranchers, like the labor leaders before them, increasingly demanded protection. Various anti-Japanese groups, citing the entry of "picture brides," complained that the "Gentlemen's Agreement" was being violated. Responding to these anti-Japanese pressures, California Governor Hiram Johnson's Progressives in August 1913 passed the Webb-Heney Law, more commonly known as the Alien Land Law, that limited leases of agricultural land to Japanese to maximum terms of three years and barred further land purchases by Japanese aliens. Additional legislation, known as the Anti-Alien Initiative Measure was passed by the California legislature in 1920 to plug loopholes in the 1913 measure. This law prohibited further transfer or lease of land to Japanese nationals; barred acquisition, by lease or purchase, of land by any corporation in which Japanese held a majority of the stock; and prohibited Issei parents who were noncitizens from serving as guardians for their minor citizen children, since that device had been used with great success by the Issei to circumvent the 1913 law. Other western states, including Washington, Oregon, and Idaho, enacted similar laws during the early 1920s.¹⁸

As a result of the anti-Japanese movement, an amendment to the California State Political Code in 1921 allowed establishment of separate schools for children of Indian, Chinese, Japanese, or Mongolian parentage. These children were not to be integrated into other public schools once separate schools were established. Accordingly, school districts in four communities in Sacramento County elected to maintain separate schools, and Chinese,

16. Quoted in Raymond L. Buell, *Japanese Immigration* (Boston, World Peace Foundation Pamphlet, 1924), VII, p. 359.

17. Isami Arifuku Waugh and Alex Yamato, "A History of Japanese Americans in California," in Isami Arifuku Waugh, Alex Yamato, and Raymond Y. Okamura, *A History of Japanese Americans in California* (Sacramento, State of California, Department of Parks and Recreation, Office of Historic Preservation, 1988), p. 162.

18. Daniels, *Politics of Prejudice*, pp. 63-64, 87-88; Stephen S. Fugita and David J. O'Brien, *Japanese American Ethnicity: The Persistence of Community* (Seattle and London, University of Washington Press, 1991), p. 8; Waugh, Yamato, and Okamura, *A History of Japanese Americans in California*, pp. 164-66, 171, 193-94; Lavender, *California*, pp. 189-90; and Yamato Ichihashi, *Japanese in the United States* (London and Stanford, California, Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press and Stanford University Press, 1932), p. 124.

Japanese, and Filipino children in these school districts attended segregated schools until World War II.¹⁹

In November 1922, a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court simplified matters for the exclusionists in *Takao Ozawa v. United States* by validating their long-standing contention that Japanese were "aliens ineligible to citizenship." "Free white persons" were made eligible for United States citizenship by Congress in 1790. "Aliens of African nativity and persons of African descent" were similarly designated by Congress in 1870. Due to some ambiguity about the term "white," 420 Japanese had been naturalized by 1910, but a ruling by a U.S. attorney general to stop issuing naturalization papers to Japanese ended the practice in 1906.²⁰ Ozawa had filed his naturalization papers in 1914. In 1922, the Supreme Court decided that since Ozawa was neither a "free white person" nor an African by birth or descent, he did not have the right of naturalization as a Japanese. This decision meant that Congress could now safely use the time-honored "aliens ineligible to citizenship" formula, which had been hitherto restricted to state and municipal statutes.²¹

Despite these laws and court decisions, the Japanese American population continued to grow, and the Japanese immigrants continued to acquire property. American statutes declared that all children born on American soil, regardless of the allegiance of their parents, automatically became American citizens. Japanese desirous of owning land simply put the title in the names of their American-born children. Bachelors without children sent to Japan for "picture brides" and raised children who could be land owners. Outraged by this so-called "duplicity", California nativists established a new Japanese Exclusion League and enlisted support in the eastern United States. In March 1924, a three-man exclusionist delegation went to Washington to testify and lobby for anti-Japanese legislation. Its leader, Valentine S. McClatchy, was seconded by former Senator Phelan and the Attorney General of California, Ulysses S. Webb. McClatchy, in a long presentation before the Senate Committee on Immigration, made the ultimate apologia for the California anti-Japanese position. He denounced the Japanese for "violations" of the "Gentlemen's Agreement," singling out the "picture brides" and their successors and the allegedly astronomical Japanese birth rate as examples. He cited as dangers to California's Anglo-Saxon civilization the increased landholdings of the Issei and their clannishness, asserting that all Japanese were loyal only to Japan. He cited their foreign-language schools and the fact that many Japanese sent their children to Japan to be educated as proof of his contention. Despite his denials, the essence of McClatchy's position, as the core of the California anti-Japanese position had been all along, was racism, based on racial stereotypes and fears — the "Yellow Peril" of an unknown, alien, and sinister Asian culture achieving substantial influence over, and thus subverting and destroying, the ideals of western civilization. He noted:

The Japanese are less assimilable and more dangerous as residents in this country than any other of the peoples ineligible under our laws. . . . With great pride of race, they have no idea of assimilating in the sense of amalgamation. They do not come here with any desire or any intent to lose their racial or national identity.

19. Waugh, Yamato, and Okamura, *History of Japanese Americans in California*, p. 171.

20. *Ibid.*

21. Daniels, *Politics of Prejudice*, p. 98.

They come here specifically and professedly for the purpose of colonizing and establishing here permanently the proud Yamato race. They never cease being Japanese. . . . In pursuit of their intent to colonize this country with that race they seek to secure land to found large families. . . . They have greater energy, greater determination, and greater ambition than the other yellow and brown races ineligible to citizenship, and with the same low standards of living, hours of labor, use of women and child labor, they naturally make more dangerous competitors in an economic way. . . . California regards herself as a frontier State. She has been making for 20 years the fight of the nation against incoming of alien races whose peaceful penetration must in time with absolute certainty drive the white race to the wall, and prior to that time inevitably provoke international trouble across the Pacific.²²

In response to such pressures, Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1924, establishing quotas for immigrants from most nations and barring Japanese as well as Chinese. One provision of this law, sponsored by Hiram Johnson who had become a United States Senator from California, completely barred the immigration of aliens who were ineligible for citizenship — a provision designed to exclude Japanese, who were, in common with other Asians, statutorily barred from naturalization. While the bill was under consideration, the Japanese ambassador sent a note warning of "grave consequences" if exclusion of Japanese were enacted. This note aroused strong hostility in Congress, which abruptly rejected all attempts at reconciliation and overwhelmingly adopted the act of exclusion. The Japanese reacted by celebrating "Humiliation Day" in Tokyo on July 1, 1924, marked by "Hate American" mass rallies.²³

After the passage of the Immigration Act of 1924, a new immigration exclusion organization known as the California Joint Immigration Committee was established to coordinate the anti-Japanese movement. It was supported by various nativist organizations, such as the Native Sons, American Legion, American Federation of Labor, and the Grange. McClatchy continued his nativist labors for that group until his death in 1936, but the crusading fervor of most of the exclusionists gained no more victories in peacetime.²⁴

Despite the new restrictive legislation, no law could prevent natural increase of the persons of Japanese descent. By 1940, there more than 112,000 Japanese on the west coast, 94,000 of whom lived in California (slightly less than three percent of the state's population). They controlled 90 percent of the truck gardens around Los Angeles, maintained a sizable fishing colony at Terminal Island in San Pedro Harbor, and raised most of the commercial flowers and did most of the landscape gardening in southern California.²⁵

22. Quoted in Daniels, *Politics of Prejudice*, p. 99.

23. Morris, ed., *Encyclopedia of American History*, p. 657, and *Dictionary of American History*, III, p. 492.

24. Daniels, *Politics of Prejudice*, p. 105.

25. Lavender, *California*, p. 191.

Notwithstanding the population and economic gains of Japanese Americans during the remainder of the 1920s and 1930s, the bitter legacy of the anti-Asian crusade in the western United States during the late 19th and early 20th centuries would set the tone for future United States-Japanese relations as the Japanese continued their efforts to become the dominant military power in the Far East and the Pacific. This background provided the historical context for the mass hysteria that would lead to the evacuation and relocation of Japanese Americans during World War II following the bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

CHAPTER TWO: EXCLUSION OF PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY FROM THE WEST COAST OF THE UNITED STATES — HISTORIC CONTEXT FOR EXECUTIVE ORDER 9066

One of America's largest undertakings in the name of national defense during World War II was the mass exclusion and evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry from California, the western halves of Oregon and Washington, and southern Arizona. Persons of Japanese descent were also removed from Alaska, and efforts were begun for what was initially intended to be a substantial transfer of such persons from Hawaii¹ to the mainland.²

Initial plans for evacuation of suspected persons from strategic areas along the Pacific front concerned enemy aliens of all three Axis nations — Germany, Italy, and Japan — rather than persons of Japanese ancestry alone. Of the latter, the census of 1940 showed that, out of a total of 126,947 in the continental United States, 112,353 were living in the three Pacific states. California had 93,717 Japanese, or nearly three-fourths of the national total. Of the west coast Japanese, 40,869 were aliens who were born in Japan and were ineligible for citizenship (Issei), and 71,484 were American-born citizens, the children (Nisei) or the grandchildren (Sansei) of immigrant Japanese. A small minority, the Japanese represented less than one tenth of one percent of the total American population and less than two percent of the population in California, the state of their heaviest concentration.³

In early 1942 there were some 58,000 Italian and 22,000 German aliens in the Pacific states. Most of the Germans, and a large proportion of the Japanese and Italians, lived in or near major metropolitan areas in the west coast states. Many of the German aliens were recent refugees from Nazi Germany. In contrast to the Germans and Italians, the Japanese in the Pacific states, and especially in California, had been the target of racial hostility and restrictive legal action since the late 19th century, a factor that unquestionably colored the measures taken against these people after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.⁴

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1. For more information on the transfer of Japanese from Hawaii to the mainland see Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, *United States Army in World War II: The Western Hemisphere, Guarding the United States and Its Outposts* (Washington, United States Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1964), pp. 206-16.
 2. Three of the best sources for this subject are Conn, *et al.*, *Guarding the United States*, pp. 115-49, and *Personal Justice Denied: Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians* (Washington, Government Printing Office, December 1982); and Roger Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA: Japanese Americans and World War II* (Hinsdale, Illinois, The Dryden Press, 1972). For a comparison study of Japanese exclusion and evacuation from the military point of view, see U.S. War Department, *Final Report: Japanese Evacuation From the West Coast, 1942* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943). A history of Japanese exclusion and evacuation from the viewpoint of the War Relocation Authority may be found in U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *WRA: A Story of Human Conservation* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946), and *Ibid.*, *Wartime Exile: The Exclusion of the Japanese Americans From the West Coast*, by Ruth E. McKee (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 97-167.
 3. Dorothy Swaine Thomas and Richard S. Nishimoto, *The Spoilage* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1946), p. 1.
 4. Conn, *et al.*, *Guarding the United States*, pp. 115-16.

BACKGROUND OF EXCLUSION AND EVACUATION PLANNING

A prewar agreement made the Department of Justice responsible for controlling enemy aliens in the continental United States in the event of war. During 1941, this department, primarily through its Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), scrutinized the records of prospective enemy aliens and compiled lists of those against whom there were grounds for suspicion of disloyalty.⁵ Three presidential proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, dealing with the control of Japanese and of German and Italian aliens, respectively, provided the basis for immediate action against those so suspected by the Department of Justice. The proclamations authorized the Army to co-operate with the FBI in rounding up individual enemy aliens considered actually or potentially dangerous, made enemy aliens subject to apprehension and internment, restricted them in traveling, prohibited them from possessing a large number of contraband items, and designated them for possible exclusion from military zones. By December 10, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover reported that "practically all" whom he initially planned to arrest had been taken into custody: 1,291 Japanese (367 in Hawaii, 924 in the continental United States); 857 Germans; 147 Italians. In fact, however, the government continued to apprehend enemy aliens. By February 16, 1942, the Department of Justice held 2,191 Japanese; 1,393 Germans; and 264 Italians and arrests continued after that date. Many of the Japanese arrested in the early FBI sweeps were Issei leaders of Japanese American communities and their organizations. By specifically authorizing the exclusion of enemy aliens "from any locality in which residence by an alien enemy shall be found to constitute a danger to the public peace and safety of the United States," the presidential proclamations also provided a basis for evacuation on a larger scale.⁶

During the first few days after the Pearl Harbor attack a large number of reports — all later proven to be false — of enemy ships offshore surfaced on the west coast, fanning the fires of racial hysteria and wartime panic. In this atmosphere, the first proposal for mass evacuation of the Japanese developed. On December 10, a Treasury Department agent

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5. Pre-Pearl Harbor archival documents dealing with discussions between the War and Justice departments over responsibilities for enemy aliens in case of war and with internal Army communications about construction of accommodations for enemy aliens and interned merchant seamen may be found in Roger Daniels, ed., *American Concentration Camps: A Documentary History of the Relocation and Incarceration of Japanese Americans, 1942-1945* (9 vols., New York and London, Garland Publishing, 1989), Vol. 1, Part 1. Although the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor precipitated the movement for exclusion and evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry from the west coast during World War II, it is significant to note a White House memorandum written by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on August 10, 1936. Discussing the surveillance of people of Japanese descent on the Hawaiian island of Oahu, Roosevelt demanded that a list of people under surveillance be kept so that the suspected problem people would "be the first to be placed in a concentration camp in the event of trouble." Record Group 181, Records of Naval Districts and Shore Establishments, 14th Naval District, Commandants Office, General Correspondence, 1925-42, File No. A8-5, Document 20, National Archives and Records Administration, Pacific Sierra Region, San Bruno.
 6. *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 55; Thomas and Nashimoto *Spoilage*, p. 5; and ten Brock, Jacobus, Edward N. Barnhart, and Floyd W. Matson, *Prejudice, War and the Constitution* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1954), p. 101. Copies of three proclamations may be found in Daniels, ed., *American Concentration Camps*, Vol. 1, Part 2. Printed copies of the three proclamations (No. 2525, December 7, 1941, and Nos. 2526 and 2527 on December 8, 1941) may be found in U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, *National Defense Migration, Fourth Interim Report . . . Pursuant to H. Res. 113, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., H. Report 2124, May 1942, Appendixes 1-3*, pp. 294-300.

reported to Army authorities that "an estimated 20,000 Japanese in the San Francisco metropolitan area were ready for organized action." Without checking the authenticity of the report, the Ninth Corps Area staff hurriedly completed a plan for the evacuation of the purported subversives that was approved by the corps area commander. The next day the local FBI chief stopped further local action by characterizing the report "as the wild imaginings of a discharged former FBI man," but the corps area commander reported the incident to Washington and expressed the hope that "it may have the effect of arousing the War Department to some action looking to the establishment of an area or areas for the detention of aliens." His recommendation that "plans be made for large-scale internment" was forwarded to military leaders in Washington.⁷

When Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox returned to the mainland from a visit to Hawaii on December 15, he told the press, "I think the most effective Fifth Column work of the entire war was done in Hawaii with the possible exception of Norway." His accompanying recommendation for the removal of all Japanese, regardless of citizenship, from Oahu was another of a growing series of calls for mass racial exclusion. The basis of Knox's statement was never made clear, and his official report on December 16 contained no reference to fifth column activities. Instead, it described espionage by Japanese consular officers and praised the Japanese Americans who had manned machine guns against the enemy. Nevertheless, his earlier comments to the press received widespread attention in major west coast newspapers, and nothing was promptly done at the highest levels of government to repudiate Knox's initial statement or publicly to affirm the loyalty of persons of Japanese descent.⁸

In this charged atmosphere it is not surprising that General John L. DeWitt, a career soldier who had been placed in command of the Fourth Army and Western Defense Command (WDC) in 1939 with headquarters at the Presidio in San Francisco, would take a cautious, almost nervous, approach to any perceived threat of attack or disruption on the Pacific coast. Aware of the speed with which the disgraced Lieutenant General Walter Short and Rear Admiral Husband Kimmel were forced out of the military after being criticized for not adopting adequate defense measures at Pearl Harbor, DeWitt, anxious to preserve his position in the military, reacted to the rising hysteria on the west coast by recommending to General Headquarters on December 19 "that action be initiated at the earliest practicable date to collect all alien subjects fourteen years of age and over, of enemy nations and remove them to the Zone of the Interior."⁹

7. Quoted in Conn, *et al.*, *Guarding the United States*, pp. 116-17.

8. *Personal Justice Denied*, pp. 55-57; Bill Hosokawa, *Nisei: The Quiet Americans* (New York, William Morrow & Co., Inc., 1969), pp. 463-64; and Morton Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 399.

9. *Personal Justice Denied*, pp. 64-65; Gordon W. Prange, *At Dawn We Slept* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1981), p. 605; Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, p. 278; and Conn, *et al.*, *Guarding the United States*, p. 117.

John DeWitt was born on January 9, 1880, at Fort Sidney, Nebraska. His father was an army doctor who had served in the Civil War, and during John's youth his father and family were transferred to Fort Hancock, Texas, Fort Missoula, Montana, and Fort Sully in the Dakotas. When John was 16, he was sent to Princeton. He applied to West Point, but was turned down. On November 1, 1898, he dropped out of college to accept a lieutenancy in the 20th Infantry during the Spanish-American War and he was sent to the Philippines. From then until World War I, he was posted back and forth between stateside and the

However, General DeWitt may have felt during December about the treatment of enemy aliens, he was firmly opposed to any evacuation of citizens. In a telephone conversation with Major General Allen W. Gullion, the Provost Marshal General, on December 26 he reacted to a recommendation by a representative of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce that all Japanese in the Los Angeles area should be rounded up:

. . . if we go ahead and arrest the 93,000 Japanese, native born and foreign born, we are going to have an awful job on our hands and are very liable to alienate the loyal Japanese from disloyal. . . . I'm very doubtful that it would be common sense procedure to try and intern or to intern 117,000 Japanese in this theater. . . . I told the governors of all the states that those people should be watched better if they were watched by the police and people of the community in which they live and have been living for years. . . . and then inform the F.B.I. or the military authorities of any suspicious action so we could take necessary steps to handle it . . . rather than try to intern all those people, men, women and children, and hold them under military control and under guard. . . . An American citizen, after all, is an American citizen. And while they all may not be loyal, I think we can weed the disloyal out of the loyal and lock them up if necessary.¹⁰

At this time, General DeWitt wanted the prompt issuance of clear instructions to FBI agents on the west coast that would enable them to take more effective steps to prevent sabotage and espionage. At his urging, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson conferred with Attorney General Francis Biddle, and thereafter the latter speeded up the preparation of regulations to implement the presidential proclamations of December 7 and 8. Late in December, the Department of Justice announced regulations requiring enemy aliens in the Western Defense Command to surrender radio transmitters, short-wave radio receivers, and certain types of cameras to local police stations by January 5, 1942. On December 30, DeWitt was informed that the attorney general had also authorized the issuance of warrants for search and arrest in any house where an enemy alien lived upon representation by an FBI agent that there was reasonable cause to believe that contraband was on the premises. In addition, the Department of Justice and the provost marshal general arranged to send representatives to San Francisco to confer with DeWitt in order to work out more specific arrangements for controlling enemy aliens. To centralize and expedite Army action in Washington, General Gullion arranged for DeWitt to deal directly with the provost marshal general's office on west coast alien problems, and for the latter to keep General Headquarters informed of developments.¹¹

The San Francisco conference took place on January 4-5, 1942. Before the meetings, the War Department's representative, Major Karl R. Bendetsen, Chief of the Aliens Division, Provost Marshal General's office, urged DeWitt to insist on the definition of strategic areas

Philippines. In late 1917, he went to France as a quartermaster, serving behind the lines as a supply officer. Between World Wars I and II, he served on army posts in Washington, Georgia, Texas, and the Philippines.

10. Quoted in Conn, *et al.*, *Guarding the United States*, pp. 117-18.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 118. Archival documents (dating from December 7 to 31, 1941) demonstrating the growing conflicts between the War and Justice departments and showing the rising concern about internal security in both the government and the nation at large may be seen in Daniels, ed., *American Concentration Camps*, Vol. 1, Part 3.

from which all enemy aliens were to be excluded and that authority to prescribe such areas be vested in the Army. In opening the conference, General DeWitt declared his serious concern over the alien situation and his distrust in particular of the Japanese population — both aliens and citizens. Although he opposed a mass evacuation of the Japanese, he wanted full implementation of the president's proclamations. The conference ended with agreement on a plan of action providing for alien registration with the least practicable delay, FBI searches of suspected premises without warrants under guidelines stating that merely being an enemy alien would be sufficient cause for a search, and the designation of strategic areas from which enemy aliens could be barred by the attorney general, who would "entertain" Army recommendations on this score if they were accompanied by an exact description of each area.¹²

At this point, designation of restricted areas appeared to be a device to exclude only aliens, not citizens. However, some military officers began to consider broadening the definition of "enemy aliens." Accordingly, Major Carter Garver, Acting Assistant Adjutant General of the Army, wrote to DeWitt on January 8:

Upon being consulted in this connection, Admiral C. S. Freeman, Commandant 13th Naval District, recommended that all enemy aliens be evacuated from the states of Washington and Oregon; that all American [sic] born of Japanese racial origin who cannot show actual severance of all allegiance to the Japanese government be classified as enemy aliens, and lastly that no pass or temporary permit to enter these states be issued to enemy aliens. He based this recommendation on the fact that communications and industry in these states are so vital to the operations of the Naval District that any hostile activities in the two states will be a serious embarrassment. This view is also held by this headquarters.

Garver continued with language that demonstrated the increasing racial sentiments that would lead to mass evacuation:

The reputed operations of Axis spies and Fifth Columnists in Europe and the known activities of such elements during the recent Japanese attack on Hawaii clearly indicate the danger of temporizing with such a menace. It is deemed to be a certainty that any hostile operations against the Northwestern Sector will be characterized by a similar treacherous activity. From what is known of the Japanese character and mentality it is also considered dangerous to rely on the loyalty of native born persons of Japanese blood unless such loyalty can be affirmatively demonstrated.¹³

The arrangements agreed upon at San Francisco took longer to put into effect than either General DeWitt or the Justice representatives anticipated. The registration of enemy aliens was finally undertaken between February 2 and 9, and the large-scale "spot" raids that DeWitt was anxious to have launched did not get under way until the same week, so that both operations took place during the period when public agitation against the Japanese

12. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 4-6, 19-24.

13. Quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, pp. 63-64.

was rapidly mounting. Although DeWitt planned to fix the boundaries of restricted areas by January 9, it was January 21 before he sent the first of his lists to Washington for transmission to the attorney general. One of his principal difficulties was to reconcile the recommendations of the Navy, which by agreement were to be made through him, with the position of the Department of Justice. Navy commanders wanted to exclude not only enemy aliens but also all American-born Japanese who could not show "actual severance of all allegiance to the Japanese Government."¹⁴

On January 21, General DeWitt recommended the exclusion of enemy aliens from 86 Category A zones in California and their close control by a pass and permit system in 8 Category B zones. Although many of the Category A areas were uninhabited or had no alien population, the implementation of this recommendation would have required the evacuation of more than 7,000 persons. Only 40 percent of these would have been Japanese aliens, and the majority would have been Italians.¹⁵ In his letter forwarding this recommendation to Attorney General Biddle, Secretary of War Stimson observed:

In recent conferences with General DeWitt, he has expressed great apprehension because of the presence on the Pacific coast of many thousand alien enemies. As late as yesterday, 24 January, he stated over the telephone that shore-to-ship and ship-to-shore radio communications, undoubtedly coordinated by intelligent enemy control were continually operating. A few days ago it was reported by military observers on the Pacific coast that not a single ship had sailed from our Pacific ports without being subsequently attacked. General DeWitt's been confirmed by recent visits of military observers from the War Department to the Pacific coast. . . .

The alarming and dangerous situation just described, in my opinion, calls for immediate and stringent action.¹⁶

Actually, there had been no Japanese submarine or surface vessels anywhere near the west coast during the preceding month, and careful investigation subsequently indicated that all claims of hostile shore-to-ship and ship-to-shore communication lacked foundation. Similar recommendations for restricted areas in Arizona, Oregon, and Washington followed, and were forwarded to the Justice Department by February 3. By that date, the position of the Japanese population was under heavy attack as a result of the intensifying wartime racial hysteria, and in consequence the alien exclusion program was soon eclipsed by a drive to evacuate all people of Japanese descent from the west coast states.¹⁷

Meantime, racial hysteria was sweeping the Pacific states, fanned by newspaper sensationalism and nativist organizations. The Native Sons and Daughters of the Golden West, for instance, saw the war as a fulfillment of everything they had feared and fought.

14. Conn, *et al.*, *Guarding the United States*, p. 119.

15. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 120.

16. For further data on this subject, see U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Wartime Exile*, pp. 154-58.

17. Conn, *et al.*, *Guarding the United States*, p. 120.

In the January 1942 issue of *The Grizzly Bear*, the organization's publication, the editor emphasized the consequences of ignoring past predictions:

Had the warnings been heeded — had the federal and state authorities been "on the alert" and rigidly enforced the Exclusion Law and the Alien Land Law; had the Jap propaganda agencies in this country been silenced; had the legislation been enacted . . . denying citizenship to offspring of all aliens ineligible to citizenship; had the Japs been prohibited from colonizing in strategic locations; had not Jap-dollars been so eagerly sought by White landowners and businessmen; had a dull ear been turned to the honeyed words of the Japs and the pro-Japs; had the yellow-Jap and the white-Jap "fifth columnists" been disposed of within the law; had Japan been denied the privilege of using California as a breeding ground for dual-citizens (nisei); — the treacherous Japs probably would not have attacked Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941, and this country would not today be at war with Japan.¹⁸

Nurtured by fear and anger at Japanese victories in the Far East following the Pearl Harbor attack and by eagerness to strike at the enemy with whom the ethnic Japanese in the United States were now identified, calls for radical government action began to fill letters to the editor and newspaper commentary. Old stereotypes of the "Yellow peril" and other forms of historic anti-Japanese agitation provided a ready body of lore to bolster this "pseudo-patriotic" cause. By the end of January 1942, the clamor for exclusion fired by race hatred and war hysteria was prominent in California newspapers, particularly those owned by the Hearst family. Henry McLemore, an influential Hearst syndicated columnist, published a particularly vicious diatribe:

The only Japanese apprehended have been the ones the FBI actually had something on. The rest of them, so help me, are free as birds. There isn't an airport in California that isn't flanked by Japanese farms. There is hardly an air field where the same situation doesn't exist. . . .

I know this is the melting pot of the world and all men are created equal and there must be no such thing as race or creed hatred, but do those things go when a country is fighting for its life? Not in my book. No country has ever won a war because of courtesy and I trust and pray we won't be the first because of the lovely, gracious spirit. . . .

I am for immediate removal of every Japanese on the West Coast to a point deep in the interior. I don't mean a nice part of the interior either. Herd 'em up, pack 'em off and give 'em the inside room in the badlands. Let 'em be pinched, hurt, hungry and dead up against it . . .

Personally, I hate the Japanese. And that goes for all of them.¹⁹

18. Quoted in Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, p. 48.

19. Quoted in ten Brock, *et al.*, *Prejudice, War and the Constitution*, p. 75.

Thus, public agitation for mass evacuation of the Japanese from the west coast began to reach significant levels during mid-January 1942, and politicians soon responded to the rising tempo and volume of demands for federal and state action. Among the first of these was a letter dated January 16 addressed by Representative Leland M. Ford of Santa Monica, California, to the Secretaries of War and Navy and the FBI director informing them that his California mail was running heavily in favor of evacuation and internment:

I know that there will be some complications in connection with a matter like this, particularly where there are native born Japanese, who are citizens. My suggestions in connection with this are as follows:

1. That these native born Japanese either are or are not loyal to the United States.
2. That all Japanese, whether citizens or not, be placed in inland concentration camps. As justification for this, I submit that if an American born Japanese, who is a citizen, is really patriotic and wishes to make his contribution to the safety and welfare of this country, right here is his opportunity to do so, namely, that by permitting himself to be placed in a concentration camp, he would be making his sacrifice and he should be willing to do it if he is patriotic and is working for us. As against his sacrifice, millions of other native born citizens are willing to lay down their lives, which is a far greater sacrifice, of course, than being placed in a concentration camp.²⁰

Behind this and similar suggestions lay a profound suspicion of the Japanese population, fanned by the nature and scope of Japan's military successes in the Pacific in the months following Pearl Harbor. For example, a General Headquarters intelligence bulletin of January 21 concluded that there was an "espionage net containing Japanese aliens, first and second generation Japanese and other nations . . . thoroughly organized and working underground." DeWitt, who feared that an enemy raid on the west coast would probably be accompanied by "a violent outburst of coordinated and controlled sabotage" among the Japanese population stated on January 24 the disingenuous assertion that would become one of the principal arguments for mass evacuation:

The fact that nothing has happened so far is more or less . . . ominous, in that I feel that in view of the fact that we have had no sporadic attempts at sabotage that there is a control being exercised and when we have it will be on a mass basis.²¹

The first official inquiry into the Pearl Harbor disaster was conducted by the Roberts Commission, appointed by the President and chaired by Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts. The Roberts Commission report, issued on January 23, 1942, had immediate effect

20. Quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 70. Copies of Ford's letters may be found in Daniels, ed., *American Concentration Camps*, Vol. 2, Part 1.

21. Quoted in Conn, et al., *Guarding the United States*, p. 121.

both on public opinion and on government action. The report concluded that there had been widespread espionage in Hawaii before Pearl Harbor, both by Japanese consular agents and by Japanese residents of Oahu who had "no open relations with the Japanese foreign service."²²

The latter charge, though proven false after the war, was especially inflammatory. On January 27, General DeWitt reported after a lengthy talk with Governor Culbert L. Olson of California:

There's a tremendous volume of public opinion now developing against the Japanese of all classes, that is aliens and non-aliens, to get them off the land, and in Southern California around Los Angeles — in that area too — they want and they are bringing pressure on the government to move all the Japanese out. As a matter of fact, it's not being instigated or developed by people who are not thinking but by the best people of California. Since the publication of the Roberts Report they feel that they are living in the midst of a lot of enemies. They don't trust the Japanese, none of them.²³

Led by representatives of the California congressional delegation who were reportedly "beginning to get up in arms" over the Japanese situation, an informal meeting that included Washington state congressmen and Justice and War Department personnel unanimously approved on January 30 a suggested program for action, which was a verbatim copy of a draft submitted by a representative of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce. The recommended action program called for an evacuation of enemy aliens and "dual" citizens from critical areas, but which made no specific mention of the Japanese. In presenting the congressional program to his chief, Major Bendetsen described it as "calling for the immediate evacuation of all Japanese from the Pacific coast strip including Japanese citizens of the age of 21 and under, and calling for an Executive Order of the President, imposing full responsibility and authority (with power to requisition the services of other Federal agencies) upon the War Department."²⁴ He also reported the recommendations as adopted to DeWitt, who expressed general approval of them despite some technical objections. After the congressional meeting, its chairman, Representative Clarence F. Lea of California, formally presented the recommendations to the War Department.

The next day, in reflecting on these recommendations as well as a conversation he had conducted on January 29 with Earl Warren, the Attorney General of California who supported Governor Olson's proposals for removal of all Japanese from the state, General DeWitt recorded his opinion that gave evidence of his hardening attitude toward mass evacuation. He noted:

22. The Roberts Commission report was published in *Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack* (39 parts, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946), Part 39, pp. 1-21.

23. Quoted in Conn, *et al.*, *Guarding the United States*, p. 122.

24. For further data on this subject see Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, pp. 67-69.

As a matter of fact, the steps now being taken by the Attorney General through the F.B.I. will do nothing more than exercise a controlling influence and preventive action against sabotage; it will not, in my opinion, be able to stop it. The only positive answer to this question is evacuation of all enemy aliens from the West Coast and resettlement or internment under positive control, military or otherwise.

DeWitt not only wanted the removal and internment of German and Italian aliens and all Japanese residents, including both aliens and dual citizens, but he also wanted all evacuees from a particular area to be moved at the same time. Action should be taken at the earliest possible date "even if they [the aliens and dual citizens] were temporarily inconvenienced." He also expressed his willingness to accept responsibility for the enemy alien program if it was formally transferred to him.²⁵

In the meantime, the Department of Justice had agreed informally to accept General DeWitt's initial recommendation for restricted areas in California, and it was preparing to carry out this and other aspects of the alien control program. On January 28, it announced the appointment of Thomas C. Clark as Co-ordinator of the Alien Enemy Control Program within the Western Defense Command, and Clark commenced work the next day. On January 29, the Justice Department made its first public announcement about the restricted Category A areas that were to be cleared of enemy aliens by February 24. In a series of press releases between January 31 and February 7, the attorney general announced 84 prohibited areas in California, 7 in Washington, 24 in Oregon, and 18 in Arizona — 135 zones around airports, dams, powerplants, pumping stations, harbor areas, and military installations. In most cases, the areas were small, usually circles of 1,000 feet or rectangles of several city blocks. The Justice Department also announced twelve "restricted" areas for enemy aliens, eleven being small zones surrounding hydroelectric plants in California, but the twelfth encompassed the entire coastal strip from the Oregon border south to a point approximately 50 miles north of Los Angeles and extended inland for distances varying from 30 to 150 miles. Regulations for these restricted areas required that (1) enemy aliens remain within their places of residence between the hours of 9 p.m. and 6 a.m.; (2) at all other times during the day they be found only at their place of residence or employment or traveling between those two places, or within a distance of not more than five miles from their place of residence; and (3) if found disobeying the regulations they were to be subject to immediate apprehension and internment. But the Justice Department balked at quarantining extensive populated areas, such as all of Seattle or Portland.²⁶

As a result of the congressional recommendations and related developments, Attorney General Biddle asked War Department representatives to attend a meeting at his office on February 1. There he presented a draft press release to be issued jointly by the Justice and War departments, indicating agreement on all alien control measures taken to date and including the statement: "The Department of War and the Department of Justice are in agreement that the present military situation does not at this time require the removal of

25. Conn, *et al.*, *Guarding the United States*, p. 123.

26. *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 72; Thomas and Nashimoto, *Spoilage*, p. 7; and Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, pp. 241-42. Copies of the Department of Justice press releases may be found in Daniels, ed., *American Concentration Camps*, Vol. 1, Part 2. Printed copies of the Justice Department press releases between January 29 and February 7 may be found in House Report 2124, May 1942, Appendixes 6-11, pp. 302-14.

American citizens of the Japanese race." In the meeting, Biddle, a member of a wealthy eastern establishment family who had little sympathy for a mass evacuation program, stated that Justice would have nothing to do with any interference with citizens or a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The War Department representatives — Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, General Gullion, and Major Bendetsen — agreed to the wording of the press release except for the sentence quoted. The meeting then adjourned, the War Department representatives withholding approval of any press release until DeWitt's views could be obtained, and until they learned the outcome of a conference at Sacramento that had been arranged for February 2 between General DeWitt, Clark, Governor Olsen, and other federal and state officials. Major Bendetsen informed the chief of staff's office that the Justice Department's proposal had also been held up because DeWitt had been provisionally recommending the evacuation of the entire Japanese population from the Pacific coastal area. In the meantime, the provost marshal general's office had formulated plans for mass evacuation and nontroop shelter for all of the west coast Japanese. In a telephone conversation immediately after the meeting with Justice representatives, Major Bendetsen reported, General DeWitt agreed to submit a recommendation for mass evacuation in writing.²⁷

Before DeWitt could report the outcome of the Sacramento meeting, Secretary of War Stimson met on February 3 with McCloy, Gullion, and Bendetsen to confer about the proposed press release and the Japanese problem in general. They discussed a proposal under which military reservations would be established around large aircraft factories and some port and harbor installations, and from which everyone could be excluded at the outset until they were licensed to return. In practice, licenses would not be issued to Japanese residents or to other groups or individuals under suspicion. It appeared that under this plan citizens as well as aliens could be excluded legally without overt discrimination.²⁸

During the discussion, Stimson received a record of a telephone conversation between General George C. Marshall and DeWitt in which the latter reported on the meeting in Sacramento. DeWitt stated:

I had a conference yesterday with the Governor and several representatives from the Department of Justice and Department of Agriculture, with a view to removal of the Japanese from where they are now living to other portions of the state. And the Governor thinks it can be satisfactorily handled without having a resettlement somewhere in the central part of the United States and removing them entirely from the state of California. As you know the people out here are very much disturbed over these aliens, the Japanese being among them, and want to get them out of the several communities. And I've agreed that if they can solve the problem by getting them out of the areas limited as the combat zone, that it would be satisfactory. That would take them 100 to 150 miles from the coast, and they're working on it. The Department of Justice has a representative here and the Department of Agriculture, and they think the plan an excellent one. I'm only

27. Conn, et al., *Guarding the United States*, pp. 123-24.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 124, and Grodzins, *Japanese Evacuation*, p. 124.

concerned with getting them away from around these aircraft factories and other places.²⁹

In subsequent exchanges General DeWitt explained the details of the California officials' proposals, particularly those of Governor Olson who had been asked by federal authorities to recommend the best procedure for handling the situation. According to DeWitt, the state officials proposed to move both citizen and alien Japanese (voluntarily if possible, and in collaboration with American-born Japanese leaders) from urban areas and from along the coast to agricultural areas in the interior of the state. They wanted to do this to avoid having to replace the Japanese with Mexican and Negro farm laborers who might otherwise have to be brought into California in considerable numbers. The California officials felt they needed ten days to study the problem and develop a workable plan. By February 4, DeWitt was convinced that they could produce a plan that would be satisfactory from a defense standpoint.³⁰

After the meeting with Stimson, McCloy called General DeWitt to tell him about the licensing plan and caution him against taking any position in favor of mass Japanese evacuation. The next day General Gullion told Clark that Stimson and McCloy opposed mass evacuation of the Japanese and interfering with citizens unless such action could be done legally. While admitting that this point of view represented the War Department position for the moment, General Gullion offered his personal view that he did not think the proposed licensing action was going to solve the situation. On this same day, February 4, Lieutenant Colonel Bendetsen, who had just been promoted to that rank, remarked to DeWitt that he was sure that American citizens of Japanese extraction would have to be excluded from some areas. In response DeWitt remarked:

You see, the situation is this: I have never on my own initiative recommended a mass evacuation, or the removal of any man, any Jap, other than an alien. In other words, I have made no distinction between an alien as to whether he is Jap, Italian, or German — that they must all get out of Area A, that is the Category A area. The agitation to move all the Japanese away from the coast, and some suggestions, out of California entirely — is with the State, the population of the State, which has been espoused by the Governor. I have never been a body [sic] to that, but I have said, if you do that, and can solve that problem, it will be a positive step toward the protection of the coast. . . . But I have never said, "You've got to do it, in order to protect the coast"; . . . I can take such measures as are necessary from a military standpoint to control the American Jap if he is going to cause trouble within those restricted areas.³¹

Two days earlier, on February 2, members of Congress from the Pacific states had organized informally under the leadership of their senior Senator, Hiram Johnson of California. He had appointed two subcommittees, one headed by Senator Rufus C. Holman of Oregon to consider plans for increased military strength along the Pacific coast, and the other by Senator Mon C. Wallgren of Washington to deal with questions relating

29. Quoted in *ibid*, p. 125.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 125, and *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 76-77.

31. Quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 126.

to enemy aliens and the prevention of sabotage. On February 4, Brigadier General Mark W. Clark of General Headquarters and Admiral Harold R. Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, offered testimony on the west coast military outlook at a meeting of the first of these subcommittees. At the hearings, Senator Holman summed up the situation by observing that the people of the Pacific coast states were alarmed and horrified as to their persons, their employment, and their homes. Clark observed that he thought the people were unduly alarmed. While both he and Stark agreed the west coast defenses were not adequate to prevent the enemy from attacking, they felt the chance of any sustained attack or of an invasion was nil. They recognized that sporadic air raids on key installations were a distinct possibility, but they also believed that the west coast military defenses were considerable. From the military point of view the Pacific coast had a necessarily low priority as compared with Hawaii and the far Pacific. These authoritative Army and Navy views were passed on to the Wallgren subcommittee, but they appear to have made little impression on the western congressional leaders.³²

On the same day as the hearing, February 4, the federal government's Office of Facts and Figures completed an analysis of a hasty survey of public opinion in California. The report, written by Archibald MacLeish, concluded that "Even with such a small sample," one "can infer the situation in California is serious; that it is loaded with potential dynamite; but that it is not as desperate as some people believe." The report noted that "a majority of people think that the Government (chiefly the FBI) has the situation in hand," but it did concede that between 23 and 43 percent of the population felt further action was needed. The report suggested that these people "tend to cluster in the low income, poorly educated groups, and they are the ones who are most suspicious of local Japanese in general."³³

A contemporary Navy report described what was happening to the Japanese population in the Los Angeles area: ". . . loss of employment and income due to anti-Japanese agitation by and among Caucasian Americans, continued personal attacks by Filipinos and other racial groups, denial of relief funds to desperately needy cases, cancellation of licenses for markets, produce houses, stores, etc., by California State authorities, discharges from jobs by the wholesale, [and] unnecessarily harsh restrictions on travel including discriminatory regulations against all Nisei preventing them from engaging in commercial fishing." While expressing opposition to any mass evacuation of the Japanese, the report concluded that if practices such as those described continued there would "most certainly be outbreaks of sabotage, riots, and other civil strife in the not too distant future."³⁴

DECISION FOR MASS EVACUATION

On February 4, Colonel Bendetsen addressed a lengthy memorandum to General Gullion, concluding that an enemy alien evacuation "would accomplish little as a measure of

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 126-27.

33. Quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 77.

34. Quoted in Conn, *et al.*, *Guarding the United States*, p. 127. The substance of this report, one of the most detailed and sympathetic military analyses of the Japanese problem in early 1942, was published anonymously in *Harper's Magazine*, October 1942, pp. 489-97.

safety," since the alien Japanese were mostly elderly people who could do little harm to the American defense effort. Furthermore, their removal would inevitably antagonize large numbers of their relatives among the American-born Japanese. After considering the various alternatives that had been suggested for dealing with citizens, Colonel Bendetsen recommended the designation of military areas from which all persons who did not have permission to enter and remain would be excluded as a measure of military necessity. He rejected mass evacuation as unjustified by military necessity, but he insisted that "by far the vast majority of those who have studied the Asian assert that a substantial majority of Nisei bear allegiance to Japan, are well controlled and disciplined by the enemy, and at the proper time will engage in organized sabotage, particularly, should a raid along the Pacific Coast be attempted by the Japanese." He believed that this plan was clearly legal and recommended that it be executed via three steps: (1) issuance of an Executive Order by the President authorizing the Secretary of War to designate military areas; (2) designation of military areas upon the recommendation of General DeWitt; and (3) immediate evacuation from areas so designated of all persons to whom it was not proposed to issue licenses to re-enter or remain. Bendetsen assumed that, if military areas were established on the west coast in place of all Category A areas thus far recommended by General DeWitt, about 30,000 people would have to be evacuated. At the same time, Bendetsen's division drafted a proposal for applying the military areas scheme to the entire nation.³⁵

Colonel Archer L. Lerch, the deputy provost marshal general, endorsed Bendetsen's proposals, commenting on the "deciding weakening of General DeWitt" on the issue of Japanese evacuation, which he considered "most unfortunate." He thought the plan for resettlement within California being worked out between DeWitt and state authorities savored "too much of the spirit of Rotary" and overlooked "the necessary cold-bloodedness of war." General Gullion presented a condensed version of Bendetsen's observations and recommendation to McCloy on February 5, noting that DeWitt had changed his position and appeared to favor a more lenient treatment of the American-born Japanese to be developed in cooperation with their leaders — a position he considered "extremely dangerous." A revision of his memorandum, with all reference to DeWitt deleted, became the provost marshal general's recommendation of February 6 to McCloy that immediate steps be taken to eliminate the great danger of Japanese-inspired sabotage on the west coast. Gullion advised that these steps should include the internment by the Army of all alien Japanese east of the Sierra Nevada, together with as many citizen members of their families as would voluntarily accompany them, and the exclusion of all citizen Japanese from restricted zones and their resettlement with the assistance of various federal agencies.³⁶

On February 7, Colonel Bendetsen read General Gullion's memorandum to DeWitt, who expressed some enthusiasm for its recommendations but did not wish to endorse them without further study. That same day McCloy decided to send Bendetsen to the west coast "to confer with General DeWitt in connection with mass evacuation of all Japanese," a

35. Conn, *et al.*, *Guarding the United States*, pp. 127-28, and *Personal Justice Denied*, pp. 77-78.

36. Conn, *et al.*, *Guarding the United States*, pp. 128-29.

mission that would result in new and detailed recommendations from the west coast commander.³⁷

In the meantime, the War and Justice departments were approaching an impasse over the area evacuations contemplated under the enemy alien control program. After agreeing informally to accept DeWitt's initial California recommendations, Justice officials balked at accepting the large Category A areas he recommended for Washington and Oregon, since they included the entire cities of Seattle, Tacoma, and Portland. The execution of this recommendation would have required the evacuation of about 10,700 additional enemy aliens and, as in the case of California, only about 40 percent of these would have been Japanese. By February 4, representatives of the Department of Justice, believing that they would have difficulty in supplying either the manpower or the internment facilities that large-scale compulsory evacuation would require, began to intimate that if there were any further Category A recommendations or if the evacuation of any citizens were to be involved, Justice would bow out and turn its evacuation responsibilities over to the War Department.³⁸

At the same time, DeWitt was considering placing the entire Los Angeles area in Category A, because his air commander recommended Category A zones around 220 different installations that, when plotted on a map, virtually blanketed the metropolitan area. For similar reasons, DeWitt believed he might have to put all of San Diego in Category A. On February 7, he recommended the blanket Category A coverage of these two cities, and five days later he recommended that almost all of the San Francisco Bay area be placed in Category A. If all of General DeWitt's recommendations for Category A areas through February 12 were accepted, it would make necessary the evacuation of nearly 89,000 enemy aliens from areas along the Pacific coast — only 25,000 of whom would be Japanese. Although the concentration of the Japanese population near strategic points seemed to be sinister in itself in 1942 and was used by the War Department as one of principal reasons that made evacuation necessary, it is interesting to note that there was a greater proportionate concentration of German and Italian aliens near strategic points than there was of Japanese. General DeWitt's Category A recommendations would have affected nine-tenths of the west coast German alien population and nearly three-fourths of the Italian aliens, but less than two-thirds of the Japanese aliens. Thus, it appeared that DeWitt was counting upon the California state authorities to persuade the citizen Japanese to evacuate California's urban areas and other sensitive points along the coast.³⁹

On February 9, Attorney General Biddle formally agreed to announce the Category A areas initially recommended for Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington as prohibited to enemy aliens by February 15 or 24, with the latter date applicable to those areas that had a considerable alien population. Biddle, however, questioned the necessity of forcibly excluding German and Italian aliens from those areas and wondered why entire cities had been included in Washington and Oregon and none in California. If all of Los Angeles County was going to be recommended as a Category A area, he stated that the Department of Justice would have to step out of the picture, because it did not have

37. *Ibid.*, p. 129.

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 129-30.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 130, and U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 9.

the physical means to carry out a mass evacuation of this magnitude. He concluded that the Justice Department was not authorized under any circumstances to evacuate American citizens. If the Army wanted that done in particular areas for reasons of military necessity, the Army itself would have to do it.⁴⁰

As a result of the Attorney General Biddle's position, the War Department drafted a memorandum summarizing the "questions to be determined re Japanese exclusion" for presentation to President Roosevelt. After a conference with McCloy and General Clark about the alternative courses proposed, Stimson attempted to see Roosevelt. Although too busy for a personal interview, Roosevelt and Stimson spoke on the telephone. After Stimson described the situation to the president, he found that Roosevelt "was very vigorous about it." The president told Stimson "to go ahead on the line that I had myself thought the best." According to his diary, Stimson thought the best course of action at the time was to begin as quickly as possible with the evacuation of both citizen and alien Japanese from the vicinity of "the most vital places of army and navy production."⁴¹

In reporting Stimson's conversation with the president to San Francisco, McCloy told Colonel Bendetsen that "we have carte blanche to do what we want to as far as the President's concerned" and that Roosevelt had specifically authorized the evacuation of citizens. McCloy said that the president had recognized that there probably would be some repercussions to the evacuation of citizens, but that what was to be done had to be dictated by the military necessity of the situation, subject only to the qualification, "Be as reasonable as you can." McCloy also told Bendetsen that he thought the president was prepared to sign an executive order giving the War Department the authority to carry out any action it decided upon.⁴²

The president's decisions as reported by McCloy provided impetus to the preparation of new written recommendations by General DeWitt with the assistance of Bendetsen. These final recommendations, entitled "Evacuation of Japanese and Other Subversive Persons from the Pacific Coast," were embodied in a formal memorandum for the Secretary of War dated February 13 that was sent to General Headquarters. Having estimated that the west coast was open to air and naval attacks as well as sabotage, but without suggesting that a Japanese raid or invasion would land troops on the west coast, the general set out his military justification for requesting the power to exclude all ethnic Japanese. General DeWitt's final recommendations differed from those he had already submitted under the enemy alien control program in only one important particular: he recommended the enforced evacuation by federal authority of the American-born Japanese (Nisei) from the Category A areas already recommended by him in previous letters to the Secretary of War. In the memorandum, DeWitt, undoubtedly influenced by the growing pressures of racial hysteria that were sweeping the Pacific states, stated in unequivocal terms the racist overtones that had come to shape military policy toward evacuation:

The area lying to the west of Cascade and Sierra Nevada Mountains in Washington, Oregon and California, is highly critical not only because the lines of

40. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 7-8.

41. Quoted in Conn, *et al.*, *Guarding the United States*, pp. 131-32.

42. Conn, *et al.*, *Guarding the United States*, 132.

communication and supply to the Pacific theater pass through it, but also because of the vital industrial production therein, particularly aircraft.

In the war in which we are now engaged racial affinities are not severed by migration. The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become "Americanized," the racial strains are undiluted. To conclude otherwise is to expect that children born of white parents on Japanese soil sever all racial affinity and become loyal Japanese subjects, ready to fight and, if necessary, to die for Japan in a war against the nation of their parents. That Japan is allied with Germany and Italy in this struggle is no ground for assuming that any Japanese, barred from assimilation by convention as he is, though born and raised in the United States, will not turn against this nation when the final test of loyalty comes. It., therefore, follows that along the vital Pacific Coast over 112,000 potential enemies, of Japanese extraction, are at large today. There are indications that these are organized and ready for concerted action at a favorable opportunity. The very fact that no sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing and confirming indication that such action will be taken.⁴³

After DeWitt's memorandum was reviewed at a staff conference at General Headquarters on February 19, it was decided not to concur in his recommendations, but instead to recommend to General Mark Clark that only enemy alien leaders be arrested and interned. After conferring with Clark, General Headquarters on February 20 sent DeWitt's memorandum to the War Department through normal channels, with an endorsement that they were being "transmitted in view of the proposed action already decided upon by the War Department." The memorandum reached the provost marshal general's office "for remark and recommendation on February 24, the day after DeWitt received new instructions from the War Department that differed in many particulars from the recommendations he had submitted."⁴⁴

In the meantime, on February 12 and 13, additional political pressures were brought to bear which favored mass evacuation. On February 12, Walter Lippman, perhaps the most influential columnist in the nation, published, from San Francisco, an article entitled "The Fifth Column on the Coast." Its major argument was for some kind of mass removal of Japanese, although the columnist laid out no blueprint:

. . . the Pacific Coast is in imminent danger of a combined attack from within and without. . . . It is a fact that the Japanese navy has been reconnoitering the coast more or less continuously. . . . There is an assumption [in Washington] that a citizen may not be interfered with unless he has committed an overt act. . . . The Pacific Coast is officially a combat zone. Some part of it may at any moment be a

43. The memorandum is printed in U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 33-38. According to Conn, *et al.*, *Guarding the United States*, p. 132, the memorandum should be dated February 13. Also see *Personal Justice Denied*, pp. 66, 82.

44. Conn, *et al.*, *Guarding the United States*, pp. 132-33.

battlefield. And nobody ought to be on a battlefield who has no good reason for being there. There is plenty of room elsewhere for him to exercise his rights.⁴⁵

On February 13, the Pacific coast congressional subcommittee on aliens and sabotage contributed to the growing pressures for mass evacuation by adopting recommendations that were forwarded to President Roosevelt with a covering letter signed by Congressman Lea on behalf of the entire west coast congressional delegation. The recommendations read:

We recommend the immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese lineage and all others, aliens and citizens alike, whose presence shall be deemed dangerous or inimical to the defense of the United States from all strategic areas.

In defining said strategic areas we recommend that such areas include all military installations, war industries, water and power installations, oil fields, and refineries, transportation and other essential facilities as well as adequate protective areas adjacent thereto.

We further recommend that such areas be enlarged as expeditiously as possible until they shall encompass the entire strategic areas of the states of California, Oregon and Washington, and Territory of Alaska.

We make these recommendations in order that no citizen, located in a strategic area, may cloak his disloyalty or subversive activity under the mantle of his citizenship alone and further to guarantee protection to all loyal persons, alien and citizen alike, whose safety may be endangered by some wanton act of sabotage.⁴⁶

On February 16, the president sent the letter and recommendations to Stimson with a memorandum that read: "Will you please be good enough to reply to Congressman Lea in regard to the enclosed letter."

The provost marshal general's office initiated a telegraphic survey among the corps areas commanders with a message on February 17. The communication read:

Probable that orders for very large evacuation of enemy aliens of all nationalities predominantly Japanese from Pacific Coast will issue within 48 hours. Internment facilities will be taxed to utmost. Report at once maximum you can care for, including housing, feeding, medical care, and supply. Your breakdown should include number of men, women, and children. Very important to keep this a closely guarded secret.

45. Quoted in Roger Daniels, *The Decision to Relocate Japanese Americans* (Malabar, Florida, Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1986), p. 47.

46. Quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, pp. 81-82. In Alaska the Army had been made responsible for controlling enemy aliens soon after Pearl Harbor, and it had promptly interned those considered dangerous. On March 6, 1942, the Secretary of War extended his authority under Executive Order 9066 to the Army commander in Alaska. By late May he had evacuated not only his alien internees but also the entire Japanese population of Alaska — 230, of whom more than half were United States citizens.

A follow-up letter explained that 100,000 enemy aliens would be involved, 60,000 of whom would be women and children, and that all were to be interned east of the Western Defense Command, "50 percent in the Eighth Corps Area, 30 percent in the Seventh, and 10 percent each in the Fourth and Sixth."⁴⁷

Thus, by February 17, the rationale for removing the Pacific coast Japanese to areas east of the Western Defense Command rested on three principal reasons. First, since mid-December, DeWitt had insisted that internment of enemy aliens ought to be outside his theater of operations. Second, some of the governments of the intermountain states had already indicated that they would not countenance any free settlement of the west coast Japanese within their borders. Third, an Army survey of existing facilities for internment in the five interior states of the Ninth Corps Area disclosed that they could not accommodate more than 2,500 people.⁴⁸

The War Department's plan for mass evacuation took definite shape in a conference on February 17 attended by Secretary Stimson, McCloy, General Gullion, General Clark, and Colonel Bendetsen. Despite Clark's protest that any mass evacuation would involve the use of too many troops, Stimson decided that DeWitt should be instructed to commence an evacuation immediately and to the extent he deemed necessary for the protection of vital military and strategic installations. Following the meeting, it was determined that DeWitt should be allotted additional troops for evacuation purposes.⁴⁹

That evening McCloy, General Gullion, and Bendetsen met with Justice representatives at the home of Attorney General Biddle. During the meeting, Gullion presented a draft of a proposed presidential executive order that would authorize the Secretary of War to remove both citizens and aliens from areas that he might designate. Biddle, who had opposed mass evacuation to this point, accepted the draft without argument, because President Roosevelt had indicated to him that this was a matter for military decision. After several more meetings between Justice and Army officials during the next two days, the executive order was presented to the president and signed by him late on February 19.⁵⁰ Executive Order 9066 was a sweeping, and unprecedented, delegation of presidential power to an appointed subordinate. Although its authority was used only against

47. Quoted in Conn, *et al.*, *Guarding the United States*, p. 134. In its *Final Report* the War Department stated on page 25: "The War Department representative [Colonel Bendetsen] carried back to the Secretary the recommendation of the Commanding General that some method be developed empowering the Federal Government to provide for the evacuation from sensitive areas of all persons of Japanese ancestry, and any other persons individually or collectively regarded as potentially dangerous. The Commanding General's proposal was reduced to writing in a memorandum for the Secretary of War, dated February 14, 1942 This recommendation was presented to the Secretary of War on or about February 16th." No other evidence was found that the recommendations contained in General DeWitt's memorandum to the Secretary of War were considered or referred to in the preparation of new War Department directives on the subject between February 17 and 20. After these directives were drafted and after talking with General DeWitt on February 20, Bendetsen informed Secretary Stimson: "It was I who misunderstood General DeWitt's plan — he has no mass movement in mind." Quoted in Conn, *et al.*, *Guarding the United States*, p. 134, footnote 64.

48. Conn, *et al.*, *Guarding the United States*, pp. 134-35.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 135.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 135.

Japanese Americans, it was an instrument that could have affected any American. Based on a war powers act passed by Congress in 1918, the order empowered the Secretary of War and military commanders designated by him, whenever it was deemed necessary or desirable, "to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion. . ." The executive order went on to authorize the Secretary of War "to provide for residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary, in the judgment of the Secretary of War or the said Military Commander, and until other arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order." The designation of military areas in any region or locality were to "supersede designations of prohibited and restricted areas by the Attorney General under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941," and were to "supersede the responsibility and authority of the Attorney General under the said Proclamations in respect of such prohibited and restricted areas." All executive departments of the government were directed to assist the military in carrying out any subsequent evacuation. There was no direct mention of American citizens of Japanese descent, but unquestionably the order was directed at those Americans. Several months later, when there was talk of the War Department using the executive order to move Germans and Italians on the east coast, President Roosevelt wrote Stimson that he considered enemy alien control to be "primarily a civilian matter except of course in the case of the Japanese mass evacuation on the Pacific Coast."⁵¹

On February 20, the day after Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, Attorney General Biddle sent to the President's personal attention a memorandum underscoring the government's new-found unity on this decision. The memorandum represented Biddle's capitulation to the military authorities regarding the need for mass evacuation of the Japanese and justified the executive order and its broad grant of powers to the military:

This authority gives very broad powers to the Secretary of War and the Military Commanders. These powers are broad enough to permit them to exclude any particular individual from military areas. They could also evacuate groups of persons based on a reasonable classification. The order is not limited to aliens but includes citizens so that it can be exercised with respect to Japanese, irrespective of their citizenship.

The decision of safety of the nation in time of war is necessarily for the military authorities. Authority over the movement of persons, whether citizens or noncitizens, may be exercised in time of war. . . . This authority is no more than declaratory of the power of the President, in time of war, with reference to all areas, sea or land.

51. Executive Order 9066, February 19, 1942, *Federal Register*, Vol. 7, No. 38, February 25, 1942. Also see U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 25-29; *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 85; Maisie and Richard Conrat, "Executive Order 9066: The Internment of 110,000 Japanese Americans" (Los Angeles, California Historical Society, 1972); and ten Brock, *Prejudice, War and the Constitution*, pp. 111-12. A copy of Executive Order 9066 may be seen in Appendix A of this study. Daniels, *Decision to Relocate the Japanese*, pp. 49-50.

The President is authorized in acting under his general war powers without further legislation. The exercise of the power can meet the specific situation and, of course, cannot be considered as any punitive measure against any particular nationalities. It is rather a precautionary measure to protect the national safety. It is not based on any legal theory but on the facts that the unrestricted movement of certain racial classes, whether American citizens or aliens, in specified defense areas may lead to serious disturbances. These disturbances cannot be controlled by police protection and have the threat of injury to our war effort. A condition and not a theory confronts the nation.

After the executive order was signed, there was no further disagreement at the highest levels of the federal government. The War Department stood behind its interpretation of the facts, and the Justice Department stood behind the laws which were the foundation of the executive order.⁵²

On February 21, the day after Biddle sent the aforementioned memorandum to Roosevelt, the secretary of war, in accordance with the president's request, answered the congressional letter of February 13 by assuring the west coast delegation that plans were being developed for the evacuation of the Japanese from the Pacific coast. In consultation with the Department of Justice, War Department officials also prepared a draft of legislation that would put teeth into enforcement of the new evacuation program, but did not submit it to Congress until March 9. This draft bill became Public Law 503 after brief debate, passing by a voice vote in both houses on March 19 and signed into law by President Roosevelt on March 21. Three days later, the Western Defense Command issued its first compulsory exclusion order.⁵³

Between February 18 and 20, McCloy, Gullion, and Bendetsen drafted instructions for General DeWitt to guide his actions in carrying out the provisions of Executive Order 9066. The plan for evacuation embodied in the War Department's directives of February 20 differed materially from the plan recommended by General DeWitt in his memorandum of February 13. The central objective of the DeWitt plan was to move all enemy aliens and American-born Japanese out of all Category A areas in California, Oregon, and Washington that the general had recommended through February 12. Although General DeWitt had repeatedly described the Japanese as the most dangerous element of the west coast population, he also made it clear as late as February 17 that he was "opposed to any preferential treatment to any alien irrespective of race," and that he wanted German and Italian aliens as well as all Japanese evacuated from Category A areas. His plan assumed that all enemy aliens would be interned under guard outside the Western Defense Command, at least until arrangements could be made for their resettlement. Citizen evacuees would either accept internment voluntarily or relocate themselves with such assistance as state and federal agencies might offer. Although this group would be permitted to resettle in Category B areas within the coastal zone, General DeWitt clearly preferred that they move inland.⁵⁴

52. Quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, pp. 85-86.

53. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 29-31, 49, and Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, pp. 331-39.

54. Conn, et al., *Guarding the United States*, p. 136.

On the other hand, the central objective of the War Department plan was to move all Japanese out of the California Category A areas first, and they were not to be permitted to resettle within Category B areas or within a larger Military Area No. 1 to be established along the coast.⁵⁵ There was to be no evacuation of Italians without the express permission of the secretary of war except on an individual basis. Although the War Department plan ostensibly provided that German aliens were to be treated in the same manner as the Japanese, it qualified this intention by providing for the exemption of "bona fide" German refugees. This qualification automatically stayed the evacuation of German aliens until General DeWitt could determine who among them were genuine refugees. The War Department plan contemplated voluntary relocation by all types of evacuees to the maximum extent possible, with internment as necessary outside the Western Defense Command. Another major difference between the two plans was related to DeWitt's recommendation of a licensing system for Category A areas. Neither Executive Order 9066 nor the War Department's directives of February 20 required or embodied a licensing plan nor did they specify when mass evacuation would begin, where evacuees would be confined, or who would be in charge of them.⁵⁶

The two plans exhibited other differences. General DeWitt had recommended that before any evacuation all preparations should be complete, including "selection and establishment of internment facilities in the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Corps Areas." At this time, the War Department was planning to put all internees east of the Ninth Corps Area, but its directives did not contemplate any postponement of evacuation until internment facilities were ready. General DeWitt also recommended the initial and separate internment of all enemy alien males over 14 years of age, until family units could be established in internment camps, while the War Department plan had no such provision. DeWitt's memorandum estimated that 133,000 people would be evacuated either voluntarily or by compulsion. A breakdown of this figure (based on his previous Category A recommendations) disclosed that his plan would involve about 69,000 Japanese (25,000 aliens and 44,000 American citizens), about 44,000 Italians, and about 20,000 Germans. The War Department planners apparently made no estimate of the numbers that their directives would involve, but eventually they did affect more than 110,000 Japanese residents — citizens and aliens — of the west coast states.⁵⁷

MASS EVACUATION OF JAPANESE IN PERSPECTIVE

The general answer to the question of what reasons impelled the Army to carry out mass evacuation of Japanese residents from the west coast beginning in March 1942 is that President Roosevelt and Congress approved mass evacuation and the Secretary of War Stimson and his principal civilian assistant in this matter thought it a military necessity. On March 16, several days before the evacuation began, Stimson referred to the prospect as a "tragedy" that appeared "to be a military necessity" because large numbers of Japanese were "located in close proximity to installations of vital importance to the war effort." The following week, McCloy, after visiting the west coast, reported that there had

55. "Outline Memorandum of February 20, 1942, printed in U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 28-29.

56. Daniels, *Decision to Relocate the Japanese*, pp. 51-52.

57. Conn, et al., *Guarding the United States*, pp. 136-37.

been no cases of sabotage traceable to the Japanese population, but that "there was much evidence of espionage." Despite his assertion, however, no proven instances of espionage after Pearl Harbor among the Japanese have ever been disclosed.⁵⁸

The most damaging tangible evidence against the Japanese was that produced by the intensive searches of their premises by the FBI from early February onward. By May, the bureau had seized 2,592 guns of various kinds, 199,000 rounds of ammunition (the major portion of the guns and ammunition were picked up in a raid on a sporting goods shop and another large supply of material was found in the warehouse of a general store owner), 1,652 sticks of dynamite, 1,458 radio receivers, 2,914 cameras, 37 motion picture cameras, and numerous other articles that the alien Japanese had been ordered to turn in at the beginning of January. Nonetheless, after assessing the evidence, Department of Justice officials concluded that the accumulated materials had negligible significance:

We have not, however, uncovered through these searches any dangerous persons that we could not otherwise know about. We have not found among all the sticks of dynamite and gun powder any evidence that any of it was to be used in bombs. We have not found a single machine gun nor have we found any gun in any circumstances indicating that it was to be used in a manner helpful to our enemies. We have not found a camera which we have reason to believe was for use in espionage.⁵⁹

There were better if less tangible grounds for suspecting that some of the Japanese people — citizens as well as aliens — would become disloyal in the event of a Japanese invasion. The Navy reported in early February 1942 that a small minority of less than 3 percent of alien and citizen Japanese were so fanatically loyal to Japan that they could be expected to act as saboteurs or enemy agents, and a somewhat larger minority might be passively disloyal, if given the opportunity. The War Relocation Authority similarly concluded that "a selective evacuation of people of Japanese descent from the west coast military area was justified and administratively feasible in the spring of 1942," although the mass evacuation that was carried out was never justified. No military estimate after December 1941 forecast even the possibility of an invasion of the west coast by the Japanese in strength, and all disloyalty among the Japanese remained passive until after their removal to relocation centers.⁶⁰

Although little support for the argument that military necessity required a mass evacuation of the Japanese can be found in contemporary evidence, it might be contended that the co-operation of the white population of the Pacific states in the national defense effort could not have been otherwise assured. By March 1942, a large segment of that population along the coast was determined to be rid of the Japanese, at least for the duration of the war. Prewar racial antagonism and prejudice combined with wartime fears and anxieties to create formidable political and social pressure for removal. In June, McCloy explained that the nature of the sudden attack on Pearl Harbor and the apparent exposure of the west coast to enemy action left the American people "in a condition of

58. *Ibid.*, p. 147.

59. Quoted in Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, pp. 134-36.

60. Conn et al., *Guarding the United States*, p. 148.

great excitement and apprehension," which "tended greatly to inflame our people against all persons of Japanese ancestry." Several months after the evacuation had been completed, the assistant secretary commented further:

As you know, the Japanese were removed from the West Coast, first, because of the proximity of the West Coast to the Japanese theater of operations and second, because of the very large number of Japanese concentrated in that area, and thirdly, because of the fear that direct action might be taken against the Japanese as a result of the rather antagonistic attitude of the local population.⁶¹

The first and second points in this statement, however, are open to question since no similar removal occurred in Hawaii even though it had a considerably greater concentration of Japanese much closer to the arena of military operations despite similar evacuation planning after the bombing of Pearl Harbor. The third point — that the exclusion served to protect the Nisei against vigilantism — deserves further scrutiny.

Violence against ethnic Japanese on the West Coast cannot be dismissed lightly. Between Pearl Harbor and February 15, 5 murders and 25 other serious crimes — rapes, assaults, shootings, property damage, robbery, or extortion — were reported against ethnic Japanese. More violence against ethnic Japanese followed the signing of Executive Order 9066. One author has summarized the mounting violence against the Japanese in California:

During March an attempt was made to burn down a Japanese-owned hotel at Sultana. On April 13 at Del Ray five evacuees were involved in a brawl with the local constable — following which a crowd of white residents, some armed with shotguns, threatened violence to a nearby camp of Japanese Americans. On succeeding nights the windows of four Japanese stores were smashed, and similar incidents occurred in Fresno. In northern Tulare County, a group known as the "Bald Eagles" — described by one observer as a "guerrilla army of nearly 1,000 farmers" — armed themselves for the announced purpose of "guarding" the Japanese in case of emergency. A similar organization was formed in the southeast part of the county, where a large number of evacuees were concentrated.⁶²

Protecting ethnic Japanese from vigilantes is a justification for the exclusion which has been repeatedly emphasized over the years. Stimson, McCloy, and Clark, for example, have each emphasized the protection against vigilantism as the reason they were willing to support the exclusion. Stimson's autobiography relied on it as a principal reason:

What critics ignored was the situation that led to the evacuation. Japanese raids on the west coast seemed not only possible but probable in the first months of the war, and it was quite impossible to be sure that the raiders would not receive important help from individuals of Japanese origin. More than that, anti-Japanese

61. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 149.

62. Quoted in ten Brock, *et al.*, *Prejudice, War and the constitution*, p. 191.

feeling on the west coast had reached a level which endangered the lives of all such individuals; incidents of extra-legal violence were increasingly frequent.⁶³

This explanation, however, sounds lame in retrospect because it was not generally advanced at the time to justify the exclusion, and when it was mentioned at all, it was given as a subsidiary consideration. Had protection been on official minds at the time, a much different evacuation program would likely have been implemented. McCloy supplied the most telling rebuttal of the contention in a 1943 letter to General DeWitt:

That there is serious animosity on the West Coast against all evacuated Japanese I do not doubt, but that does not necessarily mean that we should trim our sails accordingly. . . . The Army, as I see it, is not responsible for the general public peace of the Western Defense Command. That responsibility still rests with the civil authorities. There may, as you suggest, be incidents, but these can be effectively discouraged by prompt action by law enforcement agencies, with the cooperation of the military if they even [sic] assume really threatening proportions.⁶⁴

Thus, exclusion and evacuation of Japanese Americans from the west coast in early 1942 was the culmination of decades of anti-Asian agitation within the context of the wartime tensions engendered by the national emergency. The prejudicial propaganda of the anti-Japanese elements of society, virtually unopposed, had finally won the day. Race became synonymous with allegiance and patriotism, and the American citizen of Japanese ancestry was identified with the Japanese enemy. Under the guise of national defense, exclusion and evacuation of Japanese Americans became an end in itself, a fortuitous wartime opportunity to rid the Pacific states of their most unpopular minority group. As one Joint Immigration Committee official observed in early February, "This is our time to get things done that we have been trying to get done for a quarter of a century." The War Department and the president, through the press, western politicians, and various military leaders such as DeWitt, had been sold a bill of goods. In accepting the racist views of California's ugly past, these national leaders came to believe that the Issei and Nisei represented a threat to the military security of the west coast. They had come to the conclusion that exclusion and evacuation were justified on the grounds of military necessity, but in reality they were carrying out the long-sought program of the anti-Asian and anti-Japanese forces on the west coast.⁶⁵

The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians that was established by Congress in 1980 "to review the facts and circumstances surrounding" Executive Order 9066 arrived at similar conclusions. After conducting extensive hearings and research, the commission stated:

63. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1947), p. 406.

64. Quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 89.

65. Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, pp. 361-74; ten Brock, *Prejudice, War and the Constitution*, p. 78; and *Personal Justice Denied*, pp. 91-92.

The promulgation of Executive Order 9066 was not justified by military necessity, and the decisions which followed from it — detention, ending detention and ending exclusion — were not driven by analysis of military conditions. The broad historical causes which shaped these decisions were race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership. Widespread ignorance of Japanese Americans contributed to a policy conceived in haste and executed in an atmosphere of fear and anger at Japan. A grave injustice was done to American citizens and resident aliens of Japanese ancestry who, without individual review or any probative evidence against them, were excluded, removed and detained by the United States during World War II.⁶⁶

66. *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 18.

CHAPTER THREE: EVACUATION OF PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY FROM THE WEST COAST OF THE UNITED STATES: IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 9066

With the signing of Executive Order 9066, the foundation for mass evacuation of Japanese Americans from the west coast was set. American citizens of Japanese ancestry would be required to move from the west coast on the basis of wartime military necessity, and the way was open to move any other group the military thought necessary. For the War Department and the Western Defense Command, the problem now became primarily one of method and operation, not basic policy. General DeWitt first tried "voluntary" resettlement under which the Issei and Nisei were to move outside restricted military zones on the west coast, as well as outside the boundaries of his command, but were free to go wherever they chose. From a military standpoint, this policy was bizarre and impractical. If the Issei and Nisei were being excluded because they threatened sabotage and espionage, why would they be left at large in the interior where there were innumerable dams, power lines, bridges, and war industries vital to the nation's security to be spied upon or disrupted. Sabotage in the interior could also be synchronized with a Japanese military invasion for a powerful fifth column effect. Thus, "voluntary" evacuation raised substantial doubts about how gravely the War Department regarded the threat. The implications were not lost on the citizens and politicians of the interior western states; they believed that people who were a threat to wartime security on the west coast were equally dangerous in the interior.

For the Issei and Nisei, "voluntary" relocation was highly impractical. Quick sale of a business or a farm with crops in the ground could not be expected at a fair price. Most businesses that relied on the ethnic trade in the "Little Tokyos" of the west coast could not be sold for anything close to market value. The absence of fathers and husbands who had been incarcerated in government internment camps following Pearl Harbor and the lack of liquidity after funds were frozen made matters more difficult. It was not easy to leave familiar surroundings, and the prospect of a deeply hostile reception in some unknown location in the interior was a powerful deterrent to moving.

Inevitably, the government ordered mandatory mass evacuation controlled by the Army, the Japanese Americans first being ordered to assembly centers — temporary staging areas, typically at fairgrounds and racetracks — and from there to relocation centers — bleak, barbed-wire-enclosed camps in the interior. Mass evacuation proceeded in one locality after another along the west coast, on short notice, with military thoroughness and lack of sentimentality. As Executive Order 9066 required, government agencies attempted, only partially successful, to protect the property and economic interests of the people removed to the camps. The loss of liberty of the Japanese Americans, however, resulted in enormous economic losses.

During the months following Executive Order 9066, none of the political entities in American society came to the aid of the Nisei or their alien parents. Congress promptly passed, without debate on questions of civil rights and civil liberties, a criminal statute prohibiting violation of military orders issued under the executive order. The district courts rejected Nisei pleas and arguments, both on habeas corpus petitions and on the review of criminal convictions for violating General DeWitt's curfew and exclusion orders.

Public opinion on the west coast and in the country at large, enflamed by the continuing racial animosity and war hysteria fostered by the press, did nothing to temper its violently anti-Japanese rage. Only a handful of citizens and organizations — a few churchmen, a small part of organized labor, and a few isolated citizens — spoke out for the rights and interests of the Japanese Americans.

Thus, the Nisei and Issei had little alternative but to comply with the mass evacuation program. Few in numbers, bereft of friends, and fearful that the war hysteria would bring mob violence and vigilantism that law enforcement would do little to control, they were left only to choose a resistance which would have proven the very disloyalty that they denied. Each carried a personal burden of rage, resignation, or despair to the assembly centers and camps that the government hastily constructed to "protect" more than 130,000,000 Americans against 60,000 Nisei and their resident alien parents.¹

CONGRESSIONAL ACTS

Executive Order 9066 gave the military the power to issue orders, but it could not impose sanctions for failure to obey them. The Roosevelt Administration quickly turned to Congress to obtain that authority. By February 22, 1942, three days after the order was signed, the War Department sent draft legislation to the Justice Department for review and comment. General DeWitt wanted mandatory imprisonment and a felony sanction because "you have greater liberty to enforce a felony than you have to enforce a misdemeanor, viz. You can shoot a man to prevent the commission of a felony."² On March 9, Secretary of War Stimson sent the proposed legislation to Congress where the bill was introduced immediately by Senator Robert Reynolds of North Carolina, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, and by Representative John M. Costello, a friendly California Democrat on the House Committee of Military Affairs.³

Executive Order 9066 represented what the west coast Congressional delegation had demanded of the president and the War Department. Congressman John H. Tolan of California, who chaired the House Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration that examined the evacuation from prohibited military areas during hearings on the west coast between February 21 and March 12, 1942, characterized the order as "the recommendation in almost the same words of the Pacific coast delegation."⁴

The Tolan Committee hearings were instituted at the behest of Carey McWilliams, Chief of the California Division of Immigration and Housing, with the intent of forestalling mass evacuation by giving a forum to moderate voices. The hearings, however, boomeranged. Members of the Tolan Committee continued to support the implementation of Executive Order 9066 after the hearings. They began the hearings persuaded that espionage and fifth

1. *Personal Justice Denied*, pp. 93-95.

2. Quoted in *ibid.*, P. 95.

3. *Congressional Record*, March 9, 1942, p. 2071, and March 10, 1942, p. 2230.

4. U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, *Hearings Before the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration*, 77th cong., 2d Sess., 1942 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1942), pp. 11010, 11018.

column activity by Issei and Nisei in Hawaii had been central to the success of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Censorship in Hawaii meant that the only authoritative news from the islands was official government sanctioned information. With regard to sabotage and fifth column activity, that version of events was still largely made up of two pieces: Secretary Knox's firmly stated December views that local sabotage had substantially aided the attack, and the Roberts' Commission's silence about fifth column activity. Thus, there was no effective answer to be made when Tolan challenged pro-Nisei witnesses. Not privy to the facts in Hawaii, advocates of Japanese American loyalty, such as the Japanese American Citizens League, were frequently reduced to arguing lamely that the mainland Nisei were different from, and more reliable than, the residents of Hawaii. This view of Pearl Harbor explains in part the continuing argument, repeated by the Tolan Committee, that the lack of sabotage only showed that enemy loyalists were waiting for a raid or invasion to trigger organized activity.⁵

During the Tolan Committee hearings, the Nisei spoke in their own defense, a few academics, churchmen, and labor leaders, supporting them. The strongest statements in support of the Japanese Americans came from A. L. Wirin, Counsel for the Southern California Branch of the American Civil Liberties Union, and Louis Goldblatt, Secretary of the State Congress of Industrial Organizations. In his testimony, Wirin observed:

. . . there must be a point beyond which there may be no abridgement of civil liberties and we feel that whatever the emergency, that persons must be judged, so long as we have a Bill of Rights, because of what they do as persons. . . . We feel that treating persons, because they are members of a race, constitutes illegal discrimination, which is forbidden by the fourteenth amendment whether we are at war or peace.⁶

Much of the testimony before the Tolan Committee, however, assumed that mass evacuation was a *fait accompli*, and addressed secondary issues such as treatment during evacuation. Traditional anti-Japanese voices, such as the California Joint Immigration Committee, testified in support of the executive order, reiterating the historical catalogue of anti-Japanese charges. The press encouraged anti-Japanese sentiments by reporting primarily testimony that supported evacuation.⁷

Several events occurred on the west coast soon after the Tolan Committee hearings began, heightening public war hysteria and adding urgency to the demands for immediate mass evacuation. On February 23, four days after the signing of Executive Order 9066 and two days after the hearings commenced, an oil refinery at Goleta on the California coast near Santa Barbara, north of Los Angeles, was shelled by a surfaced Japanese submarine, identified after the war as the I-17 commanded by Kozo Nishino, a captain in the Japanese navy. This was the occasion for the publication of eye-witness accounts identifying the

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 11012, 11141, 11153, 11181, 11226.

6. Quoted in Roger Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA: Japanese Americans and World War II* (Hinsdale, Illinois, The Dryden Press, 1972), p. 78.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 11068, 11137, 11148, 11153, 11178, 11203, 11207, 11220, 11240, and Leonard Broom and John I. Kitsuse, *The Managed Casualty: The Japanese-American Family in World War II* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1956), p. 14.

craft as a Japanese submarine and spurious reports of signaling activities on shore. Two days later, on February 25, in the "Battle of Los Angeles," one to five unidentified planes were reported over the city which was blacked out. Antiaircraft guns were fired. None of the planes (if there were any) over Los Angeles were ever identified as Japanese. However, the two incidents received widespread coverage in the press and provided increased support to demands for the immediate removal of all persons of Japanese descent from the west coast.⁸

Earl Warren, then Attorney General of California and preparing to run for governor of the state later that year, strongly supported the anti-Japanese forces during his testimony at the Tolan hearings. One of the first witnesses, Warren presented his views at length to the committee. He candidly admitted that California had made no sabotage or espionage investigation of its own and that he had no evidence of sabotage or espionage. In place of evidence Warren offered extensive documentation concerning Japanese American cultural patterns and ethnic organizations as well as the opinions of California law enforcement officers, illustrating his testimony with maps showing Nisei land ownership. Among other things, he observed:

I do not mean to suggest that it should be thought that all of these Japanese who are adjacent to strategic points are knowing parties to some vast conspiracy to destroy our State by sudden and mass sabotage. Undoubtedly, the presence of many of these persons in their present locations is mere coincidence, but it would seem equally beyond doubt that the presence of others is no coincidence. It would seem difficult, for example, to explain the situation in Santa Barbara County by coincidence alone.

After stating that Japanese farmers and property owners flanked virtually every principal military installation, utility, airfield, bridge, telephone and power line, harbor entrance, oil field, and open stretch of beach in Santa Barbara County suited for landing purposes, Warren noted that "there were no Japanese on the equally attractive lands between these points." He concluded:

Such a distribution of the Japanese population appears to manifest something more than coincidence. But, in any case, it is certainly evident that the Japanese population of California is, as a whole, ideally situated, with reference to points of strategic importance, to carry into execution a tremendous program of sabotage on a mass scale should any considerable number of them be inclined to do so.⁹

As late as February 8, Warren had advised the state personnel board that it could not bar Nisei employees on the basis that they were children of enemy alien parentage, stating

8. Broom and Kitsuse, *Managed Casualty*, p. 14. For more information on the Goleta attack see Burl Burlingame, *Advance Force Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Navy's Underway Assault on America* (Kailua, Hawaii, Pacific Monograph, 1992), pp. 348-51; Bert Webber, *Retaliation: Japanese Attacks and Allied Countermeasures on the Pacific Coast in World War II* (Corvallis, Oregon State University Press, 1975), pp. 25-32; and Bert Webber, *Silent Siege — III: Japanese Attacks On North America in WWII; Ship's Sunk, Air Raids, Bombs Dropped, Civilians Killed* (Medford, Oregon, Webb Research Group, 1992).

9. *Hearings Before the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration*, pp. 10974, 11011-12.

that such action was a violation of constitutionally-protected liberties.¹⁰ This earlier position undoubtedly provided his testimony before the Tolan Committee with special effectiveness. Although Warren may have presented his views to General DeWitt earlier in February, it is interesting to note that the aforementioned War Department's *Final Report*, prepared principally by DeWitt and published in 1943, repeated much of Warren's presentation to the Tolan Committee virtually verbatim without attribution as the central arguments for the issuance of Executive Order 9066.¹¹

Although Warren's presentation before the Tolan Committee provided no proof or evidence, the overpowering mass of his data — maps and letters and lists from all parts of the state — gripped the public imagination and turned the discussion to fruitless argument about such questions as whether land was bought before or after a power line or plant was built. These were not weeks of calm reflection on the west coast, and there was little or no focus on the meaning or significance of this "evidence."¹²

In late February and early March, the Tolan Committee assumed that Secretary Knox had evidence to substantiate his "Fifth Column" charges and that President Roosevelt had based his signing of Executive Order 9066 on informed factual analysis. The views of anti-Japanese witnesses added substance and confirmed what was already publicized and suspected. Although the committee was eager to see that the property of aliens was safeguarded by the government and wanted the Army to be concerned about hardship cases in an evacuation, it returned to Washington unwilling to challenge the need for Executive Order 9066 and the evacuation. Despite its support of the executive order, however, the Tolan Committee would issue reports during the next several months in which it began to raise questions about the policy underlying exclusion and removal.¹³

In the aftermath of the Tolan Committee hearings, Congress took up the matter of legislation that would put teeth into enforcement of the new evacuation program, making criminal any violation of Executive Order 9066. There was no civil liberty opposition in Congress, and the Nisei, few of whom were of voting age, had no voice in that legislative body. Thus, debate over the bill to formalize the order as a federal statute focused only on the inclusive wording of the bill, no one publicly questioning the military necessity of the action or its intrusion into the fundamental liberties of American citizens. Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio spoke briefly against the bill, although he did not vote against it:

I think this is probably the "sloppiest" criminal law I have ever read or seen anywhere. I certainly think the Senate should not pass it. I do not want to object, because the purpose of it is understood. . . .

[The bill] does not say who shall prescribe the restrictions. It does not say how anyone shall know that the restrictions are applicable to that particular zone. It

10. *Ibid.*, p. 11247, and Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, pp. 124-25.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 10974, and U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 9-10.

12. *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 98.

13. House Report 2124.

does not appear that there is any authority given to anyone to prescribe any restriction. . . .

I have no doubt an act of that kind would be enforced in war time. I have no doubt that in peacetime no man could ever be convicted under it, because the court would find that it was so indefinite and so uncertain that it could not be enforced under the Constitution.¹⁴

The debate was no more pointed or cogent in the House, where there seemed to be some suggestion that the bill applied to aliens rather than citizens.¹⁵ The bill became Public Law 503, passing by voice vote in both houses on March 19, and it was signed into law by President Roosevelt on March 21, 1942.¹⁶ The law stated:

That whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military area or military zone prescribed, under the authority of an Executive Order of the President, by the Secretary of War, or by any military commander designated by the Secretary of War, contrary to the restrictions applicable to any such areas or zone or contrary to the order of the Secretary of War or any such military commander, shall, if it appears that he knew or should have known of the existence and extent of the restrictions or order and that his act was in violation thereof, be guilty of misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be liable to a fine of not to exceed \$5,000 or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, for each offense.¹⁷

This ratification of executive branch actions under Executive Order 9066 was significant, because another independent branch of the federal government now stood formally behind the exclusion and evacuation of Japanese Americans. During 1943 and 1944, the Supreme Court gave great weight to the Congressional action in upholding the imposition of a curfew as well as the evacuation itself.¹⁸

INITIAL PROCLAMATIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE EXECUTIVE ORDER

Executive Order 9066 empowered the Secretary of War or his delegate to designate military areas to which entry of any or all persons would be barred whenever such action was deemed militarily necessary or desirable. On February 20, 1942, the day after President Roosevelt signed the order, Secretary Stimson wrote to General DeWitt delegating authority to implement the order within the Western Defense Command and

14. *Congressional Record*, March 19, 1942, p. 2726.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 2729-30.

16. U.S. War Department *Final Report*, pp. 29-31, 49, and Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, pp. 331-44. More data on the legal aspects and consequences of the presidential and congressional decisions may be found in Clinton Rossiter, *The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief* (Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1951), pp. 42-54.

17. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 30-31.

18. *Personal Justice Denied*, pp. 99.

setting forth a series of specific requests and instructions. American citizens of Japanese descent, Japanese and German aliens, and any persons suspected of being potentially dangerous were to be excluded from designated military areas. Everyone of Italian descent was to be omitted from any plan of exclusion, at least for the time being, because they were "potentially less dangerous, as a whole." DeWitt was to consider redesignating the Justice Department's prohibited areas as military areas, excluding Japanese and German aliens from those areas by February 24 and excluding "actually" suspicious persons "as soon as practicable." Full advantage was to be taken of voluntary exodus. People were to be removed gradually to avoid unnecessary hardship and dislocation of business and industry "so far as is consistent with national safety." Accommodations for the evacuees were to be established before the exodus, with proper provision for housing, food, transportation, and medical care, and evacuation plans were to include protection for evacuees' property.¹⁹

On February 23, Colonel Bendetsen arrived in San Francisco to serve as a liaison officer between DeWitt and Assistant Secretary of War McCloy and to help in the execution of the War Department directives. With his assistance, DeWitt drafted and obtained War Department approval of his first public proclamation for the evacuation program and an accompanying press release, both of which were issued on March 2. Public Proclamation No. 1, announced as a matter of military necessity the establishment of Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2. Military Area No. 1 included the approximate western half of Washington, Oregon, and California and the southern half of Arizona. All portions of those states not included in Military Area No. 1 were placed in Military Area No. 2. The proclamation also established a number of zones; Zones A-1 through A-99, which included a strip about fifteen miles wide running the entire length of the coast and along the Mexican border, were primarily within Military Area No. 1, while Zone B constituted the remainder of Military Area No. 1. The proclamation noted that in the future people might be excluded from Military Area No. 1 and from Zones A-2 to A-99 and that the designation of Military Area No. 2 did not contemplate restrictions or prohibitions except with respect to the designated zones. In this proclamation, for the first time, restrictions were applied not only to "any Japanese, German or Italian alien" but also to "any person of Japanese ancestry." All such persons residing in Military Area No. 1 who changed their residence, were required to file a form with the post office. Finally, the proclamation expressly continued the prohibited and restricted areas designated earlier by the Attorney General.²⁰

In the press release accompanying his first proclamation, DeWitt stated that orders would eventually be issued "requiring all Japanese, including those who are American born, to vacate all of Military Area No. 1." He added that those "Japanese and other aliens who move into the interior out of this area now will gain considerable advantage, and in all probability will not again be disturbed." Only after the Japanese had been excluded would German and Italian aliens be evacuated, and some of these would be entirely exempt from evacuation.²¹

19. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 28-29. Also see Daniels, *Decision to Relocate*, pp. 116-21.

20. Daniels, *Decision to Relocate*, p. 53. A copy of Public Proclamation No. 1 is printed in Appendix 15, House Report 2124, pp. 317-20.

21. Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, pp. 304-05.

DeWitt issued Public Proclamations Nos. 2 and 3 during the next several weeks. Public Proclamation No. 2, issued March 16, established four military areas covering the states of Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Utah and listed 933 additional prohibited zones.²² Public Proclamation No. 3, issued on March 24 and effective on March 27 affected the daily lives of Japanese Americans directly, instituting a curfew regulation requiring all enemy aliens and "persons of Japanese ancestry" to be in their homes between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m. The proclamation provided that "at all other times all such persons shall only be at their place of residence or employment or travelling between those places or within a distance of not more than five miles from their place of residence." They could continue to move out of the military area if they did so during noncurfew hours.²³

VOLUNTARY EVACUATION

In late February and early March, both the War Department and General DeWitt hoped that the mere announcement of prohibited and restricted zones would induce a voluntary migration out of these zones, as had been the case in the California prohibited zones previously announced by the Department of Justice in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack. Bendetsen, for example, noted that many aliens ordered to move after Pearl Harbor had found new residences for themselves; thus, he felt the Army should not advertise that it would provide food and housing for those it displaced because numerous aliens might take advantage of a free "living." He also supported voluntary migration because he thought the Army should not be responsible for resettlement, since such action would divert the military from its primary task of winning the war. DeWitt estimated that 15,000 persons moved out of the Justice Department's prohibited zones by midnight, February 24. Most of them had moved into adjacent restricted zones in urban areas. Thus, in his press release of March 2, DeWitt urged the continuation of this voluntary migration of Japanese from Military Area No. 1 along the coast to the interior.²⁴

It soon became apparent to many observers, however, that the voluntary program could not work. As early as February 21, the Tolan Committee received complaints from interior areas to which the evacuees were moving, indicating that fears of sabotage and destruction were spreading inland.²⁵ The Japanese who were willing to migrate also struggled with problems of insecurity as evidenced by a statement to the Tolan Committee by the Emergency Defense Council of the Seattle Chapter, Japanese American Citizens League:

A large number of people have remarked that they will go where the Government orders them to go, willingly, if it will help the national defense effort. But the biggest problem in their minds is where to go. The first unofficial evacuation announcement pointed out that the Government did not concern itself

22. A copy of Public Proclamation No. 2 is printed in Appendix 16, House Report 2124, pp. 321-29.

23. Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA*, p. 85. A copy of Public Proclamation No. 3 is printed in Appendix 17, House Report 2124, pp. 330-31.

24. *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 101.

25. *Hearings Before the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration*, p. 11061. Also see Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, pp. 307-09.

with where evacuees went, just so they left prohibited areas. Obviously this was no solution to the question, for immediately, from Yakima, Idaho, Montana, Colorado and elsewhere authoritative voices shouted: 'No Japs wanted Here!'

The Japanese feared with reason that, forced to vacate their homes, unable to find a place to stay, they would be kicked from town to town in the interior like the 'Okies' of John Steinbeck's novel. Others went further, and envisioned the day when inhabitants of inland States, aroused by the steady influx of Japanese, would refuse to sell gasoline and food to them. They saw, too, the possibility of mob action against them as exhausted, impoverished and unable to travel further, they stopped in some town or village where they were not wanted.²⁶

As a result of such developments, political officials, including Earl Warren and Richard Neustadt, the regional director of the Federal Security Agency, realized that only a mandatory evacuation and relocation program operated by the government could work.²⁷

The reaction from the interior states was direct and forceful. On February 21, for instance, Governor Carville of Nevada informed General DeWitt that permitting unsupervised enemy aliens to go to all parts of the country, particularly his state, would be conducive to the spread of sabotage and subversive activities:

I have made the statement here that enemy aliens would be accepted in the State of Nevada under proper supervision. This would apply to concentration camps as well as to those who might be allowed to farm or do such other things as they could do in helping out. This is the attitude that I am going to maintain in this State and I do not desire that Nevada be made a dumping ground for enemy aliens to be going anywhere they might see fit for travel.²⁸

Although Governor Ralph L. Carr of Colorado was characterized by many contemporaries as the one mountain state chief executive receptive to relocation of the Issei and Nisei, his radio address of February 28, 1942, offered a vivid impression of the emotions associated with the relocation of the Japanese in the interior:

If those who command the armed forces of our Nation say that it is necessary to remove any persons from the Pacific coast and call upon Colorado to do her part in this war by furnishing temporary quarters for those individuals, we stand ready to carry out that order. If any enemy aliens must be transferred as a war measure, then we of Colorado are big enough and patriotic enough to do our duty. We announce to the world that 1,118,000 red-blooded citizens of this State are able to take care of 3,500 or any number of enemies, if that be the task which is allotted to us. . . .

The people of Colorado are giving their sons, are offering their possessions, are surrendering their rights and privileges to the end that this war may be fought to

26. Quoted in U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 101.

27. *Hearings Before the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration*, pp. 11020, 11054.

28. Quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 102.

victory and permanent peace. If it is our duty to receive disloyal persons, we shall welcome the performance of that task.

This statement must not be construed as an invitation, however. Only because the needs of our Nation dictate it, do we even consider such an arrangement. In making the transfers, we can feel assured that governmental agencies will take every precaution to protect our people, our defense projects, and our property from the same menace which demands their removal from those sections.²⁹

Federal officials were also beginning to realize the hardship which the "voluntary" program was posing for evacuees. Secretary Knox, for instance, forwarded to the attorney general a report that the situation of the Japanese in southern California was becoming critical because they were being forced to move with no provision for housing or means of livelihood. McCloy, who although continuing to favor the voluntary program, wrote to Harry Hopkins, one President Roosevelt's leading advisers at the White House, that one "of the drawbacks they have is the loss of their property. A number of forced sales are taking place, and, until the last minute, they hate to leave their land or their shop."³⁰

Inevitably, the voluntary evacuation failed. On March 21, Colonel Bendetsen recommended the termination of voluntary migration, and four days later DeWitt determined that it should end. The Army recognized this failure in Public Proclamation No. 4 issued on March 27, the same day that Public Proclamation No. 3 went into effect. The proclamation prohibited all persons of Japanese ancestry in Military Area No. 1, where most of them still lived, from changing their residence without permission or approval from the Army, effective midnight, March 29.³¹ The Western Defense Command explained that the proclamation was designed "to ensure an orderly, supervised, and thoroughly controlled evacuation with adequate provision for the protection . . . of the evacuees as well as their property." Thus, the evacuees, according to the military, would be shielded from intense public hostility by this approach.³²

Government statistics, although not entirely consistent, show the failure of the voluntary evacuation program. The change-of-address cards required by Public Proclamation No. 1 show the number of people who voluntarily relocated before March 29. In the three weeks following March 2, only 2,005 of the approximately 107,500 persons of Japanese descent who lived in Military Area No. 1 moved out. These statistics alone demonstrated that voluntary migration would not achieve evacuation. Public Proclamation No. 4 was issued on March 27 and became effective at midnight March 29. In the interval, approximately 2,500 cards show moves out of Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2. The statistics in the War Department's *Final Report* show discrepancies concerning the number of voluntary evacuees. They show that from March 12 to June 30, 1942, 10,312 persons reported their "voluntary" intention to move out of Military Area No. 1. But a net total of less than half

29. Quoted in *Hearings Before the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration*, p. 11276.

30. Quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 103.

31. Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA*, p. 85. A copy of Proclamation No. 4 is printed in Appendix 18, House Report 2124, p. 331.

32. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 105.

that number — 4,889 — left the areas as part of the voluntary program. Of these voluntary migrants, 1,963 went to Colorado, 1,519 to Utah, 305 to Idaho, 208 to eastern Washington, 115 to eastern Oregon, and the remainder to other states. The *Final Report* concludes that this net total "probably accounts for 90 percent of the total number of Japanese . . . who voluntarily left the West Coast area for inland points."³³

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY AND THE WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION

While the voluntary program was failing, government officials and others began to propose programs designed to benefit the evacuees. On February 20, 1942, Carey McWilliams, a California state official who later became editor of *The Nation*, sent a telegram to Biddle recommending that the president establish an Alien Control Authority operated by representatives of federal agencies. The agency would register, license, settle, maintain, and reemploy the evacuees, and conserve alien property. During the first week of March, John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs in the Department of the Interior, proposed a constructive program for the evacuees, including useful work, education, health care, and other services, as well as a plan for rehabilitation after the war. While these recommendations were being circulated, the Tolan Committee filed an interim report which showed great prescience about future problems and concern for the fate of the evacuees.³⁴

As these recommendations were being circulated, the realization that voluntary migration was failing and that considerable manpower would be needed to implement a mandatory evacuation program led to further discussions by federal officials as to how the government might systematize the process and supervise the evacuees. The War Department was eager to be out of the resettlement business, and discussed with the attorney general and the Budget Bureau the mechanism for setting up a permanent organization to take over the job. In his record of a Cabinet meeting discussion at the White House on February 27, Secretary Stimson noted:

The President brought this up first of all and showed that thus far he has given very little attention to the principal task of the transportation and resettlement of the evacuees. I outlined what DeWitt's plan was and his proclamation [Public Proclamation No. 1] so far as I could without having the paper there. Biddle supported us loyally, saying that he had the proclamation already in his hands. I enumerated the five classes in the order which are being affected and tried to make clear that the process was necessarily gradual, DeWitt being limited by the size of the task and the limitations of his own force. The President seized upon the idea that the work should be taken off the shoulders of the Army so far as possible after the evacuees had been selected and removed from places where they were dangerous. There was general confusion around the table arising from

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 106-13.

34. *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 104, and U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, *National Defense Migration, Report . . . Pursuant to H Res. 113 . . . Preliminary Report and Recommendations on Problems of Evacuation of Citizens and Aliens From Military Areas*, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., H. Rept. 1911, March 19, 1942, pp. 15-19.

the fact that nobody had realized how big it was, nobody wanted to take care of the evacuees, and the general weight and complication of the project. Biddle suggested that a single head should be chosen to handle the resettlement instead of the pulling and hauling of all the different agencies, and the President seemed to accept this; the single person to be of course a civilian and not the Army . . .

35

As a result of this discussion, Milton S. Eisenhower, Assistant to the Secretary of the Agriculture as director of information and coordinator of the department's land use programs and a brother of Dwight D. Eisenhower, a fast-rising and popular general in the military, was selected as the civilian to oversee the Japanese evacuation and resettlement effort. Eisenhower, a 42-year-old native of Abilene, Kansas, had been trained as a journalist and had served in the Department of Agriculture since 1926. A candidate fully acceptable to the War Department, he worked informally on the evacuation problem from the end of February, and McCloy took him to San Francisco to meet DeWitt in March 1942. By March 17, plans for an independent authority responsible for the resettlement of Japanese Americans were completed. The next day President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9102 establishing the War Relocation Authority in the Office for Emergency Management in the Executive Office of the President, appointed Eisenhower director, and allocated \$5,500,000 for the WRA.³⁶

According to Executive Order 9102, the purpose of the WRA was "to provide for the removal from designated areas of persons whose removal is necessary in the interest of national security." The director was given wide discretion; the executive order did not expressly provide for relocation camps, but it gave the director authority to "accomplish all necessary evacuation not undertaken by the Secretary of War or appropriate military commander, provide for the relocation of such persons in appropriate places, provide for their needs in such manner as may be appropriate, and supervise their activities." The director was to "provide, insofar as feasible and desirable, for the employment of such persons at useful work in industry, commerce, agriculture, or public projects, prescribe the terms and conditions of such public employment, and safeguard the public interest in the private employment of such persons."³⁷

Until a meeting with the governors and other officials of ten western and intermountain states at Salt Lake City on April 7, the War Relocation Authority under Eisenhower continued to hope that it could arrange for the resettlement of a substantial number of the evacuated Japanese in the interior and provide for their employment in public works, land development, agricultural production, and manufacturing in the relocation areas. But the intransigent attitudes exhibited at that meeting persuaded all concerned that the Japanese, whether aliens or citizens, would have to be kept indefinitely in large government-operated camps, called relocation centers, to be hastily constructed by the Corps of Engineers during the spring and summer of 1942. With that final destination placed in the

35. Quoted in Conn *et al.*, *Guarding the United States*, p. 140.

36. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 50-51, and Peter Irons, *Justice at War* (New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 69-70.

37. A copy of Executive Order 9102 may be seen in Appendix B of this study.

hands of a civilian agency, the Army was ready to push firmly ahead with its part of the evacuation.³⁸

On March 10, 1942, eight days prior to the establishment of the WRA, General DeWitt established a civil affairs organization of his own to handle evacuation problems and facilitate voluntary migration. The War Department directives of February 20 to DeWitt in effect placed the Western Defense Command's evacuation operations under the direct supervision of the Secretary of War, and, as aforementioned, Colonel Bendetsen was chosen as coordinator of evacuation issues between Washington and San Francisco. Because Army headquarters was facing an impending general reorganization, the arrangements for supervision from Washington were somewhat confused, thus necessitating Bendetsen's role as coordinator. After the reorganization of March 9, the Washington military staff agencies would almost disappear from the picture as far as evacuation supervision was concerned, except for planning and direction of construction of assembly centers by the Corps of Engineers with staff supervision by the Services of Supply. During a visit by McCloy to the west coast, DeWitt established a Civil Affairs Division in his general staff on March 10. The following day he created the Wartime Civil Control Administration to act as his operations agency to carry out assigned missions involving civilian control and evacuation program procedures. At McCloy's urging, Colonel Bendetsen was transferred from the War Department staff and designated as Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs, General Staff, and also as Director, WCCA. Thomas Clark was loaned to the WCCA by the Justice Department to be head of its civilian staff and coordinate the many federal civilian agencies that took part in the evacuation program. The WCCA initiated its operations with a brief, but nonetheless comprehensive, directive from DeWitt:

To provide for the evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry. . . . with a minimum of economic and social dislocation; a minimum use of military personnel and maximum speed; and initially to employ all appropriate means to encourage voluntary migration.³⁹

Although the principal activities of the WCCA would focus on processing the evacuees, the new organization initially established 48 service offices, one in each area of significant Japanese population in the area to be affected by evacuation, to facilitate voluntary migration. Announcements "through every available public information channel" encouraged evacuees to visit these offices in order to receive aid in undertaking voluntary movement. The offices were staffed by representatives of various federal agencies that were equipped to provide help to the evacuees. Provisions were made to assist in property settlements, provide social counseling and travel permits, and lend financial assistance to those evacuees who needed it. The WCCA offices also offered to locate specific employment opportunities in interior areas for voluntary migrants.⁴⁰

38. U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Story of Human Conservation*, pp. 26-30, and Irons, *Justice At War*, pp. 71-72.

39. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 41.

40. *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44, 65-74, 104-05. For an examination of related activities of the WCCA, such as curfew and travel control and repatriation, see *ibid.*, pp. 291-333.

ASSEMBLY CENTER SELECTION

Once the decision was made that evacuation would no longer be voluntary, a plan for immediate compulsory evacuation was needed. To facilitate the evacuation effort, the WCCA determined to separate evacuation from the problem of removing evacuees to more permanent relocation centers. The War Department's *Final Report* stated:

It was concluded that evacuation and relocation could not be accomplished simultaneously. This was the heart of the plan. It entailed the provision for a transitory phase. It called for establishment of Assembly Centers at or near each center of evacuee population. These Centers were to be designed to provide shelter and messing facilities and the minimum essentials for the maintenance of health and morale. . . .

The program would have been seriously delayed if all evacuation had been forced to await the development of Relocation Centers. The initial movement of evacuees to an Assembly Center as close as possible to the area of origin also aided the program (a) by reducing the initial travel; (b) by keeping evacuees close to their places of former residence for a brief period while property matters and family arrangements which had not been completed prior to evacuation could be settled; and (c) by acclimating the evacuees to the group life of a Center in their own climatic region.⁴¹

During the period of the voluntary evacuation program, the Army had begun the search for appropriate camp facilities, both temporary and more permanent. Regarding the criteria for selection of assembly centers, as the temporary camps came to be called, General DeWitt later wrote:

Assembly Center site selection was a task of relative simplicity. As time was of the essence, it will be apparent that the choice was limited by four rather fundamental requirements which virtually pointed out the selections ultimately made. First, it was necessary to find places with some adaptable pre-existing facilities suitable for the establishment of shelter, and the many needed community services. Second, power, light, and water had to be within immediate availability as there was no time for a long pre-development period. Third, the distance from the Center of the main elements of evacuee population served had to be short, the connected road and rail net good, and the potential capacity sufficient to accept the adjacent evacuee group. Finally, it was essential that there be some area within the enclosure for recreation and allied activities as the necessary confinement would otherwise have been completely demoralizing. The sudden expansion of our military and naval establishments further limited the choice.⁴²

By early March 1942, the Army had selected two sites as "reception centers." DeWitt issued instructions to establish these centers through which Japanese Americans would be

41. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 151.

funneled out of Military Area No. 1. Work began immediately on the construction of the two centers — Manzanar at the eastern base of the Sierra Nevada in Owens Valley in eastern California and Poston south of Parker Dam on the Colorado River Indian Reservation in Arizona. The two sites, located in barren areas and constructed to house some 10,000 evacuees each, were designed "to provide temporary housing for those who were either unable to undertake their own evacuation, or who declined to leave until forced to." Designed initially by the WCCA as assembly centers to provide temporary quarters for evacuees, the two sites would later become two of the ten permanent relocation centers under the WRA.⁴³

Meanwhile, the other assembly center sites, which were to serve as temporary quarters for the evacuees, were selected with dispatch. On March 16, Bendetsen dispatched two site-selection teams of federal officials, including representatives of the Bureau of Reclamation in the Department of the Interior, the National Resources Planning Board, Soil Conservation Service, and Farm Security Administration in the Department of Agriculture, the Works Projects Administration, and the Corps of Engineers, South Pacific Division, with instructions to locate facilities capable of housing 100,000 people. Within four days these teams reported back to Bendetsen, listing between them 17 potential sites. The War Department's *Final Report* described their selection:

After an intensive survey the selections were made. Except at Portland, Oregon, Pinedale and Sacramento, California and Mayer, Arizona, large fairgrounds or racetracks were selected. As the Arizona requirements were small, an abandoned Civilian Conservation Corps camp at Mayer was employed. In Portland the Pacific International Live Stock Exposition facilities were adapted to the purpose. At Pinedale the place chosen made use of the facilities remaining on a former mill site where mill employees had previously resided. At Sacramento an area was employed where a migrant camp had once operated and advantage was taken of nearby utilities.⁴⁴

After quick review, DeWitt, on March 20, ordered the Army's Corps of Engineers to proceed with construction of 16 (including the Manzanar and Poston "reception centers") "Assembly Centers for the housing of evacuees," and gave the Corps of Engineers a deadline of April 21 for making the camps ready. Thirteen assembly centers were located in California (Marysville, Sacramento, Tanforan, Stockton, Turlock, Salinas, Merced, Pinedale, Fresno, Tulare, Santa Anita, Pomona, and Manzanar), and the other three at Puyallup, Washington, Portland, Oregon, and Mayer, Arizona.⁴⁵

Thus, as systematic compulsory evacuation began, the evacuation program and the operation of the assembly centers were under the authority of the Army, by agreement with the WRA. Evacuation was under military supervision, while the centers were operated by the WCCA.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 44, and Irons, *Justice At War*, p. 69. More indepth study of the Manzanar site selection may be found in Chapter Five of this study.

44. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 44, 46, and 151.

45. *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 138, and Irons, *Justice At War*, p. 69. Chapter Four of this study includes data on the construction, development, and operation of the assembly centers.

TERMINAL ISLAND EVACUATION

The small-scale evacuation of Terminal Island in February 1942 was a precursor of the mass evacuation of the west coast and provided a vivid portent of the hardship that would be wrought by evacuation. Approximately six miles long and one-half mile wide, Terminal Island, most of whose residents would ultimately be evacuated to Manzanar, marked the boundaries of Los Angeles Harbor and the Cerritos Channel. Lying directly across the harbor from a U.S. Navy base at San Pedro, the island was reached in 1942 by ferry or a small drawbridge.

The isolated Japanese community on the island consisted of some 500 families, primarily occupied in the fishing and canning industries. A half-dozen fish canneries, each with its own employee housing, were located on the island. In 1942, the Japanese population of the island was approximately 3,500, of whom approximately half were American-born Nisei. The majority of the businesses, including restaurants, grocery stores, barbershops, beauty shops, and poolhalls (in addition to three physicians, and two dentists), which served the island were owned or operated by Issei or Nisei.⁴⁶

Immediately following the Pearl Harbor attack, the FBI removed individuals from the Japanese community on Terminal Island who were considered dangerous aliens, and followed this with "daily dawn raids . . . removing several hundred more aliens" and sending them to internment camps in Montana and North Dakota. In late January 1942, the island was designated by authorities as a "strategic area" from which enemy aliens would be barred. Within several days, FBI agents again raided the Japanese community, arresting 336 Issei who were considered potentially dangerous. On February 10, 1942, the Department of Justice posted a warning that all Japanese aliens had to leave the island by the following Monday. The next day, a presidential order placed Terminal Island under the jurisdiction of the Navy. By the 15th, Secretary of the Navy Knox directed Rear Admiral R. S. Holmes, Commandant of the 11th Naval District in San Diego, to notify all island residents that their dwellings would be condemned, effective within 30 days. On February 25, however, the Navy informed the island residents that the deadline had been advanced to midnight, February 27, slightly more than 48 hours away. The Terminal Islanders were, in essence, evicted, and the Navy did not care where they went as long as they left the "strategic" island.⁴⁷

As a consequence of the FBI raids on Terminal Island, the heads of many families, as well as community and business leaders, were gone and mainly older women and minor children were left. With the new edict, these women and children, who were unaccustomed and ill equipped to handle business transactions, were forced to make

46. For more information on the historical development of the Japanese community on Terminal Island see Kanshi Stanley Yamashita, "Terminal Island: Ethnography of an Ethnic Community: Its Dissolution and Reorganization to a Non-Spatial Community" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Irvine, 1985).

47. U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Wartime Exile*, p. 124; Daniels, *Decision to Relocate*, p. 54; and Daniel S. Davis, *Behind Barbed Wire: The Imprisonment of Japanese Americans During World War II* (New York, E.P. Dutton, 1982), pp. 43-44.

quick financial decisions regarding their property and possessions.⁴⁸ Dr. Yoshihiko Fujikawa, a resident of the island, described the chaotic scene prior to evacuation:

It was during these 48 hours that I witnessed unscrupulous vultures in the form of human beings taking advantage of bewildered housewives whose husbands had been rounded up by the F. B. I. within 48 hours after Pearl Harbor. They were offered pittance for practically new furniture and appliances: refrigerators, radio consoles, etc., as well as cars, and many were falling prey to these people.⁴⁹

The day after the Terminal Island evacuation, the former Japanese community was littered with abandoned goods and equipment, much of which would disappear or be stolen.⁵⁰ Most of the Terminal Islanders, unprepared for such an abrupt move, remained in Los Angeles County, many sleeping out in the open or sleeping under blanket tents in crowded church chapels or Japanese language schools.⁵¹

The experience of Henry Murikami, a Japanese fisherman on Terminal Island, was typical. He had become a fisherman after graduating from high school. After gaining experience, he leased a boat from the Van Camp Seafood Company and went into business on his own, saving money to increase and improve his fishing equipment. By the time of Pearl Harbor he owned three sets of purse seine nets valued at \$22,500. After the Pearl Harbor attack, he, as well as the rest of the Japanese fishermen, were stopped from fishing and told to remain in their fishing camps. In early February, Murikami, along with every alien male on Terminal Island who held a fisherman's license, was arrested and sent to a Department of Justice internment camp in Bismarck, North Dakota. His equipment lay abandoned, accessible for the taking.⁵²

INITIAL EVACUATION TO MANZANAR

Approximately three weeks after the Terminal Island evacuation and several days before the issuance of the Army's first compulsory exclusion order, a hastily-planned evacuation of some 1,000 Japanese residents from Los Angeles to Manzanar was undertaken. While assembly center site selection was underway, and before construction of the centers was completed, public pressure for initiation of a definite evacuation movement reached the point that, according to some observers, there was "grave danger of serious incidents." Accordingly, on March 23 the WCCA organized a voluntary evacuation of some 1,000 persons from Los Angeles to Manzanar where work had started on March 16 to clear land and erect housing under the direction of the Corps of Engineers. The Commanding

48. *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 108, and Alexander Leighton, *The Governing of Men* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 38.

49. Quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, pp. 108-09.

50. *Hearings Before the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration*, p. 11667.

51. Takeo Kaneshiro, comp., *Internees: War Relocation Center Memoirs and Diaries* (New York, Washington, Atlanta, and Hollywood, Vantage Press, 1976), pp. 2-5.

52. *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 109.

General, Southern California Sector, Western Defense Command, provided escort for the convoy of several hundred privately-owned automobiles, from Model Ts to 1942 sedans, that assembled at the Rose Bowl in Pasadena. The vehicles were driven by their owners, the convoy being spaced by highway patrol cars and Army jeeps. The convoy "extended at some points a distance in excess of six miles." In addition to the convoy, a train transported some 500 of the evacuees from Los Angeles to Lone Pine. The Quartermaster, Western Defense Command, obtained the necessary subsistence, and the U.S. Public Health Service provided medical care. An advance party of some 80 voluntary evacuees, consisting primarily of single men and heads of families, had preceded the main party on March 21 to assist the WCCA administrative staff at Manzanar in preparing for the reception of the 1,000 evacuees. Thus, Manzanar became the first assembly or reception center to receive evacuees.⁵³

COMMENCEMENT OF MANDATORY EVACUATION: EVACUATION OF BAINBRIDGE ISLAND

The first compulsory exclusion order under the Army evacuation program was issued on March 24, 1942, three days following the enactment of Public Law 503 providing criminal penalties for disobeying Executive Order 9066. The exclusion order applied to the largely agrarian and fishing Japanese community, consisting of about 54 families, on Bainbridge Island in Puget Sound, some ten miles west of Seattle, Washington, near the strategically-sensitive Bremerton Naval Base. In a sense, the Bainbridge Islanders were used as "guinea pigs" by the Army "in a kind of dress rehearsal for the full scale evacuation which was to come." The 227 Bainbridge Islanders were evacuated directly via a lengthy train trip to Manzanar, because the Puyallup Assembly Center on the Washington state fairgrounds, the nearest assembly center site to their homes, was not ready for occupancy, and the Manzanar assembly or reception center was the only camp to be open at the time.⁵⁴

The exclusion order directed "that all persons of Japanese ancestry, including aliens and nonaliens, be excluded from that Portion of Military Area No. 1 described as 'Bainbridge Island,' in the State of Washington, on or before 12 o'clock noon, P.W.T., of the 30th day of March 1942." The order stated that exclusion would be accomplished in the following manner:

- (a) Such persons may, with permission, on or prior to March 29, 1942, proceed to any approved place of their choosing beyond the limits of Military Area No. 1 and the prohibited zones established by said proclamations [Public Proclamations Nos. 1 and 2] or hereafter similarly established, subject only to such regulations as to travel and change of residence as are now or may hereafter be prescribed by this headquarters and by the United States Attorney General. Persons affected hereby will not be permitted to take up residence or remain within the region

53. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 48-49; House Report 2124, p. 5; and Audrie Girdner and Ann Loftis, *The Great Betrayal: The Evacuation of the Japanese-Americans During World War II* (London, The Macmillan Company, Collier-Macmillan, Ltd., 1969), p. 133.

54. Daniels, *Decision to Relocate*, pp. 54-55, and U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 49, 519-21.

designated as Military Area No. 1 or the prohibited zones heretofore or hereafter established. Persons affected hereby are required on leaving or entering Bainbridge Island [after 9 a. m., March 24, 1942] to register and obtain a permit at the Civil Control Office to be established on said Island at or near the ferryboat landing [at the Anderson Dock Store in Winslow].

- (b) On March 30, 1942, all such persons who have not removed themselves from Bainbridge Island in accordance with Paragraph 1 hereof shall, in accordance with instructions of the Commanding General, Northwestern Sector, report to the Civil Control Office referred to above on Bainbridge Island for evacuation in such manner and to such place or places as shall then be prescribed.
- (c) A responsible member of each family [preferably the head of the family or the person in whose name most of the property was held] affected by this order and each individual living alone so affected will report to the Civil Control Office described above between 8 a.m. and 5 p. m. Wednesday, March 25, 1942 [to receive further instruction].

The exclusion order went on to state that any "person affected by this order who fails to comply with any of its provisions or who is found on Bainbridge Island after 12 o'clock noon, P.W.T. of March 30, 1942" would be subject to the criminal penalties provided by Public Law 503. Alien Japanese would "be subject to immediate apprehension and internment."

The exclusion order also included specific "Instructions To All Japanese Living on Bainbridge Island." Among other things, these instructions included a list of topics for which the Civil Control Office was equipped to assist the Japanese population:

1. Give advice and instructions on the evacuation.
2. Provide services with respect to the management, leasing, sale, storage, or other disposition of most kinds of property, including farms, livestock and farm equipment, boats, tools, household goods, automobiles, etc.
3. Provide temporary residence for all Japanese in family groups, elsewhere.
4. Transport persons and a limited amount of clothing and equipment to their new residence, as specified below.
5. Give medical examinations and make provision for all invalided persons affected by the evacuation order.
6. Give special permission to individuals and families who are able to leave the area and proceed to an approved destination of their own choosing on or prior to March 29, 1942.

The exclusion order noted that there were two conditions "imposed on voluntary evacuation." The destination must be outside Military Area No. 1, and arrangements must "have been made for employment and shelter at the destination." The instructions stated further that provisions "have been made to give temporary residence in a reception center elsewhere [Puyallup Assembly Center]." Evacuees who did not go to "an approved destination of their own choice, but who go to a reception center under Government supervision, must carry with them the following property, not exceeding that which can be carried by the family or the individual." These items included:

- (a) Blankets and linens for each member of the family;
- (b) Toilet articles for each member of the family;
- (c) Clothing for each member of the family;
- (d) Sufficient knives, forks, spoons, plates, bowls, and cups for each member of the family

All items "carried will be securely packaged, tied, and plainly marked with the name of the owner and numbered in accordance with instructions received at the Civil Control Office." No contraband items, as earlier specified by the Department of Justice, could be carried.

The instructions noted that the federal government "through its agencies will provide for the storage at the sole risk of the owner of only the more substantial household items, such as ice boxes, washing machines, pianos, and other heavy furniture." Cooking utensils and other small items "must be crated, packed, and plainly marked with the name and address of the owner." All persons going to a reception center would "be furnished transportation and food for the trip." Transportation "by private means" would "not be permitted." Instructions would "be given by the Civil Control Office as to when evacuees must be fully prepared to travel."⁵⁵

Tom G. Rathbone, field supervisor for the U.S. Employment Service, filed a report after the Bainbridge Island evacuation, with recommendations for improvement that provide a picture of the government's approach to the first compulsory exclusion order. On March 23, a meeting, attended by representatives of various federal agencies, was called by the WCCA, which oversaw operation of the civil control station on Bainbridge Island, to outline evacuation procedures. After setting up the station on the island, the government group "reported to Center at 8:00 a.m. . . . for the purpose of conducting a complete registration" of the "persons of Japanese ancestry who were residents of the Island." Rathbone recommended that more complete instructions from Army officials would clarify many questions, including what articles the evacuees could take with them, the climate at the designated assembly center, and the timing of the evacuation. He also suggested better planning so that the evacuees would not be required to return repeatedly to the center. He observed that "such planning would have to contemplate the ability to answer the type of question [sic] which occur and the ability to give accurate and definite information which would enable the evacuee to close out his business and be prepared to report at the

55. A copy of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1 is printed in Appendix 20, House Report 2124, pp. 332-34.

designated point with necessary baggage, etc." Further, Rathbone noted that disposition of evacuees' property following evacuation caused the most serious hardship and prompted the most questions. He reported:

We received tentative information late Friday afternoon to the effect that it was presumed that the Government would pay the transportation costs of such personal belongings and equipment to the point of relocation upon proper notice. When this word was given to the evacuees, many complained bitterly because they had not been given such information prior to that time and had, therefore, sold, at considerable loss, many such properties which they would have retained had they known that it would be shipped to them upon relocation. Saturday morning we receive additional word through the Federal Reserve Bank that the question had not been answered and that probably no such transportation costs would be paid. Between the time on Friday afternoon and Saturday morning some Japanese had arranged to repossess belongings which they had already sold and were in a greater turmoil than ever upon getting the latter information. To my knowledge, there still is no answer to this question, but it should be definitely decided before the next evacuation is attempted.⁵⁶

The Bainbridge Islanders were the last Japanese Americans in Military Area No. 1 to have the option of moving voluntarily to an approved place of their choosing. While their evacuation was in progress, DeWitt issued the aforementioned Public Proclamation No. 4 on March 27 ending voluntary migration at midnight, March 29.⁵⁷ After the Bainbridge evacuation, exclusion orders (a copy of a typical order may be seen on pages 59-62) were issued for each of the other 98 exclusion areas in Military Area No. 1, each area having approximately 1,000 resident Japanese. In establishing the boundaries of the exclusion areas, efforts were made to adhere "to the established policy of keeping family units unbroken, and to move communities with similar social and economic backgrounds to the same Assembly Center." The evacuation process commenced with the issuance of a civilian exclusion order, a document which defined the exclusion area and provided the immediate sanction for its evacuation. The order specified the exclusion date and the registration date or dates. The order was accompanied by specific "Instructions to Evacuees" concerning their responsibilities in the evacuation program. In each area covered by a civilian exclusion order, a civil control station, staffed with representatives of the Federal Reserve Bank, Farm Security Administration, associated agencies of the Federal Security Agency, including the U.S. Employment Service, U.S. Public Health Service, and Bureau of Public Assistance of the Social Security Board, was set up under the direction of the WCCA to provide information, administer registration and medical inspection, render financial assistance, and process the evacuees. These stations were usually located in a public hall, school gymnasium, or auditorium and, whenever possible, they were near the center of the Japanese population of the area being evacuated.

The exclusion orders were issued in a sequence based upon several considerations. Military security requirements were the primary considerations, but other issues were involved as well. The ability of the assembly or reception centers to receive evacuees, the

56. Quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, pp. 109-10.

57. Daniels, *Decision to Relocate*, pp. 54-55.

availability of civilian personnel in the various agencies which participated in the operation of control stations, the distance evacuees were to be moved, and the availability of rail or motor transportation were important factors in determining the order in which the exclusion areas were evacuated. Areas were evacuated in the order indicated by the civilian exclusion order number "with but a few exceptions."

No publicity was permitted concerning the evacuation of any specific unit area prior to the posting of the civilian exclusion order within the affected area. The evacuation operations within most exclusion areas covered a period of seven days. Exclusion orders were posted throughout the area from 12:00 noon the first day to 5:00 a.m. the second day. Registration of all persons of Japanese ancestry within the area was conducted from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on the second and third days. Processing or preparing of evacuees for evacuation occurred from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on the fourth and fifth days. Movements of evacuees in increments of approximately 500 took place on the sixth and seventh days.⁵⁸

The last of the exclusion orders (No. 99 affecting a small area near Sacramento) that required the departure of Japanese Americans who resided in Military No. 1 was issued on June 6, 1942. Thus, this phase of the evacuation was completed nearly six months after Pearl Harbor and two days after the stunning American naval victory over Japan in the Battle of Midway Island.⁵⁹

EVACUEES' PROPERTY DISPOSAL

Although later evacuations tended to be better organized than the one at Bainbridge Island, difficulties continued to plague the program. The handling of evacuee property, for instance, continued to present a major problem for the government. Early in its hearings on the west coast the Tolan Committee learned that frightened, bewildered Japanese were being preyed upon by second-hand dealers and real estate profiteers. On February 28, the committee cabled Attorney General Biddle recommending that an Alien Property Custodian be appointed.⁶⁰

Before any action was taken, however, evacuation proceedings had commenced. Spot prohibited zones had been cleared of Japanese by order of the Department of Justice immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack; the Navy had evacuated Terminal Island in Los Angeles in late February; and the Western Defense Command had urged a number of west coast residents of Japanese ancestry to leave the military area voluntarily. The

58. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 89-93, 114-26, and Thomas and Nashimoto, *Spoilage*, pp. 13-17.

59. A complete set of the 108 civilian exclusion orders may be found in Record Group 210, Records of the War Relocation Authority, Entry 16, Headquarters Subject - Classified General Files, 1942-46, Box 242, File 35.434, National Archives and Records Administration, Archives I, Washington, D.C. In conjunction with the issuance of each civilian exclusion order the Civil Affairs Division of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army prepared memoranda detailing the responsibilities of each agency and military unit for implementation of the order. Copies of some of these memoranda may be found in Collection No. 200, California Ephemera Collection, Japanese in California, Box 42, Folders 4-6, Department of Special Collections, University Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

60. House Report 1911, pp. 5-6.

**Headquarters
Western Defense Command
and Fourth Army**

Presidio of San Francisco, California

April 20, 1942

Civilian Exclusion Order No. 7

1. Pursuant to the provisions of Public Proclamations Nos. 1 and 2, this Headquarters, dated March 2, 1942, and March 16, 1942, respectively, it is hereby ordered that from and after 12 o'clock noon, P.W.T., of Tuesday, April 28, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien, be excluded from that portion of Military Area No. 1 described as follows:

All that portion of the County of Los Angeles, State of California, within the boundary beginning at the point where the Los Angeles-Ventura County line meets the Pacific Ocean; thence northeasterly along said county line to U. S. Highway No. 101; thence easterly along said Highway No. 101 to Sepulveda Boulevard; thence southerly along Sepulveda Boulevard to Wilshire Boulevard; thence westerly on Wilshire Boulevard to the limits of the City of Santa Monica; thence southerly along the said city limits to Pico Boulevard; thence easterly along Pico Boulevard to Sepulveda Boulevard; thence southerly on Sepulveda Boulevard to Manchester Avenue; thence westerly on Manchester Avenue and Manchester Avenue extended to the Pacific Ocean; thence northwesterly across Santa Monica Bay to the point of beginning.

2. A responsible member of each family and each individual living alone in the above described area will report between the hours of 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M., Tuesday, April 21, 1942, or during the same hours on Wednesday, April 22, 1942, to the Civil Control Station located at:


2422 Lincoln Boulevard
Santa Monica, California

3. Any person subject to this order who fails to comply with any of its provisions or with the provisions of published instructions pertaining hereto or who is found in the above area after 12 o'clock noon, P.W.T., of Tuesday, April 28, 1942, will be liable to the criminal penalties provided by Public Law No. 503, 77th Congress, approved March 21, 1942, entitled "An Act to Provide a Penalty for Violation of Restrictions or Orders with Respect to Persons Entering, Remaining in, Leaving, or Committing any Act in Military Areas or Zones," and alien Japanese will be subject to immediate apprehension and internment.

J. L. DEWITT
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

Figure 1: Civilian Exclusion Order No. 7.

PROHIBITED AREA
EXCLUSION ORDER NO.7
WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY



This map is prepared for the convenience of the public; see the Civilian Exclusion Order for the full and correct description.

Figure 2: Prohibited Area Exclusion Order No. 7.

**WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION**

Presidio of San Francisco, California

**INSTRUCTIONS
TO ALL PERSONS OF
JAPANESE
ANCESTRY**

LIVING IN THE FOLLOWING AREA:

All that portion of the County of Los Angeles, State of California, within the boundary beginning at the point where the Los Angeles-Ventura County line meets the Pacific Ocean; thence northeasterly along said county line to U. S. Highway No. 101; thence easterly along said Highway No. 101 to Sepulveda Boulevard; thence southerly along Sepulveda Boulevard to Wilshire Boulevard; thence westerly on Wilshire Boulevard to the limits of the City of Santa Monica; thence southerly along the said city limits to Pico Boulevard; thence easterly along Pico Boulevard to Sepulveda Boulevard; thence southerly on Sepulveda Boulevard to Manchester Avenue; thence westerly on Manchester Avenue and Manchester Avenue extended to the Pacific Ocean; thence northwesterly across Santa Monica Bay to the point of beginning.

Pursuant to the provisions of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 7, this Headquarters, dated April 20, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien, will be evacuated from the above area by 12 o'clock noon, P.W.T., Tuesday, April 28, 1942.

No Japanese person living in the above area will be permitted to change residence after 12 o'clock noon, P.W.T., Monday, April 20, 1942, without obtaining special permission from the representative of the Commanding General, Southern California Sector at the Civil Control Station located at:

2422 Lincoln Boulevard
Santa Monica, California

Such permits will only be granted for the purpose of uniting members of a family, or in cases of grave emergency.

The Civil Control Station is equipped to assist the Japanese population affected by this evacuation in the following ways:

1. Give advice and instructions on the evacuation.
2. Provide services with respect to the management, leasing, sale, storage or other disposition of most kinds of property, such as real

Figure 3: Instructions to All Persons of Japanese Ancestry, page 3.

estate, business and professional equipment, household goods, boats, automobiles and livestock.

3. Provide temporary residence elsewhere for all Japanese in family groups.

4. Transport persons and a limited amount of clothing and equipment to their new residence.

THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS MUST BE OBSERVED:

1. A responsible member of each family, preferably the head of the family, or the person in whose name most of the property is held, and each individual living alone, will report to the Civil Control Station to receive further instructions. This must be done between 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M. on Tuesday, April 21, 1942, or between 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M. on Wednesday, April 22, 1942.

2. Evacuees must carry with them on departure for the Reception Center, the following property:

- (a) Bedding and linens (no mattress) for each member of the family;
- (b) Toilet articles for each member of the family;
- (c) Extra clothing for each member of the family;
- (d) Sufficient knives, forks, spoons, plates, bowls and cups for each member of the family;
- (e) Essential personal effects for each member of the family.

All items carried will be securely packaged, tied and plainly marked with the name of the owner and numbered in accordance with instructions obtained at the Civil Control Station. The size and number of packages is limited to that which can be carried by the individual or family group.

3. No pets of any kind will be permitted.

4. The United States Government through its agencies will provide for the storage at the sole risk of the owner of the more substantial household items, such as iceboxes, washing machines, pianos and other heavy furniture. Cooking utensils and other small items will be accepted for storage if crated, packed and plainly marked with the name and address of the owner. Only one name and address will be used by a given family.

5. Each family and individual living alone will be furnished transportation to the Reception Center. Private means of transportation will not be utilized. All instructions pertaining to the movement will be obtained at the Civil Control Station.

Go to the Civil Control Station between the hours of 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M., Tuesday, April 21, 1942, or between the hours of 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M., Wednesday, April 22, 1942 to receive further instructions.

J. L. DEWITT
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

1-11 20 1042

Figure 4: Instructions to All Persons of Japanese Ancestry, page 2.

military viewed its primary mission to be removal of evacuees from the designated areas rather than looking after their property.

On March 6, 1942, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, acting as the agent of the Treasury Department, was given responsibility for handling the urban property problems of the evacuees, and an Alien Property Custodian was appointed on March 11.⁶¹ Four days later, the Farm Security Administration assumed responsibility for assisting with farm property questions. The Federal Security Agency, through its various associated agencies, agreed to provide necessary social services. Each of these agencies had representatives at the 48 WCCA civil control stations to facilitate the early initiatives for voluntary migration, and although voluntary migration from Military Area No. 1 formally ended on March 29 each agency retained its obligation under the direction of the WCCA by staffing the civil control stations in the exclusion areas until the WRA assumed total responsibility for the evacuees in August 1942.⁶²

By that time, however, many abuses had already been committed. Vulnerable to opportunists, the evacuees were subjected to droves of people who came to purchase goods and to take advantage of the availability of household furnishings, farm equipment, automobiles, and merchandise at bargain prices.⁶³ The Tolan Committee provided a succinct example of what it had discovered:

A typical practice was the following: Japanese would be visited by individuals representing themselves as F.B.I. agents and advised that an order of immediate evacuation was forthcoming. A few hours later, a different set of individuals would call on the Japanese so forewarned and offer to buy up their household and other equipment. Under these conditions the Japanese would accept offers at a fraction of the worth of their possessions. Refrigerators were thus reported to have been sold for as low as \$5.⁶⁴

Property and business losses also arose from confusion among government agencies. The military's delay in providing reasonable and adequate property protection and its failure to provide warehouses or other secure structures contributed to initial evacuee losses. Confusion existed among the Federal Reserve Bank, the Farm Security Administration, and the Office of the Alien Property Custodian. Not only did each agency have different policies, but there was also confusion within each how to implement its program. Dillon S. Myer, a Department of Agriculture official who replaced Eisenhower as director of the WRA on June 17, 1942, after the latter became Deputy Director of the Office of War Information, decried the result of the government's efforts to protect the evacuees' property:

The loss of hundreds of property leases and the disappearance of a number of equities in land and buildings which had been built up over the major portion of

61. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-8.

62. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 43, 127-29, 136-38.

63. Girdner and Loftis, *Great Betrayal*, pp. 132-33.

64. House Report 1911, p. 19.

a lifetime were among the most regrettable and least justifiable of all the many costs of the wartime evacuation.⁶⁵

In general, the Japanese evacuees were encouraged to take care of their own goods and their own affairs. Given the immense difficulties of protecting the diverse economic interests of more than 100,000 people, it is not surprising that despite the government's offer of aid it relied primarily on the evacuees to care for their own interests. At the same time, it is not surprising that, facing the distrust expressed in the government's exclusion and evacuation policies, most evacuees wanted to do what they could for themselves.⁶⁶ Economic losses from the evacuation were substantial for the Japanese. Owners and operators of farms and businesses either sold their income-producing assets under distress-sale circumstances on very short notice or attempted, with or without government help, to place their property in the custody of Caucasian friends or other people remaining on the coast. The effectiveness of these measures varied greatly in protecting evacuees' economic interests. Homes had to be sold or left without the personal attention that owners would devote to them. Businesses lost their good will, reputation, and customers. Professionals had their careers and practices disrupted. Not only did many suffer major losses during evacuation, but their economic circumstances deteriorated further while they resided in assembly and relocation centers during the war. The years of exclusion were frequently punctuated by financial troubles as the Japanese attempted to look after property without being on the scene when troubles arose, and they lacked a source of income to meet tax, mortgage, and insurance payments. Goods were lost or stolen during the war years, and the income and earning capacity of the excluded Japanese were reduced to almost nothing during the lengthy detention in relocation centers.⁶⁷

SECOND STAGE OF EVACUATION

On June 2, 1942, a second stage of the government's Japanese evacuation program began when, by Public Proclamation No. 6, DeWitt ordered the exclusion of Japanese aliens and American citizens of Japanese ancestry from the California portion of Military Area No. 2 on the grounds of military necessity.⁶⁸ This order left undisturbed those Japanese then living in eastern Oregon and Washington, southern Arizona, and in other states of the

65. Dillon S. Myer, *Uprooted Americans: The Japanese Americans and the War Relocation Authority During World War II* (Tucson, Arizona, University of Arizona Press, 1971), p. 253.

66. Leonard Bloom and Ruth Riemer, *Removal and Return* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1949), p. 129.

67. *Personal Justice Denied*, pp. 117-18. For further information on this topic, see U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *The Wartime Handling of Evacuee Property* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 1-109; House Report 2124, pp. 13-16, 173-95; U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Story of Human Conservation*, pp. 155-62; U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 127-44; and Final Report of the Participation of the Farm Security Administration In the Evacuation Program of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, Civil Affairs Division, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Covering the Period, March 15, 1942 through May 31, 1942, RG 210, Entry 7, Issuances of Other Federal Government Agencies, 1942-46, Box 5, File, "Wartime Civil Control Administration – Final Report of Farm Security Administration."

68. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 15, 105.

Western Defense Command — except as DeWitt applied to them his new authority to exclude suspected individuals from sensitive areas. The first civilian exclusion order [No. 100] for this area was issued on June 27, and by August 8 all persons of Japanese ancestry had been removed from the eastern part of California. In all, 9,337 evacuees were encompassed in Civilian Exclusion Orders Nos. 100-08. This final phase of the mass evacuation was carried out by direct movements from places of residence to relocation centers. More than half of these were Japanese who had moved voluntarily, with the encouragement of the military, into the interior of California from Military Area No. 1, the majority of whom moved on the two days between the issuance of the "freeze order" [Public Proclamation No. 4] of March 27 and its effective date of March 29.⁶⁹

The exclusion from the California portion of Military Area No. 2 appears to have been decided without any additional evidence of threat or danger in the area. The aforementioned War Department's *Final Report* observed:

Military Area No. 2 in California was evacuated because (1) geographically and strategically the eastern boundary of the State of California approximates the easterly limit of Military Area No. 1 in Washington and Oregon . . . and because (2) the natural forests and mountain barriers, from which it was determined to exclude all Japanese, lie in Military Area No. 2 in California, although these lie in Military Area No. 1 of Washington and Oregon.⁷⁰

Analysis of this second exclusion decision belies the lame military rationale on which it was presumably based. The eastern boundary of California lies more than 100 miles east of Military Area No. 1 at the Oregon border. If there had been a general decision to exclude the ethnic Japanese from forests and mountains, why had they been allowed to resettle in Military Area No. 2? Morton Grodzins, an authority on the Japanese evacuation, has concluded that this second exclusion decision was another example of the Western Defense Command's adoption of an unsound military rationale to carry out the program of politicians, agriculturalists, and agitators in eastern California who were determined to remove all ethnic Japanese from the state.⁷¹

Whatever the motivation, this second exclusion decision had two principal results. The voluntary evacuees who had resettled in eastern California were uprooted a second time, and, by August 8, 1942, everyone of Japanese descent had been expelled from the entire state of California except for those under guard at the Manzanar and Tule Lake relocation centers and a small handful under constant supervision in hospitals and prisons. The anti-Japanese forces in California had finally triumphed in their historic crusade.⁷²

69. Thomas and Nishimoto, *Spoilage*, pp. 12-13, and Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, pp. 304-05, 312-13. See Appendix B for a list of the exclusion dates, number of persons evacuated, and destinations of Japanese associated with each civilian exclusion order.

70. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 15.

71. Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, pp. 303-22.

72. ten Brock, et al., *Prejudice, War, and the Constitution*, p. 133.

COMPLETION OF EVACUATION

Public Proclamation No. 7, issued by DeWitt on June 8, provided for the exclusion of any Japanese in Military Area No. 1, "should there be any areas remaining . . . from which Japanese have not been excluded." Under this proclamation, any ethnic Japanese remaining in the area and not exempt from evacuation were ordered to report to the nearest assembly center.⁷³

With the implementation of Public Proclamations Nos. 6 and 7, the compulsory evacuation of Japanese Americans from the west coast was completed. Bendetsen's staff later calculated that precisely 111,999 "persons of Japanese ancestry" had been placed under detention in relocation centers by October 30, 1942. The Army, through the auspices of the WCCA, kept control of the evacuees at the assembly centers until November 3, 1942, when, with the last movement from an assembly center to a relocation center, the WRA took over general responsibility for the care and disposition of evacuated Japanese.⁷⁴

TREATMENT OF GERMAN AND ITALIAN ALIENS

While the mass evacuation of Japanese was underway during the spring and summer of 1942, federal officials continued to deliberate the fate of German and Italian aliens. By early May, DeWitt intended to evacuate these people from all prohibited zones within the Western Defense Command. His plans for a collective evacuation of German and Italian aliens, however, faced strong opposition both within his own staff and in Washington. In DeWitt's San Francisco headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel William A. Boekel, assistant chief of the Civil Affairs Division, concluded:

So far as concerns the mission [of the Western Defense Command] of protecting against sabotage and the evacuation of German and Italian aliens, the accomplishment of the mission should be started by a different approach. In the case of the Japanese, their oriental habits of life, their and our inability to assimilate biologically, and, what is more important, our inability to distinguish the subverters and saboteurs from the rest of the mass made necessary their class evacuation on a horizontal basis. In the case of the Germans and Italians, such mass evacuation is neither necessary nor desirable.⁷⁵

Boekel urged instead that a policy of individual exclusion for the Germans and Italians, rather than mass evacuation, be adopted. In Washington, as Colonel Bendetsen subsequently explained, "there was much opposition in the War Department to the evacuation of Italian aliens and considerable opposition, as well, to the collective evacuation of German aliens."⁷⁶

73. Public Proclamation No. 7, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 125.

74. U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Store of Human Conservation*, pp. ix-x, 23, and Irons, *Justice At War*, p. 73.

75. Quoted in Conn, *et al.*, *Guarding the United States*, p. 144.

76. *Ibid.*

Pursuant to further discussion, President Roosevelt, on May 15, 1942, approved a policy which the War Department had developed to deal with the question of German and Italian aliens. Instead of a collective evacuation of such aliens, the War Department would authorize the defense commander to issue individual exclusion orders against both aliens and citizens under the authority of Executive Order 9066. This rejection of DeWitt's recommendation concerning the removal of German and Italian aliens, which he explicitly justified on grounds of military necessity at a time when the Pacific outlook was more grim than it had been in February, weakens the theory later advanced by the War Department that it acted on evacuation in accordance with DeWitt's recommendations that were in turn based on the general's estimate of the military necessity of the situation. Instructions to implement the approved policy regarding German and Italian aliens, including a caution enjoining strict secrecy, went to DeWitt on May 22.⁷⁷

77. House Report 2124, pp. 25ff, 227ff.

CHAPTER FOUR: ASSEMBLY CENTERS UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION

Compulsory mass evacuation began on March 30, 1942. Until August 8, groups of Japanese left their homes for assembly centers, directed by one of the 108 civilian exclusion orders. The WCCA attempted, not always successfully, to place people in centers close to their homes. Sixteen assembly centers (a list of the centers and their average population, total days occupied, dates of occupancy, and maximum population may be seen on the following page) were established by the WCCA to provide temporary facilities for the Japanese evacuees before they would be transferred to permanent relocation centers. Thirteen of the centers were in California, one (Puyallup) was in Washington, one (Portland) was in Oregon, and one (Mayer) was in Arizona. The thirteen centers in California included Marysville, Sacramento, Tanforan, Stockton, Turlock, Salinas, Merced, Pinedale, Fresno, Tulare, Santa Anita, Pomona, and Manzanar. Two of the assembly center sites were converted race tracks (Santa Anita and Tanforan), one was a rodeo ground (Salinas), and nine were fairgrounds (Marysville, Stockton, Turlock, Merced, Fresno, Tulare, Portland, Puyallup, and Pomona).¹

As mentioned in Chapter 3 of this study, the Manzanar and Poston (officially designated the Colorado River Relocation Center) assembly centers were intended initially as "reception centers." They were to be operated by the Army during the initial phases of evacuation. Manzanar remained under the administration of the WCCA (and thus functioned generally as an assembly center) from its opening in mid-March until June 1, 1942, when it was transferred to the War Relocation Authority for use as a permanent relocation center. In June, Mayer was closed down, and its inhabitants were transferred to Poston, a WRA-operated relocation center established on a former Arizona Indian reservation. Direct evacuation to both of these centers was substantial. In the War Department's *Final Report*, DeWitt observed that 9,830 evacuees were moved directly to Manzanar, and 11,711 were evacuated directly to Poston, thus eliminating the need for additional assembly center capacity.²

ASSEMBLY CENTERS

Assembly centers were planned for use for short periods of time, their sole purpose being to serve as points of concentration and confinement until the War Relocation Authority could establish permanent relocation centers. Because of wartime difficulties in construction and transportation, as well as a shortage of building materials, however, the period of assembly center operation extended for approximately seven and one-half months. The assembly center operations program extended for 224 days from the opening

1. Brian Niiya, ed., *Japanese American History: An A-Z Reference from 1868 to the Present* (New York, Facts on File, 1993), pp. 110-11, and "Summary of Available Data on Assembly Centers," [July 14, 1943], Community Analysis Reports and Community Analysis Trend Reports of the War Relocation Authority, 1942-1946, p. 5, Roll 3, No. 69, Microfilm Publication MP 342, RG 210.

2. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 151, and Girdner and Loftis, *Great Betrayal*, p. 153.

Center	Average population	Total days occupied	DATES OF OCCUPANCY		MAXIMUM POPULATION	
			From	To	Number	Date
Fresno.....	4,403	178	5-6	10-30	5,120	9-4
Manzanar.....	5,186	72	3-21	5-31	9,666	5-31
Marysville.....	1,760	53	5-8	6-29	2,451	6-2
Mayer.....	214	27	5-7	6-2	245	5-25
Merced.....	3,762	133	5-6	9-15	4,508	6-3
Pinedale.....	3,690	78	5-7	7-23	4,792	6-29
Pomona.....	4,755	110	5-7	8-24	5,434	7-20
Portland.....	2,969	132	5-2	9-10	3,676	6-6
Puyallup.....	5,704	137	4-28	9-12	7,390	5-25
Sacramento.....	3,190	52	5-6	6-26	4,739	5-30
Salinas.....	3,032	69	4-27	7-4	3,594	6-23
Santa Anita.....	12,919	215	3-27	10-27	18,719	8-23
Stockton.....	3,725	161	5-10	10-17	4,271	5-21
Tanforan.....	6,501	169	4-28	10-13	7,816	7-25
Tulare.....	4,112	138	4-20	9-4	4,978	8-11
Turlock.....	2,888	105	4-30	8-12	3,662	6-2

Figure 5: U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 227.

of Manzanar on March 21 to the closing of Fresno on October 30. Exclusive of Manzanar, the Santa Anita Assembly Center, located at a racetrack in Los Angeles, had the longest period of occupancy and the largest number of residents — 215 days with an average population of 12,919. During much of this period, the population of Santa Anita was more than 18,000.³ Next in order of length of evacuee occupancy were Fresno, 178 days; Tanforan, 169 days; and Stockton, 161 days. On the other hand, the center at Mayer was closed after 27 days, Sacramento after 52 days, Marysville after 53 days, Salinas after 69 days, and Pinedale after 78 days.⁴

CONSTRUCTION AND FACILITIES

In the War Department's *Final Report*, DeWitt observed that the sites selected for assembly centers "proved to be reasonably adequate for the purpose." He noted that the original intention "was to house evacuees in Assembly Centers for a much shorter period than that which proved to be the case." For "extended occupancy by men, women, and children whose movements were necessarily restricted, the use of [hastily constructed cantonment-type] facilities of this character" was "not highly desirable." However, there was, according to the general, "no alternative." "Modifications and additions effected during the course of operations," according to DeWitt, "tended largely to overcome the natural disadvantages inherent in the confinement of a large community within a limited area." DeWitt noted that assembly center construction by the Corps of Engineers

generally followed those specifications established for Army cantonments. Of course, numerous refinements were included adequately to provide for the

3. For a history of the Santa Anita Assembly Center, see Anthony L. Lehman, *Birthright of Barbed Wire* (Los Angeles, Westernlore Press, 1970).

4. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 227.

housing of family units. Considerable augmentation was essential because of the necessity for providing separate utilities for men and for women and children.⁵

In most cases, adaptive use of existing structures at the assembly centers was limited, being used primarily as warehouse facilities, offices, infirmaries, or large mess halls. Some buildings, however, were utilized for evacuee work projects, schools, repair shops, and recreational activities.

Although a few existing buildings were modified for use as living quarters, apartment space was largely provided through new construction. The type of buildings erected for this purpose was substantially uniform. Theater of operations type barracks with suitable floors, ceilings, and partitions were built at most centers. Where possible, living quarters were grouped in blocks, each having showers, lavatories, and flush toilet facilities. Generally, blocks consisted of fourteen barracks. The capacity of each block varied, but the norm was between 600 to 800 persons. In the larger centers, there were up to 48 blocks. Where practicable, a kitchen and mess hall were provided for each block. In some centers, notably Santa Anita, Tanforan, and Portland, existing facilities were adapted for use as mess halls in which larger groups of evacuees were fed at a single facility. At Santa Anita, for instance, the 25-acre camp was divided into seven sections, each with a post office, a store, a mess hall, and showers.⁶

Although most assembly centers were located at fairgrounds or racetracks, their design and construction varied. In Portland's Pacific International Livestock Exposition Pavilion, for instance, virtually all the evacuees were housed under one roof because the pavilion covered 11 acres and provided living quarters for 3,800 people. Puyallup had four separate housing areas — three were originally parking lots and one was the fairground itself. At Santa Anita and Tanforan, the stable areas were renovated and modified to provide "apartment" space.

Where existing structures were inadequate to provide housing for community services, DeWitt noted that new buildings were built. At Tanforan, for instance, 169 new buildings were constructed. Infirmaries, each with a laboratory, surgical room, and kitchen, were established at each of the smaller assembly centers, and, in the larger centers, hospitals were constructed. Laundries, equipped with stationary wash tubs and ironing boards, canteens, post offices, dental clinics, barber shops, warehouses, administration buildings, recreation halls, and reception areas were built or created by adaptation of existing buildings. Hot water was initially in short supply at most assembly centers, but this "deficiency" was soon "augmented." Play fields, recreational halls, and fire stations were equipped "with the necessary items."⁷

5. *Ibid.*, p. 152. For more information on Army cantonment construction, see U.S. Department of Defense, Legacy Resources Management Program, and U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, *World War II and the U.S. Army Mobilization Program: A History of 700 and 800 Series Cantonment Construction, Including Historic American Buildings Survey Documentation for Camp Edwards, Massachusetts, and Fort McCoy, Wisconsin*, by Diane Shaw Wasch, Perry Bush, Keith Landreth, and James Glass. 1993.

6. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 183, and Girdner and Loftis, *Great Betrayal*, p. 149.

7. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 183-85, and Girdner and Loftis, *Great Betrayal*, pp. 183-85.

Housing for military police at each center was provided in an area separate from the assembly center "barbed-wire" enclosure for the detainees. Where existing accommodations could not be adapted for this purpose, barracks were constructed as were "auxiliary installations." Although DeWitt claimed that these facilities were ordinarily "similar to those used by evacuees," there is evidence that facilities for the military police were more substantial than those for the evacuees.

Following transfer of the evacuees to the WRA-directed relocation centers, assembly center facilities were occupied by various Army units, most serving "as service schools for the various Army branches, such as ordnance, signal corps, quartermaster and transportation corps." DeWitt noted that the assembly centers were "more ideally suited for troop use than they were for the housing of families."⁸

WCCA policy allotted a 10-foot x 20-foot space (200 square feet) per married couple. Family groups inside the centers were to be kept together, and families would share space with others only if it were unavoidable. To meet these needs, units were to be remodeled if necessary, and each was to be furnished with "standard Army steel cots," mattresses, blankets (a minimum of three per person), and pillows. Each unit was to have electrical outlets. However, the speed of evacuation and the shortages of labor and building materials, such as lumber, meant that living arrangements did not always conform to WCCA policy. At Tanforan, for instance, bachelors who did not live in the renovated stables occupied a huge dormitory under the racetrack grandstand, an enormous room with 350 to 400 beds along one wall with less than two feet between each bed.⁹

Despite the problems associated with the sites and facilities at the assembly centers, the Red Cross representative who visited the centers at the Army's request concluded, taking into account his own experience in housing large numbers of refugees, that as a whole the evacuees were "comfortably and adequately sheltered." He stated:

Generally, the sites selected were satisfactory with the possible exception of Puyallup, where lack of adequate drainage and sewage disposal facilities created a serious problem. . . . In studying the housing facilities in these centers, it is necessary to keep in mind that the job was without precedent, and that the sites were selected and buildings completed in record-breaking time in the face of such handicaps as material and labor shortages and transportation difficulties.¹⁰

ADMINISTRATION

Following establishment of the WCCA, R. L. Nicholson, then regional director of the Works Projects Administration for the eleven western states, was appointed in mid-March

8. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 183-84.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 186, and Girdner and Loftis, *Great Betrayal*, p. 152.

10. American National Red Cross, "Report of the American Red Cross Survey of Assembly Centers in California, Oregon, and Washington," August 1942, p. 37, quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 139. The per capita cost of constructing the centers ranged from \$64 for Puyallup to \$196 for Pomona. "Summary of Available Data on Assembly Centers," pp. 5-6ff, Roll 3, No. 69, M1342, RG 210.

as its Chief, Assembly Center Branch of the Temporary Settlement Operations Division. As the operations of the Works Projects Administration, a large-scale national works program that had been established during the Depression for jobless employables, were being phased out as a result of the emerging war economy, large numbers of its field staff were available for other employment. As a result, Nicholson, who took a temporary leave of absence from the WPA to aid the evacuation program, facilitated the "transfer" of many former WPA personnel, who had considerable experience in federal fiscal, procurement, and administrative policy and procedures, to provide administrative staff for the assembly centers. The responsibility for assembly center operations, however, remained with DeWitt whose "administrative directions were carried into effect through" Colonel Bendetsen, the WCCA director, from the agency's headquarters in the Whitcomb Hotel in San Francisco.¹¹

The "executive" organizational structure (A copy of an "Assembly Center Organization" chart may be seen on the following page) in the assembly centers included a manager and assistant manager under whom were an internal relations officer, public relations officer, center cashier, and executive assistant. There were four operating divisions: service, works, finance, and mess/lodging. Caucasian staff were a class apart: their quarters were generally located in a separate, guarded section outside the barbed-wire center enclosure. Even where the staff quarters were not rigidly separated from the rest of the center, they were noticeably better built and furnished than those of the evacuees. Fraternization with the Japanese was forbidden by written rule.¹²

U.S. postal service facilities were operated in the assembly centers by regular, bonded postal employees assigned by postal authorities. They were authorized to carry on normal postal services, such as selling stamps and money orders and handling parcel post packages. They were also authorized to sell war bonds. Evacuees sorted and delivered incoming and outgoing mail. Although such mail was not censored, parcel post packages were inspected for contraband "in the presence of the addressee." Banking facilities were provided in all assembly centers, although banking by mail was encouraged through the assistance of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.¹³

The U.S. Public Health Service was responsible for the immediate direction of center infirmaries, hospitals, and outpatient services. Evacuee doctors and nurses were recruited to staff the medical facilities. An evacuee physician in each center was designated as chief medical officer and dealt directly with the management.¹⁴

11. U.S. War Department *Final Report*, pp. 46-47, 222, and Girdner and Loftis, *Great Betrayal*, p. 169.

12. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 222-23, and Girdner and Loftis, *Great Betrayal*, p. 169.

13. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 226.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 222-27.

ASSEMBLY CENTER ORGANIZATION




Figure 6: Assembly Center Organization
U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 223.

Soon after the selection of the assembly center sites, the WCCA issued an *Operation Manual* to provide administrative guidance for the centers' operation. Periodically updated, the manual, according to DeWitt, "covered all aspects of operations, and prescribed the rules to be observed by evacuees in the interests of public health, morals and order." Regulations were posted for the "information and guidance of those affected."¹⁵

SECURITY

The commanding generals of each sector of the Western Defense Command were responsible to DeWitt for the external security at each of the assembly centers. One or more military police companies were assigned to each assembly center "as required by the area and evacuee population involved."

15. *Ibid.*, p. 225. A copy of the W.C.C.A. *Operations Manual*, dated June 11, 1942, may be found in collection No. 200, Japanese in California, Box 42, Folder 5, Department of Special Collections, UCLA.

The basic function of the military police at the assembly centers was to guard the camp perimeters and to "prevent ingress and egress of unauthorized persons [without passes issued by the WCCA]." According to the *Operation Manual*, the assembly centers were "generally located in grounds surrounded by fences clearly defining the limits for evacuees." In centers "having no fences, and boundaries marked only by signs, the military police" were to "control the roads leading into the Center and may have sentry towers placed to observe the evacuee barracks." The "balance of the area could "be covered by motor patrol."¹⁶ If an evacuee attempted to leave camp without permission, he would be halted, arrested, and delivered to the center internal civilian police. A "firm but courteous" attitude toward the evacuees was required, but the military police were not permitted to fraternize with them. The military police were permitted within the areas occupied by the evacuees only when performing their prescribed duties. In the event of a fire, riot, or disorder which was beyond the control of center management or its internal police, assembly center officials were authorized to call for assistance from the military police. When they were called, the "commanding officer assumed full charge of the entire Center until the emergency was ended." The commanding officer of the military police was responsible for black-outs of the centers, and a switch was to "be so located to permit the prompt cut-off by the military police of all electric current in the center." The military police were also responsible for protection of merchandise at the post exchanges furnished for the use of the military personnel.

Original plans for internal security at each center contemplated a civilian law enforcement body consisting of an experienced Caucasian peace officer as chief of police and one other Caucasian assistant, with evacuees to serve as patrolmen. Early in the operation of the first centers, "disaffection among the evacuees" became "rampant," necessitating a change in plans. An Interior Security Branch was established in the central office of the WCCA, and an army officer with previous experience as a student of municipal affairs and as a metropolitan police chief was assigned as chief. Caucasian civilians with municipal police experience were employed as assistant chiefs of the branch, inspectors, and planning assistants. An experienced municipal police officer, directly responsible to the WCCA, was employed as chief of interior security police in each center. An assistant chief and two or more sergeants rounded out his Caucasian staff. A number of patrolmen were recruited from the evacuee population. The proportion of interior security police was four per one thousand evacuee population. Duties of the interior security police, as governed by an Interior Security Manual, included inspection of all incoming and outgoing parcels, except letter mail, for contraband; inspection of all vehicles passing through entrances and exits; supervision of visitors; patrol of mess halls; and escort of all evacuees who were authorized by the center manager to leave the center. The personnel of the Interior Security Branch reached its maximum in the month of July 1942 with a total of 334 employees — 319 in the assembly centers and 15 in the WCCA headquarters.

Charges for criminal offenses in the assembly centers totaled 534 between April 25 and October 25, 1942. The largest categories of offenses were larceny (theft), 123; "suspicion," 117; disorderly conduct, 72; gambling, 55; and assault, 36.

16. W.C.C.A. *Operation Manual*, June 11, 1942, p. 2, Collection No. 200, Department of Special Collections, UCLA.

To assist in keeping the peace and regulating foot and motorized traffic during the early operations of the assembly centers, the chiefs of internal security recruited staffs of auxiliary police from among evacuees. This practice, according to DeWitt, "proved wholly unsuccessful." Their alleged "transgressions" included extending special privileges to influential evacuees, demanding extra compensation and privileges, protecting gambling rings, and participating in demonstrations and disturbances. Thus, after "more than a fair trial," the evacuee auxiliaries were disbanded.

Direct liaison was established between the internal security police at each center and local law enforcement agencies, county attorneys, and courts. All internal security police at each center received deputizations from local county sheriffs except in those cases where the center was entirely within a municipality. There special police commissions were issued by local police chiefs. Violations of local ordinances and state laws were tried in local courts before local prosecutors.

Subversive activities and violations of federal laws were investigated by the FBI and prosecuted in the federal courts. Internal security police conducted preliminary investigations, reported those that appeared to be federal violations to the FBI, and cooperated with FBI agents in further investigations and the apprehension of violators.¹⁷

EVACUEE EXPERIENCES

The evacuees endured the frustrations and inconveniences of the assembly centers for the most part peacefully and stoically. The experiences of many evacuees, however, contributed to and reinforced their sense of bitterness, hopelessness, and despair — attitudes they would take with them to the relocation centers.

Transfer to Assembly Centers

Once a civilian exclusion order was posted in an area to be evacuated, a representative of each family was directed to visit a civilian control station where the family was registered and issued a number that was to be appended to each piece of baggage and coat lapel of each family member. The representative was told when and where the family should report and what belongings could be taken. Baggage restrictions posed a problem, because most evacuees did not know their ultimate destination. They could only take what they could carry, a stipulation that created considerable anguish as one's lifetime possessions were sorted.

On departure day, the evacuees, wearing tags and carrying their baggage, gathered in groups of about 500 at an appointed spot. Although some were allowed to take their automobiles, traveling in military-escorted convoys to the assembly centers, most made the trip by bus or train. The WCCA made an effort to foresee problems during the journey. Ideally each group was to travel with at least one doctor and a nurse, as well as medical supplies and food. One of every four seats on the conveyance was to be vacant to

17. U.S., War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 215-21, 225.

hold hand luggage. The buses were to stop as necessary, and persons who might require medical assistance would be clustered in one bus or train car with the nurse.

Despite such planning, many evacuees experienced less than ideal conditions on their trips to the assembly centers. In some cases, there was little or no food on long trips. Sometimes train windows were blacked out, aggravating the evacuees' feelings of uncertainty and heightening their sense of isolation and abandonment. The sight of armed guards patrolling the trains and buses was not reassuring. One evacuee, for instance, later recalled her trip to an assembly center:

On May 16, 1942 at 9:30 a.m., we departed . . . for an unknown destination. To this day [August 6, 1981], I can remember vividly the plight of the elderly, some on stretchers, orphans herded onto the train by caretakers, and especially a young couple with 4 pre-school children. The mother had two frightened toddlers hanging on to her coat. In her arms, she carried two crying babies. The father had diapers and other baby paraphernalia strapped to his back. In his hands he struggled with duffle bag and suitcase. The shades were drawn on the train for our entire trip. Military police patrolled the aisles.¹⁸

Many evacuees recall two images of their arrival at the assembly centers. One was walking to the camp between a cordon of armed military guards with bared bayonets, and the other was first seeing the barbed wire, watchtowers, and searchlights surrounding the camp. Leonard Abrams, a member of a Field Artillery Battalion that guarded the Santa Anita Assembly Center, later recounted:

We were put on full alert one day, issued full belts of live ammunition, and went to Santa Anita Race Track. . . . There we formed part of a cordon of troops leading into the grounds; busses kept on arriving and many people walked along . . . many weeping or simply dazed, or bewildered by our formidable ranks.¹⁹

For many evacuees, arrival at the assembly center brought the first vivid realization of their condition. They were under military guard and considered possible threats to the national security of the nation. One evacuee later recalled his entry into the Tanforan Assembly Center at San Bruno, California:

At the entrance . . . stood two lines of troops with rifles and fixed bayonets pointed at the evacuees as they walked between the soldiers to the prison compound. Overwhelmed with bitterness and blind with rage, I screamed every obscenity I knew at the armed guards daring them to shoot me.²⁰

18. Oral testimony, Grace Nakamura, Los Angeles, August 6, 1981, Hearings, Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, p. 252, quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*.

19. Unsolicited testimony, Leonard Abrams, Philadelphia, Hearings, Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 136.

20. Oral testimony, William Kochiyama, New York, November 23, 1981, Hearings, Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, p. 97, quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 136.

Once inside the gates of the assembly center, the evacuees were searched, fingerprinted, interrogated, given a cursory medical examination, and inoculated. After the preliminaries, Caucasian administrators compiled a lengthy social and occupational history of each arrival and explained the rules of the camp. Following these preliminaries, assembly center staff or selected Nisei directed the evacuees to their assigned quarters. Each family was presented with a broom, mop, and bucket for most of the camps were extremely dusty. Arrivals were handed long bags of mattress ticking containing straw, a method of mattressing the cots. Most new arrivals stuffed their own casings with straw, making not too uncomfortable beds at first — before they began to mat down and turn to dust, requiring them to be refilled every few weeks.²¹

Many of the evacuees typically reacted to their initial encounters at the assembly centers with feelings of bewilderment, insecurity, and apprehension. Red Cross representatives who visited the assembly centers described some evacuees' reactions soon after arrival:

Many families with sons in the United States Army and married daughters living in Japan are said to feel terrific conflict. Many who consider themselves good Americans now feel they have been classed with the Japanese. . . . There is a great financial insecurity. Many families have lost heavily in the sale of property. . . . Savings are dipped into for the purchase of coupon books to be used at the center store, and with the depletion of savings comes a mounting sense of insecurity and anxiety as to what will be done when the money is gone. . . . Doubtless the greatest insecurity is that about post-war conditions. Many wonder if they will ever be accepted in Caucasian communities.²²

Housing and Facilities

During the hearings of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians in 1981, evacuees described typical living arrangements that were well below the WCCA's spartan standards. Among the reminiscences were the following:

Pinedale. The hastily built camp consisted of tar paper roofed barracks with gaping cracks that let in insects, dirt from the . . . dust storms . . . no toilet facilities except smelly outhouses, and community bathrooms with overhead pipes with holes punched in to serve as showers. The furniture was camp cots with dirty straw mattresses.²³

Puyallup. This was temporary housing, and the room in which I was confined was a makeshift barracks from a horse stable. Between the floorboards we saw weeds coming up. The room had only one bed and no other furniture. We were

21. Girdner and Loftis, *Great Betrayal*, pp. 146-48.

22. American National Red Cross, "Survey of Assembly Centers," pp. 18-19, quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 137.

23. Oral testimony, Ken Hayashi, Los Angeles, August 4, 1981, Hearings, Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, p. 222, quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 138.

given a sack to fill up with hay from a stack outside the barracks to make our mattresses.²⁴

Portland. The assembly center was the Portland stockyard. It was filthy, smelly, and dirty. There was roughly two thousand people packed in one large building. No beds were provided, so they gave us gunny sacks to fill with straw, that was our bed.²⁵

Santa Anita. We were confined to horse stables. The horse stables were whitewashed. In the hot summers, the legs of the cots were sinking through the asphalt. We were given mattress covers and told to stuff straw in them. The toilet facilities were terrible. They were communal. There were no partitions. Toilet paper was rationed by family members. We had to, to bathe, go to the horse showers. The horses all took showers in there, regardless of sex, but with human beings, they built a partition. . . . The women complained that the men were climbing over the top to view the women taking showers. [When the women complained] one of the officials said, are you sure you women are not climbing the walls to look at the men. . . .²⁶

It had extra guard towers with a searchlight panoraming the camp, and it was very difficult to sleep because the light kept coming into our window . . . I wasn't in a stable area, . . . [but] everyone who was in a stable area claimed that they were housed in the stall that housed the great Sea Biscuit.²⁷

Barracks at most assembly centers were constructed of rough green lumber. These thin pine boards buckled and separated, and large spaces grew between them. The tar paper glued on the outside of the barracks did not keep the searchlights from shining between the boards at night. Doors might or might not fit the openings meant for them. Floors made of the same raw lumber developed cracks between the boards, although in some camps the government eventually laid linoleum. Cold entered the cracks at night and dust in the daytime.

A typical single family unit had one window that looked out on the street. Some quarters had no windows at all, while an exceptional room, such as some at Pomona, had three windows. There were no shades or curtains except when people were able to find goods with which to make them, no shelves, closets, or lockers, and to keep their places neat evacuees often stored their belongings under the beds.

24. Oral testimony, Toshiko Toku, Seattle, September 10, 1981, Hearings, Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, p. 39, quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 139.

25. Oral testimony, James T. Fiyii, Los Angeles, August 6, 1981, Hearings, Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, p. 80, quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 139.

26. Oral testimony, Thomas M. Tajiri, Chicago, September 22, 1981, Hearings, Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, p. 293, quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 139.

27. Oral testimony, Marshall M. Sumida, San Francisco, August 11, 1981, Hearings, Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, p. 102, quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 139.

Evacuees began immediately to improve their quarters, busying themselves scrubbing down floors and putting away their belongings. Water had to be hauled a long way as the block laundry rooms and mess halls were generally a good distance off. Water from these sources was cold as often as warm. Victory gardens were planted beside the barracks, and Tanforan evacuees built a miniature aquatic park with bridge, promenade, and islands.²⁸

Among the most severe discomforts experienced by the evacuees at the assembly centers were overcrowding and lack of privacy. Despite WCCA planning, eight-person families were sometimes placed in 20-foot by 20-foot rooms, six persons in 12-foot by 20-foot rooms, and four persons in 8-foot by 20-foot rooms. If families were small, other persons were often moved in with them. Extra children might be housed next door. Several married couples sometimes were forced to share a single room, their quarters separated by sheets hung on wires across the room. Partitions between apartments did not provide much privacy, for many did not extend up to the roof, and conversations on the other side were necessarily overheard. Latrines were not properly partitioned, and it frequently took considerable protest by the evacuees to get the authorities to have appropriate partitions and shower curtains installed.²⁹ One evacuee, for instance, wrote from the Merced Assembly Center:

. . . the only thing I really don't like are the lavatories. It's not very sanitary and has caused a great deal of constipation in camp for both men and women. The toilets are one big row of seats, that is, one straight board with holes out about a foot apart with no partitions at all and all the toilets flush together. . . . about every five minutes. The younger girls couldn't go to them at first until they couldn't stand it any longer, which is really bad for them.³⁰

The weather often made conditions oppressive in the assembly centers. On hot days, overcrowding and sewage problems made the heat seem unbearable. At Pinedale, for instance, temperatures soared to 110 degrees, and evacuees were given salt tablets to prevent dehydration.³¹ At Puyallup, mud posed serious difficulties:

We fought a daily battle with the carnivorous Puyallup mud. The ground was a vast ocean of mud, and whenever it threatened to dry and cake up, the rains came and softened it into slippery ooze.³²

Family Separation

Many families arrived at the assembly centers with family members missing, thus adding to their demoralized feelings. In some cases, family members, usually the father, had

28. Girdner and Loftis, *Great Betrayal*, pp. 148-49; *Personal Justice Denied*, pp. 139-40; and Mine Okubo, *Citizen 13660* (New York, Arno Press, 1978), pp. 50, 97, 99.

29. *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 140, and Girdner and Loftis, *Great Betrayal*, p. 149.

30. Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA*, p. 89.

31. *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 140.

32. Monica Sone, *Nisai Daughter* (Seattle and London, University of Washington Press, 1953), p. 180.

earlier been taken into custody by the FBI. In other instances, family members were institutionalized in sanatoriums, hospitals, or asylums. Those whom the WCCA considered too sick to move, who resided in institutions, or who were in prison, received exemptions or deferments until they were able to travel. As a result, some families arrived with single parents or without a child, and sometimes children arrived without either parent.

Another source of family separation was the WCCA policy defining who was "Japanese." Many individuals of mixed parentage had some Japanese ancestors; others were Caucasian but married to someone of Japanese ancestry. Many of these people went to assembly centers but had a particularly difficult time, because they were not fully accepted into the community. Those who were allowed to leave often did so.

Some families were separated after they reached the centers. A 17-year-old boy, for instance, was apprehended after sneaking away from Santa Anita to go to the movies. He was sent to a different assembly center and did not see his family again for three years.

Family separation probably occurred most frequently among those who lived in different communities. Grown children were sent to centers different from their parents if they lived in another community. In some cases, exclusion area lines drawn arbitrarily through communities separated family members who lived in different parts of the same Japanese enclave. No visiting privileges, however, were permitted save for exceptional circumstances.³³

Food, Sanitation, Clothing, and Medical Care

Most of the assembly centers were organized to feed the evacuees in large mess halls. At Santa Anita, for instance, there were three large mess halls where meals were served in three shifts of 2,000 persons each. Where shift feeding was instituted, a system of regulatory badges prevented evacuees from attending the same meal at various mess halls.³⁴ Lining up and waiting to eat is a memory shared by many:

[W]e stood two hours three times a day with pails in our hands like beggars to receive our meals. There was no hot water, no washing or bathing. It took about two months before we lived half way civilized.³⁵

Communal feeding weakened traditional Japanese family ties. At first, families tried to stay together, and some obtained food from the mess hall and took it back to their quarters in order to eat together. In time, however, children began to eat with their friends, leaving many parents to congregate together.³⁶

33. *Personal Justice Denied*, pp. 140-41, and U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 145.

34. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 186; *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 141; and Michi Weglyn, *Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America's Concentration Camps* (New York, William Morrow & Co., 1976), p. 82.

35. Oral testimony, Misao Sakamoto, Seattle, September 9, 1981, Hearings Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, p. 177, quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 141.

36. *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 141.

Most evacuees generally agreed that food at the assembly centers left much to be desired. One evacuee recalled that "breakfast consisted of toast, coffee, occasionally eggs or bacon. Then it was an ice cream scoop of rice, a cold sardine, a weeny, or sauerkraut."³⁷ Another evacuee remembered:

For the first few months our diet. . . consisted of brined liver — salted liver. Huge liver. Brown and bluish in color . . . [that] . . would bounce if dropped. . . . Then there was rice and for dessert, maybe half a can of peach or a pear, tea and coffee. Mornings were better with one egg, oatmeal, tea or coffee.³⁸

In time, the kitchens were taken over by evacuee cooks, and culinary style improved, but problems of quality would remain.

Despite the complaints of evacuees, the Red Cross reported that, given the inherent limitations of mass feeding, menus "showed no serious shortages in nutritive values."³⁹ Many evacuees complained that there was enough milk only for babies and the elderly, thus contradicting the WCCA assertion that "per capita consumption of milk by the population was higher than before evacuation and that it was also higher than that of the American population as a whole."⁴⁰ Food problems were aggravated at some centers by a prohibition on importing food into the center.⁴¹

The WCCA had the same food allowance as that prescribed for the Army — 50 cents per day per person. The assembly centers, however, averaged less than that sum — an average of 39 cents per person per day. The WCCA was very cost conscious in its purchases of foodstuffs since various anti-Japanese elements outside the centers pressed the government to cut expenses even more.⁴²

Food became a controversial issue at some assembly centers. At Santa Anita, for instance, a camp staff member was apparently stealing food. A letterwriting campaign began, and, at one point, a confrontation with the military police was narrowly averted when evacuees attempted to halt the car of a Caucasian mess steward whom they believed was purloining food. Following an investigation, the guilty staff member was dismissed.⁴³

Assembly center sanitation arrangements were primitive, although the WCCA attempted to minimize health risks by establishing a system of block monitors to inspect evacuee quarters and regular inspections of barracks, showers, and latrines by the assembly center

37. Oral testimony, Shizuko Tokushige, San Francisco, August 12, 1981, Hearings, Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, p. 227, quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 142.

38. Oral testimony, James M. Goto, Los Angeles, August 5, 1981, Hearings, Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, p. 213, quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 142.

39. American National Red Cross, "Survey of Assembly Centers," p. 4, quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 142.

40. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 193.

41. *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 142.

42. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 186.

43. *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 142.

housing supervisor. Food handlers were supposed to undergo physical examinations, and kitchens were to be inspected daily.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, shower, washroom, toilet, and laundry facilities were overcrowded, necessitating long waiting lines. The distance to the lavatories, more than 100 yards in some parts of the Puyallup camp, posed a problem for the elderly and families with small children, especially given the muddy conditions. As a result, chamber pots became a highly valued commodity.⁴⁵ At some centers temporary plumbing and sewage disposal were problems. On hot days children played "in the shower water that overflowed from the plumbing."⁴⁶ An official report of the U.S. Public Health Service concluded that sanitation was bad and the lack of serious epidemics arising from unsanitary conditions in the camps was the result of "heroic efforts of the management of the centers, the County Health Departments and the Japanese Medical staffs."⁴⁷

The Army's own reports testified to the poor sanitation in the assembly centers. For instance, a report prepared by a food consultant and a Quartermaster Corps officer indicated serious sanitary deficiencies:

The kitchens are not up to Army standards of cleanliness. . . . The dishes looked bad . . . gray and cracked. . . . Dishwashing not very satisfactory due to an insufficiency of hot water. . . . Soup plates being used instead of plates, which means that the food all runs together and looks untidy and unappetizing.⁴⁸

Securing everyday necessities was difficult for many evacuees. Most had brought their own clothing, but a few, either because of poverty or because they had not anticipated the climate, did not have appropriate clothing. In these cases, upon application, the WCCA provided a clothing allowance of between \$25 and \$42.19 a year depending on age and gender. The centers had canteens, though often these were poorly supplied. Thus, most evacuees were forced to purchase necessities by ordering from mail order houses.⁴⁹

Inadequate medical facilities and care were among the greatest problems facing the evacuees at the assembly centers, thus adding fear, pain, and inconvenience to their experience. The evacuee doctors and nurses who were recruited by the U.S. Public Health Service found minimal equipment and supplies. At Pinedale, for instance, dental chairs were made out of crates, and the only instruments were forceps and a few syringes. At Fresno, the hospital was a large room with cots; its only supplies were mineral oil, iodine, aspirin, Kaopectate, alcohol, and sulfa ointment. Some of the doctors who had not brought their instruments were sent home to retrieve them, and all relied, to some extent, on

44. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 186.

45. Okubo, *Citizen 13660*, p. 86, and *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 142.

46. Okubo, *Citizen 13660*, p. 78, and Oral testimony, Kinya Noguchi, San Francisco, August 11, 1981, Hearings, Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, p. 107, quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 142.

47. Quoted in Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA*, p. 89.

48. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 89.

49. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 188; Okubo, *Citizen 13660*, p. 84; and *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 143.

donated supplies. Shortages of medical personnel plagued the assembly centers. At Fresno, for instance, two doctors had to care for 2,500 people.⁵⁰

With few exceptions, medical staff treated the normal range of illnesses and injuries. There were, however, some emergencies. At Fresno, an outbreak of food poisoning affected more than 200 persons, and a similar outbreak occurred at Puyallup. At Santa Anita, hospital records show that about 75 percent of the illnesses came from occupants of the horse stalls. Serious illnesses were treated at nearby hospitals outside the centers, and the Army reported that it paid for such services. Some evacuees, however, recall paying the bills themselves.⁵¹

Life in the Centers

Because the WCCA had planned only short stays in the assembly centers, they paid little attention to how evacuees would spend their time. As the move to relocation centers was postponed, however, the WCCA and the evacuees attempted to establish a semblance of normal life.

The educational program got off to a slow start but progressed rapidly at most centers. Because evacuation occurred near the end of the school year and the time at the centers was to be temporary, there was no provision in the original plan for schools or educational work. As the assembly centers continued operations into the fall, however, this aspect of life was given increasing attention.⁵²

Responding to the needs of the population of the assembly centers, the WCCA belatedly appointed a director of education at each center. This educational supervisor was a member of the center administrative staff, while the education program was under the technical direction of the U.S. Office of Education. Rudimentary classrooms were staffed by evacuee teachers, mostly college graduates. A number of these graduates had been certified, and they were paid \$16 per month. School programs varied. At Tanforan, for instance, schools opened late but were well attended — of 7,800 evacuees, 3,650 were students and 100 teachers. At Santa Anita, on the other hand, there was no organized educational program. School furnishings at the assembly centers were "either constructed with evacuee labor or improvised." Progress reports were issued, and work was exhibited. Books and classroom materials, which were often in short supply, were provided primarily through donation from the state and county schools the children had attended prior to evacuation. Supplies arrived sporadically, most being the gifts of interested groups and individuals. Instruction was provided for pre-school through high school levels, and adult education classes were also offered at most centers. The curriculum varied, but most traditional subjects were taught in the elementary through high school levels, and adult education offered such subjects as English, knitting and sewing,

50. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 190, and *Personal Justice Denied*, pp. 143–44.

51. Sone, *Nisei Daughter*, p. 178; Weglyn, *Years of Infamy*, p. 81; and U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 192.

52. American National Red Cross, *Survey of Assembly Centers*, p. 52, in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 144.

American history, music, and art. Special classes were held in first aid, safety, fire prevention, and nursing.⁵³

Recreational programs were organized cooperatively between the WCCA and the evacuees. Scout troops, musical groups, and arts and crafts classes were formed. Sports teams and leagues for baseball and basketball were established. A calisthenics class at Stockton drew 350 evacuees. Donations helped remedy equipment shortages. Movies were shown regularly at most centers often using donated equipment. At Tanforan, for instance, the mess card served as entrance pass; different nights were reserved for different mess hall groups. Some centers opened libraries to which both evacuees and outside donors contributed. Virtually all centers had some playground area, and some had more elaborate facilities, one even having a pitch-and-putt golf course.⁵⁴

Holidays were cause for celebrations. One evacuee described her preparation for the Fourth of July festivities at Tanforan:

I worked as a recreation leader in our block for a group of 7-10 year old girls. Perhaps one of the highlights was the yards and yards of paper chains we (my 7-10 year old girls) made from cut up strips of newspaper which we colored red, white, and blue for the big Fourth of July dance aboard the ship (recreation hall) dubbed the S.S.-6.

These paper chains were the decoration that festooned the walls of the Recreation Hall. It was our Independence Day celebration, though we were behind barbed wire, military police all around us, and we could see the big sign of 'South San Francisco' on the hill just outside of the Tanforan Assembly Center.⁵⁵

Some recreational pursuits, however, were simply traditional pastimes that the evacuees engaged in to while away the time at the assembly centers. *Goh* and *Shogi*, Japanese games akin to chess, were popular among the Issei, who ran frequent tournaments and matches. Knitting was a popular pastime among the women. Gambling games were operated, prompting raids and arrests by assembly center police in some cases.⁵⁶

The majority of the evacuees were predominantly Buddhist or Protestant. The WCCA allowed evacuees to hold religious services in designated facilities in the centers and to request assistance from outside religious leaders. Caucasian religious workers were not allowed to live in the centers and could visit only by invitation. The services were monitored for fear they might be used for enemy propaganda or incitement. The use of Japanese was generally prohibited and publications had to be cleared. The prohibition on

53. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 207-09; Okubo, *Citizen 13660*, p. 92; and *Personal Justice Denied*, pp. 144-45.

54. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 209-10; Okubo, *Citizen 13660*, pp. 88, 93; and *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 145.

55. Unsolicited testimony, Sachi Kajiwara, Dayton, Ohio, Hearings, Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 145.

56. Okubo, *Citizen 13660*, pp. 103-05.

speaking Japanese created particular problems for the Buddhists, who had few English-speaking priests. Thus, their services were restructured and service books rewritten.⁵⁷

Control of publications extended to the mimeographed center newspapers. Each center had a newspaper, written in English by evacuees under the "guidance of WCCA public relations representatives." News items were generally confined to those determined of "actual interest" to the evacuees.⁵⁸

At some centers, evacuees organized rudimentary forms of self-government. For example, evacuees at Tanforan elected a Center Advisory Council. In August, however, the Army, concerned that such bodies were contributing to evacuee unrest and protest, issued an order dissolving all self-government bodies.⁵⁹

Although no evacuee was required to work, the WCCA planned that assembly center operations be carried out principally by evacuees. Efforts were undertaken to employ evacuees "to the fullest extent practicable on assignments they proved to be capable of performing." Thus, evacuees were employed in virtually every center department, including maintenance and repairs, construction, sanitation, gardening, recreation, education, and services, and some assisted WCCA administrators. Under supervision all kitchens and mess halls were staffed by evacuees. Some 27,000 evacuees, or more than 30 percent of the assembly centers' population, were employed in "necessary and productive" tasks. The average "man-hours per month of those employed equaled 47.7 hours per person of the aggregate evacuee population, non- workers included."

The appropriate payment for evacuee employment was a matter of dispute and a source of continuing dissatisfaction among the evacuee population. At first there was no pay. Eventually evacuees were compensated nominally for work. General DeWitt determined that net cash wages paid to evacuees "should not exceed the net cash allowance then available [\$21 for their first four months of service] to any enlisted man in the United States Army." Thus, comparatively low monthly wage rates, based on a 40-hour week, were set at \$8 and \$12 for unskilled and skilled labor, respectively, and \$16 for professionals.⁶⁰

Subsistence, shelter, and medical care, including dental work and hospitalization, were furnished without cost. All evacuees were given a monthly allowance in script or coupons for the purchase of necessities. The monthly coupon allowance was \$1 for evacuees under 16 years of age, \$2.50 for those over age 16, a maximum of \$4.50 for married couples, and a maximum of \$7.50 for families. Available community services, such as shoe repair, barber, and beauty shops, were "obtainable in exchange for coupons only." Evacuees were permitted to purchase extra coupon books.⁶¹

57. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 211-12, and *Personal Justice Denied*, pp. 145-46.

58. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 213, and *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 146.

59. Okubo, *Citizen 13660*, p. 91.

60. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 205-06, and *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 146.

61. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 224.

Several assembly centers experimented with establishing enterprises to support the war effort and raise funds to cover the cost of center operations. At Santa Anita, for instance, a camouflage net project produced enough revenue to offset the cost of food for the entire camp. Limited to American citizens because of restrictions imposed by the Geneva Convention, the project attracted more than 800 evacuees. The camouflage net factory was the scene of the only strike in the assembly centers, a sit-down protest over working conditions and insufficient food. At Marysville, in May 1942, a group of evacuees was given leave to thin sugar beets, thus alleviating a labor shortage in the local agricultural sector. This development was exceptional; from most assembly centers, no leave for outside work was permitted.⁶²

Security

The military police guarding the perimeters of the assembly centers aroused substantial concern among the evacuees. Armed with machine guns, they appeared menacing. In some cases, they were accused of propositioning or otherwise harassing female evacuees. In general, however, they were rather remote from the life of the centers, entering only at the director's request. The military police, however, had a significant impact on the evacuees in that they signified "the loss and freedom and independence."⁶³

According to a study of the assembly centers by the War Relocation Authority Community Analysis Section, the "fences, the military police, the searchlights and watchtowers of the centers created a good deal of ill-feeling among the people." "Resentment was high, and in spite of the publicity efforts stating these were not concentration camps, the presence of these fences made this assertion unconvincing." The study stated further:

The crowded conditions and lack of adequate space made the fences seem even closer and more unbearable. After a while, the people became resigned to them. However, they continued to resent the searchlights, especially in those centers in which the guards would play them over the center and flash them into the barracks and on people walking through the area (as reported from Santa Anita). The evacuees hoped and thought that their feeling of restraint and restriction, focused on the psychology of the fences, would be eliminated when they came to the relocation centers. . . .⁶⁴

The evacuees had more encounters and thus more conflict with the internal police in the assembly centers. Internal security measures varied at the centers, but curfews and rollcalls were common. Curfew at Puyallup, for instance, was at 10 p.m., while rollcall at Tanforan was held twice a day at 6:45 A.M. and 6:45 P.M.⁶⁵

62. *Ibid.*, pp. 205-06; Weglyn, *Years of Infamy*, p. 81; and *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 146.

63. American National Red Cross, "Survey of Assembly Centers," p. 22, quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 147.

64. "Summary of Available Data on Assembly Centers," pp. 11-12, Roll 3, No. 69, M1342, RG 210.

65. Sone, *Nisei Daughter*, p. 176, and Okubo, *Citizen 13660*, p. 59.

Most assembly centers held inspections, designed to search out and seize contraband and prohibited items. The definition of "contraband," however, changed as time went on, causing confusion and resentment. Flashlights and shortwave radios that conceivably could be used for signalling were always contraband. Hot plates and other electrical appliances (often controlled in the interests of fire prevention) were usually contraband, although exceptions were sometimes granted. Alcoholic beverages were forbidden, as were "potentially dangerous" items such as weapons, but the latter category sometimes included knives, scissors, chisels, and saws. At Tulare, inspection sometimes occurred at night, and at Tanforan, one was conducted by the Army, which placed each "section" under armed guard while searching. Evacuees at Puyallup were told to remain in their quarters during search procedures.⁶⁶

Visits to the assembly centers by outsiders were controlled tightly, heightening the evacuees' sense of isolation. Visitors were not allowed "to enter the Center proper or to meet evacuees in their living quarters except in cases of serious illness or other emergency." Visitors could obtain passes to meet evacuees in "visiting houses," through mail application, or at the center gate from an attendant representing center management.⁶⁷ Visitors bringing gifts watched packages being opened. Melons, cakes, and pies were cut in half to ensure that none contained weapons or contraband. At some centers, evacuees could converse with visitors only through a wire fence, while others designated special visiting areas. At Tanforan and Pomona, for example, rooms at the top of grandstands were reserved for receiving visitors during specified hours. At Santa Anita, each family was allowed only one visitor's permit a week, and visits were limited to 30 minutes.⁶⁸

According to the aforementioned study by the WRA Community Analysis Section, the "factors in the assembly centers that made the most vivid impressions on the evacuees were fears about the future, the long time spent standing in line for meals, the shame of the entire situation, and the deep feeling of humiliation they experienced because of the 'prison' atmosphere when their Caucasian friends visited them." The "fences around the center made them constantly aware of their status." The study stated further:

The deepest impression on the people was made not so much by the assembly center living conditions as by the sense of restraint, of being fenced in and watched over, of being evacuated from their homes, and by the basic insecurities and anxieties the evacuation had created. Added to this were the fears of the parents that their children were growing up in an artificial environment; that they were not learning the values of the society in which they must adjust and assimilate; and that their education was not comparable to that provided in the communities from which they came. . . .⁶⁹

Evacuees endured the frustrations and inconveniences of the assembly centers for the most part peacefully and stoically. They believed these centers were temporary, and most looked forward to better treatment at the next stop on their evacuation journey — the relocation center.

66. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 218; Okubo, *Citizen 13660*, p. 108; and Sone, *Nisei Daughter*, p. 187.

67. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 226.

68. Okubo, *Citizen 13660*, p. 79, and *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 148.

69. "Summary of Available Data on Assembly Centers," pp. 27-28, Roll 3, No. 69, M1342, RG 210.

Although a "nebulous protest movement" developed at many centers, only one major disturbance occurred in the assembly centers. On August 4, 1942, a routine search for various articles of contraband was started after breakfast at Santa Anita. Several internal security police, according to DeWitt, became "over-zealous in their search and somewhat overbearing in their manner of approach to evacuees in two of the Center's seven districts." The evacuees were already upset by an order from the center manager "to pick up, without advance notice, electric hot plates which had previously been allowed on written individual authorization of the Center Management staff to families who needed them for the preparation of infant formulas and food for the sick." Other resentments had been accumulating at the center, including curtailment on reading and possessing Japanese language literature and a ban on Japanese phonograph records.

According to DeWitt, two mobs and a crowd of women evacuees, led in part by some of the evacuee auxiliary police, formed to protest the actions of the internal police and center management. One evacuee long suspected of giving information to the police was beaten, and the internal security police were "harassed" but not injured. Unable to reach the chief of internal security, rumors of other alleged improprieties at the center spread. The military police, armed with tanks and machine guns, were called to quell the disturbance, and the crowds dispersed without further incident. Center management and internal security staff officials responsible for the lack of liaison which allowed the signs of "brewing trouble to reach the boiling point without action" were removed from the center, and the police who had initially precipitated the trouble were replaced. Although this incident was settled without further violence, it, as well as latent protests at other centers, set a pattern that would be repeated with variations in one relocation center after another throughout the war.⁷⁰

70. Thomas and Nishimoto, *Spoilage*, pp. 22-23; U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 218-19; and *Personal Justice Denied*, pp. 147-48.

CHAPTER FIVE: RELOCATION CENTERS UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

In early May 1942, the first evacuees began to arrive at the relocation centers operated by the War Relocation Authority, the two exceptions being Manzanar (which was transferred from the Wartime Civil Control Administration to the WRA to become an officially-designated relocation center on June 1, 1942) and Poston which had been established initially by the Army as "reception centers" to serve not only as assembly centers but also as permanent relocation centers. By June 5, when the movement of evacuees from their homes in Military Area No. 1 into assembly centers was completed, the transfer of evacuees to relocation centers was well underway. Most entrants to the relocation centers came directly from the WCCA assembly centers, although some arrived from other places, as shown in the chart on the next page. Evacuees had been assured that the WRA centers would be more suitable for residence and more permanent than the hastily-established assembly centers. They also believed that at the new camps some of the most repressive aspects of the assembly centers, particularly the guard towers and barbed wire fences, would be eliminated. All things considered, most evacuees were prepared for an orderly, cooperative move.¹

Compared with the rapidity of the movement of the Japanese from their homes to the assembly centers, the movement to relocation centers was a lengthy six-month process.² By June 30, more than 27,000 people were living at three relocation centers: Manzanar, Poston, and Tule Lake. Three months later, all ten relocation centers except Jerome, Arkansas, had opened, and 90,000 people had been transferred. By November 1, transfers had been completed and, at the end of the year, the centers had the highest population they would ever have — 106,770 persons. More than 175 groups of about 500 each had moved, generally aboard one of 171 special trains, to a center in one of six western states or Arkansas.³

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

When evacuees entered a relocation center, they left Army jurisdiction and came into the custody of the War Relocation Authority, a federal agency that had been established by President Roosevelt on March 18, 1942, by Executive Order 9102. Under the provisions of the executive order, the WRA was authorized to formulate and execute a relocation program — to provide shelter, subsistence, clothing, medical attention, educational and

1. Weglyn, *Years of Infamy*, p. 89, and *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 149.

2. Edward H. Spicer, Asael T. Hansen, Katherine Luomala, and Marvin K. Opler, *Impounded People: Japanese-Americans in the Relocation Centers* (Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 1969), p. 62.

3. War Relocation Authority, *First Quarterly Report, March 18 to June 30, 1942*, p. 8; *ibid.*, *Second Quarterly Report, July 1 to September 30, 1942*, pp. 1-2; and *ibid.*, *[Third] Quarterly Report, October 1 to December 31, 1942*, pp. 1-2, and U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 282-84, 288.




Figure 7: U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority.
The Evacuated People: A Quantitative Description
(Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 8.

recreational facilities, as well as private and public opportunities for evacuees. To implement the WRA program, its director was authorized by the order to

1. Accomplish all necessary evacuation not undertaken by the Secretary of War or military commanders
2. Relocate, supervise, and provide for the needs of such persons
3. Provide for employment of such persons with due regard to the safeguarding of the public interest
4. Secure cooperation and assistance of any governmental agency
5. Consult with the Secretary of War relative to regulations issued by him in order to coordinate evacuation and relocation activities

6. Delegate authority
7. Employ personnel and make expenditures including loans, grants, and the purchase of real property
8. Consult with the U.S. Employment Service and cooperate with the Alien Property Custodian
9. Establish a War Relocation Work Corps to be made up by voluntary enlistment of evacuees
10. Avoid duplication of evacuation activities by not undertaking any evacuation activities within military areas designated under Executive Order 9066 without the approval of the Secretary of War and an appropriate military commander.⁴

Milton S. Eisenhower, appointed by President Roosevelt as the WRA's first director, faced a gargantuan task — building an agency to direct and supervise the lives of more than 100,000 people and, at the same time, deciding what to do with them. The WRA had to move quickly in finding centers to house the evacuees and in developing policies and procedures for handling the evacuees soon to come under its jurisdiction. The president had stressed the need for immediate action, and both the War Department and the WRA were anxious to remove the evacuees from the primitive, makeshift assembly centers. Eisenhower quickly concluded that the evacuation would eventually be viewed as "avoidable injustice" and an "inhuman mistake." Eisenhower confronted an initial decision that would shape the rest of the WRA program — would the evacuees be resettled and placed in new homes and jobs, or would they be detained, confined, and supervised for the duration of the war? He was given almost no guidance on this crucial matter. Nothing had been decided beyond the fact that the military would deliver the evacuees to the WRA and thereafter wish no further part in the "Japanese problem."⁵

Eisenhower and his advisors believed that the vast majority of the evacuees were law-abiding and loyal and that, once out of the combat zone, they should be returned quickly to conditions approximating normal life. Convinced that the WRA's goal should be to achieve this rehabilitative measure, they devised a plan to move evacuees to the intermountain states. The government would operate "reception centers" and some evacuees would work within them, developing the land and farming. Many more, however, would work outside the centers in private employment — manufacturing, farming, or creating new self-supporting communities.⁶

Mike Masaoka, National Secretary of the Japanese American Citizens League, approached Eisenhower on April 6 with a lengthy letter setting out recommendations and suggestions

4. See Appendix B of this study for a copy of Executive Order 9102.

5. Milton S. Eisenhower, *The President Is Calling* (Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Co., 1974), pp. 95-96, 125.

6. *Personal Justice Denied*, pp. 53-54.

for policies the WRA should follow. His suggestions were grounded in the basic position that JACL had taken on exclusion and evacuation:

We have not contested the right of the military to order this movement, even though it meant leaving all that we hold dear and sacred, because we believe that cooperation on our part will mean a reciprocal cooperation on the part of the government.

Among the letter's many recommendations was the plea that the government permit Japanese Americans to have as much contact as possible with white Americans to avoid isolation and segregation.⁷

The WRA's plans were in sympathy with such an approach, and on April 2 Eisenhower announced a five-point program for employment of evacuees. The employment program included public works such as land development, agricultural production, and manufacturing within relocation areas, private employment, and private resettlement.⁸ However, the government's experience with voluntary relocation suggested that the WRA would only be successful if it could enlist the help of the interior state governors. Accordingly, the WRA arranged a meeting with officials of ten western states for April 7 in Salt Lake City. Representing the federal government were Bendetsen and Eisenhower, the former describing the evacuation and the Western Defense Command's reasons for it and the latter discussing his planned program. From the states, which included Utah, Arizona, Nevada, Montana, Idaho, Colorado, New Mexico, Washington, Oregon, and Wyoming, came five governors and a host of other officials, as well as a few farmers who were anxious to employ evacuees for harvesting.⁹

The governors of the mountain states were unimpressed by Bendetsen's presentation, but they adamantly opposed the "social engineering" theories on which Eisenhower's proposed program was based. They opposed any evacuee land purchase or settlement in their states and wanted guarantees that the government would forbid evacuees to buy land and that it would remove them at the end of the war. They objected to California using the interior states as a "dumping ground" for a California "problem."

People in their states were so bitter over the voluntary evacuation, they said, that unguarded evacuees would face physical danger. The most extreme viewpoint was expressed by Governor Herbert Maw of Utah who set forth a plan whereby the states would operate the relocation program with federal financing, hiring state guards and setting up camps where Japanese could be detained while working on federally approved projects. Citing strategic defense installations in Utah, he stated that evacuees should not be allowed to "roam" at large. Accusing the WRA of being too concerned about the rights and liberties of Japanese American citizens, he suggested that the Constitution be amended. The governors of Idaho and Wyoming agreed, the former advocating the round up and supervision of those who had already entered his state and the latter urging that

7. Letter, Masaoka to Eisenhower, April 6, 1942, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 154.

8. War Relocation Authority, *First Quarterly Report*, p. 3.

9. Eisenhower, *The President Is Calling*, pp. 116-17, and U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Story of Human Conservation*, pp. 28-30.

evacuees be placed in "concentration camps." With few exceptions, the other officials present echoed these sentiments. Only Governor Ralph L. Carr of Colorado took a moderate position, and the voices of those hoping to use the evacuees for agricultural labor were drowned out.¹⁰

Bendetsen and Eisenhower were unable or unwilling to face down this united political opposition. The consensus of the meeting, to which these two reluctantly agreed, was that the plan for reception centers was acceptable, as long as the evacuees remained under guard within the camps. As he left Salt Lake City, Eisenhower had no doubt that private resettlement efforts had to be put off and that "the plan to move the evacuees into private employment had to be abandoned — at least temporarily."¹¹

Before it had begun, Eisenhower and the WRA were thus forced by political pressure to abandon their evacuee resettlement theories and adopt an evacuee confinement policy. West coast politicians had achieved their program of exclusion, while political leaders of the interior states had achieved their program of detention. Without giving up its belief that evacuees should be brought back to normal productive life, WRA had, in effect, become their jailer, contending that confinement was for the benefit of the evacuees and that the controls on their departure were designed to prevent mistreatment by other Americans.¹²

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE WAR DEPARTMENT AND THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

The tenor of Executive Order 9102 establishing the War Relocation Authority indicated that the agency would fully assume the task of formulating and implementing a relocation program. However, to expedite the removal of evacuees from the assembly centers to the relocation centers, the Army assumed certain responsibilities imposed on the WRA by the executive order. Among the most significant activities in this category were the construction and equipment of the relocation centers and the transfer of the evacuees to the latter.

General plans for the establishment, construction, and equipment of relocation centers, then termed reception centers, were developed by the Wartime Civil Control Administration before the WRA was established. Following creation of the WRA, the WCCA halted the relocation center site selection aspects of its program. Otherwise, the WRA accepted, almost without change, the program already formulated by the WCCA during the early days of its existence. In essence, the program called for the evacuation first to assembly centers and thence to relocation centers in the interior. With the exception of site selection for the relocation centers, the WRA was free to concentrate solely on the rehabilitation aspects of the relocation program.

10. *Personal Justice Denied*, pp. 154-55, and Eisenhower, *The President Is Calling*, pp. 117-19.

11. War Relocation Authority, *First Quarterly Report*, p. 3, and Eisenhower, *The President Is Calling*, p. 119.

12. *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 155.

Close coordination was established between the headquarters of the WCCA and the WRA during the spring of 1942. Following his appointment, Eisenhower arrived in San Francisco and established his headquarters in the Whitcomb Hotel where the WCCA had already had its central administrative office. Although the headquarters of the WRA would later be established in Washington, until well into the summer of 1942 its principal office was what became known as the San Francisco Regional Office. Captain Mark H. Astrup was directed by the War Department to report for duty to Eisenhower, who in turn assigned him as Liaison Officer from the WRA to the WCCA.¹³

As discussed in Chapter Three of this study, the War Department and the WRA agreed informally to a division of labor concerning evacuation and relocation by the end of March 1942. This informal understanding was formalized in a memorandum of agreement between the two governmental entities on April 17, 1942, ten days after the aforementioned meeting at Salt Lake City. The agreement stipulated that sites for the relocation centers were to be selected by the WRA, subject to War Department approval. Such approval was necessary in the eyes of the military "in order that large numbers of evacuees might not be located immediately adjacent to present or proposed military installations or in strategically important areas." The sites, however, were to be acquired by the War Department, the WRA defraying the acquisition costs. "Initial" facilities at relocation centers would be constructed by the War Department, including "all facilities necessary to provide the minimum essentials of living, viz., shelter, hospital, mess, sanitary facilities, administration building, housing for relocation staff, post office, store houses, essential refrigeration equipment, and military police housing." War Department construction would not include "refinements such as schools, churches and other community planning adjuncts." Placement and construction of military police housing would be subject to the approval of the appropriate military commander." The War Department, through the Office of the Surgeon and the Quartermaster of the Western Defense Command, would procure and supply the initial equipment for the relocation centers such as kitchen equipment, minimum mess and barrack (beds, mattresses, and blankets) equipment, hospital equipment, medical supplies, and ten days' supply of non-perishable subsistence (canned goods, smoked meats, and staples such as beans, rice, flour, sugar, etc.) based on the relocation center evacuee capacity. Once a relocation center was opened by the WRA, the War Department would transfer accountability for all such equipment to the WRA.

Other stipulations in the agreement stated that the WRA would be responsible for operating the relocation centers "from the date of opening." This responsibility would include staffing, administration, project planning, and complete operation and maintenance. The WRA would be prepared "to accept successive increments of evacuees as construction is completed and supplies and equipment are delivered." The War Department through the Western Defense Command would transport the evacuees to the relocation centers, and it had arranged for the storage of household effects of evacuees through the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. When evacuee goods were stored and the bank delivered inventory receipts to the WRA, the agency would assume responsibility for the warehousing program. In the interest of the evacuees' security, relocation sites would be designated by the appropriate military commander or by the Secretary of War as "prohibited zones and military areas, and appropriate restrictions with

13. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 237-38.

respect to the rights of evacuees and others to enter, remain in, or leave such areas will be promulgated so that ingress and egress of all persons, including evacuees, will be subject to the control of the responsible Military Commander." Each relocation site would "be under Military Police patrol and protection as determined by the War Department."¹⁴

WAR DEPARTMENT ACTIONS TAKEN TO COMPLY WITH AGREEMENT

Subsequent to the aforementioned agreement, the War Department took steps to implement its provisions. Each assembly and relocation center within the Western Defense Command was made the basis for Civilian Restrictive Orders Nos. 1, 18, 19, 20, 23, and 24, describing the boundaries of the various camps. Center residents were required to remain within these physical boundaries. Each center resident was enjoined to obtain express written authority before undertaking to leave the designated area. During the assembly center phase, such permits were issued only by the WCCA.

On June 27, 1942, DeWitt promulgated Public Proclamation No. 8 to further assure the security of relocation centers and adjacent communities. Under its terms all center residents were required to obtain a permit before leaving the designated center boundaries. The proclamation specifically controlled ingress and egress of persons other than center residents. Violators of both the civilian restrictive orders and Public Proclamation No. 8 were subjected to the penalties provided under Public Law 503. DeWitt stated further that in "the delegation of authority to control ingress and egress," the WRA "was given full freedom of action in determining who might enter and who might leave." The military police stationed around the perimeters of the relocation centers would "not participate in this determination." Their mission, according to the general, "was merely to prevent unauthorized entry and unauthorized departure — as determined solely by the War Relocation Authority."

Four of the ten relocation centers were established outside the boundaries and jurisdiction of the Western Defense Command. To secure uniformity of control, the War Department published Public Proclamation WD:1 on August 13, 1942, designating Heart Mountain in Wyoming, Granada in Colorado, and Jerome and Rohwer in Arkansas as military areas. This proclamation contained provisions similar to those of Public Proclamation No. 8 relative to entry into and departure from relocation centers.

While DeWitt retained authority to regulate and prohibit the entry or movement of persons of Japanese ancestry in the evacuated areas (Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2), he delegated authority, on August 11, 1942, to determine entry into and departure from the relocation centers to the director of the WRA and to such persons as the director might designate in writing. The director in turn delegated responsibility to the individual directors of the relocation centers. The net result of this arrangement was that in relocation centers outside the evacuated zone, the military authorities exercised no control over ingress and egress "beyond that involved in the military police function of preventing those entries and departures not authorized by the Center Director." As to the four relocation centers located within the evacuated zone (Tule Lake, Manzanar, Colorado

14. "Memorandum of Agreement Between the War Department and War Relocation Authority," April 17, 1942, printed in *ibid.*, pp. 239-40.

River, and Gila River), the control "reserved by the Commanding General [of the Western Defense Command] was limited to regulating the conditions of travel and movement through the area."

Because the WRA endeavored to use evacuee labor to construct and operate the relocation centers, further action by the military was required. The railheads serving the Colorado River, Tule Lake, Gila River, and Manzanar relocation centers were outside the center boundaries. To facilitate WRA policy, DeWitt, on September 21, 1942, authorized "emergency employment of Japanese evacuees outside of the four War Relocation Authority Centers located within the evacuated areas."¹⁵

WAR RELOCATION CENTERS

Site Selection

Selecting the sites for the relocation centers proved to be a complicated endeavor for the WRA. Two sites — Manzanar and Poston — had been chosen by military authorities before the WRA was established. Manzanar, a site in Owens Valley, California, originally selected and acquired by the Army for a reception or assembly center, was turned over to the WRA to serve as a permanent relocation center on June 1, 1942. The Colorado River Relocation Center site at Poston, Arizona, had been acquired from the Colorado River Indian Reservation for a reception center. The WCCA never operated it, however, as Eisenhower agreed to have WRA staff operate it from the beginning. Because of difficulties in assembling a staff, Eisenhower turned over initial operations to the Indian Service.¹⁶

Eight more locations were needed — designed to be "areas where the evacuees might settle down to a more stable kind of life until plans could be developed for their permanent relocation in communities outside the evacuated areas." Under the terms of the agreement of April 17, 1942, the War Department and the WRA were required to agree on site locations. Each of these entities, however, had different interests. The WRA retained the portion of its early plan that called for large-scale agricultural programs in which evacuees would clear, develop, and cultivate the land. Thus, the centers were to consist of at least 7,500 acres of land and have agricultural possibilities or provide opportunities for year-round employment of other types. The WRA insisted that the centers not displace local white labor. The War Department, no longer advocating freedom of movement outside the Western Defense Command and concerned about security arrangements, insisted that sites be isolated from civilian population centers and "not be located immediately adjacent to present or proposed military installations or strategically important areas" (a term that included power lines and reservoirs). The Army also wanted each center to have an evacuee population of at least 5,000 and thus keep to a minimum

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 241-43. Also see U. B. Stanbery to R. L. Nicholson, March 19, 1942, and attachments, "Considerations In Selecting Sites To Receive Evacuees" and "Areas Suggested For Investigation," March 17, 1942, RG 83, Records of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Western Regional Office, Berkeley, California, War Relocation Records, 1942, Box 1, File, "Suggested Resettlement Projects," National Archives and Records Administration, Pacific Sierra Region, San Bruno, California.

16. Eisenhower, *The President Is Calling*, p. 122, and U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 249.

the number of military police that would be needed. Considerations "of good public policy," according to the WRA, "made it desirable to locate the centers on lands either in Federal ownership or available for Federal purchase — so that improvements would not be made at Federal expense to increase the value of private property." Operational requirements dictated the selection of sites that "were within reasonable distance of a railhead and which had access to a dependable and comparatively economical supply of water and of electric power."¹⁷

To aid in the job of site selection, the WRA enlisted the cooperation of technicians from a number of federal and state agencies, including the Office of Indian Affairs, Soil Conservation Service, Bureau of Reclamation, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Farm Security Administration, U.S. Forest Service, U.S. Public Health Service, and the National Resources Planning Board. More than 300 proposals were considered on paper, and nearly 100 possible sites were examined by field inspection crews. By June 5, after negotiating with many potentially affected state and local government officials and consulting with War Department personnel, the WRA completed its selection of the final eight sites. (A list of the sites, their location, and projected capacities may be seen on the next page.)¹⁸

Site Acquisition

Acquisition of the property for relocation center sites was a War Department function, carried out by the United States Corps of Engineers at the request of DeWitt. When military clearance was obtained, DeWitt issued a directive to the Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, who acted for the Chief of Engineers, requesting that he direct the Division Engineer concerned to proceed with the land acquisition. DeWitt notified the governor of the state in which the site was located that, because of military necessity, a relocation center was to be constructed. The cost of acquisition was paid by the WRA.¹⁹

Site Descriptions

The sites for the relocation centers were much alike in their isolation, rugged terrain, primitive character, and almost total lack of conveniences at the start.²⁰ More than any other single factor, the requirement for large tracts of land virtually guaranteed that the

17. War Relocation Authority, *First Quarterly Report*, pp. 6-7; U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 248; U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Story of Human Conservation*, p. 20; and Girdner and Loftis, *Great Betrayal*, p. 216. Also see Report, Site Selection Board, Reception Centers For Evacuated Japanese, March 26, 1942, RG 83, Western Regional Office, Berkeley, California, War Relocation Records, 1942, Box 1, File, "Suggested Resettlement Projects," National Archives and Records Administration, Pacific Sierra Region, San Bruno. Also see "Final Report, Operations Division," Irvin Utz, Chief, Operations Division, March 1946, pp. 1-2, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 223, File 24.0528, "Final Report, Operations Division, Author Irvin Utz."

18. War Relocation Authority, *First Quarterly Report*, p. 7; U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Story of Human Conservation*, pp. 20, 22, U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 249, and Girdner and Loftis, *Great Betrayal*, p. 216.

19. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 249.

20. Girdner and Loftis, *Great Betrayal*, p. 216.

Name	Location	Capacity (in persons)
Central Utah (Topaz)	West-central Utah	10,000
Colorado River (Poston)		
Unit 1	Western Arizona	10,000
Unit 2	Western Arizona	5,000
Unit 3	Western Arizona	5,000
Gila River (Rivers)		
Butte Camp	Central Arizona	10,000
Canal Camp	Central Arizona	5,000
Granada (Amache)	Southeastern Colorado	8,000
Heart Mountain	Northwestern Wyoming	12,000
Jerome (Denson)	Southeastern Arkansas	10,000
Manzanar	East-central California	10,000
Minidoka (Hunt)	South-central Idaho	10,000
Rohwer	Southeastern Arkansas	10,000
Tule Lake (Newell)	North-central California	16,000

Figure 8: U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Story of Human Conservation*, p. 22.

sites would be inhospitable. As one relocation historian has explained: "That these areas were still vacant land in 1942, land that the ever-voracious pioneers and developers had either passed by or abandoned, speaks volumes about their attractiveness."²¹

An overview of the sites for the relocation centers demonstrates their inhospitable characteristics. Manzanar and Poston, which had been selected by the Army, were in the desert and subject to high summer temperatures and dust storms. Although both would eventually produce crops, extensive irrigation would be needed. Manzanar, which was leased from the City of Los Angeles, had once been the site of ranches and orchards, but since the late 1920s the land had "reverted to desert conditions" as the city exploited its extensive acreage in Owens Valley to provide water for the expanding metropolitan area. Poston's desert climate was particularly harsh and its land was completely undeveloped and covered with brush. While some of its soil was highly suited to irrigation, much was "fourth class and so highly impregnated with salts and alkali that cultivation would be difficult." Gila River, near Phoenix, was subject to extreme summer temperatures, but was situated in a district famous for winter vegetable production. Minidoka and Heart Mountain, the two northernmost centers, were known for harsh winters and severe dust storms. Minidoka's "68,000 acres" were "covered with lava outcroppings in such a way that only about 25 per cent" of the land was "suitable for cultivation," and Heart Mountain had an annual temperature range "from a maximum of 101 degrees above zero to a minimum of 30 degrees below zero." Tule Lake, the most developed site, was located in a dry lake bed formerly controlled by the Bureau of Reclamation in a rich potato-growing section of northern California, and its fertile sandy loam soil was ready for planting. Several thousand acres of the Central Utah site "were in crop but the greatest portion was covered with greasewood brush." Granada was little better, although there was provision

21. Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA*, p. 96.

for irrigation as much of the site had formerly been a stock ranch. The last two sites — Jerome and Rohwer in Arkansas — were in the Mississippi River delta area and were "heavily wooded," "quite swampy," and subject to severe drainage problems, excessive humidity, and mosquito infestations.²²

Design and Construction

By June 30, the Colorado River, Tule Lake, and Manzanar relocation centers were in partial operation with a combined evacuee population of 27,766. Four other centers — Gila River, Minidoka, Heart Mountain, and Granada — were under construction.²³

By September 30, all the relocation centers but one — Jerome in southeast Arkansas — were in operation. Five of them were close to their population capacities, while the other four were still receiving contingents of evacuees. More than 90,000 evacuees had been transferred to the nine operating centers.²⁴ By November 1, the transfer of evacuees to the relocation centers was completed (see the following page for a list of the relocation centers, their dates of operation, and peak populations), and at the end of the year, the centers had the highest population they would ever have — 106,770.²⁵

Design. According to the War Department's Final Report, the design of temporary buildings to house the evacuees at the relocation centers presented a problem to the Army "since no precedents for this type of housing existed." Permanent buildings were not desired. Thus, it was essential to be "as economical as possible and to avoid the excessive use of critical materials." Speed of construction was also "a vital factor because it was desired to move the Japanese out of the Assembly Centers as quickly as possible."

In the report, DeWitt observed that the Army had "available drawings of cantonment type" buildings which "might be classed as semi-permanent, and of theater of operations type buildings which were purely temporary." The latter were intended primarily for rapid construction to house troops in the rear of combat zones.

Theater of operations type buildings, according to DeWitt, "answered most of the requirements for troop shelter but were too crude for the housing of women, children and elderly persons." Normally, this type of housing had no floors; toilet facilities were meager (usually pit latrines); and heating units were omitted in all except extremely cold climates. It was decided, according to DeWitt, "that a modified theater of operations camp could be developed which would adequately house all evacuees, young and old, male and female, and still meet fairly well the desire for speed, low cost, and restricted use of critical

22. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 249-50, 263-64; War Relocation Authority, *First Quarterly Report*, pp. 9-10; War Relocation Authority, *Second Quarterly Report*, pp. 8-12; and Thomas and Nishimoto, *Spoilage*, p. 28.

23. War Relocation Authority, *First Quarterly Report*, p. 8.

24. War Relocation Authority, *Second Quarterly Report*, p. 1.

25. War Relocation Authority, *[Third] Quarterly Report*, pp. 1-2.

Note: Resident population refers to population excluding evacuees on short-term and seasonal leave.

CENTER	LOCATION		Last Post Office Address	DATE FIRST EVACUEE ARRIVED	PEAK POPULATION		DAYS OPEN BY OPERATION	DATE LAST EVACUEE DEPARTED
	State	County			Date	Population		
Central Utah	Utah	Millard	Topas	9-11-42	3-17-43	8,130	1,147	10-31-43
Colorado River	Arizona	Yuma	Porton	5- 8-42	9- 2-42	17,614	1,301	11-28-43
Gila River	Arizona	Pinal	Rivers	7-20-42	12-30-42	13,348	1,210	11-10-43
Granada	Colorado	Provers	Amache	8-27-42	2- 1-43	7,318	1,146	10-15-43
Heart Mountain	Wyoming	Park	Heart Mountain	8-12-42	1- 1-43	10,767	1,127	11-10-43
Jerome	Arkansas	Drew & Chicot	Danson	10- 6-42	2-11-43	8,497	634	6-30-44
Manzanar	California	Inyo	Manzanar	1/6- 1-42	9-22-42	10,046	1,270	11-21-43
Minidoka	Idaho	Jerome	Hunt	8-10-42	3- 1-43	9,397	1,176	10-28-43
Robber	Arkansas	Desh	Relocation	9-18-42	3-11-43	8,475	1,170	11-30-43
Tule Lake	California	Modoc	Beaull	5-27-42	12-25-44	18,789	1,394	3-20-46

Figure 9: U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Evacuated People*, p. 17.

materials."²⁶ Thus, despite the promise that the relocation centers would be more hospitable than the assembly centers, the type of construction chosen for the relocation centers was, according to the WRA, "similar to that in assembly centers."²⁷

A set of standards and details for the construction of relocation centers was developed by the WCCA. Adopted in a conference involving DeWitt and a representative of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, they were issued on June 8, 1942, under the title — "Standards and Details, Construction of Japanese Evacuee Reception Centers." Later three supplements were issued: No. 1, dated June 18, listed the hospital equipment to be provided; No. 2, dated June 29, covered fire fighting equipment; and No. 3, dated September 23, included standards for military police housing. (Copies of these standards may be seen in Appendix C of this study.)²⁸

Prior to the issuance of these standards, the WCCA experienced difficulty in establishing "uniformity" in facilities to be provided at the various relocation centers, because more than one Engineer Division was involved and each interpreted WCCA requests differently. These standards provided the necessary "uniformity" for center construction after June. The standards "provided a basis on which all of the contractors and engineers could work towards the common goal." Before the standards were issued, however, several centers, notably Manzanar, Tule Lake, Colorado River, one unit at Gila River, had been placed under construction.

Undoubtedly, experience gained during construction of those centers was reflected in the details of the standards.²⁹

26. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 264.

27. War Relocation Authority, *First Quarterly Report*, p. 12. For further information on "theater of operations" military construction, see U.S. Department of Defense, Legacy Resources Management Program, and U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, *World War II and the U.S. Army Mobilization Program*.

28. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 264, 584-91.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 264.

Typical Center Lay-Out. In the War Department's *Final Report*, DeWitt provided details and drawings for a typical relocation center designed for a resident evacuee population of 10,000. The buildings in each center, according to DeWitt, were "grouped as to use." The evacuee housing group was the largest and consisted of the blocks in which the evacuees had their homes. Several blocks in this group were reserved "for future schools, churches, and recreational centers." The other principal groups in each center included administration and warehouse groups, a military police camp, and a hospital. (A copy of a "Typical Plot Plan, War Relocation Center, 10,000 Population" may be seen on the following pages.)³⁰

The typical evacuee housing area, or camp, was an approximate square-mile barbed wire enclosure. There were 36 housing blocks. Each block contained 12 barrack buildings (20 feet x 120 feet), a recreation building, a mess hall (40 feet x 120 feet), and a combination H-shaped structure that had toilet and bath facilities for both men and women as well as a laundry room and a heater room. (A copy of a "Typical Housing Block, War Relocation Center" may be seen on the following pages.)³¹

The administration building group comprised the structures devoted to the use of relocation center management. Included in a typical administrative group were four dormitories for non-evacuee employees, two office buildings, a post office, store, fire house, warehouse, shop building, garage, mess hall for the non-evacuee staff, and a recreation building. (A copy of a "Typical Administration Group, War Relocation Center" may be seen on the following pages.)³²

The military police camp was usually separated from the relocation center proper, thus aiding in the prevention of "fraternization between the guards and the evacuees." The military police buildings on most centers were of the "modified mobilization type," and in a few cases the buildings were of prefabricated construction.³³ The buildings in the group, which provided facilities for one company of military police, included four enlisted men's barracks, a bachelor officers' quarters, headquarters and supply building, guard house, recreation and post exchange building, a dispensary, latrine, and bathhouse, mess hall, and garage. (A copy of a "Typical Military Police Group, War Relocation Center" may be seen on the following pages.)³⁴

The hospital building group provided "space for the principal medical activities carried on in any metropolitan community." The hospital buildings included an administration building, doctors' quarters, nurses' quarters, three general wards for adults, an outpatient building, obstetrical ward, surgery building, pediatric ward, mess hall isolation ward, morgue, laundry, two storehouses for supplies and equipment, and a boiler house that

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 264-66.

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 265, 267.

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 265, 268.

33. "Final Report, Operations Division," March 1946, p. 19, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 223, File 24.0528.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 265, 269.

**TYPICAL PLOT PLAN
WAR RELOCATION CENTER
10,000 POPULATION**





Figure 10: Typical Plot Plan, War Relocation Center
U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 266.


TYPICAL HOUSING BLOCK WAR RELOCATION CENTER



- | | |
|---------------------|--------------------|
| 1. Barracks 20x120 | 5. Laundry Room |
| 2. Mess Hall 40x120 | 6. Heater Room |
| 3. Women's Latrine | 7. Recreation Hall |
| 4. Men's Latrine | |

Figure 11: Typical Housing Block, War Relocation Center,
U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 267.

TYPICAL ADMINISTRATION GROUP WAR RELOCATION CENTER



- | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------|
| 1. Administration Headquarters | 6. Garage |
| 2. Post Office | 7. Store |
| 3. Warehouse | 8. Mess |
| 4. Fire Station | 9. Recreation |
| 5. Dormitory | 10. Shop |

Figure 12: Typical Administration Group, War Relocation Center,
U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 268.

TYPICAL MILITARY POLICE GROUP WAR RELOCATION CENTER




Figure 13: Typical Military Police Group, War Relocation Center,
U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 269.

supplied steam for heating buildings and operating sterilization equipment. (A copy of a "Typical Hospital Group, War Relocation Center" may be seen on the following page.)³⁵

The warehouse group provided storage space for large quantities of food, supplies, and equipment. Some were refrigerated for the preservation of perishable foods, and the balance for storing staple foods, supplies, and equipment. Originally, two 20-foot x 100-foot refrigerated warehouses were provided for a 10,000-person capacity relocation center, but it was found to be more efficient to erect one 40-foot x 100-foot building, divided into compartments for different types of food, such as fruits and vegetables, meats, and dairy products. The standard relocation center of 10,000 evacuees had twenty 40-foot x 100-foot warehouses which were not partitioned or heated for dry storage. (A copy of "Typical Warehouse Group, War Relocation Center" may be seen on page 110.)³⁶

Construction of the relocation centers included provision for water supply, sewage disposal, electric power and lighting, and telephone facilities. DeWitt described the guidelines and features for installation of each of these systems:

1. Water supply systems, designed to provide 100 gallons per capita per day with ample storage capacity, were constructed to provide adequate water for culinary, sanitary, and fire-protection purposes. In most instances, the water was secured from wells which produced potable water that needed no treatment, but in some centers partial or complete treatment was necessary.
2. Water-borne sewage disposal conforming to minimum health requirements of the respective state health departments was provided. Sewer capacity was based on 75 gallons per capita per day. The sewage systems ranged from large septic tanks with no chlorination of effluent to modern disposal plants that included digesters, chlorinators, sludge beds, and effluent ponds.
3. Electric power and lighting was designed on the basis of 2,000 KVA per 10,000 population. Street lighting was installed in the earlier centers, but after the standards were issued one light at each end of all main buildings constituted outdoor lighting.
4. Telephone facilities at relocation centers generally consisted of not more than four trunk lines to a 40-line board with 60 handset stations for administration and operation and 15 handsets for the military police unit. One separate outside line with handset station was provided for the commanding officer of the military police unit. The installation of the telephone systems was conducted or supervised by the Signal Corps of each Service Command in its area.³⁷

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 265, 270.

36. *Ibid.*, pp. 265, 271.

37. *Ibid.*, , p. 272.

TYPICAL HOSPITAL GROUP WAR RELOCATION CENTER




Figure 14: Typical Hospital Group, War Relocation Center,
U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 270.




Figure 15: Typical Warehouse Group, War Relocation Center,
U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 271.

Construction. Plans and specifications for the construction of the buildings at the relocation centers were prepared at the District Engineer's office in the district in which the centers were located. These plans were submitted for approval to the Civil Affairs Division, General Staff (thence to WCCA) of the Western Defense Command. After approval, contracts were awarded by the district engineers to private construction firms.

During construction of the relocation centers, considerable difficulty was encountered in obtaining building materials and mechanical equipment as well as skilled building-trades craftsmen because of the war emergency. Deliveries were slow, and it was necessary to have "expeditors working constantly to speed shipments." Spot shortages of various types of lumber occurred frequently, and nails, pipe, plumbing fixtures, and pumps for water supply and sewage systems were particularly difficult to secure on schedule. Skilled building-trades craftsmen were scarce in some localities, particularly the most isolated locations, and in some cases workers had to be transported long distances. To keep them on the job it was sometimes necessary for contractors to establish commissaries and dormitories near the relocation center sites.

The War Department prepared a preliminary estimate of the cost of building the ten relocation centers on December 1, 1942. The total estimated cost was \$56,482,000 or approximately \$471 per evacuee. According to the estimates, the most expensive center to be built was at Colorado River (\$9,365,000), while the least expensive was Manzanar (\$3,764,000). The center having the highest per capita cost was Minidoka (\$584), and the lowest was Manzanar (\$376).³⁸

According to the WRA, "practically all construction and improvement work over and above this subsistence base [as constructed by the Corps of Engineers] was carried out by the evacuees themselves after their arrival at the center." The plan "followed was to bring into each center first a small contingent [about 200] of evacuee specialists — such as cooks, stewards, doctors, and nurses — in order to prepare for the mass arrivals later." As the center began to fill up and the people had a chance to become settled, "improvements on individual family quarters and on the community as a whole were undertaken."³⁹

Description of Buildings. The War Department's *Final Report* provides general standard descriptions of the buildings constructed at relocation centers. The descriptions of these hastily constructed buildings demonstrate the military precision that went into their planning and design and provide ample evidence of their spartan and austere nature.

Originally, barracks or living quarters were 20-foot x 100-foot structures divided into five 20-foot x 20-foot rooms that were termed "apartments" by the Army. To accommodate differences in family sizes the design was changed to provide for 120 foot-long structures with two 16-foot x 20-foot, two 20-foot x 20-foot, and two 24-foot x 20-foot apartments. Ideally, one family was assigned to an apartment, but this goal was not always attained. No toilet or bath facilities were provided in the barracks, because they were located in a common building for each block. A heating unit, either of the cannon type stove or cabinet

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 272-73.

39. War Relocation Authority, *First Quarterly Report*, p. 13. also see U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p; 287-88.

oil heater variety, depending on the fuel used, was placed in each apartment. In the colder climates wall board was provided to the WRA so that the evacuees could line and seal the interiors of their quarters. The exterior walls and roofs were generally of shiplap or other sheathing covered with tarpaper. One drop light per room was furnished. Floors of the apartments at all centers were wood, except at Granada, where they were built of brick. Single floors were found unsatisfactory because of the cracks which resulted when the green lumber used for construction dried. At several centers, including Manzanar, Tule Lake, Gila River, and Colorado River, the WRA later installed "a patented flooring called Mastipave which gave a smooth, washable surface." Fly screening was provided to the evacuees to make screens for their quarters.

In the first relocation centers to be constructed, such as Manzanar, bachelors were housed in barracks which were not partitioned into rooms. Usually there were two of these buildings to a block, but it was proven to be more efficient to divide all barracks into rooms. Bachelors could then be assigned wherever desired and all buildings were available for the housing of families.

Mess halls were generally 40-foot x 100-foot structures. Approximately one-third of the mess halls' square footage was devoted to kitchen, store room, and space for washing dishes, pots and pans, and kitchen utensils. Windows and doors were screened against flies, and heat was provided by cannon stoves or cabinet heaters. Tables, with benches, to seat 300 persons were standard. Each kitchen was to be equipped with three ranges, 60 cubic feet of electric refrigeration, scullery sinks, hot water heater and tank, cooks' tables, and a meat block. Shelving was built into the store room, and serving counters were provided. Concrete floors were standard after the first four camps, including Manzanar, were constructed with wooden ones.

One recreation building was constructed for each evacuee housing block. This 20-foot x 100-foot structure had no partitions or equipment with the exception of heaters.

A combination latrine and laundry building, constructed in a "H" shape, was located between the two rows of barracks in each block. One side of the structure contained the block laundry, and the other the men's toilet and shower rooms and the women's toilet and bath rooms. A water heater and storage tank were housed in the space forming the cross bar of the "H". The floors of this building were concrete.

The laundry room was fitted out with 18 double compartment laundry trays and 18 ironing boards with an electric outlet at each board. Plumbing fixtures in each unit or block facility were hung on the basis of eight showerheads, four bathtubs, fourteen lavatories, fourteen toilets, and one slop sink for the women; and twelve showerheads, twelve lavatories, ten toilets, four urinals, and one slop sink for men.⁴⁰

TRANSFER OF SUPPLIES FROM ASSEMBLY TO RELOCATION CENTERS

Necessary supplies, equipment, and subsistence items for the relocation centers was the responsibility of the Quartermaster, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army. Some

40. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 273-74.

supplies and equipment used at assembly centers, including cots, mattresses, blankets, kitchen equipment, and eating utensils, were transferred to the relocation centers, while additional supplies were shipped from Quartermaster Depots. Each relocation center was provided with an initial supply of ten days' requirements of non-perishable foods, including canned goods, smoked meats, and staples such as beans, rice, flour, and sugar. According to the War Department's *Final Report*, the logistics of transferring evacuees from assembly to relocation centers were developed by the WCCA "in such a manner as to result in the use of a minimum of supplies and equipment." By providing the relocation centers that "received the first movements of evacuees with sufficient supplies and equipment to handle transfers for a three or four week period, and by scheduling the movement of supplies and equipment out of evacuated assembly centers to relocation centers in the order in which evacuees would be transferred to them," it was possible, according to General DeWitt, "to utilize again the supplies and equipment originally purchased for the Japanese in Assembly Centers." Transfer movements of evacuees were timed to provide a two-week period during which cots, blankets, mattresses, cooking and eating utensils, and other supplies and equipment to be moved from assembly to relocation centers could be inventoried, "renovated," and shipped to the new centers.⁴¹

TRANSFER OF EVACUEES FROM ASSEMBLY CENTERS TO RELOCATION CENTERS

According to the War Department's *Final Report*, evacuees were transferred from the assembly centers and custody of the military to the WRA under the provisions of the aforementioned April 17, 1942, agreement "as rapidly as Relocation Centers were completed for beneficial occupancy." Thus, evacuees passed from the custody of the Army to the WRA in the following ways during 1942:

1. Regular transfer movement from an assembly to a relocation center
2. Direct transfer of the Manzanar Reception Center on June 1, 1942
3. Direct evacuation from an exclusion area to the relocation centers at Colorado River, Gila River, and Tule Lake
4. Release to WRA on work furlough
5. Transfer of individual evacuees and special groups to WRA centers
6. Transfer to WRA during September and October the responsibilities for institutional cases remaining in hospitals, homes, prisons, jails, etc., physically located within the evacuated area

The total number of evacuees transferred by the WCCA to the WRA by these methods was 111,155. (A copy of a summary chart may be seen on the following page.) These transfers accounted for all the persons who came directly under the evacuation program with three principal exceptions. The exceptions included: (1) those persons who had been

41. *Ibid.*, pp. 275-76.

TABLE 32.—SUMMARY OF TRANSFERS OF EVACUEES FROM CUSTODY OF THE ARMY TO CUSTODY OF WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Place of Custody	Total	Transfer order	Direct evacuation	Other movement
WRA Custody.....	111,155*	89,698	18,249	2,414
To all Relocation Centers.....	108,503	89,698	18,026	779
Central Utah.....	8,255	8,223	32
Colorado River.....	17,740	5,919	11,711	110
Heart Mountain.....	10,972	10,954	18
Jerome ¹	7,674	7,674
Gila River.....	13,234	10,202	2,946	86
Granada.....	7,567	7,554	13
Manzanar ²	10,049	9,731	165	153
Minidoka.....	9,484	9,467	17
Rohwer.....	8,232	8,232
Tule Lake.....	15,296	11,742	3,204	350
To other than Relocation Centers.....	2,652*	223	1,635
Furlough.....	1,630	223	1,407
Institutions, etc.....	1,022*	228

*Including 794 persons remaining in institutions in evacuated area, and who were never evacuated.

¹Including 894 persons enroute from Fresno on October 31.

²9,666 evacuees transferred by inter-agency agreement, June 1, 1942.

Figure 16: Table 32.—Summary of Transfers of Evacuees From Custody of the Army to Custody of War Relocation Authority
U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 279.

released from assembly centers in accordance with regulations governing the release of mixed-marriage cases; (2) a few persons who were deferred from evacuation and later release; and (3) some persons who were permitted to leave the assembly centers for interior points to join their families who had previously established residence outside the evacuated area.

In accord with the provisions of the agreement between the War Department and the WRA, DeWitt authorized the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs to make the necessary arrangements for the transfer of evacuees from assembly to relocation centers on May 23, 1942. His directive also granted authority to call on the sector commanders for necessary military assistance to facilitate the transfer.

A "schedule of movement" was prepared by the military as the first step in the plan for evacuee transfers. The following factors, although not always realized, were presumably considered in formulating this schedule:

1. Date when each relocation center would be available for "beneficial occupancy," including progress of construction and availability and transfer of supplies
2. Urgency of early evacuation of assembly centers "having pit latrines or which presented an abnormal fire hazard"
3. Desirability "for efficient operation, of transferring the evacuees in an entire Assembly Center in a continuous movement, and, if possible, to the same Relocation Center destination"

4. Need to balance the urban and rural populations in each relocation center, and the desirability of relocating together the rural and urban groups which had been evacuated from the same general area
5. Attainment of a minimum climatic change consistent with the placement in available centers
6. Transfer of evacuees to a relocation center as close to their community of former residence as possible
7. Availability of sufficient train equipment to transport the evacuees without interrupting the prearranged schedules of major troop movements

A preliminary "schedule of movement" was drafted in early June. In addition to the proposed transfers from assembly to relocation centers, it allowed for the direct evacuation of Japanese from the California portion of Military Area No. 2 to relocation centers. Because of the delay in construction of some relocation centers and the unavailability of some types of supplies and equipment, however, this preliminary schedule was revised in August. The initial schedule had called for the evacuation of all assembly centers by October 12, while the revised schedule set October 30 — "the realized goal" — as the date of the final movement. (The logistics of transfer prescribed by the WCCA is represented in the chart on the following page.)

Specific transfer orders, a list of which may be seen in Appendix D , were issued covering all of the regular transfer movements of evacuees from assembly to relocation centers. The transfer orders were prepared by the Civil Affairs Division, General Staff, issued by Headquarters, Western Defense Command, and addressed to the Commanding General of the Sector in which the movement originated as well as to all WCCA agencies concerned with transfer operations. Transfer orders Nos. 1-5 and 7, however, were issued directly by the WCCA director. Such orders were usually issued 12 to 19 days prior to the departure of the first train of evacuees to be moved under the order.

Each transfer order directed the agencies concerned to make the necessary arrangements for the transfer of the evacuees. The orders contained information on the approximate number of persons, the assembly center of origin, the relocation center destination, the dates of movement, and, where necessary, a specific description by family numbers or civilian exclusion order of the exact group of evacuees who were to be moved. It also directed that a suitable military escort be provided and that the necessary transportation and meals be furnished to the evacuees, Caucasian medical attendants, and military escort. A formal operating procedure developed to prepare the orders was formalized in a "Procedure Memorandum" issued on June 26, 1942 (a copy of which is printed in the *Final Report*, pp. 592-99).

As much as possible, the evacuation of an assembly center was accomplished by blocks or other administrative areas within the center, thus permitting the closing off of unused portions of the center for cleanup by the remaining evacuees and for the removal, inventory, and storage of government property. A cleanup crew of evacuees was retained for a short period after the main body of evacuees had been transferred to a relocation

TRANSFERS FROM ASSEMBLY TO RELOCATION CENTERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULAR TRANSFER ORDERS




Figure 17: Transfers from Assembly to Relocation Centers,
U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 281.

center. These workers performed services necessary to prepare the center for reoccupancy and assisted the center staff in the completion of fiscal and property records and the storage of government property. As each assembly center was evacuated, residents of the evacuated area were required to perform necessary policing of the barracks, latrines, and grounds immediately surrounding the barracks. All shelving, wiring, and other facilities installed by evacuees in their living quarters were removed.

Once evacuation of an assembly center started, it was generally continued until the center was empty. Evacuees were normally moved by special train in increments of approximately 500 persons, because the military considered that number to be an optimum train load. It was also the maximum number that could be efficiently handled in departing an assembly center and quickly processed on arrival at a relocation center. Movements occurred daily or on alternate days until the ordered transfer was completed. Of the evacuees transferred, only 710 were moved by bus — for relatively short distances. All other transfers were conducted with the use of 171 special trains.

Coordination for transportation necessary to move the evacuees, baggage, and freight was the responsibility of the Rail Transportation Officer in the Western Defense Command's Office of the Quartermaster. The U.S. Public Health Service provided medical personnel to accompany the evacuees to the relocation centers, providing one doctor and one or two

registered nurses to accompany the longer transfers. The Sector Commander furnished the necessary military personnel, including a sector transportation officer, a train commander, and sufficient military personnel "to assure the safe conduct of the evacuees." The train commanders took responsibility for the evacuees at the exit gate of the assembly center. The evacuees were permitted "to take on the same train only such personal effects and bedding as required by the evacuee immediately upon arrival at the War Relocation Center." Two baggage cars were to be provided for each train. Excess baggage was to be sent to the relocation center by freight. When two or more meals were required enroute, dining cars were included in the train equipment. For movements involving only one or two meals, lunches were provided by the assembly center management.⁴²

EVACUEES' EXPERIENCES DURING TRANSFER TO RELOCATION CENTERS

Notwithstanding the Army's planning efforts for the transfer of evacuees from the assembly to the relocation centers, the evacuees often experienced less than ideal conditions. In its *Second Quarterly Report*, the WRA reported that during the summer and early fall of 1942 "contingent after contingent of evacuees boarded trains at the assembly centers and travelled hundreds of miles farther inland to the partially completed relocation centers." In addition some 8,000 to 9,000 people of Japanese ancestry were moved from their homes in the eastern half of California (Military Area No. 2 portion of the state) directly into relocation centers beginning on July 9. The WRA observed that in "planning the movement to relocation centers, every effort was made to hold families intact and to bring together people who came originally from a common locality." However, the agency noted:

Evacuees from the San Francisco Bay Area, for example, were first moved to the Tanforan and Santa Anita Assembly Centers and later reunited at the Central Utah Relocation Center. Colorado River Relocation Center drew its population largely from the Imperial Valley, from the Salinas and Pinedale Assembly Centers, and Military Area No. 2. The two northern-most relocation centers — Minidoka in Idaho and Heart Mountain in Wyoming — received their contingents mainly from the assembly centers at Puyallup, Washington and at North Portland, Oregon. Gila River absorbed the whole population of the assembly centers at Tulare and Turlock, plus several contingents from Santa Anita and others from Military No. 2.

"Despite this general pattern," however, the WRA reported that "some mingling of heterogeneous populations was inevitable." Evacuees at the Santa Anita Assembly Center, for example, "were widely dispersed in the movement to relocation centers." "These people, most of whom were originally from Los Angeles, were scattered among the Gila River, Granada, Central Utah, and Rohwer Relocation Centers." Later, some Santa Anita evacuees would also be sent to Manzanar and Jerome. At Granada, "where the highly urban Santa Anita people were combined with predominantly rural contingents from the Merced Assembly Center," the WRA noted that "some minor tensions had already developed between the two groups before" the end of September. "Sincere efforts were

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 278-89.

being made on both sides, however, to create a better mutual understanding and to develop greater community solidarity."⁴³

The train trips, particularly the longer ones, were often uncomfortable for the evacuees. Even on trips of several days, sleeping berths were provided only for infants, invalids, and others who were physically incapacitated. Most evacuees sat up during the entire trip, and mothers with small children who were allowed berths were separated from their husbands. Ventilation was poor because the military had ordered that the shades be drawn for security purposes. The toilets sometimes flooded, soaking suitcases and belongings on the floor. The trips were slow because the trains were old, and sometimes they were shunted to sidings while higher-priority trains passed. Delays could be as long as ten hours. Arrangements for meals were sometimes less than satisfactory, and medical care was frequently poor. Although the WCCA had ordered that trains be stopped and ailing evacuees hospitalized along the route, at least two infants died during the journeys.⁴⁴

Some evacuees were harassed by the military guards. One evacuee later recalled:

When we finally reached our destination, four of us men were ordered by the military personnel carrying guns to follow them. We were directed to unload the pile of evacuees' belongings from the boxcars to the semi-trailer truck to be transported to the concentration camp. During the interim, after filling one trailer-truck and waiting for the next to arrive, we were hot and sweaty and sitting, trying to conserve our energy, when one of the military guards standing with his gun, suggested that one of us should get a drink of water at the nearby water faucet and try and make a run for it so he could get some target practice.⁴⁵

Another evacuee remembered:

At Parker, Arizona, we were transferred to buses. With baggage and carryalls hanging from my arm, I was contemplating what I could leave behind, since my husband was not allowed to come to my aid. A soldier said, "Let me help you, put your arm out." He proceeded to pile everything on my arm. And to my horror, he placed my two-month-old baby on top of the stack. He then pushed me with the butt of the gun and told me to get off the train, knowing when I stepped off the train my baby would fall to the ground. I refused. But he kept prodding and ordering me to move. I will always be thankful [that] a lieutenant checking the cars came upon us. He took the baby down, gave her to me, and then ordered the soldier to carry all our belongings to the bus and see that I was seated and then report back to him.⁴⁶

43. War Relocation Authority, *Second Quarterly Report*, pp. 3-4.

44. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 289; Sone *Nisei Daughter*, p. 190; Okubo, *Citizen 13660*, p. 128; and *Personal Justice Denied*, pp. 149, 151.

45. Unsolicited testimony, Hearings, Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 151.

46. Oral testimony, Shizuko S. Tokushige, San Francisco, August 12, 1981, Hearings, Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, p. 228, quoted in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 151.

At the end of the lengthy train trips were the new relocation centers. To travel-weary refugees, the spectacle of guard towers and armed sentries in the middle of vast, primitive expanses of nothingness came as a rude shock, especially since they had been assured that the relocation centers were to be residential communities without the most repressive aspects of the hastily-constructed assembly centers.⁴⁷ Upon arrival at the relocation centers the evacuees underwent an often grueling "intake" procedure, which usually took about two hours. The process included five principal steps: (1) a medical check; (2) issuance of registration and address forms to each family group; (3) assignment to quarters; (4) emergency recruitment of evacuees needed in the mess halls and other essential community services; and (5) delivery of hand baggage to individual families.⁴⁸

In his *The Governing of Men*, Alexander H. Leighton described the "intake" process and its effect on the evacuees at the Poston relocation center. He observed:

In May the physical shell of Poston began to fill with its human occupants. First came the volunteers and then a swelling stream of evacuees until the city of barracks had become alive. . . .

[The] first volunteers were soon followed by others until a total of 251 turned to work in the growing heat and cleaned up the barracks for the 7,450 evacuees who arrived during the succeeding three weeks. The volunteers worked at the receiving stations interviewing, registering, housing and explaining to the travel-weary newcomers what they must do and where they must go. . . .

The new arrivals, coming in a steady stream, were poured into empty blocks one after another, as into a series of bottles. The reception procedure became known as "intake" and it left a lasting impression on all who witnessed or took part in it. . . .

When the bus stops, its forty occupants quietly peer out to see what Poston is like. A friend is recognized and hands wave. The bus is large and comfortable, but the people look tired and wilted, with perspiration running off their noses. They have been on the train for twenty-four hours and have been hot since they crossed the Sierras, with long waits at desert stations. . . .

They begin to file out of the bus, clutching tightly to children and bundles. Military Police escorts anxiously help and guides direct them in English and Japanese. They are sent into the mess halls where girls hand them ice water, salt tablets and wet towels. In the back are cots where those who faint can be stretched out, and the cots are usually occupied. At long tables sit interviewers suggesting enlistment in the War Relocation Works Corps. . . . Men and women, still sweating, holding on to children and bundles, try to think. A whirlwind comes and throws clouds of dust into the mess hall, into the water and into the faces of the people while papers fly in all directions. . . .

47. Weglyn, *Years of Infamy*, pp. 89-90.

48. War Relocation Authority, *Second Quarterly Report*, pp. 5-6.

Interviewers ask some questions about former occupations so that cooks and other types of workers much needed in the camp can be quickly secured. Finally, fingerprints are made and the evacuees troop out across an open space and into another hall for housing allotment, registration and a cursory physical examination. . . . In the end, the evacuees are loaded onto trucks along with their hand baggage and driven to their new quarters; there each group who will live together is left to survey a room 20 by 25 feet with bare boards, knotholes through the floor and into the next apartment, heaps of dust, and for each person an army cot, a blanket and a sack which can be filled with straw to make a mattress. There is nothing else. No shelves, closets, chairs, tables or screens. In this space 5 to 7 people, and in a few cases 8, men, women and their children, are to live indefinitely.

"Intake" was a focus of interest and solicitude on the part of the administrative staff. The Project Director said it was one of the things he would remember longest out of the whole experience at Poston. He thought the people looked lost, not knowing what to do or what to think.⁴⁹

While the intake process was an inauspicious introduction to the WRA for the evacuees, the physical condition of the relocation centers at the time of arrival also contributed to their feelings of disaffection. At the end of September the WRA reported on living conditions in the centers:

Seriously hampered by wartime shortages of materials and wartime transportation problems, construction of the relocation communities went busily forward under supervision of the Army Corps of Engineers throughout the summer months. At most centers, the building of evacuee barracks was finished on or very close to schedule. Installation of utilities, however, involved more critical materials and consequently moved forward at a considerably slower rate. At some of the centers, evacuees were forced temporarily to live in barracks without lights, laundry facilities, or adequate toilets. Mess halls planned to accommodate about 300 people had to handle twice and three times that number for short periods as evacuees poured in from assembly centers on schedule and shipment of stoves and kitchen facilities lagged behind. In a few cases, where cots were not delivered on time, some newly arriving evacuees spent their first night in relocation centers sleeping on barracks floors. At nearly all centers, evacuee living standards temporarily were forced, largely by inevitable wartime conditions, far below the level originally contemplated by the War Relocation Authority.

The WRA went on to report that "most of these difficulties were either straightened out or well on the way to solution" by the end of September. Still ahead, however, was "the sizable job of constructing buildings which were not included in the agreement with the War Department" such as schools and administrative housing. "With the fall term already started at most public schools in the United States, evacuee children were getting ready to

49. Leighton, *Governing of Men* pp. 61-66. Also see Davis, *Behind Barbed Wire*, pp. 67-72, and Thomas and Mishimoto, *Spoilage*, pp. 31-33.

resume their education in barracks and other buildings which were never intended for classroom use."⁵⁰

Other developments also contributed to the confusion and disgust of many evacuees as they entered the relocation centers. One of the most disconcerting issues confronting both the WRA and its new charges was the agency's unreadiness to undertake its mandate. Having selected the sites for the relocation centers, the WRA quickly turned to its second job — development of policies and procedures that would control the lives of the evacuees — while the centers were being constructed. In his letter to Eisenhower on April 6, Masaoka set forth a long list of recommendations for regulating life in the camps and stressed, among other things, the importance of respecting the citizenship of the Nisei, protecting the health of elderly Issei, providing educational opportunities, and recognizing that the evacuees were "American" in their outlook and wanted to make a contribution to the war effort.⁵¹

Although the WRA agreed with many of these recommendations, it was slow in developing policies for operating the relocation centers. The WRA would later describe the difficulties it encountered as it grappled with the issue of policy formulation:

Ideally the War Relocation Authority should have had a complete set of operating policies drawn up and ready to go into effect when the first contingent of 54 evacuees arrived at the gates of the Colorado River Relocation Center on May 8, 1942. Actually it was 3 weeks after this date before the agency produced a set of policies which were then frankly labeled by the Director as 'tentative, still fairly crude, and subject to immediate change.' And it was not until August, when more than half of the evacuee population had been transferred to WRA supervision, that the Authority was able to provide the centers with carefully conceived and really dependable answers to some of the more basic questions of community management.

The chief reason for the delay in producing a reliable set of basic policies lies in the fact that WRA had to start virtually from scratch. . . . no agency — governmental or private — had ever been called upon before to care for the needs of a tenth of a million men, women, and children who had been uprooted from their homes under a cloud of widespread popular distrust in time of total war. The problem of managing camps under these conditions were so unprecedented, so complex, and so unpredictable that the process of policy formulation continued, at varying levels of intensity, throughout the major part of the agency's active life. Nevertheless, the principal outlines of center management policy were laid down in 1942 — in tentative form in a statement issued at the Washington office on May 29 and then, somewhat more thoughtfully and against a brief background of actual operating experience, in an agency conference held at San Francisco in the middle of August.⁵²

50. War Relocation Authority, *Second Quarterly Report*, pp. 4-5.

51. *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 157.

52. U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Story of Human Conservation*, p. 75.

Given the limited time available and the novelty of WRA's task as both jailer and advocate for the evacuees, it is not surprising that the agency was not fully prepared for the evacuees when they began arriving at the relocation centers. Furthermore, the "Tentative Policy Statement" issued in mimeographed form on May 29 must have left the evacuees puzzled and confused. Committed to a policy of detention even before the relocation centers were completed, the WRA announced that it had begun making plans to assure evacuees "for the duration of the war and as nearly as wartime exigencies permit, an equitable substitute for the life, work, and homes given up, and to facilitate participation in the productive life of America both during and after the war."⁵³ Nevertheless, the fact that WRA was unable to provide dependable answers to basic questions, such as policies on evacuee employment and compensation, self-government, internal security, education, agricultural production, and consumer enterprises in the relocation centers, until late August and early September contributed to the disaffection and anxiety that increasingly characterized evacuee reactions to the relocation centers.⁵⁴

The confluence of diverse political interests had again conspired against the evacuees. The condition of the relocation centers at which the evacuees arrived in 1942 were barely an improvement over the hastily constructed and makeshift assembly centers they had left. The increased freedom and possible resettlement they had anticipated had been reversed in favor of confinement, and the rules and policies that would govern their uprooted lives for the indefinite future were uncertain, tentative, or non-existent. The Manzanar War Relocation Center, located in the arid expanse of Owens Valley in eastern California, will provide a poignant case history of the WRA administered program to both detain and relocate persons of Japanese ancestry during World War II.

53. Thomas and Nishimoto, *Spoilage*, p. 33.

54. War Relocation Authority, *Second Quarterly Report*, p. 2.

CHAPTER SIX: SITE SELECTION FOR MANZANAR WAR RELOCATION CENTER — HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF OWENS VALLEY AND MANZANAR VICINITY

In March 1942, a site in Owens Valley, approximately five miles south of Independence, California, was selected by the U. S. Army for establishment of a reception or assembly center for persons of Japanese descent who were to be evacuated from the west coast. Located on lands that had been settled by a fruit-growing community known as Manzanar during the early 20th century, this site would become known as the Manzanar War Relocation Center. Although this site's historical significance is based primarily on the events that occurred here during World War II, the historical development of the Manzanar vicinity and Owens Valley provide insights into the settlement and growth of a little-known chapter in eastern California history.

SITE SELECTION

Two principal sources provide explanations for the military's decision to locate a reception or relocation center in the Owens Valley in March 1942. The first is the "Project Director's Report," prepared in February 1946 by two men who would play influential roles in the development and operation of Manzanar. The two men were Robert L. Brown, who became reports officer at Manzanar on March 15, 1942, and later served as assistant project director at the relocation center from January 1943 to February 1946, and Ralph P. Merritt, who served as project director at Manzanar from November 24, 1942, until the center closed on November 21, 1945.¹ The second source is a report written in early April 1942 by Milton E. Silverman, a feature writer for the *San Francisco Chronicle*, who was given a 60-day assignment by the Western Defense Command to investigate the relocation center operations of the Wartime Civil Control Commission.² Although the two reports offer some conflicting viewpoints on the events surrounding the Manzanar site selection, they corroborate each other in the essential details of the decision.

The Brown and Merritt report noted that the Manzanar site was located in Inyo County in the Owens River Valley, approximately 230 miles north of Los Angeles. A "long, narrow, semi-arid valley bounded on the west by the towering Sierra Nevada mountains and on the east by the colorful, but not quite-so-high Inyo mountains," Owens Valley had "a colorful history having been the scene of one of the great 'water-wars' of the West."

In the early years of the 20th century, the City of Los Angeles "in its quest for water turned to the steams flowing down the eastern slopes of the Sierra" in Owens Valley and "conceived and built a 230 mile aqueduct to carry these waters to its rapidly expanding boundaries." During the next two decades, Los Angeles, through its Department of Water

1. "Project Director's Report," *Final Report, Manzanar Relocation Center, Manzanar, Inyo County, California*, February 27, 1942 — March 9, 1946, Ralph P. Merritt, Project Director, Vol. 1, pp. A-2 to A-6, Record Group 210, Entry 4b, Field Basic Documentation, 1942-46, Box 71, File, "Manzanar Final Reports." Unless otherwise noted, this section will be based on the "Project Director's Report."

2. Appendix 25, "The Silverman Report," in "Project Director's Report," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. 1, pp. A168 — A219, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 71, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

and Power (LADWP), purchased "most of the land in the Owens Valley to protect this source of water [i.e., the water rights], and, as a consequence, forced most of the land to revert back to semi-arid desert land." "A few cattle and sheep men were given grazing leases, the farmers moved away, and the towns shrank to semi-ghost towns."

In the 1930s, "with the advent of better roads and increased population in Southern California," however, Owens Valley "began to be visited by vacationists looking for recreation spots during the summer months." This "early trickle" of tourists "kept the towns from complete annihilation, and pumped new hope into the veins of the merchants who had refused to leave." "New leadership," according to Brown and Merritt, "began to focus the spotlight of national publicity on the injustices perpetrated by the City of Los Angeles." During the late 1930s, a "great wave of interest in Inyo and the Valley swept California" as tourists "flocked to the high mountains, the towns prospered, Los Angeles sold back some of the town property, and leased some ranches for farming." Owens Valley "was again in the public eye and on the 'uphill' grade."

One of the supporters of the "new development" of Owens Valley was Manchester Boddy, influential publisher of the *Los Angeles Daily News*. Boddy was also a friend "of the Roosevelt Administration," and as such "his advice was often sought by the Administration on matters of national importance affecting the Pacific Coast." It was "by no strange coincidence," according to Brown and Merritt, that "when the publisher was asked for help and advice by the Administration on the handling of projected evacuation of citizen and alien Japanese," he "was the first to suggest their evacuation to the Owens Valley." Aware of the "plans outlined by a citizen group in the Valley aimed at developing a stronger economic position for the residents," Boddy also "knew the Japanese and shared none of the fears of the 'Yellow Peril' decried so loudly in front page banners" by the Hearst newspapers. Knowing "the temper of the California 'public,'" Boddy agreed "to aid the Administration in laying the groundwork for an orderly evacuation of the Japanese by the Army, and *an orderly reception of them* where they were sent."

On February 21, 1942, two days after President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, Glenn Desmond, the public relations director of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, called Brown, executive secretary and public relations director of the Inyo-Mono Associates (today known simply as Inyo Associates) organization that was promoting the valley's economic development through tourism, requesting that he travel to Los Angeles "for an off-the-record talk" with Boddy "on a matter of great importance." On February 26 Boddy told Brown and Desmond "that the Army had already decided on the Owens Valley as one place of 'detention' for as many perhaps, as 50,000 Japanese." He asked for suggestions on "handling the delicate relationship between the Army, the Department of Justice, the City of Los Angeles and the people of the Owens Valley." At the request of Attorney General Biddle, Boddy introduced the two public relations men to Thomas C. Clark, who had just been named by General DeWitt as Alien Control Coordinator and head of the civilian staff of the WCCA with responsibility for working out the preliminary

organization of the evacuation. Evidently on Brown's advice, Clark chose to work with a citizens' committee that Brown would select.³

Following the meeting Brown returned to Owens Valley, enlisting the aid of some of its leading citizens. Among the individuals that agreed to aid in the endeavor were Merritt, a "rancher" near Independence and chairman of the committee on relations with the City of Los Angeles who was representing the people of Owens Valley in their discussions with the city "over land and water." Merritt, who would serve as project director of the Manzanar War Relocation Center from November 1942 until its closure in November 1945, was a gifted agricultural organizer with a lengthy career in business, politics, and agricultural development. Since Merritt would play a significant role in pre-World War II Owens Valley history as well as the development and operation of the war relocation center at Manzanar, it is appropriate that his career, especially his relationship with the Japanese government, be examined.

Merritt was born in 1883 on a cattle ranch along the Sacramento River in Rio Vista, California. After growing up in Oakland, Merritt entered the University of California, Berkeley, in 1902. He dropped out of school after his freshman year to work as a cowpuncher for Miller and Lux, a large livestock concern with extensive landholdings in California, Nevada, and Oregon. Merritt reentered the University of California in 1904, becoming student body president in 1906 and graduating from the College of Agriculture in 1907. After graduation he served as secretary to the president of the university for several years, and in 1909 he was elected graduate manager of athletics. During 1911-13 Merritt served as vice president and general manager for Miller and Lux. By that time the company had acquired approximately 10,000,000 acres of land on which it raised some 600,000 cattle and more than 1,000,000 sheep. It owned a number of meat packing plants and was the largest distributor of meat and meat products in northern California. Merritt served as the University of California's first comptroller from 1912-17, organizing its business operations and properties and overseeing building expansion on the Berkeley campus. In 1917 he was appointed adjutant general of California, becoming chairman of the first civilian draft board in the state to oversee the draft during World War I. That same year Herbert C. Hoover, federal food administrator, appointed Merritt as food administrator for California, and in that capacity he was responsible for the state agricultural program and development of food supplies needed by the government. Merritt became a close friend of Hoover, working with him in the widely-heralded operation of Belgian relief. In 1919 Merritt returned to the University of California as its comptroller and served on the administrative board of the institution. In 1920 Merritt left the university to campaign for Hoover's presidential campaign. After Warren G. Harding was elected President of the United States in 1920, Merritt opened a consulting and

3. For more information on Boddy's efforts and Brown's cooperation see Interview of Robert L. Brown by Arthur A. Hansen, December 13, 1973, and February 20, 1974, in Jessie A. Garrett and Ronald C. Larson, eds., *Camp and Community: Manzanar and the Owens Valley* (Fullerton, California State University, Fullerton, Japanese American Oral History Project, 1977), pp. 23ff. Also see John Walton, *Western Times and Water Wars: State, Culture, and Rebellion in California* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992). Brown detailed his involvement in the selection of the Manzanar site and the public relations program related to its establishment in an untitled report labeled in pencil "Assembly Centers, by Robert Brown, Reports Officer, Manzanar, April, 1943." RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 69, File, "Miscellaneous Reports." Also see "[Assembly Centers," April 1943], Robert Brown, Reports Officer, Manzanar, pp. 1-3, RG 210, Entry 4b, Relocation Center Records, Box 69, File, "Miscellaneous Reports."

property management business in San Francisco. He purchased 1,200 acres near Wasco in Kern County to develop a commercial cotton-growing demonstration project. During the early 1920s, Merritt continued to be associated with the University of California, serving as its chairman of endowments and as its acting chairman of the Grounds and Buildings Committee. In the latter capacity, he supervised the first construction on the campus of the University of California, Los Angeles. In 1919 he became the director of the California Development Board, which would later become the California State Chamber of Commerce in 1929, and from 1925-28 he served as director of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. During the 1920s, Merritt also served as chairman of the first statewide water committee, playing a leading role in the Central Valley Project that developed a dependable water supply for the San Joaquin and Sacramento valleys. Other responsibilities of his during the 1920s included taking an active part in the campaign to reapportion the state legislature and serving as a member of the Bay Bridge Committee in San Francisco. In this latter capacity, he worked with Secretary of Commerce Hoover to lay the groundwork for the construction of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge. Appointed to a federal agricultural committee by President Calvin Coolidge in the early 1920s, he worked with the War Finance Corporation to alleviate the crisis in sheep prices and with banking institutions to solve problems associated with marketing farm products. He became a leader in the field of cooperative marketing of agricultural products, helping to establish the California Rice Growers' Association and serving as its president during 1922-23.

In the latter year Merritt became president of the Sun Maid Raisin Growers' Association, a Fresno-based farm cooperative that stirred controversy in the San Joaquin Valley. He soon faced charges of violating anti-trust laws, but, as a result of his contacts with Harding administration officials, the indictment was dropped. He was with the Harding party during the president's last illness and death in San Francisco and helped with arrangements for removal of the president's body to Washington for funeral services. In 1924 Merritt and his wife went to the Orient to open markets for Sun Maid raisins in China, Japan, and the Philippines. During his visit the Japanese government proposed to award him with a medal and other honors "for having saved Japan at the time of its rice riots because the advent of the California rice into the Japanese market had quieted the rice riots and returned the people to a feeling that their kind of rice would be forthcoming." Although he declined the honors, Merritt developed significant relationships with Japanese government officials on the trip. While visiting Tokyo, word was received that the U.S. Congress had passed the Immigration Act of 1924 barring further Japanese immigration to the United States. In the wake of this announcement, violent anti-American demonstrations broke out as angry Japanese took to the streets. Merritt spoke to the crowds, promising to attempt changing the legislation if they would stop the demonstrations. Merritt would later say that this incident "began my interest in the Japanese people and my interest in trying to get this Exclusion Law and the [California] Anti-Alien land law stricken from our statutes. It finally led me to my part in the War Relocation Authority and being Director of Manzanar in World War II, the Presidency of the Japan America Society in Los Angeles in 1951, and my friendship with Crown Prince Akahito."

During the mid-1920s, Merritt purchased a vineyard outside Fresno to demonstrate his belief that vineyards should be removed and replaced by other crops to reduce the surplus of grapes and thus raise their "price" in domestic and foreign markets. The Sun Maid

Raisin Growers' Association went bankrupt in 1928 and was taken over by its creditor banks. Following the financial collapse of Sun Maid, he went to Europe, broken in health, spirit, and finances. After his return, he worked with grape growers for a period, but soon suffered a severe attack of pneumonia. Merritt had relatives in eastern California, and had maintained a long-time close friendship with descendants of John Shepherd who in 1864 had homesteaded the land that would later form a portion of the Manzanar War Relocation Center site. Thus, Merritt retreated to Death Valley to recuperate under doctor's care in the early 1930s, later buying a ranch and establishing his home near Big Pine in Owens Valley. A long-time friend of Horace M. Albright who served as Director of the National Park Service from 1929-33, Merritt played a pivotal role in the effort to have President Hoover issue an executive order establishing Death Valley National Monument on February 11, 1933. Merritt began to speculate in silver and lead mining ventures in the Death Valley area and purchased additional ranch lands in the vicinity of Yerington in western Nevada. In 1937 he helped to found the Inyo-Mono Associates.⁴

Other persons in addition to Merritt that Brown contacted included George W. Savage, a resident of Independence and owner of the Chalfant Press which published the three major Owens Valley newspapers; Douglas Joseph, a Bishop merchant and president of Inyo-Mono Associates; R. R. Henderson, a lumber company owner in Lone Pine and chairman of the Inyo County Evacuation Committee; Inyo County Superior Court Judge William Dehy, one of the county's most respected citizens and a leader in the valley's resistance to the Los Angeles aqueduct during the 1920s; Dr. Howard Dueker, a medical doctor in Lone Pine, president of the Lone Pine Lions Club, and spokesman for medical aid and sanitation in Inyo County; and George Francis, a resident of Independence and District Attorney for Inyo County. These men, according to the Brown and Merritt report, "all saw the [Japanese relocation] program as a beneficial one to the area, but all of them also saw the difficulties ahead in handling public reaction."⁵

This "ad hoc" committee with Merritt as chairman was "asked unofficially" by Clark "to draw up a program for the Japanese which would be beneficial to the Valley." He also requested that they "aid the military in selecting a site" and "give advice to the military and to his office on the best and most timely way of informing the people of the Valley of the coming influx of people."

On February 27 Merritt and Brown, along with an Inyo County supervisor, accompanied "officers from the U. S. [Corps of] Engineers on a detailed tour of the Valley" during

4. Bob Brown, "Inyo-Mono Comes Back," *California Magazine of the Pacific*, April 1940, pp. 20-22; William Kahrl, *Water and Power: The Conflict Over Los Angeles Water Supply in the Owens Valley* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982), p. 361; and Appendix 2, Letter, Ralph P. Merritt to Aunt Luella, December 25, 1942, in "Project Director's Report, *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. I, A-74 to A-76, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 71, File, "Manzanar Final Reports." The best biographical source on Ralph P. Merritt is University of California, Berkeley and Los Angeles, "After Me Cometh A Builder:" *The Recollections of Ralph Palmer Merritt*, Completed under the auspices of the Regional Cultural History Project and the Oral History Program, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962. Also see Ardis M. Walker, *Ralph P. Merritt* (San Bernadino, California, Inland Printing and Engraving Company, 1964), p 3-5.

5. For more information on the men contacted by Brown see Walton, *Western Times and Water Wars*, p. 217. Also see "Owens Valley Coordinating Committee," n.d., Box 21, File, "Public Relations — State, County, etc., Coordinating Committee Collection No. 122, War Relocation Authority Archive, Department of Special Collections, University Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

which several sites, including locations near Olancha and Bishop and one on the east side of the valley, were inspected. According to Brown and Merritt, the engineers selected a site on the west side of the valley between the towns of Independence and Lone Pine, primarily because of its relatively level ground and the water available from several streams which ran down from the Sierra Nevada. The location selected was the site of John Shepherd's 1864 homestead and of an early 20th century "irrigation colony" known as Manzanar, where portions of the drainage system and concrete conduits George Chaffey constructed were still in place.⁶ In his report, Silverman stated that the military selected the site "because of its distance from any vital defense project (except the Los Angeles aqueduct), its relative inaccessibility, the ease with which it could be policed, and its general geography." The following day a first draft of a detailed plan "for the use of the Japanese and methods of handling public relations" was presented to Clark.⁷

A preliminary report on the Manzanar site was prepared on February 28 by Colonel Bendetsen and Lieutenant Colonel I.K. Evans but was not made public.⁸ Confusion and controversy developed on February 28 when personnel of the Corps of Engineers "without consulting Clark on any method of approach on the delicate matter of public reaction, called on [H. A. Van Norman] the Chief Engineer of the Department of Water and Power." To "his utter consternation," according to Brown and Merritt, the military officials "demanded a lease on Department of Water and Power land in the Owens Valley amounting to 8,000 acres, for a 'prison camp' for 'Japs'!" Refusing the request, the chief engineer "started immediately to use his own influence in Washington to counteract any idea of the Army to use City-owned lands to house evacuated 'Japs'." Instead, he attempted to convince the Army that a site near Parker, Arizona, should be selected for a relocation center, and he tried to interest federal government officials, including the FBI, in the Japanese consulate's inquiry into the construction and operational details of the Los Angeles municipal water system in 1934, implying that the inquiry and subsequent hiring of 12 Japanese civil service employees by the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power was part of a conspiracy by the Japanese government to sabotage the system.⁹

6. For more information on this topic, see Karhl, *Water and Power*, p. 367, and Interview of Robert L. Brown by Arthur A. Hansen, in Garrett and Larson, eds., *Camp and Community*, p. 27.

7. Appendix 25, "The Silverman Report," in "Project Director's Report," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. 1, p. A170, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 71, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

8. W. B. Higgins, Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers to M. S. Eisenhower, Coordinator, U.S. Department of Agriculture, March 13, 1942, land attachment, "Preliminary Report on Possible Sites for Relocation of Citizens of Japanese Ancestry, and of Japanese Aliens, March 5, 1942), RG 83, War Relocation Records, 1942, Box 1, File — "Suggested Resettlement Projects," National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno.

9. See, for instance, H. A. Van Norman, Chief Engineer and General Manager to Honorable Sheridan Downey, United States Senator, March 5, 1942 (and attachments); Teletype, H. A. Van Norman to S. B. Robinson, March 6, 1942, in Correspondence, March 1942 — October 1943, Manzanar Relocation Center, Administrative and Executive Files, Water Executive Office Historical Records, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, Historical Records Program, Los Angeles, California, (LADWP Historical Records) and R. R. Proctor, Field Engineer to H. A. Van Norman, Chief Engineer and General Manager, Department of Water and Power, March 9, 10, 1942. Also see G. M. Desmond to C. E. Miller, President, Water and Power Commission, January 19, 1942; Glenn M. Desmond, Publicity Director to Orville R. Caldwell, Executive Deputy, Office of the Mayor, City Hall, January 19, 1942; H. A. Van Norman, Chief Engineer and General Manager to R. B. Hood Special Agent In Charge, January 12, 1942 (and attachments); R. B. Hood, Special Agent In Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation to H. A. Van Norman, January 14, 1942 (and attachments); Teletype, S. B. Robinson to H. A. Van Norman, March 4, 1942; and Statement by the Board of Water and

According to Brown and Merritt, this lack of coordination in handling the situation in Owens Valley prevented the "carefully worked out plan by all parties in the Clark agreement" from being presented.

Rumors began to spread through political circles in Los Angeles as well as the communities in Owens Valley, causing anxiety, fear, and anger. Anxious to get rid of its Japanese residents, Los Angeles officials nevertheless bitterly protested the choice of the Manzanar site. The vital aqueduct that carried water to Los Angeles originated in the Owens Valley and had been sabotaged in the past, and they feared that the Japanese would present a physical or sanitation threat, or both, to their water supply. Leading the attack against the Manzanar site was Los Angeles Mayor Fletcher Bowron and Congressmen Thomas F. Ford of Los Angeles, both of whom had consistently called for the evacuation and internment of persons of Japanese ancestry living on the west coast. Ford noted:

In my mind, I can see Tokio grinning with joy because of the opportunity this action will afford to sabotage the water supply of 1,500,000 people. I cannot penetrate the mind of the General [DeWitt]. He may have reasons for his action that are satisfactory to him, but I most vigorously protest this action as in my judgment as [an] inexcusable piece of stupidity. I sincerely hope that his military superiors in Washington will stop this move until a more thorough examination of the dangers inherent in the situation are investigated.¹⁰

Mayor Bowron, while reiterating his support for evacuation and internment, trembled to think of placing the Japanese in Owens Valley. Nevertheless, he added that if "the Army really won't take anything but the Owens Valley" we "certainly can't stop them."¹¹

Meanwhile, the residents of Owens Valley were also becoming embroiled in the heated controversy. On March 3, for instance, the situation in Owens Valley was aggravated when a private contractor told a local garage owner that he had come to look over the area where the Army was going to build "16 miles of prison camps" for those "damn Japs."

To restore order Clark on March 5 asked Los Angeles Mayor Fletcher Bowron to call together members of the Los Angeles Board of Water and Power Commission, the chief engineer of the Department of Water and Power, publishers of the four Los Angeles daily newspapers, and the president of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce. At the meeting, according to Brown and Merritt, Clark "brought order out of the chaos by masterful handling of the situation and forceful presentation of the will of the government." Among other things, Clark emphasized that the Western Defense Command had determined that an area "of some 6,000 acres situated between Lone Pine and Independence was absolutely

Power Commissioners Relative to the Establishment of a Japanese "Reception Center" in Owens Valley, by Clinton E. Miller, President, March 13, 1942 (and attachment); Manzanar Relocation Center, Correspondence, January 1942 — May 1945, Ephemera Collection (Service III), Historical Records Program Library, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power.

10. Quoted in Appendix 25, "The Silverman Report," in "Project Director's Report, *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. I, p. A169, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 71, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

11. *Ibid.*

essential to the Japanese evacuation program." Press releases were agreed upon by all present that would be published in each of the major dailies the next day. In addition, Savage produced extra editions for his three valley newspapers that were published on March 6.¹²

Highlights of the press releases included the story that the former Manzanar site had been selected by the Army for a "processing station" or reception center to house 10,000 to 15,000 persons of Japanese ancestry. Bids for the contract to construct the center, however, had been opened the previous day. The public was assured that the military was in complete control of the project "for the time being at least." All rights of the county and towns in the valley would be fully protected. Clark was quoted to the effect that the center would be "a boon not a burden to the community." In his editorial comments on March 6, Savage pointed to all the good that could come to the valley from such a project, praised the federal government for its ability to work quickly, and complemented the City of Los Angeles for its cooperativeness.

While the publication of the press release helped to inform the local residents of the contemplated moves by the government, it did not allay the fears of many people nor did it stop the "growing crop of rumors." One local resident, for instance, became so excited over current rumors that he attempted to form a "vigilante" committee that mapped out a plan of defense for the town of Independence, some five miles north of the site of the proposed relocation center. The plan, according to Brown and Merritt, contained "all the old methods of 'Indian Fighting,' including a 'delaying action' from rock to rock as the band of 'defenders' were to fall back when being pressed by 'superior forces.'"¹³

On March 7 General DeWitt sent a letter to the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, formally informing it that the Army had selected the Manzanar site as a reception or relocation center site. He stated:

. . . . In order adequately to provide the means for orderly and rapid accomplishment of these [evacuation program] objectives, the immediate establishment of necessary facilities to care for persons excluded is necessary. With the assistance of Federal, State, and local agencies a careful reconnaissance has been undertaken of possible sites for this purpose. Although many areas were suggested as immediately available, actual surveys on the ground revealed only two sites possessing all the features necessary and desirable for the intended use. Both of these sites are absolutely essential to the program. One of these sites lies in the area known as Owens Valley within Inyo County, California, the ownership of which is in the City of Los Angeles.

12. Informal Statement of Tom C. Clark, Alien Control Coordinator, in office of H. A. Van Norman, Chief Engineer and General Manager, Bureau of Water Works and Supply, City of Los Angeles . . . March 5, 1942, Correspondence, March 1942 — October 1943, Manzanar Relocation Center, Administrative and Executive Files, Water Executive Office Historical Records, LADWP Historical Records. Also see "Evacuated Japanese To Be Settled In Owens Valley," *Intake*, March 1942, p. 3. Copies of the *Intake*, a periodical of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, may be found in Manzanar Relocation Center, Administrative and Executive Files, Water Executive Office Historical Records, LADWP Historical Records.

13. For more information on various reactions by Owens Valley residents, see the interviews in Garrett and Larson, eds., *Camp and Community*.

In view of the urgency of the situation, I have initiated construction of necessary facilities in Owens Valley near Manzanar upon property owned by the City of Los Angeles and within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Water Works and Supply thereof. . . . Use of this property will be for so long as the present emergency requires, following which possession will be relinquished. Incident to the use of the said property, water in the watershed in which the said property lies will be appropriated in such quantities and for such specific purposes as may be necessary, fully bearing in mind, however, the needs of the City of Los Angeles for such water.

DeWitt "assured that adequate provision will be made and continued for protection of the Los Angeles Municipal Water Aqueduct and works appurtenant thereto against any injury or pollution by reason of the project." The general stated further:

I therefore advise you in the name of the United States Government that, effective immediately, temporary possession of the said property described . . . will be taken by duly authorized officials and agents of the United States Government for such uses as may be necessary.

DeWitt closed the letter by stating that he was acting under the broad powers of the Tucker Act under which the Army could take property necessary for national defense. Although not mentioned in the letter, DeWitt promised city officials during private conversations that the Manzanar site would be patrolled by military police.¹⁴ On March 9 the Los Angeles City Council debated the question of the military's acquisition of the Manzanar site, determining to postpone a vote of endorsement pending further study. More than a year later on April 15, 1943, the city council, after acrimonious discussion, would resolve that the city's "agricultural lands and water in the Owens Valley may be made available to the Federal Government, conditioned upon the same being placed under agriculture and tilled by the internees at Manzanar, and the vegetables produced therefrom be made available to the armed forces of the United States or sold in the open market at prevailing prices to the residents of the City of Los Angeles."¹⁵

Although the military was taking physical possession of the land for the Manzanar relocation center, the legal issues involved had not been settled. The federal government filed a civil complaint for condemnation of the land "under the power of eminent domain" on June 27, 1942, based on authority given to the Executive Branch by the Second War

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14. DeWitt to Department of Water and Power, March 7, 1942, and attachments, File — Jap[anese] Resettlement Area," Reference Files, City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power, Bishop, California. Attached to the letter was Exhibit "A" describing the land parcels that the military wished to lease for the construction of Manzanar. Originally, the military reported that the Manzanar site covered approximately 5,700 acres. On March 11, however, the U.S. Corps of Engineers revised the total acreage to 6,020 after conducting more accurate surveys. Exhibit "A," [March 7, 1942], Correspondence, March 1942 — October 1943, Manzanar Relocation Center, Administrative and Executive Files, Water Executive Office Historical Records, LADWP Historical Records. Also see "Evacuated Japanese To Be Settled In Owens Valley," *Intake*, March 1942, p. 3.
 15. E. L. Thrasher, Councilman, 14th Dist. to Board of Water and Power Commissioners, March 10, 1942, and Walter C. Peterson, City Clerk to Water and Power Commission, April 15, 1943, Correspondence, March 1942 — October 1943, Manzanar Relocation Center, Administrative and Executive Files, Water Executive Office, Historical Records, LADWP Historical Records.

Powers Act of 1942.¹⁶ The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, Northern Division, granted to the United States immediate possession under a leasehold interest expiring June 30, 1943, for 6,020 acres. The order included all water wells and pumping installations in addition to the land.¹⁷ The Western Defense Command and the City of Los Angeles disagreed on the annual payment that should be made for the use of the land, with the military claiming \$12,000 and the city \$25,000. The court decided in favor of Los Angeles and a "Declaration of Taking" was issued, granting the Western Defense Command the legal right to occupy and use the land "for a term of years ending June 30, 1944, extendable for yearly periods during the national emergency" and six month periods thereafter.¹⁸

Under the pressure of persistent rumors that continued to spread throughout Owens Valley, the "ad hoc" committee arranged for a series of public meetings to be held in the Lone Pine, Independence, and Bishop, the three principal towns in Owens Valley. Representatives of the Justice Department, the Army, and the WCCA spoke at the meetings, outlining the government evacuation program, according to Brown and Merritt, "in such a manner that there was no possible chance of misunderstanding on the part of the residents." Acceptance of the program by the majority of valley residents, however, was another matter, as "racial intolerance" "made itself manifest." The Inyo County Board of Supervisors was antagonistic, in part because they had not been consulted by federal authorities. According to Brown and Merritt, most "of the residents of the county (population 7,000) having known each other on a first-name basis for a long time, infused personalities into the program from the beginning." Members of the "ad hoc" committee were accused of making "deals" with the government for personal gain, and the charge of "Jap lovers" was hurled in the town meetings in the valley.¹⁹

Following release of the first newspaper stories on the project on March 6, Merritt reconvened the "ad hoc" committee. An amended program of suggestions, with local problems and suggested means of solution, was adopted. The recommendations were taken by Brown and Savage to Clark at WCCA headquarters in San Francisco. Clark supported the committee's recommendations, and felt that the use of a local committee during the "first hectic days and weeks of this project and others like it soon to come was

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16. Condemnation Proceeding: United States of America, Plaintiff, vs. 5,700 Acres of Land, More or Less, in the County of Inyo, State of California; City of Los Angeles, a municipal corporation; Bureau of Power and Light, a political subdivision of the City of Los Angeles; County of Inyo, a body politic and corporate; State of California, a corporation sovereign. No. 147 Civil Complaint in Condemnation. June 27, 1942. RG 210, Entry 16, Box 293, File 41.080, "Individual Projects (Manzanar Relocation Center)." For more information on legal questions relating to acquisition of the Manzanar site, see Norman M. Littell, Assistant Attorney General to Undersecretary of War Robert P. Patterson, April 8, 1942, Correspondence, March 1942 — October 1943, Manzanar Relocation Center, Administrative and Executive Files, Water Executive Office Historical Records, LADWP Historical Records.
 17. Memo, E. A. Porter to H. A. Van Norman, July 2, 1942, Correspondence, March 1942 — October 1943, Manzanar Relocation Center, Administrative and Executive Files, Water Executive Office Historical Records, LADWP Historical Records.
 18. Dillon S. Myer, Director, WRA to Chief of Engineers, Real Estate Division, War Department, March 13, 1945, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 293, File No. 41.080, "Individual Projects (Manzanar Relocation Center)."
 19. More information on the reactions of Owens Valley residents may be found in the interviews in Garrett and Larson, eds., *Camp and Community*.

one answer to helpful community relations in those communities where other camps were to be located." Thus, Clark formalized his appointment of the members of the "ad hoc" committee to the Owens Valley Citizens Committee with Merritt as chairman, thus giving that group "dignity and status in the community."²⁰ At the same time Clark urged Brown to leave his public relations work for the Inyo-Mono Associates and take over public relations work for the government at Manzanar.

He assumed his new position on March 15, the day after the first truckloads of lumber arrived at the relocation center site and the day when workmen began land-clearing operations for construction of the center.

In his report Silverman observed that local residents in Owens Valley "wanted no prison camps, it wanted no Japanese, and particularly it wanted no deal wherein any part of the City of Los Angeles was concerned." It took "nearly two weeks for the valley people to cool down, to realize this was a war and the acceptance of the so-called "prison camp" was necessary wartime sacrifice." A key change of heart in the valley occurred when George Savage had shifted his alarmism to the highroad of patriotism. In an editorial published in the *Inyo Independent* and his other valley newspapers on March 20, Savage now saw "History in the Making":

These changes were not of our asking, but the military necessities of war brought war to our own doorstep in an unexpected manner. Thus we see that the people of Inyo County have a definite part to play in the American wartime effort. Let's do the job so that the eyes of the nation and the world will be focused on the citizens of this county and outsiders will say that 'there's a group of people who are tackling a most strategic international problem and doing a great job of it.'²¹

Furthermore, Silverman noted that "public opinion" was modified after "a group of leading valley citizens" received "tentative approval from the Wartime Civilian Control Authority (or so the citizens understood) for a series of public works projects which the Japanese could undertake for the permanent benefit of the valley."²² Based on this understanding Merritt's committee met on March 30 and developed a set of proposals that were forwarded to Clark on April 1. These included use of the Japanese internees at Manzanar for: (1) agricultural development; (2) broadgauging the railroad between Lone Pine and Mina, Nevada; (3) construction of mine to market roads for development of strategic materials and metals; (4) improvement of roads under a plan already worked out by the state Division of Highways; (5) development of small industries to be taken over by

20. In addition to the Brown and Merritt report, see Tom C. Clark, Chief of civilian Staff, Western Defense Command to Ralph P. Merritt, March 7, 1942, and Ralph P. Merritt to Tom C. Clark, Chief of Civilian Staff, Western Defense Command, April 1, 1942, Coll. 122, Box 21, File — "WRA — Public Relations — State, County, Etc., Coordinating Committee," Coll. 122, Department of Special Collections, UCLA. The Owens Valley Coordinating Committee would later name a 12-member advisory board consisting of leading citizens of the area. "Owens Valley Coordinating Committee," n.d., Box 21, File, "Public Relocations — State, County, etc., Coordinating Committee," Coll. 122, Department of Special Collections, UCLA.

21. *Inyo Independent*, March 20, 1942. A microfilm copy of this newspaper is on file in the Inyo County Library, Independence, California.

22. Appendix 25, "The Silverman Report," in "Project Director's Report," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. I, p. A171-72, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 71, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

veterans after the war; (6) national forest and national park development and protection; (7) development of facilities for veteran rehabilitation; (8) development of wildlife conservation; and (9) other long range projects that may arise or have been planned by federal, state, and City of Los Angeles agencies.²³ Despite the initial support that the proposals received, however, they would never be implemented as a result of conflicts between WCCA and WRA and opposition by western state officials.

THE MANZANAR SITE IN MARCH 1942

When DeWitt formally announced the selection of the Manzanar site on March 7, 1942, the 6,020-acre parcel was described as a largely arid and barren patch of sand-swept desert. According to Silverman, there was "nothing left at Manzanar but a frowzy, dilapidated orchard of old apple trees surrounded by spotty stands of sagebrush, rabbit brush, and mesquite." Where a fruit packing house had once stood, "there was nothing but a stick or two of timber."²⁴ Although the property was desolate and barren, the vestiges of an apple orchard and mention of a packing shed indicate that the area had once been settled and farmed.

GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY OF OWENS VALLEY

Natural Setting

The Owens Valley is the westernmost of the more than 150 desert basins which, together with the more than 160 discontinuous subparallel mountain ranges that separate them, form the Great Basin section of the Basin and Range Province of the western United States. Owens Valley is commonly defined as the narrow northwest/southeast trending trough bounded by the towering Sierra Nevada on the west, the White-Inyo Range on the east and extending northward from the Coso Range south of Owens Lake for more than 100 miles to the great bend in the Owens River northwest of Laws, California. The average elevation of the valley floor is approximately 3,700 feet. The valley includes the area drained by Owens River and its tributaries, and it contains two smaller topographic depressions, Long and Round Valleys.²⁵

23. Ralph P. Merritt to Tom C. Clark, Chief of Civilian staff, Western Defense Command, April 1, 1942, and attached "Memorandum on Proposed Owens Valley Project," Box 21, File, "WRA — Public Relations — State, County, Etc., Coordinating Committee," Coll. 122, Department of Special Collections, UCLA.

24. Appendix 25 "The Silverman Report," in "Project Director's Report," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. 1, A172, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 71, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

25. Colin I. Busby, John M. Findlay, and James C. Bard, *A Cultural Resource Overview of the Bureau of Land Management Coleville, Bodie, Benton and Owens Valley Planning Units, California*. Prepared for United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Bakersfield District Office, Contract No. YA-512-CT8-181 (Oakland, California, Basin Research Associates, June 1979), p. 3; U.S. Department of the Interior, Geological Survey, Water-Supply and Irrigation Paper No. 181, *Geology and Water Sources of Owens Valley, California*, by Willis T. Lee (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1906); and U.S. Department of the Interior, Geological Survey, Water-Supply Paper 294, *An Intensive Study of the Water Resources of a Part of Owens Valley, California*, by Charles H. Lee (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1912), pp. 8-10.

Geologic History

Throughout the Paleozoic Era the area of the present western United States was submerged beneath the ocean. It was exposed only at the shores of ancient Cascadia somewhere in the eastern part of the Pacific Basin. Erosion from the bordering lands and subsequent sediment deposition on the ocean floor, combined with the additional weight of volcanics from eruptions triggered by the growing stress of the deposits, led to the depression of a geosyncline at the western margin of the submerged region sometime in the early Mesozoic era, probably during the Triassic period. In the late Jurassic or early Cretaceous, this trough yielded to the tension. High temperatures and pressure caused the sedimentary rocks and volcanics to melt, and resulted in the recrystallization and granitization and emplacement of the Sierran batholith one mile or two beneath the surface (Nevadan orogeny) with aureoles of contact metamorphic rocks. These processes were followed by a rising of the trough. Erosion of the uplifted rocks exposed the granites with erosion continuing through and after the cessation of vertical movement into the early Tertiary. This period of relative quiescence was succeeded in the Eocene by a gradual up-arching of the eroded plain, probably along an axis through the area of the present Sierra-Cascade system. Some geologists tentatively place the movement along Owens Valley faults into this period. In the late Miocene and/or early Pliocene, the arch fractured into a number of segments. The Sierran block, remaining intact, continued to rise, tilting to the west. The eastern flank broke into a series of eastward tilted basin and range blocks, the westernmost of which was downdropped as the wedge-shaped graben that now forms the Owens Valley. Some geologists have suggested that the valleys to the east may merely represent alluviated areas on the lower ends of eastward tilted blocks, implying uplift without subsidence in this region. The downfaulting of Long Valley and Mono Basin is suggested to have occurred during this period as well, resulting from volcanic eruptions causing low pressure zones in these areas of local tension which in turn are attributed to the southward movement of the Sierra Nevada relative to the western Great Basin, including Owens Valley.

As a result of its geologic history, portions of Owens Valley, particularly the Manzanar-George Creek area, came to possess an isolated but magnificent natural environment. The formation of artesian springs and high water tables, together with fertile soil, resulted in this vicinity becoming one of the only areas in the southern Owens Valley to be suitable for agriculture.²⁶

26. Busby, Findlay, and Bard, *Cultural Resource Overview*, p. 3, and U.S. Department of the Interior, Geological Survey, Water-Supply Paper 294, pp. 10-14. Also see Clemens Arvid Nelson, *Guidebook to the Geology of a Portion of the Eastern Sierra Nevada, Owens Valley, and White Inyo Range: Fall 1980 Field Trip*, Department of Earth and Space Sciences, University of California, Los Angeles (Los Angeles, UCLA Department of Earth and Space Sciences, 1980); U. S. Department of the Interior, Geological Survey, Professional Paper 110, *A Geologic Reconnaissance of the Inyo Range and the Eastern Slope of the Southern Sierra Nevada, California*, by Adolph Knopf and Edwin Kirk (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1918); Genny Schumacher-Smith, ed., *Deepest Valley: A Guide to Owens Valley, Its Roadsides and Mountain Trails* (Rev. ed., Palo Alto, Genny Smith Books, 1978), pp. 119-48; and Robert A Sauder, *The Lost Frontier: Water Diversion in the Growth and Destruction of Owens Valley Agriculture* (Tucson and London, University of Arizona Press, 1994), pp. 7-15.

History

Exploration. Most historians believe that the first non-aboriginal people²⁷ to enter the Owens Valley area were American and English fur trappers and mountain men. Although early Spanish explorers may have discovered the area, no records of any such journeys have been uncovered. The Paiutes, however, probably had contact with travelers, judging from their rudimentary knowledge of Spanish.²⁸ Most evidence points to Jedediah Strong Smith as the first non-Indian to enter the region east of the Sierras in present California.²⁹

After his exploratory journey across the Great Basin to southern California, Smith, who stands out as the epitome of the American combination of mountain man and explorer, came into contact with Mexican authorities who then laid claim to the present American Southwest. Disobeying his deportation orders, Smith travelled up the San Joaquin Valley. Faced with the need to return to a trappers' rendezvous at Great Salt Lake, Smith made the first crossing of the Sierra Nevada by a Euro-American during the late spring of 1827. The record of Smith's exact route remains unclear. However, most historians now believe that Smith crossed Ebbets Pass and either traversed the Antelope Valley or followed the Carson River northward, bypassing the Owens Valley vicinity entirely. Nevertheless, his exploits encouraged later mountain men and explorers to journey into both the eastern and western Sierra Nevada of present California.³⁰

The next Euro-American explorer to traverse present Inyo and Mono counties, according to several noted historians, was the British trapper Peter Skene Ogden. An agent of the Hudson's Bay Company based in the Northwest, Ogden has generally been remembered for his expeditions in the Great Basin from 1824 to 1830. Although his geographical descriptions are sketchy, some historians believe that his last trapping expedition in 1829-30 from the Columbia River to the Colorado River traversed Owens Valley and present eastern Mono County.³¹

Joseph Reddeford Walker, one of the most persistent explorers of the Sierra Nevada and Owens Valley, led three expeditions into eastern California. During the first expedition in 1833-34, Walker left the Great Salt Lake area, crossed the Great Basin, and travelled into the eastern Sierra in the first successful Euro-American effort to cross from east to west. While his exact route is not definitely known, most students of his travels suggest that he

27. For more information on the Pauites in Owens Valley see Julian H. Steward, "Ethnography of the Owens Valley Paiute," *University of California Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology*, XXXIII (September 6, 1933), pp. 233-350; Sven Liljeblad and Catherine S. Fowler, "Owens Valley Paiute," in William C. Sturtevant, ed., *Handbook of North American Indians, Volume 11, Great Basin* (Washington, Smithsonian Institution, 1986), pp. 412-34; and Busby, Findlay, and Bard, *Culture Resource Overview*, pp. 108-323.

28. Walton, *Western Times and Water Wars*, p. 14.

29. For more information on early Euro-American exploration of Owens Valley see Gloria Griffen Cline, *Exploring the Great Basin* (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1963).

30. E. M. Cain, *The Story of Early Mono County: Its Settlers, Gold Rushes, Indians, and Ghost Towns* (San Francisco, Fearan Publishers, 1961), pp. 1-2, and Fred M. Phillips, *Desert People and Mountain Men: Exploration of the Great Basin, 1824-1865* (Bishop, Chalfant Press, 1977), p. 25.

31. Cline, *Exploring the Great Basin*, pp. 124-28, and Phillips, *Desert People and Mountain Men*, p. 33.

followed the east fork of the Walker River, perhaps traveled up Virginia Canyon, and crossed the Sierra somewhere in the vicinity of present Tioga Pass. After wintering on the California coast, Walker returned in 1834, some Indians guiding him over the pass across the southern Sierra that today bears his name. He then moved north through the Owens Valley, hugging the foothills of the Sierra. After passing through the valley, his party camped at Benton Hot Springs before turning eastward into Nevada.³²

The Walker party's reaction to the eastern Sierra exemplified an attitude toward the land and the environment that would be echoed by subsequent generations of Euro-Americans. The expedition entered Owens Valley in late April 1834 and found the country not much to their liking. Zenas Leonard, a member of the party, described the region:

The country on this side is much inferior to that on the opposite side — the soil being thin and rather sandy, producing but little grass, which was very discouraging to our stock. . . . On the opposite side vegetation had been growing for several weeks — on this side it has not started yet. . . . The country we found to be very poor, and almost destitute of grass.³³

The lack of pasturage and the harsh climate made the journey through Owens Valley slow for men anxious to get home, and probably affected their reaction to the valley. Significantly for its later history, numerous other exploratory and immigrant parties, most of whom traversed the arid Owens Valley during the harsher seasons, echoed Leonard's unfavorable reaction to the valley. Their negative comments, however, may have reflected, in part, an implicit comparison with western California and a lack of interest in lands that appeared to be a barrier to their final destinations.

Although westward moving Americans did not initially wish to settle on the barren lands east of the Sierra, they had to pass through them on their way to the mines and farmlands of western California. As a result the region began to be visited by passing wagon trains. In 1841 the first emigrant party to cross the Great Basin made its way into California. Sixty-four members of the Bidwell-Bartleson party left Missouri for California in spring. Internal dissensions divided the party, and half turned off on to a better known trail to Oregon in August. The others struggled toward the Humboldt River, still rife with conflict. They entered California passing through Antelope Valley, near present-day Coleville, in October, before following the West Walker River into the mountains and passing the crest of the Sierra in the late autumn somewhere in the vicinity of Sonora Pass.³⁴

Joseph Chiles, a member of this successful crossing, returned to Missouri in 1842 and organized another group of emigrants. Hoping to avoid the hardships of the earlier group, he hired Joseph R. Walker to guide his party to California. Although Chiles later split off

32. Cline, *Exploring the Great Basin*, pp. 175-77, and Francis P. Farquhar, *History of the Sierra Nevada* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, University of California Press, 1965), p. 34-39.

33. J. C. Ewers, ed., *The Adventures of Zenas Leonard: Fur Trader* (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1959), pp. 122-25.

34. Farquhar, *History of the Sierra Nevada*, pp. 43-44; Phillips, *Desert People and Mountain Men*, pp. 51-52; and Rolle, *California: A History*, p. 182.

to find a northerly path, Walker led the bulk of the party through a portion of the Mono Basin, down the eastern shore of the Owens River, and over Walker Pass in 1843. The emigrants hauled their wagons, the first ever brought into California by overland homeseekers, and equipment all the way to Owens Valley, but to save their hard-pressed livestock they were forced to abandon much of their equipment near Owens Lake. After this journey Owens Valley became an occasionally used emigrant trail, providing a route into California that avoided crossing the High Sierra.³⁵

John C. Fremont, a noted naturalist-explorer-scientist who became known as the "Great Pathfinder," led a party through the Bridgeport and Antelope valleys on his "second expedition" in late 1843-44 during an unsuccessful effort to cross the Sierra in winter. Following this somewhat foolhardy adventure, he led a party into the Sierra during the late fall of 1845 on his third and final western expedition. While Fremont took a small band over the Sierra near Truckee, a larger party headed south under Joseph R. Walker, Edward M. Kern, and Theodore Talbot. The group passed east of Mono Lake through the Adobe Hills, striking the Owens River on December 16, 1845. Short on rations, the party hastened down the valley, leaving Owens Lake on December 21. The men crossed Walker Pass around Christmas and moved into the San Joaquin Valley to rendezvous with Fremont's group.³⁶

Like the members of Walker's earlier party, this group also reacted negatively to the Owens Valley area. Edward Kern wrote in his journal that the area was "a sandy waste," lacked sufficient water, and provided poor grass for livestock. Kern noted a significant number of "wild-fowl," and was impressed by the "fine, bold stream," now known as the Owens River, but the "strong, disagreeable, salty, nauseous taste" of Owens Lake disappointed him. Kern spotted "numerous," "badly disposed" hidden Indians which caused apprehension for the party.³⁷ Needless to say, comments such as those of Kern and Leonard, did little to enhance the reputation of Owens Valley and Mono Basin. During this trip through the valley, Walker's third and last, the deep trough between the Sierra and the Inyo-White ranges received its name. Most sources argue that Fremont named the river, lake, and valley after reuniting with Kern, Walker, and Talbot. The namesake was Richard Owens, who like Fremont had never seen the valley. One of Fremont's captains on his third western expedition, Owens was rewarded with this appellation. However, two historians, Philip J. Wilke and Harry W. Lawton, dispute this interpretation. Noting that Kern's daily journal mentioned "Owen's River" during the trek down the valley, and believing that the journal was written during the trip and not afterward, Wilke and Lawton have attributed the naming of the valley to Kern. Later, Fremont claimed credit for naming the river, lake, and valley in his *Memoirs*, published in

35. Farquhar, *History of the Sierra Nevada*, pp. 43-44; Phillips, *Desert People and Mountain Men*, pp. 51-52; and Rolle, *California: A History*, p. 182.

36. Busby, Findlay, and Bard, *Cultural Resource Overview*, pp. 39-40, and Farquhar, *History of the Sierra Nevada*, pp. 58-61.

37. Appendix Q, "Journal of Mr. Edward Kern of an Exploration of Mary's or Humboldt River, Carson Lake and Owens River and Lake," in *Report of Explorations Across the Great Basin of the Territory of Utah for a Direct Wagon Route from Camp Floyd to Genoa, in Carson Valley, in 1859 by Captain J. H. Simpson* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1876), pp. 482, 484.

1887, during his only mention of the incident. In any case, the valley first appeared on a map under its present name in 1848.³⁸

From the time of Walker's last journey to the late 1850s, many travelers passed through Owens Valley and Mono Basin. Most were on their way to western California, and likely viewed the arid lands east of the Sierra as the last obstacles in their journey. Various sources note the occasional presence of travelers in the area. In 1849, for instance, several groups of Midwesterners journeyed near Owens Lake during their crossing of eastern California, having suffered greatly while passing through Death Valley. Other emigrant trains, using various passes through the Sierra to reach coastal and central California, continued to pass through the area on their way to the mines and new settlements springing up throughout western California.³⁹

After California was admitted to statehood in 1850, the new state government became interested in the area east of the Sierra. In 1855 the state Surveyor of Public Lands commissioned A. W. Von Schmidt to survey lands east of the Sierra and south of Mono Lake. During 1855-56, Von Schmidt's team worked the area from Mono Lake to Owens Lake. The observations of Von Schmidt, like those of Kern and Leonard, probably served to discourage interest in settling the area. Like his predecessors, Von Schmidt found the region inhospitable. With the exception of Round and Long Valleys, he declared the "land entirely worthless. . . . On a general average the country forming Owens Valley is worthless to the white man, both in soil and climate." He noted the scarcity of game and observed that the valley "contains about 1000 Indians of the Mono tribe, and they are a fine looking set of men. They live principally on pine nuts, fish, and hares, which are very plenty."⁴⁰

Although they had done nothing to whites settling in California, the Indians east of the Sierra were under constant surveillance by the U.S. Army and the Office of Indian Affairs after the late 1850s. In February 1859, 22,300 acres near Independence in southern Owens Valley were withdrawn from settlement pending a decision about establishing a reserve. That year both the Army and the Office of Indian Affairs made excursions into Owens Valley, thus affording whites a better knowledge of the area. During the year, Indian agent Frederick Dodge of the Utah Superintendency travelled through the valley, exploring the region and preparing a map as he went.⁴¹

That same year Captain John W. Davidson led an exploratory expedition through the region. After heavy civilian livestock losses were reported in the Fort Tejon, southern San Joaquin Valley, and Los Angeles areas, Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin L. Beall, officer in charge of Fort Tejon, ordered Davidson to lead a group of soldiers into Owens Valley to

38. Erwin G. Gudda, *California Place Names: The Origin and Etymology of Current Geographical Names* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969), p. 232, and Philip J. Wilke and Harry W. Lawton, eds., *The Expedition of Capt. J. W. Davidson from Fort Tejon to the Owens Valley in 1859* (Socorro, New Mexico, Ballena Press, 1976), p. 36.

39. W. A. Chalfant, *The Story of Inyo* (Bishop, Chalfant Press, 1922), pp. 57-59.

40. Northern California Historical Records Survey Project, *Inventory of the County Archives of California, No. 27, Mono County (Bridgeport)*. San Francisco, 1940, p. 12, and Walton, *Western Times and Water Wars*, p. 13.

41. Busby, Findlay, and Bard, *Cultural Resource Overview*, p. 41.

search for the stolen horses. Davidson, as well as many whites, had long suspected the Paiute of eastern California, but upon observing the natives of the region he concluded that such suspicions were incorrect. Finding few horses in the valley, he concentrated on observing the tribes and exploring the area, motivated in part by the prospect of establishing an Indian reservation on the withdrawn land in the valley as he had been instructed by Beall. Davidson observed that the Indians "are not only not horsethieves, but . . . their character is that of an interesting, peaceful, industrious people, deserving the protection and watchful care of the government."⁴²

During July, Davidson's route took his group up the west side of Owens Valley to a point just north of Round Valley. Unlike most of his predecessors, Davidson was favorably impressed with the climate and much of the land. He found the climate "delightful." The soil, where "touched by water," was fertile and "well suited to the growth of weath [sic], barley [sic], oats, rye, and various fruits, the apple, pear, &c." Grasses were "of luxuriant growth." In particular, Davidson found Round Valley to be "one of the finest parts of the state." To the farmer, it offered "every advantage but a market; to the Indian, nature, unaided by Cultivation, kindly bears on her bosom the means of his subsistence." He found "building timber enough for all the uses of a population commensurate with the agricultural resources of the valley." He noted an abundance of water in the region and suggested that much of the land could be irrigated from the many streams flowing down from the Sierra. Owens Valley and the Mono Basin were in his opinion "the finest watered portion of the lower half of the state." Davidson concluded that Owens Valley was an ideal location for an Indian reservation — the "country is large enough, & fruitful enough, not only for them, but for all the Indians of the Southern part of California." "Properly managed," a reservation "should cost nothing to the Government but the first outfit." After the first harvest, it "should be self-sustaining, for the means are here and nothing is lacking but their proper application." Despite Davidson's favorable report, however, the February 1859 order withdrawing acreage for a reservation was revoked by the government in 1864.⁴³

The final state-sponsored exploration of Owens Valley during the 1860s was conducted by a Whitney survey team in 1864. Commissioned by state geologist Josiah Dwight Whitney, William H. Brewer led survey teams over uncharted areas of California during the early and mid-1860s. After surveying the Mono Basin area during the summer of 1863, Brewer's men reconnoitered Owens Valley during late July and early August 1864. The party traveled from Visalia over Kearsarge Pass, down Independence Creek to Owens River and Owens Lake, back upstream past Camp Independence, a military outpost established in Owens Valley in 1862, past the headwaters of the Owens River, and back over the Sierra. Brewer described the valley during his travels:

It lies four thousand to five thousand feet above the sea and is entirely closed in by mountains. On the west the Sierra Nevada rises to over fourteen thousand feet; on the east the Inyo Mountains to twelve thousand or thirteen thousand feet. The Owens River is fed by streams from the Sierra Nevada, runs through a crooked channel through this valley, and empties into Owens Lake. This lake is

42. Wilke and Lawton, eds., *Expedition of Capt. J. W. Davidson*, pp. 6-7, 14

43. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-20, 23-27, 29-31.

the color of coffee, has no outlet, and is a nearly saturated solution of salt and alkali. The Sierra Nevada catches all the rains and clouds from the west — to the east are deserts — so, of course, this valley sees but little rain, but where streams come down from the Sierra they spread out and great meadows of green grass occur.⁴⁴

Throughout the trip in Owens Valley, which took place during a widespread drought in the state, Brewer and his party were uncomfortable in the dust and heat that frequently exceeded 100 degrees. Brewer noted:

It [the heat] almost made us sick. There was some wind, but with that temperature it felt as if it came from a furnace. It came from behind us and blew the fine alkaline dust into our nostrils, making it still worse.

Brewer failed to find any wood or other fuel. The cattle in the valley were "starving," because all but ten percent of the land, according to Brewer, was desert. Mosquitoes were a nuisance, preventing sleep. Brewer's party was happy to depart the valley, taking with it an unfavorable impression of the area that would contribute to its reputation as an inhospitable area for settlement.⁴⁵

Despite these impressions, however, Euro-American pioneers had begun settling in Owens Valley by the time of Brewer's survey. His mention of cattle and settlements in the region demonstrated the extent to which white settlement had encroached upon the valley lands that had hitherto been the domain of Indians. With the commencement of Indian-white hostilities in 1861, the federal government made its first imprint on the area with establishment of Camp Independence the following year. To get to the valley Brewer had relied on well-traveled prospectors' trails through the rugged Sierra. His reliance on those trails indicated the extent to which prospecting and mining was drawing Euro-Americans to the valley.

Mining. By the late 1850s mining strikes and production in the goldfields of western California and the Sierra were declining, leaving many prospectors unemployed and searching for new beds of ore. The mining industry itself had been reorganized with the realization that successful extraction required the discipline, money, and organization that capitalist methods could bring to the mother lode. As a result, the means of production became increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few, and many miners had to face the prospect of working for mining firms. Although this reorganization probably provided more security and success than the earlier individualistic and haphazard methods associated with independent entrepreneurial prospecting, some men sought to retain the independence they had envisioned in the west. Largely excluded from new strikes in the eastern Sierra, these hardy independents turned to the area east of the Sierra in the hope of independently striking it rich.⁴⁶

44. Quoted in Farquhar, *History of the Sierra Nevada*, p. 137.

45. *Ibid.*, pp. 134-43.

46. An overview of this period of mining history in California may be found in Chapter One of W. W. Paul, *California Gold: The Beginning of Mining in the Far West* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1947). Also see Remi A. Nadeau, *Ghost Towns and Mining Camps of California* (Los Angeles, Ward Ritchie, 1965), p. 173.

The region of present Inyo and Mono counties appeared forbidding at first. Transportation and communication was difficult in the desolate and isolated region, the ores first extracted were not very high grade, and a lack of capital limited early development. Nevertheless, miners made their way to the inhospitable area, thus constituting the earliest Euro-American population in the area.⁴⁷

During this period a series of gold and silver strikes drew attention to the semi-arid lands of the western Great Basin. The discovery of the Comstock Lode in western Nevada in 1859 stimulated great interest in the region. Yet Mono and Inyo attracted their own settlers, some prospectors arriving from western California and some traveling from Los Angeles. The Mono County area, in particular, was first populated by the overflow from the California gold rush in the late 1850s.⁴⁸

Early mining strikes in present Mono County included Dogtown in 1857 and Monoville or Mono Diggings in 1859. Other strikes in the Mono County area included the discovery of gold at what would later become famous as Bodie in 1859 and discovery of silver east of present-day Benton in the early 1860s. These findings, however, were dwarfed by the larger, more fruitful strikes at Aurora on the Esmeralda Lode in Nevada in 1860.⁴⁹

To the south, mining in Owens Valley began slightly after the establishment of Dogtown and Monoville. The greatest stimulation to mining activity in the valley resulted from nearby strikes, including not only those around Mono Lake but also those east of the valley. Prospectors from Los Angeles and from the western Sierra crossed the mountains to get to the valley. In 1860 Dr. Darwin French and his prospecting party discovered the rich Coso Ledges southeast of Owens Lake. That same year prospectors located the first claims in the valley in Mazourka Canyon, but did not develop them, and the New World Mining and Exploration Company, a San Francisco firm, explored the valley and staked claims southeast of present-day Independence. By July, nearly one hundred men were reportedly prospecting in the valley.

Enthusiasm for mining in eastern California soared during the early 1860s. In late 1861 the *Mining and Scientific Press* announced the success of mining east of the Sierra, declaring that its gold, and especially its silver, deposits would eventually provide "riches beyond computation." Although such enthusiasm would eventually have some merit, development of mining in the area proceeded slowly during the first few years as a result of hostilities between whites and Indians. After the Army was called in to quell the difficulties in 1862 and 1863, however, mining operations increased. Some of the cavalymen found gold in the foothills of the White Mountains. In 1862, the San Francisco-based San Carlos Mining and Exploration Company, assured of military protection, established a camp between the Owens River and the mountains to the east.⁵⁰

47. Paul, *California Gold*, pp. 263-66, and Nadeau, *Ghost Towns*, p. 173.

48. Busby, Findlay, and Bard, *Cultural Resource Overview*, p. 45. For more information on this topic, see W. A. Chalfant, *Gold, Guns, Ghost Towns* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1947).

49. Busby, Findlay, and Bard, *Cultural Resource Overview*, pp. 45-46

50. Chalfant, *Story of Inyo*, 1922, pp. 80-87; Schumacher-Smith, ed., *Deepest Valley*, p. 177; and Mary DeDecker, *Mines of the Eastern Sierra* (Glendale, California, La Siesta Press, 1966), pp. 41-45.

Virtually all of the first mining camps in Owens Valley were founded on the east bank of the Owens River. Owensville was established in the northern part of the valley in 1862 or 1863, some 50 homesteader claims being filed before 1864 when mining activity declined. By 1871 the last resident had departed, and the buildings were dismantled and the lumber floated downstream to Independence, Lone Pine, and Big Pine.⁵¹

Further south along the Owens River, three other mining settlements were established in the 1860s, each of them having a shortlived tenure. These communities included San Carlos, near the mouth of Oak Creek at the site of a soldier's gold discovery, Chrysopolis, and Bend City. The latter was a town that at its height included 60 houses, mostly adobe, two hotels, five stores, several saloons, a library, "stock exchange," and vigilante committee.⁵²

Like the early strikes in Mono County, the first mining endeavors in Owens Valley amounted to little. Activity in the area remained slower than that taking place elsewhere in eastern California or western Nevada. Nevertheless, as miners entered the valley, the land was opened up to more permanent types of settlers. Visitors to the region noticed that the area could be used for agriculture and ranching, and the influx of miners and mining-related endeavors provided a market for dairy and beef products, farm produce, and the services of craftsmen and entrepreneurs.⁵³

Settlement. The first recorded occurrence of Euro-American settlement in the Owens Valley region and its adjacent valleys took place in the Antelope Valley in autumn 1859, when Hod Raymond drove a herd of cattle to feed there. The following year George W. Parker homesteaded in Adobe Valley near the trail that connected southern California and Aurora. During the summer of 1861, the first white settlers entered Owens Valley. A cattle-driving party, including A. Van Fleet and Henry Vansickle, moved into the valley from the north in August, scouted the land as far south as the present site of Lone Pine, and returned to the northern edge of the valley to build the first white dwelling, composed of sod and stone, near the site of present-day Laws. About the same time, Charles Putnam built a stone cabin on Independence Creek, at the present site of Independence, as a trading post to tap the increasing traffic of prospectors through the valley. Samuel A. Bishop drove a herd of 500 to 600 cattle from Fort Tejon into Owens Valley and built a ranch southwest of the town that today bears his name. In late November 1861 Barton and Alney McGee herded some cattle into the Lone Pine area from the San Joaquin Valley and built a residence.⁵⁴

After the first year of white settlement in the Owens Valley, three of the valley's four major town sites had been selected. Independence, known for a short while as "Putnam's" and "Little Pine," grew slowly, aided by the establishment of Camp Independence in 1862.

51. Chalfant, *Story of Inyo*, 1922, p. 165, and M. B. Hoover, H. E. Rensch, and W. N. Abeloe, *Historic Spots in California* (Palo Alto, Stanford University Press, 1966), p. 117.

52. DeDecker, *Mines of the Eastern Sierra*, pp. 45-46; Chalfant, *Story of Inyo*, 1922, p. 171; and Dorothy C. Cragen, *The Boys in the Sky-Blue Pants: The Men and Events at Camp Independence and Forts of Eastern California, Nevada, and Utah, 1862-1877* (Fresno, Pioneer Publishing Company, 1975), p. 48.

53. Busby, Findlay, and Bard, *Cultural Resource Overview*, p. 47.

54. Inyo County Board of Supervisors, comp., *Inyo: 1866-1966* (Independence, California, 1966), pp. 5, 9.

Thomas Edwards and his family, traveling with a large cattle herd, moved into the valley in 1863, purchased Putnam's trading post and stone cabin, and laid out the valley's first official town at Independence. Lone Pine prospered with the influx of miners, quickly attracting a multi-ethnic population. In 1862 several cattlemen from Visalia in the central valley settled on George Creek to form the nucleus of a community that would later become the orchard town of Manzanar.⁵⁵

These nascent communities formed the loci for settlement expansion in Owens Valley. Yet the influx of settlers, and especially of ranchers and farmers, was not large. When the Army established its fort near Independence in 1862, there were few sources of food for the soldiers. Only in the next several years did sufficient settlers enter the valley to support a non-agrarian population. Thus, the driving force of permanence in the valley, and the bedrock on which valley development would be based during the next 40 years, was the settlement by ranchers and farmers that began populating the valley during the early and mid-1860s.⁵⁶

One of the primary impulses for the rapid increase of farmers and stockmen in eastern California during these years was the drought that afflicted western California grazing and agricultural lands from 1862 to 1864. Searching for adequate pasturage for their stock, sheep and cattle raisers from the Central Valley drove their herds over Walker Pass into Owens Valley and northward into the Mono Basin. Later, while developing a route that remains in use today, herders pushed their stock over Sierra passes in Mono County into the northern part of the Central Valley, thus completing a circle of travel for summer pasturage. Some of these stockmen made their permanent homes east of the Sierra, while others continued making the summer journey annually, thus providing a steady stream of traffic through the region.⁵⁷

Cattle and sheep proved to be the staples of agricultural production on the remote and semi-arid lands of eastern California. Expansion of farming operations in the area was hampered by lack of a reliable nearby market for produce. Nevertheless, the growing number of settlers had to provide for themselves, and they found a temporary, although unstable, market in miners and prospectors. While beef continued to be a staple for most diets, the expanding population in the region developed taste for a mixed diet of meat, dairy products, and vegetables. Thus, despite the primitive state of the region's economy, agricultural production expanded, and by 1867 some 2,000 acres had been enclosed with fences in Inyo County and 6,000 in Mono County. Barley became the principal crop, but other foodstuffs were also raised for human and animal consumption.⁵⁸

55. Katherine Krater, *East of the High Sierra* (Independence, California, Draco Foundation, 1975), pp. 7-8, 61; Inyo County Board of Supervisors, comp., *Inyo*, p. 25; Schumacher-Smith, ed., *Deepest Valley*, pp. 28-29, 41; and Chalfant, *Story of Inyo*, 1922, p. 193.

56. Busby, Findlay, and Bard, *Cultural Resource Overview*, p. 49.

57. Schmacher-Smith, *Deepest Valley*, p. 180; *Story of Early Mono County*, p. 28, and Busby, Findlay, and Bard, *Cultural Resource Overview*, p. 49.

58. Francis P. Farquhar, ed., *Up and Down California, in 1860-1864: The Journal of William H. Brewer* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1930), pp. 538-39; Chalfant, *Story of Inyo*, 1922, pp. 208-10; and Northern California Historical Records Survey Project, *Inventory*, pp. 23-25.

As mining and settlement increased in eastern California, governmental bodies were established. The early prospectors established mining districts with defined boundaries and drew up rules and procedures for staking claims and resolving disputes. Owens Valley and the Mono Basin fell within the jurisdiction of several established California counties, including Tulare, Mariposa, and Fresno, but the distance from those centers of government was so great and the means of transportation so difficult that the miners felt they needed their own governments.⁵⁹

On April 24, 1861, the California legislature established Mono County as the first mining county east of the Sierra. Formed from parts of Fresno and Mariposa counties primarily, the county represented an attempt to bring governmental order to an area rapidly filling up with prospectors and mining operations.⁶⁰

Residents south of Mono petitioned the California legislature to form Coso County in 1864 but the motion was not acted upon. Two years later, on March 22, 1866, the petitioners succeeded in establishing Inyo County out of portions of Tulare and Mono counties. At that time the southern boundary of Mono was moved up to Big Pine Creek, and four years later Inyo purchased for \$12,000 another portion of Mono County, including the present town of Bishop, making the county's borders approximately what they are today. Competition developed between Kearsarge, a mining town high on the eastern slope of the Sierra, and Independence, near the U. S. Army post, for the honor of serving as the seat of Inyo County, but the latter was selected by county residents. After weathering dissension within the county that threatened to have its northern portion returned to Mono in the early 1870s, Inyo went on to become the second largest county in California.⁶¹

Hostilities Between Indians and Euro-Americans. The growing number of Euro-American settlers in eastern California led to tensions and conflicts with the Indians as the whites superimposed their settlements on lands that had long been inhabited by the native Paiutes. These bands of hunters and gatherers that belonged to the family of Great Basin Indians had suffered some of the problems of survival in that arid climate of eastern California but had also enjoyed the benefits of the river valley as their habitat. Until the late 1850s these people had lived largely secluded from the white man. Upon the arrival of growing numbers of Euro-American miners and settlers, however, the Owens Valley Paiute faced a severe and penetrating challenge to their centuries-old culture.⁶²

59. Paul, *California Gold*, pp. 214-17.

60. Cain, *Story of Early Mono County*, p. 10, and Northern California Historical Records Survey Project, *Inventory*, pp. 3-6.

61. Cain, *Story of Early Mono County*, p. 10; Chalfant, *Story of Inyo*, 1922, pp. 201, 211-12; Inyo County Board of Supervisors, comp., *Inyo*, pp. 35, 37.

62. For more information on the impact of Euro-American settlement on the Paiute culture in Owens Valley, see Carling I. Malouf and John M. Findlay, Euro-American Impact Before 1870, in Sturtevant, ed., *Handbook of North American Indians, Volume 11, Great Basin*, pp. 499-516; Edward D. Castillo, "The Impact of Euro-American Exploration and Settlement," in William C. Sturtevant, ed., *Handbook of North American Indians, Volume 8, California* (Washington, Smithsonian Institution, 1978), pp. 99-127; Sherburne F. Cook, *The Conflict Between the California Indian and White Civilization* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1976); Roger D. McGrath, No Goodee Cow Man," in Friends of the Eastern California Museum, comp., *Mountains to Desert: Selected Inyo Readings* (Independence, California, Friends of the

In 1859, during his aforementioned expedition, Davidson had characterized the Owens Valley Indians as "an interesting, peaceful, industrious people, deserving the protection and watchful care of the government." Davidson went on to credit the Indians' indigenous agricultural practices:

They have already some idea of tilling the ground, as the ascequias [irrigation ditches] which they have made with the labor of their rude hands for miles in extent, and the care they bestow upon their fields of grass-nuts, abundantly show. Wherever the water touches this soil of disintegrated granite, it acts like the wand of an Enchanter, and it may with truth be said that these Indians have made some portions of their Country, which otherwise were Desert, to bloom and blossom as the rose.⁶³

Davidson's observations were later shared by Colonel James H. Carleton of the First Infantry, California Volunteers, who described the tribe as both "inoffensive" and "gentle". The supposition that these agrarian and food gathering people would not have the weapons and the hunting technology to make them dangerous to the encroaching white civilization would later surprise military officials when war broke out in the early 1860s.⁶⁴

In 1859 Davidson not only recommended that Owens Valley be set aside as a reservation, but he also promised the Indians that their valley would be reserved, precluding whites from settling there. Provided that the Paiutes allowed free travel through the valley and that they "maintained honest and peaceful habits," Davidson was willing to protect them. It is likely that this plan had been approved, or perhaps suggested, by military and governmental officials far removed from the valley.⁶⁵

Promises made by Davidson were reiterated by other agents of the Office of Indian Affairs. Warren Wasson, an agent with the Nevada Superintendency, reported in 1862 that the Indians had been promised security, material goods, and land by "officers of the government," presumably including both military and Indian agents.⁶⁶ In the Owens Valley, as in other areas east of the Sierra, the government had spoken too freely. Nevada's territorial governor, James B. Nye, reported in 1861, "the Indians have been promised too much, and led to expect more from their government than it would be possible to perform."⁶⁷ In the case of the Owens Valley Paiute, Nye's commentary proved

Eastern California Museum, 1988), pp. 17-73; Walton, *Western Times and Water Wars*, pp. 16-22; and William H. Michael, "'At the Plow and in the Harvest Field': Indian Conflict and Accommodation in the Owens Valley, 1860-1880" (Master's Thesis, University of Oklahoma, 1993).

63. Wilke and Lawton, eds., *Expedition of Capt. J. W. Davidson*, pp. 19-20.

64. Cragen, *Boys in Sky-Blue Pants*, pp. 45.

65. Wilke and Lawton, eds., *Expedition of Capt. J. W. Davidson*, pp. 21, 31, and Cragen, *Boys in Sky-Blue Pants*, p. 12.

66. U.S. Office of Indian Affairs, *Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 1862* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1863), pp. 226-27.

67. U.S. Office of Indian Affairs, *Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1861* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1861), pp. 110.

prophetic. Once valuable minerals, grazing lands, and agricultural plots had been discovered in the area, the flow of white settlement could not be restrained by government promises to the Indians, and armed conflict resulted.

Tensions between Euro-American settlers and the Paiutes began to mount as miners and stockmen invaded Indian lands in Owens Valley. By 1863, the valley had become "a great thoroughfare." White cattlemen and herdsman, hoping to feed their stock or sell it to miners in Esmeralda, Mono, and Inyo counties, drove their herds through the valley, undoubtedly the most passable route in the region. The sheep and cattle devoured the seed plants that the Paiutes relied upon for winter food, and the increase of lumbering in the eastern Sierra, as an adjunct to mining development and settlement, depleted the supply of piñon trees, and thus pine nuts, a staple of the Paiute diet. Game, another staple of the Paiute diet, was depleted by the influx of miners and settlers. Not only did the Paiute lack an adequate food supply, but they also lost much of the surplus which they used to barter with Indians west of the Sierra for other goods.⁶⁸

As tensions mounted in the early 1860s, word of the conflict began to spread. Neighboring Indian tribes and whites became acutely aware of the forthcoming hostilities. Colonel Carleton understood the problem rather clearly, observing that

the poor Indians are doubtless at a loss to know how to live, having their field turned into pastures whether they are willing or not willing. It is very possible, therefore, that the whites are to blame, and it is also probable that in strict justice they should be compelled to move away and leave the valley to its rightful owners.⁶⁹

They rejected Paiute demands for tribute and appeals to move off their cultivated and gathering lands. Thus, the rift between the two peoples grew larger, pushing both sides beyond compromise or reconciliation.

The breaking point was finally reached during the winter of 1861-62. By felling pinyon pines for fuel, destroying seed plants and meadow lands with their stock, and depleting game, whites drastically reduced the natives' supply of food for the winter. Because of the particularly harsh conditions that season, the Paiutes virtually had no place where they could turn for food. When they began raiding the herds of cattle in the valley to replace depleted game, ironically capturing the very animals that had destroyed their seed plants, whites retaliated by shooting the Paiutes. Hostilities soon escalated. By joining forces under several leaders, most prominent among them Captain George from southern Owens Valley and Joaquin Jim from the north (a Yokuts), the Indians, by superior numbers, were in undisputed control of the valley by early 1862. The damage caused by the Indian raids was never made clear. It is possible that Indians may have been blamed for the thefts of other whites, as well as their own, because some whites probably suffered with the

68. U.S. Office of Indian Affairs, *Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 1862*, p. 106; Cragen, *Boys in Sky-Blue Pants*, pp. 11-13; and Cook, *Conflict*, pp. 483-85.

69. Quoted in Cragen, *Boys in Sky-Blue Pants*, pp. 4-5.

Indians that winter. In any case, the Indians that Captain Davidson had found peaceful in 1859 became hostile and feared by whites by 1862.⁷⁰

Although most settlers, miners, and soldiers in the area hoped to put the Indians down forcibly, agents of the Office of Indian Affairs continued to work for peaceful resolution of the difficulties. During the spring of 1862, while early skirmishes were occurring around Bishop Creek, Indian agent Warren Wasson met Colonel Evans, who was leading the California Volunteers in the struggle to subdue the Indians. Wasson complained that his peace-making mission had been squeezed out by the military. His complaints were reiterated the following year by John P.H. Wentworth, Indian agent for the Southern District of California. After being turned down by Congress when requesting a \$30,000 appropriation to subsidize and pacify the Paiutes, Wentworth lamented:

By heeding the reports of its agents, who are upon the ground and ought to know the wants of the Indians far better than those who are so remote from them, oftentimes formidable and expensive wars will be averted, and the condition of the Indians vastly improved.⁷¹

The military first appeared in Owens Valley during early 1862 after it received reports of troubles between the Indians and white settlers. A troop of California Volunteers arrived as the Indians laid Putnam's to siege in the vicinity of present-day Independence. Led by Evans, the troops drove away the natives and proceeded to Bishop Creek where a larger battle was underway. Following some skirmishing, Evans determined that a military post should be established in the valley to protect the growing numbers of white settlers.⁷²

After a trip to Los Angeles to resupply his outfit, Evans returned to Owens Valley in June 1862 and established Camp Independence near the present-day county seat on July 4. Soon thereafter a short-lived treaty was signed with the Indians at the Indian agent's instigation, and the level of hostilities receded. As the supplies of both the Indians and the soldiers began to run out, however, warfare was renewed, especially after the soldiers and Indian agents could not provide the Indians with the material goods they had promised as part of the treaty.⁷³

Armed conflict between the Paiutes and the whites extended into 1863, the military using increasingly brutal tactics to subdue the Indians. As Indian attacks increased during the

70. Phillips, *Desert People and Mountain Men*, pp. 58-60; Chalfant, *Story of Inyo*, 1922, pp. 96-98; and Farquhar, ed., *Up and Down California*, p. 538.

71. U.S. Office of Indian Affairs, *Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 1862*, pp. 225-27, and *ibid.*, *Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 1863* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1864), p. 99.

72. Cragen, *Boys in Sky-Blue Pants*, pp. 6-9. An excellent analysis of military activities in Owens Valley during the 1860s and 1870s may be found in Michael, "At the Plow and in the Harvest Field." For more information on military operations in Owens Valley during the early 1860s, see U.S. War Department, *War of the Rebellion*, Vol. L, No. 1, Chap. LXII, pp. 46-49, 145-53, 210-13, 935-36, 939, 1003, 1024-26, 1036-37, 1047, 1058-59, 1065, 1097-98, 1102-03, 1106-07, 1116, 1120-3, 1128, 1140, 1149, 1165, and 1168-70, and Vol. L, No. 2, Chap. LXII, pp. 33, 46-47, 75, 93, 111, 135, 139, 450-51, 1022, 1080-87, 1095, 1112-14, 1118-19, 1162, 1166, 1218, 1278, 1292.

73. Cragen, *Boys in Sky-Blue Pants*, pp. 10-11, 21-23, 28-34.

early months of the year, choking off white traffic through the valley, soldiers and civilians responded harshly, killing and imprisoning the natives and destroying their homes and food supplies. Some white soldiers began taking advantage of Indian women, and the Indian women in turn looked to the whites for food and protection when their own tribesmen were deprived of the ability to provide for and defend them. Squaws began to stay around Camp Independence as early as 1862, angering the Indian men who had been undercut by white intrusions in the valley. Generally, the Indians fought on an "informal" basis, although during much of early 1863 they roamed the area in a band consisting of 150 to 300 warriors. A group of 41 Indians was exterminated on the shores of Owens Lake, just east of where the river flows into it, as revenge for the Indians' killing the wife and son of a civilian. Other pitched battles occurred on Owens Lake at the mouth of Cottonwood Creek, and in the Black Rocks area near Bishop.⁷⁴

In the spring of 1863 Captain Moses A. McLaughlin replaced Colonel Evans as commander at Camp Independence. After ruthless pursuit of the Indians and decimating many of their homes and much of their food supply through a "scorched earth" policy, McLaughlin managed to subdue the Paiutes. Hungry and beaten, the Indians trickled and then poured into Camp Independence during the late spring and early summer until approximately 1,000, or slightly less than one-half of the estimated native population of the valley before the coming of the whites, had surrendered. Anxious to dispose of the beaten and troublesome Indians and to dismantle Camp Independence, McLaughlin, heeding the advice of local Indian agents, herded the Indians to San Sebastian Reservation in the southern San Joaquin Valley and Tehachapi Mountains near Fort Tejon, a military post that had been established in 1854 to suppress stock rustling and protect San Joaquin Valley Indians. Of the approximately 1,000 Indians who began the forced march, only about 850 finished it, those not finishing either dying along the way or escaping back to the valley that was their home. The escapees would be followed during the next few years by a large number of those who made the journey to the San Sebastian Reservation as the reservation and fort were ill-equipped to hold and provide for the people. These Indians gradually sifted back into the economy of the Owens Valley, living in rude and rocky camps along the fringes of white settlement and dependent largely for employment and sustenance upon the whites who had dislodged them from their homeland. The Indians, their former way of life largely decimated, began working for whites as farm and ranch hands and performing other menial jobs in the expanding white-controlled mining, ranching, and farming operations, while attempting to supplement their subsistence with some natural products.⁷⁵

Although many of the displaced Indians returned to Owens Valley, their tribal ways were severely disrupted and their former social and familial structures all but destroyed. In

74. *Ibid.*, pp. 47-54, 74-75, and Mary Austin, *The Land of Little Rain* (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1950), pp. 59-65.

75. Cragen, *Boys in Sky-blue Pants*, pp. 55-62; Cook *Conflict*, pp. 463-465; Walton, *Western times and Water Wars*, pp. 52-54; and Rolle, *California: A History*, pp. 403-04.

1870 a census counted 1,150 Indians in the valley, but by 1877 there were only 776, or about one-third of the estimated native population before the coming of the whites.⁷⁶

When McLaughlin removed the Indians to Fort Tejon, whites assumed that the valley would be safer for their mining and agricultural pursuits. The development of these activities, which had been slowed considerably by the hostilities, accelerated. Nevertheless, some hostile Indians, who had not submitted to the soldiers, continued sporadic attacks against the white settlers. Camp Independence, which had been dismantled when McLaughlin returned to Fort Tejon in 1864, was reestablished to protect white settlers as well as travelers through the valley and remained in operation until 1877. With the reopening of the camp, most of the Indian attacks ceased.⁷⁷

Development: 1860-1890s. With the conquest of the Paiute, the lands of the eastern Sierra opened up to rapid settlement and development by white Americans. During the last thirty five years of the 19th century, Owens Valley underwent substantial development that would shape its future and determine to a large extent its present character. Two prominent mining booms took place in the area — the strikes at Cerro Gordo and Bodie — that would dominate the history of the region. Before reviewing these mining booms, however, it is important to understand their historic context and their relationship to ongoing settlement and agricultural development.⁷⁸

While the mining rushes had profound effects on the development of the Owens Valley region, they were primarily short-lived affairs. Agriculturalists began settlements that had a more permanent character, although even farms were but temporary features upon the landscape in some parts of eastern California. Initially, agriculture relied upon the market that miners provided, as did other industries that supplied lumber, transportation, and water. Despite this dependence, however, farmers and ranchers lent an air of stability to the lands east of the Sierras. The hard economic times that set in after each boom reduced agricultural interests but could not eliminate them as they did mining. The slumps in the region after 1880 attest to the difficulties in the economic sector that supported miners, but the persistence of farmers and stockmen attests to the steady character of livelihoods tied to renewable wealth of the land.⁷⁹

Although farm operations got off to a slow start in Owens Valley, they expanded rapidly during the late 1860s. By 1867 farmers were cultivating approximately 2,000 acres. Barley was the principal crop. Two years later, 250 tons of grain were harvested from 5,000 acres of cultivated land in the valley, thus indicating a rapid expansion in farm operations. By

76. Cragen, *Boys in Sky-Blue Pants*, pp. 88, 187. For more data on Indian population statistics in Owens Valley, see Sherburne F. Cook, *The Population of the California Indians: 1769-1970* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1976).

77. Cragen, *Boys in Sky-Blue Pants*, pp. 67-72, 78-82; Chalfant, *Story of Inyo*, 1922, pp. 162-65; and Farquhar, *History of the Sierra Nevada*, p. 136.

78. Walton, *Western Times and Water Wars*, pp. 55-89.

79. Busby, Findlay, and Bard, *Cultural Resource Overview*, p. 59.

1886, a variety of fruits and vegetables were being raised in the valley, bringing good prices to growers.⁸⁰

A promotional pamphlet published in 1886 optimistically advertised the agricultural possibilities in Inyo County and Owens Valley. The publication reported that more than 82,000 acres were still available for cultivation, and two-thirds of Round Valley, which contained much of the region's most fertile land, remained open for settlement. This estimate, however, was likely too optimistic. Cattlemen and sheep raisers dominated most of the choice "open" land in the region, and probably would have resisted extensive settlements by newcomers. Despite the promoters' claims, the best usable land was beginning to fill, leading to disputes and fights between potential settlers and those who had already established themselves on the land.⁸¹

Despite expanding settlement and farm and ranch operations, Owens Valley remained largely isolated from the outside world during the late 19th century. Although it generally grew faster than the settlements of Mono County to the north, it still developed slowly, particularly after the decline of Cerro Gordo in the mid-1870s. By the 1870s the valley had become a base camp for climbers heading into the High Sierra, and the route up Mount Whitney had its beginning, as it does today, at Lone Pine. Prominent visitors to the valley, who climbed Mount Whitney during the early and mid-1870s, included John Muir, the noted naturalist, explorer, and writer, and Clarence King, a prominent government surveyor in the West.⁸² But visitors to the valley in the late 19th century were comparatively rare. Besides Muir and King, the most famous visitors to the valley in the late 19th century were members of the Wheeler Expedition, an Army Corps of Engineers scientific survey team assigned to explore the Great Basin. The expedition based some of its activities at Camp Independence from 1870 until the camp's abandonment in 1877.⁸³

Selection of Owens Valley as the expedition's base camp symbolized the character of the valley in the late 19th century. Located on the fringes of the Great Basin, it epitomized the features of the region's semi-arid geography. Yet it also lay on the eastern perimeter of California, adjacent to the rapidly developing settlements in the western and central parts of the state but separated from them by the wall of the Sierra Nevada. This location as a sort of isolated backwater, lying between the turbulent mining-related prosperity of western California and western Nevada as well as the advancing modernization of California and the dry undeveloped stretches of the Great Basin, lent to Owens Valley a somewhat motley and unstable character. The population of Lone Pine in 1873, for instance, was a mixture of Mexicans, Americans, Indians, French, Swiss, and Chileans. Mining strikes, such as Cerro Gordo, created an opening for Asian workers as well. That ethnic groups could mix so easily suggests that no one element controlled the valley during these early years. Due in part to its geographical location and to its largely

80. Chalfant, *Story of Inyo*, 1922, pp. 208-10.

81. *Homes for Settlers: Government Lands, Plenty of Water; A Delightful and Healthy Country. The Resources of Inyo County. How to Reach Owens Valley* (Independence, California, Inyo Independent Printers, 1886), pp. 5-9, and Cragen, *Boys in Sky-Blue Pants*, p. 167.

82. Farquhar, *History of the Sierra Nevada*, pp. 150-54, 166-72.

83. Cragen, *Boys in Sky-Blue Pants*, pp. 93-109.

undeveloped character, society in Owens Valley would remain impermanent and unstable throughout the late 19th century.⁸⁴

Yet some families found this backwater of civilization appealing, and some agriculturalists strove to establish permanent institutions east of the Sierra. Elements of these efforts were visible largely in the small towns that dotted the landscape of the valley. Bishop Creek, a town of approximately 600, brought the first "religious society" to the eastern Sierra region in 1869 with establishment of a Baptist Church. By 1886, the town featured two churches, three hotels, and a public school. The first Inyo County newspaper, the *Inyo Independent*, was established at Independence in 1870, and the first telegraph between that town and Camp Independence was installed in 1876. The first elements of an irrigation system crucial to agricultural development in the valley were begun during these years.⁸⁵

Camp Independence, although a temporary military post, provided an aura of stability to Owens Valley. Through the 1860s it aided white settlement in the valley by serving as a base for fighting Indians, protecting travelers, and providing a market for local meat and farm produce. During the 1870s, the post helped to resolve some of the problems associated with accelerated settlement. The struggle between farmers and ranchers for land and water, and the violence and lawlessness associated with the nearby mining booms, required and received the soldiers' attention. In the mid-1870s, for instance, at the height of the Cerro Gordo boom, soldiers at Camp Independence settled feuds between cattlemen and sheepherders over rights to pasturage and water. By 1877, however, the Indian threat was gone and local government was well enough established to handle settlement problems. Thus, the camp was disbanded, and the buildings torn down or auctioned off.⁸⁶

A devastating earthquake in the early morning of March 26, 1872, had a major impact on the growing settlements as well as the landscape of Owens Valley. One of the greatest tremors recorded in the history of California, it is estimated that the quake would have registered 8.3 on the Richter scale. Lone Pine, near the epicenter, suffered extensive damage. All of Lone Pine's adobe houses collapsed in the tremor, killing 29 and injuring more than 60 of the town's 300-400 residents. Of those killed in the quake, most of whom were Mexicans, 16 had no nearby relatives. They were buried in a common grave that remains extant on the northern outskirts of Lone Pine. The adobe structures at Camp Independence toppled, but no fatalities and only a few injuries were reported. Most of the buildings in Independence were built of wood, and thus there were no reported injuries to its population of 400 because the wood flexed with the quake and did not break.⁸⁷

84. *Ibid.*, p. 142, and Busby, Findlay, and Bard, *Culture Resource Overview*, p. 61.

85. Chalfant, *Story of Inyo*, 1922, pp. 210, 212, 304, 314, and *Homes for Settlers*, p. 5.

86. Cragen, *Boys in Sky-Blue Pants*, pp. 127, 161-62.

87. W. A. Beck and Y. D. Hasse, *Historical Atlas of California* (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1974), p. 4; Schumacher-Smith, ed., *Deepest Valley*, pp. 186-88; Cragen, *Boys in Sky-Blue Pants*, pp. 115, 122; Charles Mulholland, "The Owens Valley Earthquake of 1872," *Annual Publication of the Historical Society of Southern California*, III (1894), pp. 27-32; Josiah Dwight Whitney, *Owens Valley Earthquake of March 26, 1872 . . .* (N.p., 1872) no pagination; and Mary R. Hill, A Centennial: The Great Owens Valley Earthquake of 1872," *California Geology*, XXV (March 1972), pp. 51-54.

The earthquake also resulted in changes to the landscape of Owens Valley. Scarps that reached 23 feet in height were formed along the eastern edge of the Alabama Hills, and in some places the ground moved horizontally by 20 feet. Some 28 miles north of Lone Pine, the bed of the Owens River sank, and as the river filled these new fissures the flow stopped to the south for several hours. About seven miles north of Lone Pine, the ground along the river banks sank, creating a new channel for the river. The faults and scarps of that dramatic event remain in the valley, and along with the grave of the earthquake victims, are reminders of the valley's geological history.⁸⁸

Cerro Gordo and Bodie Mining Booms. Compared to the slow, steady development of agriculture and settlement in Inyo and Mono counties, the Cerro Gordo and Bodie mining booms shook and realigned the character of the region. In a sense, they put the lands of the eastern Sierra on the map by stimulating rapid demographic and economic growth and by linking the area, albeit tenuously, to the outside world. The mining booms typified the approach of most Americans to the region. Unwilling to settle in the lowlands of the two counties, for the most part, many were willing to endure hardship and cultural deprivation at Bodie and Cerro Gordo for a few years to strike it rich. These miners planned to tap the mineral resources of the area, hoping to spend and consume its wealth elsewhere. Nonetheless, their frenzied existence in the region contributed substantially to the region's growth.⁸⁹

The silver boom at Cerro Gordo, the richest strike in the history of Inyo County, exemplified these patterns of development. Discovered about 1865 and worked constantly for 12 years, the mines at Cerro Gordo generated travel and wealth in the valley, but as was common in many western mining strikes, the profits from the venture tended to flow away from the valley to large cities and distant capitalists. Nonetheless, the mine stimulated commercial growth, created new business opportunities in the valley, and connected the region with Los Angeles, the expanding metropolitan area to the south that would one day acquire much of the valley.⁹⁰

By 1868 some 700 people had made their way to the peak high above Owens Lake, and Cerro Gordo became a full-fledged mining camp. Stage lines sprang up, connecting the mine with Owens Valley twice daily, Nevada twice weekly, San Francisco via Walker Pass three times weekly, and Los Angeles once weekly. By 1870 nearly 1,000 claims had been filed, and the town began to acquire the meager rudiments of civilization, featuring frame houses, hotels, dance halls, and unpaved roadways.⁹¹

Despite problems with crime and disorder, Cerro Gordo became one of California's richest mining strikes. Its total output was uncertain during its principal years of operation from 1865 to 1877, but estimates suggest that it produced about \$17,000,000 in silver. At its peak

88. Mulholland, "Owens Valley Earthquake," pp. 31-32.

89. Cragen, *Boys in Sky-Blue Pants*, pp. 171-74, and Busby, Findlay, and Bard, *Culture Resource Overview*, p. 63.

90. Remi A. Nadeau, *City-Makers* (Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1948), pp. 31-43, 104-20.

91. *Ibid.*, pp. 35-37, 189-90, and Chalfant, *Story of Inyo*, 1922, p. 249.

in 1874, the three smelters that served the mine produced 5,300 tons of bullion valued at \$2,000,000, or an average of 400 bars of silver per day.⁹²

The success of Cerro Gordo was due largely to its business organization. Developed by big businessmen, their disciplined organization turned the venture into a profitable enterprise. Mortimer W. Belshaw, a mining engineer from San Francisco, was responsible for much of the success of Cerro Gordo. Arriving with the earliest prospectors, Belshaw, with his partners, quickly gained control of the refining processes and later the water and lumber resources as well as the roads to Cerro Gordo, thus monopolizing production there. A proven mastermind of mineral engineering, Belshaw invented a special type of smelting furnace, and by 1868 he had begun to produce bullion at the unheard-of rate of 120 bars per day, each bar weighing 85 pounds and costing \$20-\$35.⁹³

Getting the bullion from Cerro Gordo to the California coast was one of the developers' biggest problems. Until 1873 the production of bullion outraced the abilities of mule teams to haul the silver to market. A steamboat transported the bars from the base of the range across Owens Lake, where mule teams picked them up and transported them to Los Angeles, a journey that took between three and four weeks. In another three days, the bars were shipped to San Francisco, where they were refined further and passed on to the United States mint. After attempting several operations, Belshaw helped to establish the Cerro Gordo Freighting Company, headed by Remi Nadeau, in 1873, thus stabilizing the patterns of shipment for the remainder of the Cerro Gordo boom.⁹⁴

Thus, the silver at Cerro Gordo gave Owens Valley its first consistent link with the outside world, and at the same time it fueled the growth of Los Angeles, which would later dominate the valley. The rise of Cerro Gordo coincided with one of the first land booms in the Los Angeles area, as farmers flocked to southern California. Cerro Gordo provided a market for their crops, and Los Angeles provided an entrepot for the bullion of Cerro Gordo. The 500 or so mules that hauled cargo between Cerro Gordo and San Pedro harbor near Los Angeles consumed all of the city's surplus feed crop, and the population at Cerro Gordo consumed other supplies from the city's farmers and merchants. Thus, the two regions became closely linked in a pattern of commercial growth. This connection almost resulted in construction of an early railroad between the two regions, but when the backing of an independent railroad promoter fell through, the Southern Pacific took over the idea. The company extended the rail line to Mojave, thus requiring Owens Valley to wait another 35 years for a direct connection to the city to the south.⁹⁵

The Southern Pacific's reluctance to incorporate Cerro Gordo into its rail system reflected the decline of mining on that rim of the Owens Valley. During the mid-1870s mining activities were declining, and by 1877 all known silver deposits in the area had been extracted. Lack of reliable water sources and destructive fires contributed to the declining mining operations, and by 1879 Cerro Gordo had gone into decline.

92. Chalfant, *Story of Inyo*, 1922, p. 248, and Schumacher-Smith, ed., *Deepest Valley*, p. 26.

93. Nadeau, *City-Makers*, pp. 31-35, and Nadeau, *Ghost Towns and Mining Camps*, p. 188.

94. Nadeau, *City-Makers*, pp. 42-43, 88-97.

95. *Ibid.*, and Cragen, *Boys in Sky-Blue Pants*, pp. 149, 154-57, 166-68, 181, 184.

The demise of Cerro Gordo came at an inopportune time for the Owens Valley. The financial Panic of 1873, which had afflicted the economy of the nation and California, began to impact Inyo County in 1875. As Cerro Gordo and smaller mining operations in the region slumped, miners, teamsters, and merchants experienced declining prosperity. During early 1877 soldiers at Camp Independence were discharged in a continuous stream, and on July 10 of that year the post closed, thus ending not only a social center and a source of authority but also a market for the produce of farmers and the goods of merchants. Disbandment of the fort and closure of Cerro Gordo signified the end of the first period of economic prosperity in Owens Valley.⁹⁶

To the north of Owens Valley, the rising mining camp of Bodie was able to absorb some of those dispossessed by the economic decline in Inyo, and in so doing bolstered the sluggish development of Mono County. Rich veins of gold were discovered at Bodie during the mid-1870s, and by 1880 some 6,000 people had arrived to participate in the boom. Mining activity in Bodie reached its peak during the years 1877-81, as the town experienced a peak population of nearly 16,000. Although mining operations would continue into the 20th century, production at the Bodie mines declined drastically after 1883. The mines at Bodie far outstripped those at Cerro Gordo, the total value of the generally high grade silver and gold ore amounting to some \$21,000,000. During the peak years from 1877 to 1881, approximately \$11,700,000 of that total was produced in gold, the Standard Mine yielding two-thirds of the entire gross output.⁹⁷

Carson and Colorado Railroad. The Carson and Colorado Railroad was one of the byproducts of the Cerro Gordo and Bodie mining booms, and it outlived both. The line was originally proposed in the late 1870s, although mining east of the Sierra had already begun to decline. The railway builders desired to connect Carson City, Nevada, with the Colorado River in southern California. But in the early 1880s, when this narrow gauge railroad was commenced, mining activity in Mono and Inyo counties had diminished to such an extent that the tracks from Carson City were extended only to Keeler on the eastern shore of Owens Lake at the southern end of the Owens Valley. The builders originally intended to profit from the trade of the mining strikes in the area that the railroad served, but when the railroad was completed in 1883 Cerro Gordo had been abandoned and mining operations at Bodie were declining. Nevertheless, the railroad replaced the teams of mules and burros that had been such a frequent sight through Owens Valley. Because of the stagnant mining activity in western Nevada and eastern California, D. O. Mills, the owner of the railroad, was forced to sell out to the Southern Pacific in 1900 for \$2,750,000. Shortly thereafter, strikes at Tonopah, Goldfield, and elsewhere in western Nevada made the line profitable, staving off its inevitable decline for several decades.⁹⁸

96. Nadeau, *City-Makers*, pp. 242-47, and Cragen, *Boys in Sky-Blue Pants*, pp. 174, 180-89.

97. Nadeau, *Ghost Towns and Mining Camps*, p. 203-04, 211-15. For more information on the historical development of Bodie, see State of California, Department of Parks and Recreation, *The Cultural Resources of Bodie State Historic Park*, Sacramento, 1977.

98. Among the best sources on the historic development of the Carson and Colorado Railroad are: David F. Myrick, *Railroads of Nevada and Eastern California, Volume One — The Northern Roads* (Berkeley, Howell-North Books, 19162), pp. 166-210; John F. Due, "Carson and Colorado Railroad," *Western Railroader*, XXII, (May 1959), pp. 3-5; and J. B. Hungerford, *The Slim Princess: The Story of the Southern Pacific Narrow Gauge* (Reada, California, Hungerford Press, 1956).

Despite its relative lack of success, the Carson and Colorado Railroad influenced the development of Owens Valley. The line was the valley's first modern transportation link to the outside world, connecting it with Reno and San Francisco. The function of a narrow gauge railroad in the American West was generally limited to local or regional businesses, such as livestock, lumbering, and mining. Because these industries were generally migratory and temporary, use of these railroads was generally limited, and only two narrow gauges — the Denver and Rio Grande and the Carson and Colorado — survived into the mid-20th century as did the White Pass and Yukon Route in Alaska. The purpose of the narrow tracks was to facilitate travel over and through mountain passes. The Carson and Colorado squeezed over the White Mountains near Benton, connecting western Nevada with eastern California.⁹⁹

While the railroad stimulated the economy of the eastern Sierra by creating new markets for its agricultural produce in western Nevada, the principal interest of its builders was mining. As a result, the tracks travelled down the eastern side of the valley, bypassing each of the major settlements that had emerged on the west side of the Owens River, where the elements of irrigation were available for agriculture. Thus, each permanent settlement in the valley had to build a station on the east side of the river in order to be served by the narrow gauge. Bishop utilized the town of Laws, Big Pine the town of Alvord, Independence the station at Kearsarge (originally known as Citrus), and Lone Pine developed Mount Whitney Station. The railroad's tracks skirted the northeastern shore of Owens Lake, where in later years they would provide transportation for the non-metallic minerals extracted from the lake bottom.¹⁰⁰

Despite the comparatively long life of the Carson and Colorado (in later years renamed briefly the Nevada and California and for most of the 20th century known simply as the Southern Pacific Narrow Gauge), it was doomed to extinction from its earliest years. Mining activity in eastern California never improved sufficiently to warrant full-time service, and the strikes in western Nevada were transitory in nature. Towns such as Tonopah and Goldfield provided a market for farmers, but most of the business and the ore moved from Mono and Inyo counties toward Reno and San Francisco. Competition also impacted operations on the narrow gauge line. The Southern Pacific extended its standard gauge tracks from Mojave to Owenyo in 1910 to provide transport for the construction of the aqueduct that would carry water from Owens Valley to Los Angeles, and rail traffic began to enter the region from southern California over the Southern Pacific lines. Along with other American railroads, the Carson and Colorado faced increasing competition from increased use of automobiles and trucks on passable highways that connected Owens Valley with Los Angeles during the 1920s and 1930s. When Los Angeles completed its aqueduct in the 1920s, the railroad lost the business of the valley's farmers. Though it still made regular trips through the 1940s and 1950s, the railroad continued to decline, and made its last run in 1960, and within a year had been dismantled.¹⁰¹

99. Hungerford, *Slim Princess*, pp. 8ff.

100. Krater, *East of the High Sierra*, pp. 8-9, and *Homes for Settlers*, pp. 26-27.

101. Hungerford, *Slim Princess*, p. 8, and Inyo County Board of Supervisors, comp., *Inyo*, p. 59.

Owens Valley at the Turn of the 20th Century. In 1900 the economy of Inyo County rested on an agricultural base. With a population of 4,377, the county had 424 farms and 141,059 acres of farmland. The annual value of its crops (ten-year average) was \$394,846, while the annual value of its livestock was \$574,229.¹⁰² The Carson and Colorado Railroad provided a means of export for farm produce and a mode of import for other goods. The growing season supported more crop production than Mono County, its neighbor to the north, but, like Mono, the Owens Valley largely depended on livestock. Owens Valley residents produced some fruits and vegetables, but they concentrated on feed crops such as alfalfa.¹⁰³

Earlier in 1893 the federal government had become a fixture in Inyo County when the Sierra Forest Reserve was established, protecting more than 4,000,000 acres of forest lands in five California counties. In 1907, when "timber reserves" were redesignated "national forests," parts of Inyo and Mono counties became the Inyo and Toiyabe national forests. As a result of this new land designation, sheep grazing was somewhat curtailed as restrictions on land usage in the national forests limited the number of animals that moved through the area.¹⁰⁴

At the turn of the 20th century, the population of Owens Valley was linked together in a chain of towns that ran the length of the valley, each sharing the river and the railroad as common communication channels. Foremost among the towns in the area was Bishop, located at the north end of the valley. After building a bank, public high school, and utility company in 1902, the town was incorporated in 1903. By 1909 its population numbered about 1,200, and it had acquired electric power, a town water supply system, a post office, telephones, and a telegraph. The town boasted six churches and four schools.¹⁰⁵

Lone Pine exemplified another aspect of the growth of Owens Valley at the turn of the 20th century. Although whites had dominated the valley's non-aboriginal population, a strong Mexican community sprang up in Lone Pine. The Mexicans had arrived in the settlement during the mining rushes in the region, and a deeply rooted community remained there. Mary Austin, a noted author whose own tragic life in the valley was part of the story of Independence during this period, depicted the foreign community sensitively in her *The Land of Little Rain* in 1903.¹⁰⁶

102. Walton, *Western Times and Water Wars*, p. 139.

103. Bishop Chamber of Commerce, *Owens River Valley, Inyo County, California, The Field of Opportunity, The Land of Promise* (Bishop, California, Inyo Register Printing, [ca. 1922], pp. 6-8, and Inyo County Board of Supervisors, comp., *Inyo*, p. 65.

104. Inyo County of Board of Supervisors, comp., *Inyo*, p. 77, and Farquhar, *History of the Sierra Nevada*, pp. 213-14.

105. Owens Valley Chamber of Commerce, *Inyo County, California. Inyo the Peerless Endowed with a Greater Variety of Natural Resources Than Any Other County* (Bishop, California, Inyo Mines Syndicates and Owens Valley Herald, [1908]), no pagination, in Subject History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum, Independence, California, and Schumacher-Smith, ed., *Deepest Valley*, pp. 191-92.

106. Krater, *East of the High Sierra*, pp. 31-42.

Northeast of Lone Pine, another community, known as Owenyo, was established by Quakers in the early 1900s. Located on the Carson and Colorado narrow gauge, Owenyo became the center for a 13,000-acre settlement project by the William Penn Colonial Association of California. Incorporated on June 9, 1900, the association, whose officers were headquartered in Whittier and Los Angeles, was capitalized at \$200,000. The association attempted to sell land for \$25 per acre, and it planned to construct electric power, light, and heating plants and erect a sugar beet processing factory. Liquor, gambling, and "houses of ill repute" were banned from the colony. The Quakers dug some 42 miles of irrigation canals ranging in width from 18 to 50 feet, but it soon became apparent that the settlers, most of whom were from the East, were unprepared to work the arid lands of Owens Valley. Thus, the Quakers were among the first to sell their lands to Los Angeles in 1905 when the city began to purchase land for its aqueduct.¹⁰⁷

The Basques were another European group present in Owens Valley at the turn of the 20th century. Since they came and left as transient sheepherders, little was ever recorded about them. Many of those labeled as Basque were in actuality French, Spanish, Mexican, and Portuguese. These European herders had come to North America as early as the 1850s, working primarily in western California, but some Basques had apparently reached Owens Valley and Mono Basin by the mid-1860s. However, they did not arrive in large numbers until the setting for Basque herding began to shift from central and western California to the Great Basin during the closing decade of the 19th century. In 1896-97 all but two of the 34 licenses in Inyo County went to Basque or French herders. Establishment of a hotel catering to Basque and French herders in Bishop provides evidence that these people kept to themselves in order to maintain their cultural ties and perhaps to protect themselves against discrimination by the dominant white society.¹⁰⁸

For permanent settlers in Owens Valley survival depended on the building of irrigation systems. The Paiutes had constructed an extensive network of ditches which allowed them to irrigate "nearly all the arable land in that section of the country."¹⁰⁹ When Euro-American settlers moved into the area, whites had to construct watercourses to channel water to their mining and agricultural endeavors. Early white settlers in the Owens Valley moved on to the lands formerly cultivated by the Paiutes along the rivers and streams, taking over the ditches the Indians had dug and using them to irrigate farmlands just as the Paiute had. As the number of settlers increased in the valley, conflicts erupted over the limited water supply, as farmers and ranchers both attempted to employ it for their own interests.¹¹⁰

107. Schumacher-Smith, ed., *Deepest Valley*, p. 34; "William Penn Colonial Association of California," ca. 1903, in William Penn Colonial Association, in Subject History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum; "Articles of Incorporation of William Penn Colonial Association of California," June 9, 1900, in Articles of Incorporation (Archives), Eastern California Museum; and Aqueduct Investigation Board, "Report of the Aqueduct Investigation Board to the City Council of Los Angeles," August 31, 1912, 7 vols., Vol. 1, pp. 58-59 (copy on file in Eastern California Museum Reference Library).

108. William A. Douglass and Jon Bilbao, *Amerikanuak: Basques in the New World*, (Reno, University of Nevada Press, 1975), pp. 236, 249-51, 373.

109. Harry W. Lawton, Philip J. Wilke, Mary DeDecker, and William M. Mason, "Agriculture Among the Paiute of Owens Valley," *Journal of California Anthropology*, III (Summer 1976), pp. 13-50.

110. Wilke and Lawton, eds. *Expedition of Capt. J. W. Davidson*, pp. 19, 40, 46-47; Lawton et al., "Agriculture Among the Paiute," p. 32; and Austin, *The Land of Little Rain*, pp. 81-82.

As the prime lands along the streams of the valley were settled, new arrivals began to choose lands that lay farther away. To avoid the conflicts that had permeated valley life since white settlement began, and to prosper as farmers and ranchers, residents began digging their own canals. The first sizable white irrigation projects were undertaken in 1878, when the McNally Ditch near Laws, Bishop Creek Ditch, Big Pine Canal, and Lone Pine Ditch were planned. Work began on the Owens River Canal and the Inyo Canal in 1887. Most of these canals tended to run parallel to the river, and many were located north of Bishop. By 1906 nineteen canals were in operation in Owens Valley, and by 1910 artesian wells near Independence had been dug successfully and used to provide water for irrigation. The combination of plentiful water and increasingly prosperous agricultural activities helped Owens Valley to overcome its economic doldrums in the wake of the decline of the Cerro Gordo mining boom and seemed to portend a bright future for the Owens Valley.¹¹¹

The continual increase of agricultural production in the valley during the early 1900s supported the promising expectations for the valley's economy. In 1910 an agricultural census of the valley showed that there were 43,000 sheep, 5,000 horses, 20,000 cows and cattle, 5,800 colonies of bees, 20,000 apple trees, and 40,000 grapevines. Farm production included 58,000 bushels of corn, 51,000 bushels of wheat, 53,000 bushels of potatoes, 174,000 pounds of butter, 37,000 tons of alfalfa, 100 tons of honey, and 150 tons of grapes.

One horticultural specialist, however, was less than enthusiastic about the agricultural prospects of Owens Valley during this period. J. S. Cotton, in his *Agricultural Conditions in Inyo County*, observed that of the 500,000 acres of land in the Owens Valley, about 200,000 acres were held under patent, and one-fifth of that was under cultivation. He noted that the "great majority of farmers in the Valley are very lax in their methods." Irrigation of unleveled land by flooding led to over-irrigation and increased alkalinity of the soil in many areas. Furthermore, valley farmers were "badly handicapped" by inadequate facilities to market their produce. The Carson and Colorado Railroad connecting Keeler with points in Nevada ran along the east side of the valley, far from the agricultural districts on the west. The railroad was poorly managed and freight charges were high. Much of the feasibility of any new project in the valley depended "on the future value of the land, which in turn may depend on the transportation facilities."¹¹²

Despite this negative assessment of Owens Valley agriculture, however, the combined ranching and farming industries in the valley were beginning to reach their peak by the early 1910s. Nevertheless, a water controversy with the City of Los Angeles loomed on the horizon that would shatter the valley's agricultural-based economy and have drastic impacts on the region's development.

111. Sauder, *The Lost Frontier*, pp. 125-35.

112. Schmacher-Smith, ed., *Deepest Valley*, p. 191; Edwin Schallert, "The Valley of the Flowing Waters," *West Coast Magazine*, XI (November 1911), pp. 135-49; and G. Yoell Parkhurst, *Inyo County, California* (San Francisco, Sunset Magazine Homeseekers' Bureau, ca. 1910), no pagination, in "Inyo County, California," Subject History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum. Also see *Agricultural and Industrial Survey of Inyo County, Calif., Made by the California Government Board of San Francisco, California, at the Request of the Board of Supervisors of Inyo County, June-July 1917*, Thalia Weed Newcomb, Field agent, September 1917; and J. S. Cotton, *Agricultural Conditions of Inyo County, California* (Mss., 1905).

Los Angeles, the Aqueduct, and Water Controversy. By the turn of the 20th century, Los Angeles had experienced what seemed like a perpetual boom since the heyday of Cerro Gordo, and the continual influx of people demanded more and more resources. As the city became accustomed to growth and the profits to be made from expansion, its leaders, who were committed to the "ethic of growth," began to plan for expansion. Long before the city needed actual resources, men were planning how to bring them to the rapidly expanding metropolis to insure continued prosperity and growth in the future. This was especially true in the case of water.¹¹³

The Los Angeles Basin comprises approximately 6 percent of California's habitable land, but enjoys only 0.6 percent of the natural stream flow of the state. This small portion seemed adequate until the turn of the 20th century. At that time the city had a population of about 100,000, but its phenomenal growth rate suggested that it would soon double in size. A dry weather cycle that stretched from the early 1890s until 1904 convinced city leaders that future growth of their city depended upon obtaining a large water supply from elsewhere.¹¹⁴

In 1902, three years before Los Angeles civic leaders became overtly involved in the aqueduct project, the U.S. Reclamation Service began studying Owens Valley in preparation for extending irrigation throughout the basin. Largely because of the efforts of Joseph Barlow Lippincott, who was employed by both the chief engineer of the Reclamation Service and the City of Los Angeles, the federal project was dropped when the city began to show interest in the valley's water. Los Angeles began moving into the area, purchasing lands adjacent to the Owens River as well as other streams and canals, thus acquiring most of the riparian rights to the water in the southern half of the valley. Although their methods were not illegal, the buyers for the city, under the leadership of the superintendent of the Los Angeles City Water Department, William Mulholland, and former Los Angeles mayor Fred Eaton, owner of a 440-acre poultry ranch near Big Pine

113. Material for this section is based on the following works, which are considered by most scholars to be the best documentary sources in this field, Walton, *Western Times and Water Wars*; Vincent Ostrom, *Water & Politics: A Study of Water Policies and Administration in the Development of Los Angeles* (Los Angeles, The Haynes Foundation, 1953); Kahrl, *Water and Power: The Conflict over Los Angeles Water Supply in the Owens Valley*; William L. Kahrl, "The Politics of California Water: Owens Valley and the Los Angeles Aqueduct, 1900-1927, Part I," *California Historical Quarterly*, LV (Spring 1976) pp. 2-25; William L. Kahrl, "The Politics of California Water: Owens Valley and the Los Angeles Aqueduct, 1900-1927, Part II," *California Historical Quarterly*, LV (Summer 1976), pp. 98-120; and Robert A. Sauder, "Owens Valley's Abandoned Landscapes," *California Geographer*, XXXII (1992), pp. 61-76. Also see Catherine Hoehn, "The Owens Valley-Los Angeles Water Controversy: Bibliographic Guide" (M. A. Thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1977); Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power, *A Brief Summary of Important Historical Data and Current Facts Concerning the Municipally Owned, Department of Water and Power, City of Los Angeles* (Los Angeles, The Department, 1986); Gordon R. Miller, "Los Angeles and the Owens River Aqueduct" (Ph. D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1977); Los Angeles, Bureau of the Aqueduct, *Annual Reports of the Chief Engineer of the Los Angeles Aqueduct to the Board of Public Works*, (7 vols., Los Angeles, Department of Public Works, 1907-13); and Los Angeles, Department of Public Service, *Complete Report on Construction of the Los Angeles Aqueduct* (Los Angeles, 1916).

114. Carey McWilliams, *Southern California: An Island on the Land* (Santa Barbara and Salt Lake City, Peregrine Smith, Inc., 1979), pp. 183-87, and Ostrom, *Water & Politics*, p. 9. Also see S. P. Erie, "How the Urban West Was Won: The Local State and Economic Growth in Los Angeles, 1880-1932," *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, XXVII (No. 4, 1992), pp. 519-54.

that was reportedly the largest such operation in the state¹¹⁵, sometimes employed unscrupulous methods. Posing as ranchers and agents of the Reclamation Service, buyers purchased valley lands for Los Angeles throughout the middle years of the first decade of the 20th century. By falsely representing themselves, the city's agents were attempting to avoid sudden speculation by local landholders, but many valley residents later came to resent these tactics, feeling that they had been misled into selling their land.¹¹⁶

The City of Los Angeles received assistance from the federal government in its quest to obtain land in the Owens Valley. The first two decades of the 20th century witnessed the rise of the progressive movement in American politics during which time many leaders became strong supporters of urbanization, urban reform, regional incorporation, bureaucratic management, and municipal ownership of city services. In addition, the progressives promised a solution to local underdevelopment through scientific conservation, reclamation, organizational efficiency, and economic centralization.¹¹⁷ Theodore Roosevelt, a progressive who served as President of the United States from 1901 to 1909, was sympathetic to the proposed water project, and as a result his administration aided the efforts of the city by protecting much of the unsettled portions of Owens Valley from further settlement. This objective was accomplished in 1908 when Gifford Pinchot, Chief Forester of the fledgling U.S. Forest Service, extended the borders of the Sierra National Forest to include 275,000 acres of valley land, despite the fact that the protected acreage was virtually treeless. This action, along with the Reclamation Service's earlier decision to drop its irrigation plans in favor of the Los Angeles plans to construct an aqueduct, would later lead many to conclude that the federal government was an accomplice in "the rape of Owens Valley" and encouraged distrust of the federal government in the valley.¹¹⁸

By 1908 the voters of Los Angeles had approved bond issues that funded the project, and construction of the aqueduct was begun. As construction got underway, a promotional pamphlet issued by the Owens Valley Chamber of Commerce optimistically stated:

It has been reported that Los Angeles owns the greater part of the irrigating waters of Owens Valley; not only is this not the fact, but it is true that the city of Los Angeles owns only a small minority of such waters, depending principally for its supply on the surplus flow of Owens river. . .

The water rights of Owens Valley are secure; the continued appropriation and use for many years has given vested rights, which are as near perfect as water rights

115. Schallert, "Valley of the Flowing Waters," p. 143.

116. The perspective of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power may be seen in Los Angeles Water and Power Department, "The Owens Valley Controversy in Perspective," in Southern Inyo American Association of Retired Persons, *Saga of Inyo County* (Covina, California, Taylor Publishing Company, 1977) pp. 41-43.

117. Walton, *Western Times and Water Wars*, 291.

118. Morrow Mayo, *Los Angeles: The Rape of Owens Valley* (New York, Alfred Knopf, 1933), pp. 220-46.

can be. The exceptionally few law suits over water rights are a part of the history of Inyo county.¹¹⁹

At its completion in 1913, the 230-mile aqueduct, largely the brainchild of William Mulholland, stood as one of the engineering triumphs of the early 20th century. To complete the project the Southern Pacific, at the behest of the city, built a rail line from Mojave that connected with the narrow gauge at Owensyo. Initially, it supplied the construction, already underway, of the Los Angeles Aqueduct, and later provided an outlet, albeit roundabout and costly, for Owens Valley farmers. To provide the builders with electricity, the city constructed power plants which were later converted for use by valley residents. The aqueduct intake was built at Aberdeen, where the Owens River entered a channel that pulled the water by gravity through a string of reservoirs, pipes, tunnels, and canals to Los Angeles. During the years immediately after completion of the aqueduct, the city did not need much of the water for domestic or industrial use, thus diverting much of the flow to irrigate farmlands in the expanding San Fernando Valley just north of Los Angeles.

Although concerned about the actions of Los Angeles, Owens Valley residents remained generally optimistic about the future of their homes and livelihoods until the 1920s. The aqueduct extended only to Aberdeen, leaving untouched most of the irrigated lands and riparian rights in the more cultivated northern half of the valley. During the early years of that decade, one promotional tract, for instance, contended that there was plenty of irrigation water left for new settlers and that "the filings of the city in no way jeopardize existing water rights in the valley."¹²⁰

Another promotional pamphlet circulated during the early 1920s optimistically stated that agriculture in Owens Valley was "still in its infancy." There were some 75,000 acres under cultivation, of which "at least 98 per cent" was irrigated under gravity flow of water. "In the last few years," however, a "new awakening" in agricultural development had occurred in the valley that would "lead us to a development four times as large as our present cultivated area, with 30 and 40-acre holdings, and a class of people more contented than in any other section in California."¹²¹

Despite this optimism, however, two sets of circumstances combined during the 1920s to shatter the confident illusions of Owens Valley residents. First, a number of factors prevented the construction of a dam and reservoir at the lower end of Long Valley that would have helped to regulate the inconsistent flow of the Owens River and store for later use excess water from wet years. When it became clear that this dam would not be constructed, the stage was set, according to several historians, for misunderstandings and violence.¹²²

119. Owens Valley Chamber of Commerce, *Inyo County*, [1908], no pagination.

120. Bishop Chamber of Commerce, *Owens River Valley*, [1922], p. 6.

121. *Inyo County, California's Real Primitive Playground, A Paradise for the Homemaker, the Tourist, and the Sportsman*, [ca. 1923], in "Inyo County II," Subject History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum.

122. Mayo, *Los Angeles*, pp. 239-40, and Remi A. Nadeau, *The Water-Seekers* (New York, Doubleday, 1950), p. 128.

A second set of circumstances provided the more immediate cause for the battles that erupted in Owens Valley during the mid-1920s. A severe drought that afflicted southern California in the early 1920s, combined with the explosive growth that continued in the Los Angeles area, demonstrated the need for the city to expand its holdings in Owens Valley. Initially the farms and ranches of the northern half of the valley had been left with enough water to operate easily. During the dry years of the early 1920s, however, these residents consumed most or all of the river water before it reached the aqueduct intake. While Los Angeles had earlier planned to take only the "surplus" water from the Owens River, the drought and continued growth of the city forced it to change its goals. Thus, the city launched a new land acquisition program in the Bishop and Big Pine areas, hoping to close off the ditches and canals so that all of the Owens River water would flow into the city's aqueduct. The city's new campaign led to vigorous arguments over the monetary value of the valley lands and reparation demands by valley residents for the damage the aqueduct had done and was expected to do to business and prosperity in the valley. When the two sides were unable to reach a compromise, valley residents became increasingly angry over the "rape" of their valley by the powerful and wealthy metropolis to the south and turned to bombings and violence as a last resort. Their most notable act of sabotage occurred in November 1924, when a group forcibly opened the Alabama Gates four miles north of Lone Pine, diverting water from the aqueduct and sending it down a spillway to the abandoned river bed over a five-day period.

An additional development that added to the frustrations of Owens Valley residents was the inability of the area's farmers, ranchers, and townspeople to reach a consensus on how to deal with their more numerous, powerful, and wealthy rivals in Los Angeles. Those who were willing to accept the city's terms sold out and then either moved away or stayed in the valley as tenants of Los Angeles. They were viewed as traitors by some valley residents, who sought either to hold out for high prices or to resist the Los Angeles land acquisition program entirely. Those who did not want to sell at any price often resented other opponents of Los Angeles who were merely trying to get more money for their properties. As a result of these differing opinions, many suspicions, feuds, and community disruptions occurred in the valley during the 1920s, thus shattering the former camaraderie that had characterized its small communities. This legacy of suspicion and distrust would linger for decades.¹²³

The heightened conflict between the City of Los Angeles and the residents of Owens Valley ended abruptly in 1927. Opponents of Los Angeles had organized behind the leadership of Wilfred W. and Mark Q. Watterson to resist the aqueduct until they received their price. The Watterson brothers operated the only banks in the valley, and represented the only source of loans to valley farmers and ranchers. In August 1927 the Watterson banks were suddenly audited and closed, and the brothers were convicted of embezzlement and sentenced to San Quentin prison. The collapse of the banks destroyed all effective opposition, as the valley lost not only its strongest leaders but also the money necessary for resisting Los Angeles. Ironically, many valley residents who had sold out to

123. Ostrom, *Water & Politics*, pp. 128-30. For more information on this topic, see Richard Coke Wood, *The Owens Valley and the Los Angeles Water Controversy: Owens Valley As I Knew It* (Stockton, University of the Pacific, Pacific Center For Western Historical Studies, 1973).

the city had deposited their windfalls in the Watterson banks, causing them to suffer also from the collapse.¹²⁴

During the next few years the city and the valley worked to reconcile their differences. The ability to compromise on prices and issues, which had eluded both parties for so long, suddenly made itself apparent. Both parties consented to some arbitration and price adjustments, and Los Angeles proceeded to acquire all the essential land and water rights in Owens Valley. By 1933 the city owned 95 percent of all farmland. In lieu of paying damages to townspeople who lost business as a result of the aqueduct, the city also purchased some 85 percent of all town property in the valley.¹²⁵

The impact of the water controversy upon the people and lands of Owens Valley was tremendous. The local economy slumped as people streamed out of the valley — an event that was aided in part by the onset of the Great Depression in 1929. The population of Inyo County declined from 7,031 in 1920 to 6,555 in 1930, and Bishop, its largest town, suffered a drop in population from 1,304 to 850 during the same period.¹²⁶ Land use also changed drastically as Los Angeles acquired virtually all privately owned farm lands and the federal government withdrew from homestead entry much of the public land to protect Los Angeles water rights. The city leased a small fraction of its 278,055 acres to farmers and ranchers, allowing a semblance of agriculture to persist in the valley. Nevertheless, over 500 modest farmers in 1920 were replaced by 80 cattle ranchers in 1930 who managed, on average, 5,000-acre ranches of city-owned land valued at over \$1,000,000 each.¹²⁷ Despite the on-going agricultural activities, however, the city was given priority for water from the Owens River, so no farmer or rancher could be assured of a steady and certain supply to irrigate his lands. Farming declined as a result of this uncertainty. Because the livestock industry required less water, it remained in the valley, and some feed crops were also grown. But for the most part, agriculture would never again be the dominant way of life in the valley as it had been before the coming of the Los Angeles aqueduct.¹²⁸

Owens Valley During the 1930s. During the late 1930s, a paved highway was completed from Los Angeles to Owens Valley, and with improvements in automobiles, Owens Valley and eastern California became increasingly popular tourist destinations for the expanding population of southern California. To some extent the promotional activities of some leading local residents were instrumental in developing tourism. While at the nadir of economic life in Inyo and Mono counties during the Great Depression, concerned residents joined to restore the economy of the area. Under the leadership of Ralph Merritt and

124. Judith and Neil Morgan, "California's Parched Oasis," *National Geographic*, CXLI (January 1976), p. 103.

125. Krater, *East of the High Sierra*, pp. 52-53; Kahrl, *Politics of California Water*, Part II, p. 114; and Ostrom, *Water & Politics*, p. 127.

126. Walton, *Western Times and Water Wars*, p. 201.

127. *Ibid.*, p. 222.

128. The 1929-33 period of Owens Valley history is summarized in W. A. Chalfant, *The Story of Inyo* (Rev. ed., Los Angeles, Citizens Print Shop, Inc., 1933) pp. 399-411. Also see Mary DeDecker, "Owens Valley, Then and Now," in Friends of the Eastern California Museum, comp., *Mountains to Desert*, pp. 7-15.

Father John J. Crowley, pastor of the Santa Rosa Parish headquartered in Lone Pine,¹²⁹ the aforementioned Inyo-Mono Associates was organized in 1937 to publicize the scenic beauty and recreational and investment opportunities of the two counties. By 1940 the organization had a membership of 30, including representatives from Olancho, Death Valley, Panamint, Darwin, Keeler, Bishop, Lone Pine, Big Pine, and Independence.

Among the group's most prominent members were George Savage, owner of the Chalfant Press which published the three major Owens Valley newspapers; W. A. Chalfant, editor of the *Inyo Register* at Bishop for more than 50 years; Roy Boothe, supervisor of Inyo National Forest; S. W. Lowden, division engineer of the State Division of Highways; and Theodore R. Goodwin, superintendent of Death Valley National Monument. The organization sought to restore the Owens Valley economy through a program of cooperation with the City of Los Angeles, and Merritt was appointed chairman of the committee on relations with the city. To attain its goal, the Inyo-Mono Associates posited that Owens Valley "was but a part of the whole area — called by them 'America's Range of Recreation' — and that by bringing prosperity to the area they would inevitably bring prosperity to the valley itself, not alone through the revival of agriculture but through the scenic beauties and more tourists."¹³⁰ Serving largely as a regional chamber of commerce, the organization helped to pump life and confidence into the area's decimated economy, although its initial enterprise was clouded by Merritt's reputation for "sharp practice" and rumors that Merritt and Crowley had been closely associated in Fresno during the 1920s when Merritt's Sun Maid raisin growers' association had gone bankrupt. Nevertheless, by encouraging local businessmen to subscribe funds to the advertising and public relations activities of the Inyo-Mono Associates, Merritt and Crowley were able to raise an annual budget of \$20,000 by 1942. Crowley and Merritt recruited Robert Brown, a former English teacher at Big Pine High School with a journalism background, to head the Inyo-Mono Associates as its chief of publicity. Brown was successful in his attempts to get the major Los Angeles newspapers, particularly the *Los Angeles Times*, to carry articles in their sports sections about the abundance of fish and game in Inyo and Mono counties.¹³¹

The most important achievement of the association and its supporters occurred when they convinced the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power to co-operate in efforts to make the region a tourist haven. Such an idea had been proposed before, even by planners in Los Angeles who felt that recreational use would enhance the city's efforts to protect the watershed that drained into the aqueduct, but the city had resisted any further development of the valley. During the late 1930s the Department of Water and Power began to change its mind and commenced working with the Inyo-Mono Associates to promote tourism and recreation in eastern California. Its main contribution to this cause during the pre-World War II years was the release of some city lands in Owens Valley. Some property was leased or sold back to town businessmen, and some city land was

129. "50th Anniversary of Santa Rosa Parish, 1919-1969," p. 5, in "Manzanar WWII Camp," Subject History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum.

130. Brown, "Inyo-Mono Comes Back," p. 20.

131. Kahrl, *Water and Power*, pp. 361-67, and Walton, *Western Times and Water Wars*, p.214. Also see the Interview of Robert L. Brown by Arthur A. Hansen in Garrett and Larson, eds., *Camp and Community*, pp. 21-22. The Interview of Jack B. Hopkins by Arthur A. Hansen, December 20, 1973, in Garrett and Larson, eds., *Camp and Community*, pp. 43-45, also provides perspective on this issue.

allocated for recreational purposes. With the valley's largest landowner participating, efforts to promote tourism and recreation showed marked success. In 1940 it was estimated that approximately 1,000,000 tourists visited Owens Valley.¹³² These efforts seemed assured of continued success on the eve of World War II and would later contribute to the postwar economic development of the valley economy.¹³³

EARLY HISTORY OF MANZANAR

The earliest Euro-Americans to settle in the vicinity of what would later become the site of the Manzanar War Relocation Center arrived at George Creek, approximately three miles south of the site, in 1862 in search of feed for their cattle. They arrived during the height of the hostilities then occurring between the Indians and whites as the Owens Valley Paiutes attempted to defend their traditional homeland against the encroaching white settlements. Among the settlers was John Shepherd, a cattleman from Visalia in the Central Valley of California who had been born in Illinois in 1833. Attracted by the ranching possibilities of the vicinity, Shepherd built a small cabin near George Creek.¹³⁴ John's two brothers, James and George, also settled at George Creek at the same time. Shepherd had come to California in 1852 with his brothers, sailing from their home in North Carolina around the Horn to California. After living in Stockton for a short period, John spent several years in Los Angeles engaging in freighting between that growing city and San Pedro before settling on a cattle ranch near Visalia with his two brothers.¹³⁵

When the settlers arrived, they found a Paiute village of approximately 100 inhabitants. The Paiutes practiced a form of irrigated agriculture supplemented by hunting and pine-nut gathering.¹³⁶ The Paiute leader, known to the settlers as Chief George (for whom the creek was named), would later earn the respect of both Indians and whites as a leader and mediator in the efforts to achieve peace between the two groups of people. According to one source, when Dr. S. G. George was prospecting in the area in 1860, a Paiute leader whose camp was on the creek acted as his guide and took the name Chief George.¹³⁷

132. Walton, *Western Times and Water Wars*, p. 216. Also Inyo County Board of Supervisors, comp., *Inyo*, p. 70.

133. Judith and Neil Morgan, "California's Parched Oasis," pp. 98-127. Also see Busby, Findlay, and Bard, *Culture Resource Overview*, pp. 93-95.

134. *San Francisco Examiner*, May 15, 1908; "The John Shepherd Family," n.d.; "The John Shepherd Family," told by Eva Lee Gunn and J. E. Shepherd to E. Margrave, n.d.; and numerous unidentified newspaper clippings; in "Shepherd," Family History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum. Also see Guy Chaffee Earl, *The Enchanted Valley and Other Sketches* (Glendale, California, The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1976), pp. 100-04.

135. Walton, *Western Times and Water Wars*, p. 95, and W. A. (Gus) Cashbaugh, "Index, Inyo-Mono County Cattlemen," February 1971, Typescript, Vol. I, No. 1, p. 41, in "Agriculture," Subject History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum.

136. For more information on Paiute agricultural practices, see Lawton, *et al.*, "Agriculture Among the Paiute," pp. 13-50.

137. Genny Schumacher, ed., *Deepest Valley: Guide to Owens Valley and Its Mountain Lakes,, Roadsides and Trails* (San Francisco, Sierra Club, 1962), p. 33.

In 1863 John Shepherd returned to Visalia to move his wife and two small children to his small cabin on George Creek. The following year he homesteaded 160 acres on Shepherd Creek, three miles north of George Creek, on the future site of the relocation center. Shepherd built a small adobe brick home, the bricks being of white plaster made from the alkali found on the east side of Owens Valley. He began a cattle ranching operation and grew alfalfa and grain for feed as well as for sale to the mining camps on the east side of Owens Valley. While George Shepherd would soon leave the valley, James continued to ranch with John at Shepherd Creek.¹³⁸

In 1873 Shepherd built a large nine-room ranch house near Shepherd Creek for his growing family which would soon include eight children. The two-story house featured a balcony and was constructed of redwood brought by wagon from San Pedro, and its elaborate white gabled exterior became a landmark in the valley. The new house was connected to the original adobe brick home, which was used as a kitchen, dining room, and extra bedroom, by a grape arbor. The house resembled a southern Victorian mansion and featured running water in the kitchen. It was surrounded by a grove that included apple, cottonwood, black walnut, willow, and poplar trees, and marble statues and fountains and two basins graced the grounds. Beside the creek was a flume that led to a quaint waterwheel. Shepherd quickly rose to prominence in the area's political and social circles, being elected an officer of the recently established Masonic lodge in Independence in 1873 and a county supervisor in 1874. As a result, his home became a center of social life for area residents and a stopover spot for travelers and teamsters who were housed in the original adobe structure.¹³⁹

An Indian camp and an associated burial ground developed to the west of Shepherd's home above the irrigated portion of the ranch. The camp consisted of tents and shelters made from tule reeds, which housed an unspecified number of Paiutes, most of whom were employed and given land for shelter by Shepherd following their return to the Owens Valley from the forced removal to the San Sebastian Reservation in 1863.¹⁴⁰ There is evidence that Shepherd was sympathetic to the plight of the returning Indians, because he attributed the Indian-white clashes of the early 1860s to white mistreatment, observing that "white people were not treating the Indians right and the Indians finally got tired of it."¹⁴¹

138. Jane Wehrey, "Report on Manzanar Pre-Camp Period: Data and Sources and Suggestions and Sources for Further Research on Attitudes of Owens Valley Townspeople During Manzanar Camp," California State University, Fullerton, October 1993, p. 1.

139. Walton, *Western Times and Water Wars*, p. 95; "Lone Pine Agenda," June 8, 1988, in "Manzanar Town," Subject History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum; and "The Chaffey's in Owens Valley," Newsletter, Friends of the Eastern California Museum, Spring/Summer Quarter, 1993, pp. 6, 10, in "Chaffey (Kreider)," Family History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum.

140. Louise Bossert, "The Indians of Manzanar," n.d., in "Manzanar Town," Subject History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum. Also see Wehrey, "Report on Manzanar Pre-Camp Period," p. 1.

141. Quoted in Walton, *Western Times and Water Wars*, p. 20, and Interview of Bessie Frazier by C. N. Irvin, n.d., in "Smith, J. P.," Family History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum.

By June 1874 Shepherd employed more than 30 Indian women on his ranch, paying them 75 cents a day.¹⁴² The women winnowed grain and performed domestic tasks on the ranch. Meanwhile the Indian men, many of whom were knowledgeable in irrigation techniques, performed irrigation work on the ranch and in 1874-75 helped Shepherd build a toll road from Keeler in Owens Valley to Darwin in Panamint Valley for transporting livestock and farm products to the east. One contemporary source noted:

John Shepherd has completed the toll road from the foot of the lake, via Darwin to the new survey, through the foot of Panamint Canyon, and it is now said to be a splendid road for any kind of teams. Shepherd did most of the work with his Indians under the command of Captain George, and we are told that the way the captain and his men slashed sage brush, and made rocks and dirt move, could not be surpassed by any equal number of white men that ever made road for wages.¹⁴³

As was the custom in the valley, many of the Paiutes at the ranch took the Anglo surname of their employer. This was a sign of respect on the part of the Indians and an indication of the paternalistic relationship which developed as the Paiutes became an indispensable part of the labor force and contributed to the success of the farms and ranches with their knowledge of irrigated agriculture. Additionally, there are many accounts that attest to the respect that the Indians had for Shepherd.¹⁴⁴

In November 1877, after Camp Independence had been abandoned by the military, leaders of the Paiutes from Bishop Creek, Deep Springs, Big Pine, Fish Springs, and Independence gathered at George Creek. The Indians invited local whites to the meeting and John and James Shepherd and John Kispert attended — as well as a representative from the *Inyo Independent*. Speaking for the Indians were Captain Joe Bowers and Captain George. They encouraged the other Indian leaders to recognize the folly of "entertaining thoughts of hostility to the whites," and they sought an agreement between the Indians and the whites as to how troubles between them might be adjudicated. If an Indian killed an Indian, he would be dealt with by the Indians. If an Indian harmed or killed a white, he would be turned over to the whites for justice. If a white killed an Indian he would be dealt with by the whites as if the Indian he killed had been white. The newspaper representative noted:

Captain Joe's proposition, given at the outset, was cordially endorsed by all present, and now, it only remains for us to add, that they all most respectfully ask the whites not to get excited or alarmed at the act of any individual mischief maker, to act with moderation in any event, all will be well.¹⁴⁵

Thus, a truce — or an accommodation — was agreed upon between the Indians and the whites, and peaceful relations developed in Owens Valley.

142. Michael, "'At the Plow and in the Harvest Field,'" p. 132.

143. *Inyo Independent*, December 19, April 24, 1875, quoted in Walton, *Western Times and Water Wars*, p. 29.

144. Wehrey, "Report on Manzanar Pre-Camp Period," p. 1-2, and Guy Chaffee Earl, *Indian Legends and Songs* (Glendale, California, The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1950), pp. 43-44.

145. *Inyo Independent*, October 13, 1877.

A fire on the "prosperous" Shepherd farm was reported on July 19, 1879. The fire was attributed to the carelessness of one of Shepherd's Indian laborers. A newspaper article noted:

At about 2 o'clock P.M. Thursday last a fire started near some outhouses and bid fair to sweep all the stacked hay, granaries, stables, etc. At the same moment a Petaluma hay press was aflame, and cinders were flying in every direction; yet by the almost superhuman exertions of Mr. Jas. Shepherd, members of the household and some Indians, the press and all the stacks were saved. The fire originated from some coals and ashes carelessly thrown out by an Indian employed about the place.¹⁴⁶

Following reported disagreements over water rights with neighboring ranchers, John and James Shepherd eventually acquired many of their properties. By 1881 the two Shepherd brothers owned 1,040 acres having an assessed value of \$6310. Improvements on the property had a value of \$3,800. Their personal property had an assessed value of \$3,925, including four wagons, six work horses, 40 halfbreed horses, 3 mixed blood cows, 15 stock cattle, four dozen poultry, one jack, three mules, 40 hogs, 25 bee hives, and 200 tons of hay. Among other items for which the brothers were taxed included three watches, furniture, firearms, musical instruments, a sewing machine, farming utensils, machinery, and harnesses. The total value of their property was \$14,035 on which they paid a tax of \$491.22.¹⁴⁷

By the late 1800s the Shepherd lands were all in John's name, and his landholdings had grown to some 1,300 acres, including a large portion of the future relocation center site, and two-thirds of the water rights on Shepherd Creek. Shepherd raised cattle, horses, mules, grass, hay, and grain and hauled ore from the Inyo mines to San Pedro, bringing back supplies to Owens Valley. Many of his horses were sold to ranchers in southern California, notably the Bixby family which owned extensive acreage in the Long Beach area.

By 1893 the George Creek and Shepherd Creek settlements included some 28 families, some of whom had mined at Cerro Gordo and other mining strikes.¹⁴⁸ The sizes of the ranches, which featured fertile land and lush pastures, ranged between 160 and 1,700 acres. Most of the settlers of the area had small herds of cattle and bands of sheep as well as vegetable gardens and orchards. Among the fruit raised were apples, pears, peaches, apricots, nectarines, and plums, and cherry trees were beginning to be planted. Corn and wheat were raised, and the average annual yield of the latter was 40-55 bushels. Surplus agricultural produce was sold to the surrounding mining camps or traded at stores in Lone Pine or Independence for staples. The 15-mile-long Stevens ditch had recently been

146. *Ibid.*, July 19, 1879.

147. Inyo County Tax Rolls, 1881, in Museum Collection, Eastern California Museum.

148. *Inyo Independent*, March 14, 1902, in "Hunter," Family History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum. A post office had been established at George Creek in 1875, and from 1896 to 1911 a post office named Thebe (Indian name for the surrounding mountains) served the George Creek and Shepherd Creek settlements. J. Hoyle Mayfield, comp., *Postmasters of Inyo County, California, 1866-1970* (Bakersfield, Kern County Genealogical Society, 1970), pp. 8, 20.

completed from Owens River above Independence to the southern part of the settlement, thus providing additional water for irrigation.¹⁴⁹

In September 1905, George Chaffey, after visiting Owens Valley during the spring of that year, filed an application for water rights and the right to construct a reservoir on Cottonwood Creek in the southern end of the Owens Valley, intending to use the water for establishment of a hydroelectric project to power an electric railroad to Los Angeles. In October of the following year, Chaffey established Sierra Securities Inc., a firm connected with his extensive banking interests in Los Angeles, to provide financing for the projects he envisioned in Owens Valley. During the next two years, he and his associates transferred to the company all their landholdings and water rights acquired during 1905-06.¹⁵⁰

Chaffey, a member of a prominent Southern California family that had emigrated from Ontario, Canada, was one of the foremost water developers of his generation and a prime example of the successful engineer as private entrepreneur. In his early years, he and his brother, William Benjamin Chaffey, founded the irrigation colonies of Etiwanda and Ontario in southern California, where they introduced a system for the mutual ownership of water resources which was later widely adopted to open large sections of southern California for settlement. Among other accomplishments, the Chaffey family constructed the first hydroelectric power plant and electric house lighting west of the Rocky Mountains at Etiwanda in 1881 as well as the first western street lights in downtown Los Angeles in 1882. At the request of the Australian government, George, along with several members of his family, established the first two irrigation colonies at Renmark and Mildura. Returning to California around the turn of the 20th century, George and his family established several irrigation colonies in the desert wastes of Imperial Valley, developing these communities by constructing an extensive irrigation system to carry Colorado River water north from Mexico. In 1902, George bought a small water company in east Whittier near Los Angeles and expanded the company's operations to supply water to east Whittier, La Habra, and Brea, thus enabling those communities to become large citrus and avocado producers. During 1901-02, George and his oldest son, Andrew, pioneered banks in Ontario and the Imperial Valley and subsequently in Los Angeles, and as a result he became a major economic force in the real estate boom of the rapidly-expanding Los Angeles area.

Thus, George Chaffey came to the Owens Valley in 1905 to establish his last irrigation project. His interest in the valley coincided with the early announcement of the Los Angeles Aqueduct project and with efforts taken by the City of Los Angeles to secure the right-of-way to large amounts of federally-protected land as long-term protection for its

149. Charles Mulholland, *Inyo County: Its Lands, Water, Soil, Climate, Mines, Scenery, and Other Resources* (Los Angeles, Times — Mirror Printing and Binding House, 1893, pp. 19-21. Also see Indexes to the Great Register, Inyo County California, for the years 1886 and 1894, in "Inyo County Index to Great Register," Subject History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum; "Georges Creek," by Blanche Van Norman, ca. 1940s, in "Georges Creek," Subject History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum; and Gussie M. Wood, "The Kispert Ranch on Georges Creek," in Southern Inyo American Association of Retired Persons, *Saga of Inyo County*, pp. 113-14.

150. Articles of Incorporation of the Sierra Securities Company, October 18, 1906, in "Sierra Securities, Inc., 1906," Articles of Incorporation (Archives), Eastern California Museum.

water rights in Owens Valley. Nearly 20 years of contentious litigation between Chaffey and the City of Los Angeles would ensue as each sought to implement plans for the area.¹⁵¹

Earlier in July 1905, George Chaffey sent his youngest brother, Charles Francis, to Shepherd Creek to purchase the Shepherd Ranch, which by that time totaled more than 1,300 acres, to secure both the land and the water rights to the nearby streams for his envisioned colony. In ill health, Shepherd sold his landholdings to Chaffey for \$25,000 and moved to San Francisco where he died on May 14, 1908, at the home of his daughter. Charles Francis moved his wife and six children into the former Shepherd ranch home in September and, after transferring the Shepherd Ranch to his brother in November, he became the first on-site manager of George's extensive landholdings in the vicinity. The family lived in the former Shepherd home until 1907, when Charles moved to a fruit ranch he had purchased near Vancouver, British Columbia. Thereafter, a succession of company farm superintendents took over management of the Chaffey properties in the area and occupied the house. Upon hearing of Chaffey's purchase of the Shepherd property, William Mulholland, who would oversee construction of the Los Angeles Aqueduct, reportedly told a prospective rancher in the valley that if "Chaffey purchased that ranch," we [Los Angeles] will certainly turn that back to sagebrush."¹⁵²

On May 6, 1910, the Chaffey and their partners established the Owens Valley Improvement Company to operate their proposed irrigation settlement project. The company, headquartered in Upland, California, had a capital stock of \$500,000 divided into 5,000 shares valued at \$100 each.¹⁵³ Other adjacent properties, as well as ranch lands in the vicinity of Independence, had been acquired by the Chaffey and their associates since 1905 for a total, including the former Shepherd holdings, of more than 3,000 acres. About this time, a concrete pipe and drain tile manufacturing operation owned by V. C. Lutzow was begun, probably west of the former Shepherd house.¹⁵⁴

In August 1910 the Owens Valley Improvement Company's Subdivision No. 1, consisting of approximately 1,000 acres, was laid out. A townsite was platted near the center of the subdivided tract (see a copy of townsite plat on page 173), and the initial elements of a system of concrete and steel gravity flow irrigation pipes were installed to bring water to the land parcels from Shepherd and Bairs creeks. The subdivided tract and the townsite were named the Manzanar Irrigated Farms and Manzanar, respectively, since "Manzanar"

151. Kahrl, *Water and Power*, pp. 218-20; *Inyo Independent*, June 18, 1909, in "Inyo County II," Subject History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum; and "The Manzanar 'Chaffey-Kreider' Connection," pp. 1-4, in "Chaffey (Kreider)," Family History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum. For more data on the background of Chaffey see Joseph A. Alexander, *The Life of George Chaffey: A Story of Irrigation Beginnings in California and Australia* (Melbourne, Australia, Macmillan and Co., 1928).

152. E. M. Nordyke, December 2, 1921, *Letter of Transmittal and Report of W. F. McClure, State Engineer, Concerning the Owens Valley — Los Angeles Controversy, To Governor Friend Wm. Richardson*, Published by the Senate, California Legislature (Sacramento, California State Printing Office, 1925), p. 44, in "LAWP Misc. #4," Subject History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum.

153. Articles of Incorporation of the Owens Valley Improvement Company, May 6, 1910, in "Owens Valley Improvement Company," Articles of Incorporation (Archives), Eastern California Museum.

154. Inyo Register, *Inyo County, California, Anno Domini 1912: Beautiful Owens Valley* (Bishop, California, Inyo Register, 1912), pp. 43-44.

was the Spanish name for apple grove and apples were the most logical crop for the area because of its climate. The tract was advertised by agents in San Francisco and Los Angeles and promoted via brochures that touted the possibilities for success and wealth at the new colony because of its fine soil, abundant water, favorable climate, and proximity to markets. Parcels of 10, 20, and 40 acres were offered for sale at \$150 and up [some sources refer to parcels of 16 and 25 acres] and included ownership of one share per acre in the Manzanar Water Corporation, incorporated on September 4, 1915,¹⁵⁵ and the services of a *zanjero* or water distributor. Where settlers were located on land served by the gravity flow irrigation system, water under pressure was delivered for which a small monthly charge was made. Beyond the irrigation distribution area, domestic wells were sunk, water being obtainable at from 15 to 30 feet below ground level. The Owens Valley Improvement Company's general plan was to develop and expand the valley's apple production, and the firm offered to plant apple trees and care for them for absentee landowners or to sell trees directly to residents.¹⁵⁶

Subsequent to the summer of 1910, some roads in the Manzanar townsite vicinity were graded, and purchases of the town lots began.¹⁵⁷ A community began to take shape as a two-room schoolhouse, community hall, cannery, garage, lumber yard, blacksmith shop, and store, which also served as the town post office and held the town's only telephone, were built. The nucleus of the Manzanar community was located near a "straight, broad highway," which would later become a part of present-day California State Highway 395, that had been laid out from Independence to Manzanar by 1912. Like the streets of the townsite, the highway was bordered with trees. Later, an ice cream and soft drink stand, known as the "Wickiup," was established along the highway.¹⁵⁸

Farmers and ranchers, some with little or no previous agricultural experience, arrived at Manzanar from points as distant as Missouri and Indiana, although many came from southern California and western Nevada as well as from the nearby communities of Independence and Lone Pine. While most purchased the property they farmed, some farmed lands for absentee landlords, including an English nobleman. Primary agricultural products raised at Manzanar included fruit such as apples (Winesaps, Spitzen, Burgs, Roman Beauties, Delicious, and New Town Pippens), pears, peaches, berries, and grapes; crops, such as alfalfa, corn, and wheat; and vegetables, principally onions and potatoes.

155. Articles of Incorporation of the Manzanar Water Corporation, 1915-1932, in "Manzanar Water Corporation," Articles of Incorporation (Archives), Eastern California Museum.

156. Manzanar Commercial Club, *Manzanar: Owens River Valley, Inyo County, California* [Manzanar, 1917], no pagination; *Inyo Independent*, January 27, 1911; and Sauder, *Lost Frontier*, pp. 127-28. In 1911 the Owens Valley Improvement Company published a small color brochure promoting apple growing at Manzanar. Owens Valley Improvement Company, *Fortunes in Apples in Owens Valley, Inyo County, California* (1911).

157. [Report] To the President and Board of Directors, Owens Valley Improvement Company, May 16, 1912 (incomplete, author unknown), in "Manzanar Town," Subject History, Vertical References Files, Eastern California Museum.

158. *Anno Domini 1912*, pp. 43-44, and John M. Gorman, *I Remember Manzanar* (Bishop, California, Pinion Press, 1967), pp. 9-10. The Eastern California Museum has a collection containing items relating to Manzanar town history. Among the museum's accessioned objects are documents including deeds for land acquisition by the Lacey family and receipts/assessments of the Manzanar Water Corporation. Provision for pavement of the highway from Independence to Manzanar was made in a state highway bond issue passed in November 1916.

THE
TOWN OF **MANZANAR**
INYO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA

AUGUST
1910




Figure 18: The Town of Manzanar, August 1910 Townsite Plot,
Eastern California Museum

Cattle, poultry, and pigs were raised for meat, eggs, and dairy products. Beehives were tended for honey production.¹⁵⁹

By 1912, approximately 20,000 apple trees had been planted at Manzanar. The town boasted a Manzanar Commercial Club to attract property purchasers. The club's president was Ira L. Hatfield, the second man to purchase land in the new development in October 1910. He planted 20 acres of apples, and in April 1911 he constructed the store in town, handling everything from groceries and dry goods to hardware and farm implements. He also "secured the postoffice," which had been located at Thebe since 1896, and opened the new post office in his store on May 30, 1911. At that date Manzanar had a population of 50, but the post office was organized to serve a population of 150, including the residents of the George Creek settlement. The secretary of the commercial club was W. B. Engle, who had purchased land and planted 25 acres of apples at Manzanar in 1911. Aside from ranching, he served as an agent of the Union Central Life Insurance Company of Cincinnati.¹⁶⁰

Manzanar was Owens Valley's first coordinated attempt at water conservation. In contrast to the methods of irrigation that were employed elsewhere in the valley, the new irrigation system at Manzanar consisted of miles of concrete and tile pipe to prevent seepage and improve drainage. Intake dams were constructed on Shepherd and Bairs creeks. Water was distributed throughout Manzanar via an underground steel and cement system to the high corner of the individual lots. Generally, water to which each stockholder was entitled was accumulated and delivered in large heads every 15 to 30 days. Plans were developed and carried out after 1917 to expand the system of inverted concrete tile drainage ditches.¹⁶¹

Initially, markets for the agricultural produce of the Manzanar farming enterprises were the neighboring towns and mining areas in the Owens Valley region. As the mines declined, however, more of the products were transported by railroad, either through Tonopah and Goldfield to northern markets, or southward to Mojave and Los Angeles. The trip south was made in unrefrigerated rail cars and required costly reloading from the narrow to the broad gauge line at Owenyo or hauling to Lone Pine to pick up the broad gauge directly. The Manzanar railroad station — a boxcar — was located at Francis (later the name was changed to Manzanar), four miles east of town. In the early days, a wagon and team of mules made round trips between the settlement and the railroad station for freight and passengers. By the mid-1910s the orchards that had been planted during the early 1910s began to produce fruit harvests. The Manzanar Fruit and Cannery Association

159. Henry S. "Tom" Smith, "My Associations With the Deepest Valley," *Eastern California Museum, Tuva*, February 1981, pp. 2-3 (copy in Eastern California Museum Reference Library); Henry S. (Tom) Smith, "Manzanar," Martha L. Mills, "Henry Lenbek Family — Manzanar," and Nina Taylor, "The Ezra Taylor Family," *Southern Inyo American Association of Retired Persons, Saga of Inyo County*, pp. 104-05, 122-24, and 234-35, respectively; Gorman, *I Remember Manzanar*, p. 9; and "Manzanar," p. 2, *Agricultural and Industrial Survey of Inyo County*, 1917.

160. "Manzanar," *Anno Domini 1912*, pp. 43-44; Mayfield, comp., *Postmasters of Inyo County*, p. 13; and "U.S. Post Offices in Inyo County and Vicinity, Abstracted from U.S.P.O. Records in the National Archives," n.d., in "Post Offices, Inyo County," Subject History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum.

161. Sauder, *Lost Frontier*, p. 128; "Manzanar," pp. 1-2, *Agricultural and Industrial Survey of Inyo County*, 1917; and Manzanar Commercial Club, *Manzanar*, no pagination.

was incorporated on July 24, 1918, to "conduct and carry on in all its branches the business of canning, preserving, drying, packing and otherwise handling, disposing of and selling all kinds of deciduous and other fruits, and all kinds of vegetables."¹⁶² This association was reorganized as the Manzanar Fruit & Canning Company in April 1919, affording it the right to "acquire, use, sell, or otherwise dispose of letters patent of the United States of America, or any foreign country, and any patent rights, licenses and privileges, inventions, improvements, processes, trade-marks, and trade names, labels and designs relating to or useful in connection with any business of the Corporation."¹⁶³ The focus of social life for the new community of Manzanar centered at the community hall. Farm bureau meetings — often attended by residents of Independence — followed by potluck suppers and dancing to live music provided by local musicians were held at the hall. The building was also the scene of weddings, funerals, anniversaries, Christmas celebrations, Ladies Aid Society meetings, and Sunday School and church services led at first by the Methodist Episcopal Mission and later by the Manzanar Methodist Episcopal Church which was formally established in June 1921. In addition, the hall housed the offices of the Owens Valley Improvement Company, a branch of the Inyo County library, and living quarters for farm and company personnel. After the establishment of extensive orchards at Manzanar, part of the building was converted for use as a packing house. During the mid-1920s a roller skating rink was constructed in the building.¹⁶⁴

Social activities at Manzanar included summer picnics held in a grove south of town. Other recreational pursuits of Manzanar residents included camping in George Creek Canyon and along Shepherd Creek. The town fielded a baseball team that played teams from neighboring towns in Owens Valley. Fishing in nearby streams flowing from the mountains and hunting for wild geese, ducks, doves, pheasants, quail, rabbits, and deer were favorite pastimes for many men and boys. An annual fall farm festival was sponsored by the Farm Bureau.¹⁶⁵

In 1912 the Manzanar School District was established, and on July 19 the Owens Valley Improvement Company conveyed a lot in the townsite to the district for construction of a school. A two-room school was built, with one teacher in the elementary school and another added later. High school students were bussed to Independence. By 1916, 29 pupils were enrolled at the Manzanar school, and by the early 1920s enrollment was in

162. Articles of Incorporation of the Manzanar Fruit and Cannery Association, July 24, 1918, in "Manzanar Fruit and Cannery Association, 1918," Articles of Incorporation (Archives), Eastern California Museum.

163. Articles of Incorporation of the Manzanar Fruit & Canning Company, April 17, 1919, in "Manzanar Fruit & Canning Company, 1919," Articles of Incorporation, Archives, Eastern California Museum.

164. Anne Margrave, "The Methodist Episcopal Mission Church in Manzanar," in Southern Inyo American Association of Retired Persons, *Saga of Inyo County*, p. 85; "Lone Pine Agenda," June 8, 1988, in "Manzanar Town," Subject History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum; Della Butterfield Lange, "The Butterfields," *Eastern California Museum, Tuva*, February 1982, pp. 2-3; and Articles of Incorporation of the Manzanar Methodist Episcopal Church, June 24, 1921, "Manzanar Methodist Episcopal Church, 1921," Articles of Incorporation (Archives), Eastern California Museum.

165. Dorothy Lydston Gates, "The Manzanar I Remember," and Mills, "Henry Lenbek Family," Southern Inyo American Association of Retired Persons, *Saga of Inyo County*, pp. 105, 122-24; and Lucille DeBoer, "Manzanar: A True Life Story," *The Album: Times and Tales of Inyo — Mono*, VI (Summer 1993), pp. 5-8.

excess of 50 students as the population of Manzanar reached its peak and several students were gained following closure of the George Creek school.¹⁶⁶

The Fourteenth Census taken in 1920 showed a total Inyo County population of 7,031 residents and a population of the Manzanar and Owenyo townships, which included George Creek, of 203. Of the 57 households at Manzanar that were surveyed, 42 lived on their own property and 15 were renters or operators for absentee owners. Nine Indians were living on 30 acres that had been set aside as U. S. Government land, while the rest of the population was white, with predominately northern European origins. Most residents, with the exception of the two teachers and the town's only merchant, R. J. Bandhauer, gave farming as their occupation.¹⁶⁷

In 1924 the City of Los Angeles, having determined the need to increase its delivery of water to the city from Owens Valley, began taking options on the agricultural lands at Manzanar held by individual farmers and the Owens Valley Improvement Company in order to secure stream and groundwater rights. By this time the Manzanar development included Subdivisions Nos. 1, 2, and 3 plus the townsite for a total of approximately 3,000 acres. Property owners at Manzanar had lived with the possibility of this action for months, and reactions to it ranged from relief and eagerness to sell to anger and a feeling that they had been betrayed by both Los Angeles and their neighbors.¹⁶⁸

Contrary to the glowing promises outlined by the Owens Valley Improvement Company, the Manzanar community had not prospered as expected. While the quality of Manzanar fruit was well-known throughout California, and the quantity in good years exceeded expectations, late frosts and untimely strong winds prevented the farmers from realizing consistent profits over the years. In addition, the problem of markets persisted as freight costs increased and competition from farmers in the Imperial and San Joaquin valleys resulted in lower profits for Manzanar fruit growers. Thus, while many of the farmers at Manzanar were eager to sell to Los Angeles and some even joined together to ask Los Angeles to accept their own terms of sale, others held out as long as possible before selling. Many residents later argued that the city had engaged in "checkerboard" buying

166. Deed, Owens Valley Improvement Company to Manzanar School District, Dated July 19, 1912, Inyo County Deed Book 23, Folio 181, copy in #23-040-11 and #23-080-10, Reference Files, City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power, Bishop; "Manzanar School, Inyo Co., California, 1916," in "Manzanar Town," Subject History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum; and Mills, "Henry Lenbek Family," Southern Inyo American Association of Retired Persons, *Saga of Inyo County*, pp. 122-24. Also see Dorothy C. Cragen, *A Brief History of the Schools of Inyo County and a Statistical and Financial Report Covering Sixteen Years* (Independence, California, 1954).

167. U.S. Bureau of Census, *Fourteenth Census of the United States, Taken in the Year 1920, Population*. Inyo County, Third Township.

168. Henry S. Smith to Mr. [Charles N.] Irwin, August 2, 1979, and Mrs. Barbara Wicks to Charles N. Irwin, July 31, 1979, in "Manzanar Town," Subject History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum. Also see "Maps Showing Classification and City Ownership of Lands in Owens River Valley, Department of Water and Power, City of Los Angeles, Survey Classification and Map Delineation Under Direction of J. E. Phillips, by P. E. Ritch, February 13 1931," Maps, City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power, Bishop. For city land purchase records in the Manzanar area, see "Survey of City Owned Land in Inyo and Mono Counties," n.d., in "Survey of DWP Land;" "Land Purchase Records;" "Owens Valley Lands #9;" "Photo Book, South District #4;" and "Photo Book, Sub-Divided Properties #1;" Reference Files, City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power, Bishop.

and had pitted neighbor against neighbor, leaving a legacy of bitterness that lingered for years. According to most oral and written reminiscences by former Manzanar residents, those who finally left the area under whatever circumstances felt profoundly uprooted from a close-knit community.¹⁶⁹

Several articles in the *Inyo Independent* during 1924 describe the purchase of Manzanar lands by the City of Los Angeles and the impact of the purchases on the Manzanar community. In March 1924, for instance, an article noted:

Word was received the first of the week that the options offered to Los Angeles by a combination of Manzanar and Georges Creek interests were not accepted by the City. It is presumed that the value fixed for the water was more than the City desired to pay. While some of the ranch owners in the section mentioned were undoubtedly disappointed, yet other property owners who went into the deal, so we have been told, to conserve their interests, were not displeased with the outcome of the negotiations.

Later that year another article stated:

It would seem too bad for all the beautiful apple and other fruit orchards of Manzanar to be lost for lack of water; but no passing traveler is justified in saying what should be done or what should not. Try farming first, then try marketing what you raised; if you are not an experienced farmer and excellent hard worker it is not necessary to consider the market problem. After you have tried the farming game in a country where water is none too plentiful your eyes may be equipped with the same spectacles the rancher looks through.

In August 1924 another notice in the newspaper stated that the Rotharmel, R. A. Wilder, and R. J. Bandhauer families, all Manzanar residents, had "gone to Southern California to look for home locations."¹⁷⁰

City of Los Angeles land purchases at Manzanar began in August 1924. The sale of the Owens Valley Improvement Company's property the following month placed at least half the Manzanar area under the control of the city. It is likely that this early sale was a

169. "Local Nostalgia," February 12, 19, 1988, in "Manzanar Town," Subject History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum; Marie Louise Parcher and Will C. Parcher, *Dry Ditches* (Rev. ed., Bishop, California, the Parchers, 1970; Martha Lenbek Mills and Lena Lenbeck Sluyter, "Manzanar Reunion and Comments," *Eastern California Museum, Tuva*, June 1979, p. 4; and Transcribed Interview with Robert V. Phillips by Jane Wehrey, October 1992, in Wehrey, "Report On Manzanar Pre-Camp Period," Appendix. Considerable data regarding Manzanar community reflections may be found in the Family History section of the Vertical Reference Files of the Eastern California Museum under Chaffey (Kreider), Glade, Hancock, William Lyle Hunter, Kispert, Lenbek, Walter Clarence "Stub" Lydston, McGovern, Reynolds, Robson, Shepherd, Skinner, and J. P. Smith. Among the transcribed oral interviews in the Eastern California Museum Oral History Project that contain data on these topics are those of Hazel Reynolds by Richard Potashin, August 17, 24, 1993 (ECM OH 288); Emily Roddy by Richard Potashin, June 16, 1992 (ECM OH 163); and Vic Taylor by Richard Potashin, January 22, March 4, 1991 (ECM OH 082)

170. Quoted in Jane Wehrey, "Layers of Meaning In A Place And Its Past: The Manzanar National Historic Site," May 1994, p. 17. A copy of this study may be found in the collections of the California State University, Fullerton, Oral History Program.

reflection of the opportunity Chaffey and his company saw and seized to reach a settlement with Los Angeles for both the contested Cottonwood Creek water rights and sale of the Owens Valley Improvement Company lands as it was becoming clear that the years of the Manzanar community were approaching an end given the city's intention to purchase all of the privately-owned ranches in the valley. By 1927 Subdivisions Nos. 1, 2, and 3, and the Manzanar Townsite, a total of 3,000 acres, were entirely owned by the city. Of those who sold out and left Manzanar, some moved to emerging agricultural communities in Whittier and Chino in southern California or northern California. Others gave up farming altogether and settled in Lone Pine or Independence, often to go to work for the Department of Water and Power. Several of the former landowners remained, leasing their properties back from the city and continuing their farming operations as before.¹⁷¹

By 1926-27 the City of Angeles had become owner and absentee landlord of most of the land at Manzanar. Cognizant of the fact that it was responsible for managing the lands and maintaining harmonious relations on its new properties, city leaders launched an effort to reshape the area in line with its goals. Los Angeles wanted to protect the watershed that drained into its aqueduct, and thus it supported some types of agricultural activity as it realized that it could not merely quarantine Owens Valley. The city wanted to ensure the efficient handling of the available supply of water in the valley, a goal that included the judicious use of water for agriculture with its potential for long-term groundwater storage, and it wanted to repair its image with the valley residents. The value of the agricultural enterprise at Manzanar could not be discounted as a means of recouping some of the costs of the land purchases. Thus, the city continued to farm portions of its newly-acquired property at Manzanar and to operate the packing house in the town's community hall.¹⁷² The *Los Angeles Times Farm and Orchard Magazine* reported on the city's agricultural activities on June 13, 1926:

The case of the city's Manzanar tract purchase is interesting as showing what Los Angeles has been called upon to do in maintaining improved lands pending leasing arrangements. Here, out of 3000 acres acquired with water rights, around 1200 acres had at one time or another been developed, a considerable portion to orchards. Of the developed area a great deal had, in an acute water shortage just prior to the city's purchase in August, 1924, sadly deteriorated. It was squarely up to the city to step in and farm the tract for awhile.

The Manzanar tract had been about half sold out to individual owners, the other half being farmed [sic] in part by the Owens Valley Improvement Company, which had subdivided it, when the city stepped in. Victor M. Christopher, who had been managing the company's farming operations, was employed by the city

171. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20. Also see "The Bureau of Water Works and Supply is a Fruit Grower de Luxe," *Intake*, June 1927, p. 20.

172. For more data on Los Angeles farming operations at Manzanar see J. P. Hertel, County Agent, to E. H. Lehy. A. Water and Power Board Office, Bishop, June 19, 1926, and attachment, "Some Suggestions for the Future Land Policy of the City of Los Angeles in the Owens River Valley. J. P. Hertel, Farm Advisor, June 1926," in "LAWP Misc. #1," Subject History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum. Also see Walter E. Packard, *Report on the Agricultural Situation in Owens Valley, As It Relates to the Agricultural Development of Lands Belonging to the City of Los Angeles* (Los Angeles, Department of Public Service, 1925).

to look after the maintenance and leasing of the whole tract. He started in by giving the orchards a severe pruning followed by good irrigations. He had to yank out eighty acres of pears on one place because of blight. Some owners, too, had neglected their orchards so there was no saving them. Three hundred acres of fruit, however, have been well cared for, pruned, sprayed and irrigated, and of this a third has been leased. Last year Mr. Christopher sold a fair apple crop from city-owned orchards.

Some of the alfalfa fields of the tract were in a deplorable condition when the city took them over. This spring work is going ahead on improved water distributing lines designed to make possible a rapid extension of the alfalfa acreage. The city itself is now farming about 200 acres each of alfalfa and orchards and good crops are in sight. Los Angeles expects to be in the market again this year with premium hay and big red apples and the combined crops grown by the city and its tenants at Manzanar are sure to bring quite a figure.¹⁷³

The farming operations conducted at Manzanar by the City of Los Angeles were described at length in another article in the *Los Angeles Times Farm and Orchard Magazine* on November 30, 1927. The article noted that "Growing apples unexcelled in quality even by the best produced in Northern California, Oregon or the Ozark Mountain region and distributing them under its own brand to all parts of the Southwest is one of the little-known features of the City of Los Angeles's agricultural and horticultural operations in the Owens Valley." The city's fruit-raising activities in the valley were "confined principally to Manzanar." There were approximately 300 acres of orchard, the "major portion of which has not yet attained a full-production stage." Two-thirds of this acreage was "directly cared for by the city itself under the supervision of Farm Superintendent Victor N. Christopher," the remainder being leased. According to the article, the

tenants get the full benefit of the farm superintendent's experience and ability and this has proved of substantial value to them, especially in the preparation of the fruit for market and the manner of disposal. The unusual distance from the nearest center brings up difficult problems of packing, storage, freighting and sales commissions. The group system solved these most easily, efficiently and profitably. A Los Angeles company [Klein Simpson Fruit Company] handled last year's entire output satisfactorily.

The fruit crop at Manzanar in 1926 amounted to 55 carloads, including six of peaches, 12 of Bartlett pears, and 37 of apples. The latter were mainly winesaps with some delicious and Arkansas blacks. The city's crop made 18,650 boxes and that of the tenants 7,350.

The apple harvest at Manzanar "generally was so abundant," according to the article, that there was "no disposition on the part of buyers to stock up." Consequently the maximum figure of 75 cents per box "was offered for large size, extra fancy, delivered at the city's Manzanar packing-house, the buyer to do the grading and packing and furnish all materials." Considering all grades and sizes, this meant "only a net average of 50 cents per

173. "Los Angeles Makes Hay in the Owens Valley," *Los Angeles Times Farm and Orchard Magazine*, June 13, 1926, in "Manzanar Town," Subject History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum.

box, a sum that "seemed ridiculously low in view of the fact that Owens Valley apples seem to remain in tip-top shape after those from some other sections go into a state of decay." Thus, arrangements had been made "at once for the city to pack and store its stock instead of sacrificing." Thus, the entire crop had not been sold until August 1927, eleven months after having been placed in storage.

Christopher, a horticulturist, had protected the farm tenants by bargaining with the fruit concern to handle their output on consignment, the company advancing \$1 per box to cover picking, packing, and freight costs. A Los Angeles cold storage plant held the apples at the season rate of 25 cents per box up to June 15, 1927, storage payable at the time of sale. The packing season at Manzanar started about September 20, 1926, and lasted five to six weeks. More than 20 persons were employed for the packing.

In round numbers, Los Angeles took in \$40,000 for its Manzanar fruits, while its expenses were \$30,000, leaving a profit of \$10,000. Other farm profits brought the profits from the Manzanar district to \$14,134.47, excluding taxes and interest. Twenty tons of hay was sold "in the stack for \$12 per ton and 235 tons, worth the same price, [were] furnished for consumption on the city's construction works at the Haiwee generating plant, the Tinemaha dam and elsewhere along the Aqueduct." Fruit was also supplied to "various city camps in season."

Production costs after delivery to the packing house amounted to \$1 per box. This figure included 20 cents for a box, 6 cents for a label and wraps, 20 cents for grading and packing, 6 cents for trucking 13 miles to Lone Pine, 19 cents for railroad freight to Los Angeles, 26 cents for cold storage, 2 cents for equipment, and 1 cent for miscellaneous items.

Late spring frosts in 1927 destroyed much of the Manzanar and Owens Valley fruit crop, thus making "apparent its uncertainty as a fruit country." This uncertainty, according to the article, would "in all probability lead to the discontinuance of orchard planting and use of the lands along surer and constantly remunerative channels." Like the rest of the valley, Manzanar "with its prodigiously fertile soil," had "plenty of other and reliable resources, actual and potential, the former including alfalfa, corn, potatoes, poultry, honey and garden truck." At present the city was cutting "the summer's last stand of hay," using blacks and Indians to do the work. New farming enterprises in the Manzanar vicinity included onions, chicken ranches, and honey production.

Before Los Angeles had purchased its Manzanar landholdings more than 1,200 acres had been farmed in the area. This acreage had been reduced to 1,000, because the water supply was inadequate. During years of normal or more than normal snowfall, when water for irrigation was plentiful, Los Angeles planned to enlarge the acreage farmed. The Manzanar lands were watered from Shepherd Creek "through a ditch ten years old, yet as sound as the day it was completed." The mile-long waterway, having a capacity of at least 100 inches, was built of granite boulders set in cement. The cost of maintaining the waterway was "practically nil and it will stand for decades with little repairing to be done."

Having taken over the Manzanar "lands to obtain the water and being engaged in direct farming merely pending other and better arrangements," Los Angeles, according to the

article, now desired "to retire from that sphere and lease all its Manzanar holdings to individuals." Thus, opportunities existed for ranchers "financially able to swing such propositions and seeking new fields of conquest."¹⁷⁴

Although Los Angeles continued to conduct agricultural operations on some of its lands at Manzanar, significant portions of the once highly-acclaimed irrigation system were allowed to deteriorate. One writer who decried the "rape" of Owens Valley by the City of Los Angeles wrote a series of articles in the *Sacramento Union* during March 28 to April 2, 1927. The author observed that Owens Valley was a "Pitiful Story of an Agricultural Paradise, Created by California Pioneers, Condemned to Desert Waste by Water Looters." Regarding the demise of many of the orchards at Manzanar, he noted:

Manzanar was once famous for its apples. The orchardists of Manzanar won first prizes at the State Fair in Sacramento and at the Watsonville apple show. A commodious packing plant was erected. The community was prosperous. It was growing rapidly. The village school had two teachers and there was talk of a new school building.

The Los Angeles water and power board came and bought every orchard and ranch that its agents could trick the owners into selling. The city immediately diverted the water from the ditches into the aqueduct. It dug wells and installed pumps to exhaust the underground water supply.

Today Manzanar is a ghastly place. The orchards have died. The city has sent tractors to pull up the apple trees. This should be a week of pink and white blossoms in "Apple Land," instead there is only desolation. Vigorous trees just coming into full bearing are prostrate in one field; across the road the blazing trail of the fire brand is visible.¹⁷⁵

The Manzanar community declined after the mid-1920s. Many of the houses vacated by farmers who sold their property to Los Angeles were rented to Department of Water and Power employees, farm tenants, and other workers from Independence. Some farm buildings were torn down, their materials being salvaged by the Department of Water and Power for other use. Some structures were purchased and moved to Independence and Lone Pine, while some simply deteriorated or were destroyed by windstorms or fire.¹⁷⁶

The decline of the Manzanar community resulted in closure of its post office on December 31, 1929. In 1932 the Manzanar Water Corporation was dissolved. Two years later, Los Angeles determined to stop irrigation entirely and increase groundwater pumping in the

174. *Los Angeles Times Farm and Orchard Magazine*, November 20, 1927, in "Manzanar Town," Subject History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum. Also see the reminiscences of John M. Gorman, a life-long resident and rancher near Independence, who was hired by Christopher to oversee farm crews at Manzanar during the late 1920s. Gorman, *I Remember Manzanar*, pp. 15-24.

175. "Owens Valley, Where the Trail of the Wrecker Runs," by Frederick Faulkner, Reprinted from the *Sacramento Union*, March 28-April 2, 1927, in "LAWP Misc. #1," Subject History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum.

176. "Photo Book, South District #4," and "Photo Book, Sub-Divided Properties #1," Reference Files, City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power, Bishop.

Manzanar area. Thus, the remaining orchards and farmlands were abandoned and allowed to dry up. Two families who remained at Manzanar in 1934 moved to Lone Pine and Independence, and in 1935, Clarence Butterfield, poultry farmer and last remaining resident, was asked by the Department of Water and Power to move. The following year the Manzanar school closed, and the Manzanar school district joined with Independence to form a unified district. On October 6, 1941, two months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Inyo County Board of Supervisors passed a resolution at the request of the City of Los Angeles that "all streets, alleys, lanes, etc. in the Town of Manzanar" be abandoned.¹⁷⁷

In March 1942, at the time the Army leased 6,020 acres from the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power for construction of the Manzanar War Relocation Center, two ranchers were leasing portions of the affected acreage. Archie Dean was leasing "dry brush grazing land" north and northeast from the former Manzanar townsite and the Manzanar airport, which had been surveyed in July 1941 and subsequently constructed by the United States Government, under a three-year lease at an annual fee of \$110. His original lease had been modified to cover land which was included in the lease to Inyo County for the Manzanar airport site. Peter Mairs had a lease which expired on March 1, 1942, covering land irrigated from George Creek and other dry grazing land located on the east side of the highway and below the Los Angeles Aqueduct. Mairs paid an annual fee of \$1,890 for the land on which he grazed cattle.¹⁷⁸

177. Mayfield, comp., *Postmasters of Inyo County*, p. 13; "Certificate of Dissolution of Manzanar Water Corporation, December 20, 1932, in "Manzanar Water Corporation, 1915-1932," Articles of Incorporation (Archives), Eastern California Museum; and Wehrey, "Report on Manzanar Pre-Camp Period," pp. 5-6.

178. "Inyo County's Participation in World War II," p. 3, in "War Service Records, Inyo County," Subject History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum, and Memorandum, E. A. Porter to H. A. Van Norman, March 12, 1942, in "Manzanar War Relocation Center," Reference Files, City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power, Bishop.



Photo 1: Shepherd House (built in 1872).



Photo 2: School, Manzanar.



Photo 3: Manzanar Community Hall, ca. 1912. Building in back was Hatfield's (later Bandhauer's) General Store which housed the post office.



Photo 4: Van Lutzow (at left), laying cement pipe at Manzanar.



Photo 5: Kispert Ranch house on George Creek.



Photo 6: V. C. Lutzow at the construction site of Manzanar making cement pipe for the Manzanar subdivisions.

CHAPTER SEVEN: EARLY DAYS AT MANZANAR — COMMENCEMENT OF CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATIONS UNDER THE WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION, MARCH-MAY 1942

After the Army selected the Manzanar site to serve as the first reception or relocation center for Japanese evacuees in early March 1942, the Western Defense Command made hurried plans to construct the camp to house evacuees. Before construction of the camp was completed, evacuees began arriving at Manzanar in large numbers. Amid the chaos and confusion of this early period, the Manzanar center began to take shape under the direction of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, the civilian arm of the Western Defense Command.¹

CONSTRUCTION BEGINS

As soon as the Manzanar site was selected, the Western Defense Command immediately developed plans to construct the camp. Since this was the first reception or relocation center to be built, neither the Army nor the WCCA had devised standardized construction plans. Nevertheless, specifications were hurriedly drawn up and bids for the general contract to build the camp were opened by the U. S. Engineer's Office in Los Angeles on March 5.² According to the *Inyo Independent* of March 6, three of the major contracting firms in the southwestern U.S. submitted bids. Although the contract was not located during research for this study, its specifications, according to the newspaper, included provision that 6,300,000 feet of lumber be delivered to the site within 30 days.³ The military was interested in keeping construction costs for Manzanar as low as possible. As a result, the Western Defense Command prepared an "advance copy of a [confidential] directive for the construction of a camp for alien enemies in the vicinity of Owens Valley, California" on March 6. It was noted that this "general directive" was "necessary in view of the fact that speed in construction is necessary" and that it implemented the directives of Secretary of War Stimson to DeWitt on February 20, authorizing him to "take all necessary measures and incur necessary obligations for movement of enemy aliens." The directive was formalized by the War Department and transmitted by the Adjutant General's Office to the Chief of Engineers with authorization to proceed with construction on March 8. The directive set out the basic requirements for camps to house alien enemies. The Chief of Engineers was to "collaborate with the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, and take the necessary steps to initiate the construction desired by him in the vicinity of Owens Valley, California." Layout plans and location of the site would be "as determined by the Commanding General." The directive stated further that minimum requirements consistent with health and sanitation

1. For further information on this period see Richard Brewer Rice, "The Manzanar War Relocation Center" (M. A. Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1947), pp. 25-28.

2. Informal Statement of Tom C. Clark, Alien Control Coordinator, in office of H. A. Van Norman, Chief Engineer and General Manager, Bureau of Water Works and Supply, City of Los Angeles . . . March 5, 1942, Correspondence March 1942 — October 1943, Manzanar Relocation Center, Administrative and Executive Files, Water Executive Office Historical Records, LADWP Historical Records.

3. *Inyo Independent*, March 6, 1942.

will determine the type of construction. In general, the facilities afforded by Theatre of Operations type of construction will not be exceeded. This project will be limited to a cost not to exceed \$500 per individual.

During the course of deciding upon these requirements the military had consulted with personnel in the Works Projects Administration and the Farm Security Administration, because of their experience with development of low cost housing projects. The construction directive and authorization to proceed with construction was transmitted to the Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, in San Francisco on March 13 and to Leonard G. Hogue, the District Engineer in Los Angeles who would provide direct supervision for the work at Manzanar. On March 13 the Surgeon General was notified that the directive contained no "specific mention" of "hospital facilities to be provided."⁴

On March 6, Griffith and Company of Los Angeles received the general contract for construction of all temporary buildings and structures that were initially built at Manzanar, including installation of plumbing equipment and fuel oil lines. Lieutenant Colonel Edwin C. Kelton was the contracting officer for the Corps of Engineers, and the company, using building plans drawn up by the Corps of Engineers, worked under the supervision of Leonard G. Hogue, the District Engineer in Los Angeles. The company's contract representative was J. Hopinstall, while its representative at the construction site was C. E. Evans.⁵

According to the aforementioned "Project Director's Report" by Brown and Merritt, the first truckloads of lumber began to arrive at the Manzanar site on March 14. The following day workmen began to clear the sage-covered land and dig the first ditches for water and sewer lines, and on March 17 the first buildings began to go up.⁶

As construction of the Manzanar camp began, the Wartime Civil Control Administration issued a press release on March 18. The statement, which was overly optimistic in tone and somewhat misleading in detail compared with actual conditions that the evacuees would experience, noted that brush "was being cleared and prefabricated houses were springing up today at Manzanar . . . where hundreds of mechanics, carpenters and laborers are constructing the first Japanese Resettlement Camp on the Pacific Coast." Complete facilities "for housing and caring for 1000 evacuees" would be completed "by the first of next week," and the camp would "house 10,000 Japanese when finished." Houses

4. Adjutant General to Chief of Engineers, March 8, 1942; E. K. Daley, Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers, Assistant: Operations Branch, Construction Division, March 10, 1942; J. R. D. Matheson, Colonel, Corps of Engineers, Executive Assistant to the District Engineer, U.S. Engineer Office, Los Angeles, California, March 13, 1942 (and attachments); and Memorandum for the Surgeon General, March 13, 1942, by E. K. Daley, March 13, 1942; Record Group 77, Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, Security — Classified Subject Files, 1940-45, Box 657, File No. 652, "Owens Valley, Calif.," National Archives and Records Administration, Archives I, Washington, D.C.

5. "Report on Assignment of Projects to Districts," Owens Valley Reception Center, June 1, 1942, RG 77, Security — Classified Subject files, 1940-45, Box 657, File 323.7, "Owens Valley Reception Center, Calif.," and "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, p. 995, RG 210, Entry 4b Box 72, File "Manzanar Final Reports."

6. "Project Director's Report," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. I, p. A-9, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 71, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

"for the resettled Japanese are of the 'family unit' type, in order that family units will not have to be split." The camp was expected "to be largely self-sustaining." Opportunities "for development of truck gardening and small industries — such as commercial fisheries and pheasant farms — appeared 'excellent.'" The camp was "ideally situated, away from the sandy soil near the mountains." The first contingent of Japanese would be put to work "clearing brush and building gardening installations." A 50-bed hospital, staffed by Japanese doctors and nurses, would be ready for the evacuees. Recreation facilities were being arranged "in the form of movies, athletic games and possibly university extension courses." Provision "for free religious worship of all denominations," including Buddhism, had been made. Since the camp would be "composed largely of voluntary migrants," officials expected "close cooperation from the Japanese on camp management."⁷

In his report that was discussed in Chapter Six of this study, Milton Silverman observed that on March 18 "Manzanar was in the painful, dusty throes of becoming a boom town." By March 19, he noted that "huge lumber trucks were roaring up the . . . highway from Los Angeles and 400 carpenters were already working a 10-hour shift." Soon a "hundred-foot administration building was standing where the old Manzanar packing house stood." Within "24 hours," the workmen started "on the first of 25 city blocks." The schedule "called for completion of one block a day." Silverman observed that

the workmen moved into action like an army of trained magicians. One crew led the way with small concrete blocks for foundations. A second followed with the girders and floor joists. A third came right along with the flooring, a fourth with prefabricated sections of sidewalls, a fifth with prefabricated trusses, a sixth slapped on the wooden roof, a seventh followed with heavy tarpaper, and an eighth finished with doors, windows and partitions.

All around them were other crews clearing and leveling the land ahead, excavating for sewer and water pipes, and bringing in truckloads of the prefabricated sections made in a centralized prefabrication mill only a few hundred yards away. At the same time, still other workmen were setting up the first of 25 oil centers to hold fuel oil, 40 warehouses and the barracks for military police.

The workmen had no time to build wooden buildings for themselves; they slept in a tent city.

During the early phases of construction the first complaints about wind and dust were voiced. According to Silverman, "over, under, and around and inside everything was the dust loosened by the tractors and scrapers, and blown by the interminable south wind. On mild days, the wind picked up only this dust, but it really worked up to a blow, it carried dust, sand, stinging bits of gravel and even white soda dust scooped up from the deposits at Owens Lake more than 20 miles to the south."⁸

7. Wartime Civil Control Administration, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, San Francisco, California, Press Release, March 18, 1942, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 69, File, "Miscellaneous Reports."

8. Appendix 25, "The Silverman Report," "Project Director's Report," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. I, pp. A 174-75, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 71, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

In an article in the *Inyo Independent* on March 20, E. B. Milnor, assistant superintendent of Griffith and Company, stated that between 1,000 and 1,500 workmen would be employed during the peak construction period at Manzanar and that the weekly payroll of these men would average between \$50,000 and \$70,000. The workmen were engaged six days a week in 10-hour shifts in order to complete the center within 30 days. The article also noted that military guards were expected during the week "to put [the] district under surveillance." Clearing of trees and brush from the western portion of the center site was underway. City of Los Angeles personnel were working on water facilities. Water in the Los Angeles Aqueduct was cut off during the week, and a large sewer line was being constructed under the aqueduct. The sewer line led to a sewage plant under construction east of the aqueduct. Telephone crews were installing lines to the principal administration buildings and offices. Old irrigation ditches dating from the orchards that had been planted at Manzanar in the 1910s were being reopened, and grading of roads in the center was underway. The "entire project was abuzz, reminiscent of a three-ring circus."⁹

ARRIVAL OF FIRST EVACUEES

Less than one week after construction began, the first Japanese American evacuees arrived at Manzanar, which the military continued to call the Owens Valley Reception Center, on March 21, 1942, as part of the Western Defense Command's voluntary evacuation program. A WCCA press release dated March 21, the aforementioned reports by Brown and Merritt and by Silverman, and the *Manzanar Free Press*, the camp's newspaper prepared and written by camp evacuees under the direction of Robert Brown that began publication on April 11, 1942, provide information on the early arrivals, all of whom were from Los Angeles. While the descriptions of the early arrivals differ in some details, all provide insight into a hectic and chaotic period during which large numbers of evacuees were arriving at a partially-completed camp amid its frenzied construction.

In their report, Brown and Merritt briefly described the first arrivals at Manzanar by stating that on March 21 the "first 84 'volunteers' arrived by bus; the next day 6 more came by private car." The following day, March 23, "710 arrived in a caravan of private cars escorted by the Army."¹⁰

The WCCA, *Manzanar Free Press*, and Silverman each provide more information on the first contingents of evacuees to arrive at Manzanar. On March 21 the WCCA issued a press release that stated:

In striking contrast to the fleeing refugees in other lands, the first exodus of Japanese and Japanese Americans from the Western parts of the Pacific Coast states, starts in Los Angeles Monday morning, with a voluntary movement, in ordered arrangement, with military forces as escorts rather than guards.

9. *Inyo Independent*, March 20, 1942.

10. "Project Director's Report," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. I, p. A-9, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 71, File, "Manzanar Final Reports." Also see "Jap Exodus to Owens Valley Under Way," *Intake*, April 1942, pp. 12-13.

Instead of pushcarts and wheelbarrows, or walking, the 1000 Japanese affected will travel in their own automobiles, in busses, and by train to the Manzanar Reception Center. . . .

The Los Angeles voluntary movement is the first mass departure from Military Area No. 1 in accordance with the evacuation decrees of Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt. . . . Other evacuations will be continued, to fulfill the Army's mission of minimizing sabotage and espionage in the critical areas of the Pacific Coast. . . .

Those leaving in their own car report at 6AM Monday at the South end of the Rose Bowl in Pasadena. They come prepared to start at 6:15, their tanks filled with gasoline, their tires and a spare in good shape, and prepared to buy their own gasoline enroute. Those going by busses report at 7 AM at 222 South Hewitt Street, Los Angeles. The train contingent will leave the old Santa Fe depot at 8 AM.

Each person will bring his or her bedding, except mattresses, tools of his trade, cooking and eating utensils, clothing and personal belongings, and a gallon of water. Those going by train can take what they can carry with them. Those using their own cars can carry what they can load into their machines. Each must care for his own belongings.

Under escort of troops, the caravans will travel in 10-car convoys. Two persons to a coupe or roadster, three to a touring car, and four to a truck are the passenger limitations.

Evacuees will have eaten breakfast when they appear for removal. They will be furnished a cold lunch enroute — and at the end of their 300 mile drive, or their train trip, a warm supper will await them, they will be comfortably housed, awaiting their establishment of community life and their later departure for permanent location under the War Relocation Authority.¹¹

In his report, Silverman observed that while construction was beginning at Manzanar the "clamor for removal of the Japanese" on the coast "was rising still higher and the authorities could not delay evacuation" until construction "was complete." Thus, on March 21, "with only two blocks of buildings under way, the first contingent of Japanese — the 'headquarter staff' — were brought from Los Angeles in three busses and a streamlined truck." These evacuees, according to Silverman, were "painters, and plumbers, doctors and nurses, cooks, and bakers, and stenographers with the job of preparing for the arrival of the first real group of evacuees two days later." These "first 86 arrived on a Saturday, but there was no week-end vacation for them." They worked "cleaning up kitchens, preparing a temporary hospital, organizing registration blanks, storing food, vaccines and blankets." On Sunday "they learned additional hundreds of evacuees were coming from Bainbridge Island, near Seattle."

11. Wartime Civil Control Administration, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, San Francisco, California, Press Release — Immediate, March 21, 1942, RG 210, Entry 7, Headquarters Records, Basic Documentation and Informational Files, Box 6, File, "Federal Government — Headquarters, Western Defense Command, War Department."

Silverman went on to describe the arrival of evacuees at Manzanar during its first hectic days of operation. On Monday, March 23, the

first big group of Japanese left Los Angeles for Manzanar, 800 men who had volunteered to come early and pitch into the heavy work. One section came by train — a day-long trip that began at 8 o'clock in the old Santa Fe station near little Tokyo and finished at dark in the little Lone Pine Station 9 miles south of Manzanar.

The other section came by automobile — a 240-car caravan that started at 6 o'clock in the morning from the Pasadena Rose Bowl. There was every contraption in that caravan from a Model T Ford to a 1942 Chrysler. The cars were adorned with bedding, clothes, suitcases, ironing boards, washing machines, gardening implements, furniture, dishes, and mechanics tools. By official orders, every car contained a gallon jug of water and enough gasoline to run 300 miles. Some trucks carried delicately packed boxes of flowers and tomato plants, all ready for replanting.

Official orders likewise called for a limit of two passengers to a coupe, three to a sedan, and four to a truck. Each car had to have all four tires and a spare in good condition. The schedule allowed for a ten minute stop every two hours, but the schedule-makers were not actually so optimistic — they added an ambulance and a complete wrecking car to the caravan. Inserted into the line were a dozen jeeps, and before the day was over, many of them had to be transformed into diminutive tow-cars.

The army convoy was a military escort, officers emphasized, and definitely not an armed guard. They enforced driving precautions rigorously — particularly one which said no evacuee could get out of his car on the left-hand side — and the results were satisfactory; the caravan arrived in excellent condition. It, too was a slow all-day trip, with the speed cut down to accommodate the slowest car, and the evacuees reached Manzanar just at dusk.

Waiting for them were hot dinners, beds and a welcome from the 86 'pioneers.'

For the next few days, the evacuees had not enough work, plenty of discomforts, and a snarl of misunderstood organization plans to unravel. The houses were almost finished, but the 'almost' meant lack of windows, and that meant dust in everything. The showers weren't ready.

Silverman reported that one week later, on Wednesday, April 1, the Army "started the first load of the families to join the volunteer workers already at Manzanar." He noted that

a special train was prepared to leave Los Angeles at 8 o'clock (it left nearly an hour late), crowded with women and children and old folks, carrying baggage cars loaded with trunks, suitcases and 1000 lunch boxes. Two physicians were on board to take care of any emergency, but the only medical call came when one

doctor cut himself trying to open a box; his colleague gave prompt and effective treatment.. . .

With 1000 expected to come on that first train and another 1000 expected on the following day, camp officials found their estimates were 40 per cent off. Only about 400 arrived on the first day [April 1] and 878 on the second [April 2].¹²

In a special edition printed on March 20, 1943, the *Manzanar Free Press* commemorated the first anniversary of the camp's operation. An article in the anniversary issue described the first hectic days at Manzanar:

The first merry outburst of incredulity flooded around them on that cold afternoon of March 21 when 61 men and 20 women stood on the threshold of their future abode. There was nothing on the vast flat land before them except the groundwork of future homes that was having its inception. Within the first range of rough lumber was the skeleton of the simple, crude abodes which were soon to house 10,000 evacuees.

According to the newspaper, 35 of the first volunteers or pioneers had the task "of preparing something palatable from the potatoes and canned stew, hash, corned beef, etc., that were piled up heterogeneously where the police station now stands." Perishable foodstuffs, such as milk, were stored in two ice trucks at Lone Pine. Joseph R. Winchester, chief steward at Manzanar, went to Lone Pine daily with several evacuees to get food until the ice boxes were installed at the camp. Part of the "fun" at that time, according to Winchester, was "carrying 400 loaves of bread in his car for three days."

The newspaper article went on to describe the crude facilities encountered by the first evacuees to enter Manzanar. It noted:

The sewer until then [ca. early April] had consisted of a ditch, two feet wide and four feet deep extending from Block 1 to Block 6. An amusing incident was told of three evacuees who had become drunk on the way to Manzanar. They were walking around at dusk, having a happy time sobering up when they lost one member. Almost in vain they searched for him, when they espied him helplessly clutched by the ditch which had drenched him badly by the time five men succeeded in pulling him out.

The latrine for both men and women was an ungainly, 'portable' outhouse, hooked up and dragged back and forth between the barracks. When its use was no longer needed, it was dragged up beyond Block 6, carrying a woman occupant who was trying vainly to get out!

Typical of the early evacuees were those who, having lost jobs or seeking adventure in an unenviable situation, had been eager to see what Manzanar was like. Eighteen-year-old Masiumi Kanamori . . . came with two other school

12. Appendix 25, "The Silverman Report," "Project Director's Report," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. II, pp. A-175-78, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 71, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

friends, secretly harboring the idea of earning a little money, wanting to take in the new life from the start. . . .¹³

During April evacuees entered Manzanar in large numbers, swelling its population as camp construction continued. On April 11, for instance, the first issue of the *Manzanar Free Press* reported:

Pushing aside the sage brush and literally growing from the desert sand, Manzanar has mushroomed into the bonanza town of '42, boasting today a population of 3,302.

In 3 weeks this magic town has boomed ahead to become the largest city in Owens Valley — the largest California city east of the Sierras.

From the time when 85 hardy pioneers, including 8 girls, came from Los Angeles to stake out their new homes in skeleton buildings, additions and improvements have been constantly speeded.

Today 575 buildings are occupied. . . .

Hot water is already running in some of the showers and laundries and work is being pushed on the others. As additional blocks are completed, more contingents are anticipated to swell Manzanar town.¹⁴

Two weeks later, on April 25, the newspaper observed that "3000 newcomers in the next three days climaxes three weeks of wondering when and from where the next contingents would arrive." These new evacuees, who would come from the Los Angeles area (Santa Monica Bay area, Sawtelle in West Los Angeles, and the Burbank and Glendale districts of the San Fernando Valley), would

find a cozier and cheerier welcome for during the three weeks' lull, carpenters and workmen were able to go ahead and complete steps and windows, washing facilities that will help make their adjustment easier.¹⁵

In the same issue, the newspaper reported that Griffith and Company would complete the camp in "a matter of days." With a construction crew of 600 men at work ten hours a day, 600 buildings had been erected to date. Proposed plans called for 770 buildings. J. Hopinstall, the company's contract representative, reported that "buildings are put up at the rate of two an hour and that 25,000 board feet of lumber are being used every ten minutes."¹⁶

13. *Manzanar Free Press*, March 20, 1943, pp. 2-3.

14. *Ibid.*, April 11, 1942, p. 1.

15. *Ibid.*, April 25, 1942, p. 1.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

ADMINISTRATION

Clayton E. Triggs was assigned by the WCCA as the first manager of Manzanar. According to Brown and Merritt, he had "a background of large scale camp administration, and years of administrative experience in the W. P. A. [Work Progress Administration]." Triggs brought "seven men who had been under his supervision on other jobs." The seven men opened the project and did all the work for the first few days. From the day the camp opened, Triggs administered Manzanar with the aid of what he called the "Strategy Board." This group, which determined all matters of policy for the camp, included Brown, the assistant director, chief engineer, and head of community services. The staff grew gradually with most of the individuals recruited \ from the WPA, a large-scale Depression-era national works program for jobless employables that was closing down.

One of Triggs' first goals, according to Brown and Merritt, was improvement of relations with Owens Valley residents. He worked closely with the Citizens Committee led by Merritt, and he, along with Brown, spoke at many service club and community meetings in the valley, outlining the work going on within the center. As a result of these public relations initiatives, some of the early hostility by local residents began to dissipate. Brown and Merritt observed that Triggs' efforts "began to bear fruit almost immediately." They noted that the

more members of the community began to feel that he was bringing the community in to having a part in the operation of the Center, the more the people began to take an interest in what was going on. The rumor-mongers found their audience dwindling away. The alarmists were laughed at openly. The change in community reaction was almost a complete right-about-face from the day of the first news announcement to the day of full operation some two months later.

This new feeling of acceptance and tolerance, however, would "change again back to resentment and distrust" later in the year.¹⁷

EARLY ORGANIZATION

The first service for evacuees at Manzanar was established on March 24, three days after the first evacuees arrived at the camp. This service, organized by Brown, took the form of an Information Office designed to issue, interpret, and translate the instructions and orders given by the camp administration to the evacuees. The office was staffed by five bilingual evacuees who were among the first volunteers to arrive at Manzanar. A bulletin board was erected in front of the office on which announcements, schedules, news, rules, and regulations were posted. It was also suggested, according to Brown and Merritt, that at a regular time each morning, "an assembly should be held at which "managers could make statements or give lectures to keep the boys informed and in good morale."

17. "Project Director's Report," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. I, pp. A-9-10, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 71, File, "Manzanar Final Reports." Also see Report by Robert Brown, Reports Officer, Manzanar, April 1943, pp. 3-4, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 69, File, "Miscellaneous Reports."

A messenger system, staffed by ten young evacuees, connected the evacuee barracks with the Information Office. These "runners rounded up workers" as they were needed for various jobs and facilitated communication between administrative officials and new evacuees.

According to Brown and Merritt, the Information Office was "the first attempt to organize and control the camp by self help." When evacuees arrived at Manzanar, they were registered and assigned to barracks. Their employment history was scanned by an employment officer, and those with basic skills needed to keep the camp running "in the emergency period" were assigned to supervisors and put to work. Such jobs included cooks, kitchen help, yard workers, garbage, and trash crews. There "was never any difficulty," according to Brown and Merritt, "in getting people to work even in the first days of the camp."

On March 25, the day after the Information Service was established, the first rules and regulations for the operation of Manzanar were issued in a memorandum by the Chief of the Service Division. These rules and regulations were posted on the bulletin board and concerned such issues as room occupation and food. Friends of the same sex over 18 years of age were allowed, with the permission of their parents, to live together. Males could not change their rooms without written permission granted by a designated administrative officer. Individual cooking in the barracks was not permitted because of the fire danger. At the same time, necessary bedroom equipment was promised to the evacuees, and it was announced that rice would soon be available in the mess halls.¹⁸

EARLY PROBLEMS AT MANZANAR

According to Brown and Merritt, the Information Office was the "switchboard" for channeling administration information to the evacuees as well as communicating questions and complaints from the evacuees to the administration. The first sampling of troubles voiced by evacuees was submitted to the administration on March 26 in a report prepared by the Information Office. The report included a list of 19 topics for which the Information Office sought information or clarification. Most of the queries centered around financial problems and concerns of the evacuees, what jobs would be available for evacuees at Manzanar, and what wages they could expect.

During the early days at Manzanar mail, money orders, checks, radios, telephone, telegraph, and other contact with friends and relatives outside Manzanar were topics of constant concern for the evacuees. Problems with expected or overdue baggage, lost or undelivered parcels, and requests for supplies needed in occupying the barracks, such as brooms, maps, buckets, and soap, took up much of the time of the Information Office. Problems and questions relating to cleanliness and health, recreational activities, and children's education were matters of continuing concern for the evacuees from the first days of the center's operation. As a result of these identified needs and concerns, many services and programs would not only be initiated at Manzanar but would also be incorporated "in regular operating charts for all the centers."

18. "Project Director's Report," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol., pp. A-11-12, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 71, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

Brown and Merritt listed six primary problems faced by evacuees at Manzanar during the camp's early days of operation. These problems were: adjustment to center life, housing, latrine usage, financial concerns, vocational worries, and wages.

ADJUSTMENT TO CENTER LIFE

The Manzanar center was established to house some 10,000 evacuees. According to Brown and Merritt, all evacuees were housed in standard Army barracks which "did not differ in any detail," and all were "fed on a common diet to be served in mess halls." "Previously existing inequalities among Japanese were thus to be ironed out insofar as the standard of living was concerned." Brown and Merritt observed that "for the first few months, most inequalities were ironed out in the scramble for the primary, simple comforts of living." Until basic needs were met, there was little "struggle for leadership, power, prestige, or control of the camp — all of which came at a later date."

Housing

Housing was one of the principal concerns and complaints of the early evacuees to arrive at Manzanar. The lack of privacy in the barracks was a particular concern. Not only were unrelated families scrambled together, but often wives of other men were assigned to the same rooms with bachelors. Wives were sometimes welcomed at the gate by husbands who had preceded them to camp, and then the husbands would not be permitted to share their wives' quarters. While construction of the camp was underway during the early months of the camp's operation, changes could not be effected quickly. Even harder to endure was the forced company of people who did not belong to the family or who logically ought not to be assigned to a common apartment. According to Brown and Merritt, dictates "of decency and logic were violated by the pressure of population and the confusion of conditions because 10,000 persons were received in a little more than two months, and, during this time, the camp was still in the process of construction." On several occasions, "groups were sent in by the Army before the carpenter crews had windows, doors, or roofs on the block buildings to be occupied."

Latrine Usage

One of the most recurrent and emphatic complaints of the early evacuees at Manzanar related to the absence or scarcity of toilet paper in the latrines. Lack of privacy, according to Brown and Merritt, was also a "legitimate" complaint. Women particularly had difficulty coping with the "installation of an Army-latrine system" that provided no partitions.

Financial Concerns

Many of the early evacuees to arrive at Manzanar were concerned about payments for the upkeep of insurance policies, articles and goods bought on installment plans, and

automobiles brought to camp. Most evacuees brought "problems in their wake which could not lightly be solved."

Vocational Worries

Many of the early arrivals at Manzanar exerted pressure on the administration to provide them with jobs. They had considerable idle time on their hands, and many had a strong work ethic. The evacuees were told early that they would be expected to work and that the center would develop "as a community in proportion to the interests and efforts the residents themselves were willing to put into building it." However, employment projects were slow in developing at the camp.

Wages

The first issue of critical importance to face center management, according to Brown and Merritt, was "over money." The first evacuees to arrive at the center received "an impression" that they "would be paid Army wages." This "probably stemmed from the fact that the Army was in charge of the evacuation, and that it did hire a number of Japanese in clerical and translation positions during evacuation." An Army officer had spoken to a mass meeting sponsored by the Maryknoll Fathers at San Pedro prior to evacuation. During his talk the officer left the impression that "Army wages were to be paid to those who would volunteer to go to Manzanar and make it ready for the others to come." In his first news conference, Triggs stated that he thought the evacuees would be paid "the old WPA wage with deductions made for room and board." The discussion of wages was reported in major metropolitan daily newspapers which the evacuees read at Manzanar, thus becoming a national issue which the evacuees followed closely.

Meanwhile, no decision was made by the Western Defense Command on wages for several months. In the interim, Manzanar center management asked the evacuees to "volunteer" their services to keep essential operations going. Many evacuees became disillusioned, believing they had been "promised" certain wages. Confusion and indecision on the part of the Army and the WCCA over wages, compounded by failure to receive any pay for three months, led to the first charges of "broken promises" by the evacuees. The "broken promise" charge, according to Brown and Merritt, was "an important turning point in the story of Manzanar as it was this weapon which was used by the anti-administration and so-called pro-Japanese forces six months later to stir up the turbulence which resulted in the 'Incident' of December 6."¹⁹

EVACUEE EXPERIENCES

While Manzanar was under construction and during the period when its first evacuee residents were arriving at the camp, the Los Angeles newspapers described the center in glowing terms. On March 30, 1942, for instance, the *Los Angeles Times* reported:

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-16.

If Uncle Sam's children trapped in Japan by the outbreak of the conflict fare one-half as well as Japanese whom the fortunes of war and the will of the Western Defense Command place in Owens Valley, they will have reason enough to disagree with Sherman's opinion of armed conflict.

The present and prospective Nipponese occupants of the fast-building Owens Valley Reception Center at Manzanar are lucky. They couldn't be censured for hoping, in their own behalf, that the war lasts for years.

Owens Valley, potentially one of the most fertile in California, and that means all the world, has the makings of a garden spot to supplement its natural attractions.

They couldn't wish for better scenery or a cleaner, more healthful atmosphere.²⁰

The *Manzanar Free Press*, which generally took a pro-government stance in its commentary on evacuation and camp life, offered somewhat contrasting observations regarding the experiences of the first evacuees to arrive at the camp. In an editorial on May 2, 1942, the newspaper noted that evacuees "arrive in Manzanar with a mingled feeling of uncertainty and bewilderment." "Sooner or later," however, "the snow-capped High Sierras imbue us with complacency which makes us forget the bitter war now waging ever nearer our shores." The editorial stated further that as "a protective measure executed by the Army, we were moved as a collective racial group — far from the industrial centers." "Some are inclined to be bitter, for being moved from homes and friends." "Many have suffered financial losses." Nevertheless, prolonged "idleness makes people forget worldly cares and tribulations." Thus, all residents "must pitch in and make our camp life really worth while."²¹

With the aforementioned observations and commentary in mind, this section will provide insights into the experiences of evacuees during their removal to Manzanar and the early days of the camp's operation by focusing on representative eyewitness accounts. The experiences not only had a significant impact on the outlook and attitudes of the evacuees during the early internment period, but they also laid the foundation for serious antagonisms that would plague the center's operation throughout the war.

Pre-Evacuation Rumors About Manzanar

The arrival of the bulk of evacuees at Manzanar brought to light the fact that the majority of them had been subjected to rumors in the pre-evacuation period that would have a negative effect on their first experiences at the camp and thus contribute to their disillusionment during the chaotic early days of its operation. On April 14, 1944, Morris E. Opler, a community analyst assigned to Manzanar by the War Relocation Authority, prepared a summary report on pre-evacuation rumors about Manzanar and their effect on its evacuee residents. His report was based on interviews with three unnamed evacuees from the Los Angeles area. According to Opler, the rumors were "evidently general" in the

20. *Los Angeles Times*, March 30, 1942, pp. 1-2.

21. *Manzanar Free Press*. May 2, 1942, p. 2.

metropolitan area, because the three persons were from three different and widely-separated parts of the city. The importance of "recapturing such evidence," according to Opler, was that attitudes and impressions "which are formed under strong emotional stress perpetuate themselves in various forms and are often found to have relation to events which afterwards occur."

Among the most drastic pre-evacuation rumors, according to Opler's interviewees, was the story "that we were being put closely together, concentrated in a narrow valley between two mountains along an airplane route, so that if the coast was attacked by Japan we could be bombed and all killed." Another story was that they "would open the reservoir on us and drown us all." One interviewee observed: "People expected to get killed; I expected to die here."

As a result of some stories, the evacuees brought many non-useful items to Manzanar. Rumors circulated that the site was "full of big, biting ants and snakes," prompting many persons to bring bulky boots. There were rumors that Manzanar was inhabited by "swarms of big mosquitoes and that you couldn't get any sleep at night unless you brought mosquito netting." One evacuee noted: "I still remember how I ran around trying to find some. And we all got plenty of it because we understood that the beds were in tiers, one above another, so that you had to have enough to reach to the floor from the top."

After the first evacuees arrived at Manzanar, rumors started in Los Angeles that men and women were forced to use the same showers and bathe together. As a result, "nearly all the girls and some of the boys brought bathing suits." One of Opler's interviewees had also packed a "big wash tub" and had it sent to the camp. Because of rumors that Manzanar was "full of thieves," the evacuees "stocked up on and brought along" "chains and padlocks and hasps for the doors." Rumors had it that "you had to get long chains and string all your suitcases together; if you left one by itself it would disappear."

Because of rumors that Manzanar did not have sufficient supplies of medicine and cotton, many evacuees brought large quantities of medications with them. One interviewee told Opler:

I had so much of the stuff that I couldn't get it all in my hand baggage and carried some in a wooden box. At the train the M.P. wanted to throw it out because he said the rule was that nothing but hand baggage was allowed on the train with the passengers. I told him it was my medicine and begged him to let me keep it and he finally did, but many people who brought wooden boxes to the train had them thrown off.

Even though there was medical attention here I found that much of this medicine didn't last long. At first they had no partitions in the latrines, just toilets in a row. Some of the women were so ashamed they wouldn't go to them and got sick. I gave out lots of medicine, ex-lax and things like that.

Rumors that all camp laundry was to be sent to one facility outside the camp led to the belief that everyone needed to put their "mark" or "initials" on every piece of clothing. Thus, prior to evacuation many evacuees "went around trying to get the proper ink so that

they could put laundry marks on their clothes." Ink supplies quickly diminished. Thus, some evacuees sewed their initials on every piece of clothing they took to Manzanar. After the evacuees arrived at Manzanar, they were told that those "stories were started so that the stores in Little Tokyo and in downtown Los Angeles could sell their stock." One evacuee had purchased so much ink that he "was in a hole financially when I got here." Just prior to evacuation one "couldn't get rope, tags and many other things in Little Tokyo or in stores of the Boyle Heights district."

The evacuees also told Opler that when they went "to the regular places [civil control stations] to ask what to bring" they were given inaccurate or misleading advice. For instance, they had been told that curtains and furniture would be provided at camp and thus such items should not be taken to Manzanar. When these items were not furnished to them after their arrival, they became disillusioned.

Concerning the issue of clothes, the evacuees told Opler that "no one did the right thing." One interviewee, for instance, related:

Mayor Bowron of Los Angeles made a speech in which he said that we were all to be put to work raising soy beans for the army. So I made sun bonnets and packed away all my good clothes. Practically no one brought along good hats or shoes. About the only thing that people brought were slacks and rough work clothes. The mother of one girl I know sold her good dresses for 5 cents a-piece to Mexicans. Some of these were expensive silk dresses. People had the idea that they didn't need such things. They had the idea that they were going into another world. People didn't seem to look ahead. Because they were told to bring only what they absolutely needed at the time, they brought summer clothes only. For the first year everyone wore slacks. Perhaps it was a good thing while the dust was so bad and before the place was settled. But as these things began to wear out, instead of patching them, as could have been done, people began to make or buy new clothes and dress up. . . .

Prior to evacuation, rumors started that Manzanar did not have sufficient water supplies. Thus, some evacuees brought innumerable bottles of water, some of which were whiskey bottles. Opler observed that his interviewees told him:

They tell of some boys who were sitting by some of these bottles which had been thrown in a ditch. . . . Some M.P.'s accused them of having whiskey. They couldn't convince the M.P.'s that it was just water in the bottles and had to go to the police station with them till it was straightened out.

Based on rumors that spread through the Japanese community in Los Angeles prior to evacuation, some parents were "greatly worried about bringing their daughters up here where everyone lives so close together." After the first group had arrived at Manzanar the parents in Los Angeles heard that "the bachelors and the loafers from Hawaii who used to hang around the drug store at San Pedro and 1st Street were up here and were doing bad things (raping) the girls." The parents were warned "to be very careful with their daughters and not to let them go anywhere alone at night."

The interviewees told Opler that it "was a relief to learn that these rumors were not true, but there were disappointments the other way too." Some of the things which happened in the early days of the camp's operation were "almost as bad as the rumors." As an example, one evacuee observed:

I came in the middle of May, 1942. Our baggage was put out in the firebreak by block 13. The baggage of one person often was not all together. A piece would be here and a piece would be there. It was hard to locate your luggage and get it together. The M.P.'s came to inspect it. There was a terrible dust storm that day. If you weren't there to open the piece of luggage they would break the lock and go through the contents. The wind was blowing things all over and people were running here and there trying to take care of the belongings. Everything got dirty and all the people were angry.²²

'Early Days at Manzanar' (By an Evacuee)

In a foreword to a report on an interview with an unnamed evacuee concerning the early days at Manzanar Opler observed on April 25, 1944, that many "of the present attitude sets and the convictions of evacuees are fully explicable only in terms of events and conditions which prevailed during evacuation and during the early days of the Center." Opler noted that "habits of mind which still persist" were established during the evacuation period and early days at Manzanar. These habits had developed as a result of the "effects on attitudes toward work," the "indecision, wrangling and false starts over wage scales," the "petty dishonesty and hypocrisy which arose over the failure to provide furniture or an openly approved way of constructing any," and the "unwillingness of the evacuee to assume responsibility for directions when their execution may bring him into conflict with other evacuees." He observed that the "psychology seems to be that, as a result of evacuation, a fundamental opposition obtained between the government, represented by the Center administration and the appointed personnel, and the evacuees." The enforcement "of any unpopular ruling, no matter how plainly it fell in the line of duty, subjected the individual to the criticism that he was siding with the administration and the government against the Japanese people." The "tremendous concern of the average evacuee over unfavorable comment and gossip directed against him made it almost impossible for the person to perform tasks objectively as he would have done in a less charged atmosphere." What the administration desired "was constantly weighed against what was considered to be the wishes and attitudes of the people." Where "the interests were not deemed identical, performance and cooperation were poor." These attitudes formed during the early days at Manzanar would continue "to exist until greater confidence in the government" was restored." Thus, it was important, according to Opler, to examine the experiences of evacuees at Manzanar during their evacuation to the camp and its early days of operation.

The evacuee that Opler interviewed had arrived at Manzanar on April 2, 1942. Concerning his induction at Manzanar, he stated:

22. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, February 14 1944, Report No. 189, "Pre-Evacuation Rumors About Manzanar and Their Effect," by Morris E. Opler RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File 63,318, No. 10.

I was on the last bus which transferred us from the train that brought us from Los Angeles to Lone Pine. The last bus pulled into Manzanar about five-thirty P.M. I was told to register at the Block 5 recreation hall. There I was assigned an apartment for my family and we were assigned some blankets. . . .

We slept that night with just the army blankets that were issued to us, for our bedding was checked in warehouses and the bedding was not to be distributed till the following day.

I awoke at the crack of dawn and got ready for breakfast. I don't exactly remember what I had for breakfast but I do know that in those early days of evacuation, food was pretty good, as rationing hadn't begun yet.

I wasn't any too anxious to work or to look for a job as we were told that the wages were to be \$21 a month and each person would have to pay \$15 subsistence. This meant that in my case, even if I did work, I would still owe the government \$24, as I had to pay for my wife and son. I said to myself, 'Heck, I might as well not work at all.'

After breakfast the evacuee went to get his baggage. He noted:

Prior to evacuation I had rigged up a two-wheel pull-cart in order to carry the heavy baggage to the station. When we left Los Angeles I had to handle the baggage of three. My wife was pregnant and couldn't carry anything much and the boy was just a tot and couldn't carry anything. . . . I had this two-wheeler still and tried to use it now at Manzanar. But this contraption did not do much to alleviate the baggage problem as it was sandy all over and then again there were the sewage pits to cross. I discarded the cart and had some friends help me carry the baggage from the warehouse to the apartment.

After getting partly settled in our new home, I walked around looking for the lake that some Caucasian friends had told me about. They had mentioned that I was going on a nice vacation, as Manzanar was situated beside a lake, and that I could go fishing, swimming, and boating. In the winter, they told me, there was skiing to enjoy in the mountains. This sure turned out to be a sour joke to me for none of those things were available to us.

I was rather disappointed at the barracks which we evacuees were to live in. I thought at least each individual family would be assigned to a separate apartment. Instead, two or three families were crowded into a six beam apartment, offering no privacy. It didn't matter so much with the bachelors or the single girls if they slept in quarters together. But when two or three families were placed in one apartment to make the quota for the barrack, it was terrible.

As for the facilities, at first we had to endure the telephone booth type of latrine, which had a chemical task receptacle. When the wind blew, which was often, it blew right through the latrine. Sometimes it blew so fiercely that it seemed as if the latrine would be toppled over. I'm not exaggerating when I say this. At this

time the present flush toilets were not ready from Block 3 on up to Block 12. The other blocks were not even built yet.

As for showers, hot water was only available in Blocks 1 and 2, as the volunteer groups lived there. We lived in Block 4, so we could not bathe every day as it was pretty far to walk in those days. By the time we bathed and returned home, we would catch cold. In due time, the boiler was installed in our block so we were able to bathe regularly. It was about two weeks after we came here, though.

We felt pretty leery walking in the night to the latrine, and there were snakes all over. The thought of stepping on one was enough to send a chill up one's spine. I suppose the evacuees from rural districts didn't think anything of it, but we who were raised in cities didn't feel just right walking to the latrine at night.

All the barracks in those early days were bare, and when the wind blew, the dust would seep right up through the cracks in the floor and through the walls, the ceiling and all over. The construction of these barracks was of the cheapest and simplest type. Even though there was a partition between apartments, you could distinctly hear the neighbors voices and their snoring too. Talk about sand! After walking all day, my shoes used to be full of it. If I had watered my shoes, I might have been able to grow thistle weeds. This sand is very hard on leather soled shoes and it really wears them out fast. We had to sweep the room every so often and mop once or twice a day because of the sand which was tracked or blown into the house.

The administration told us to mop at least once daily and to keep everything off the floor — at least six inches off the floor. Now, how were we to keep our belongings six inches off the floor if we had no lumber with which to build stands? Every time we mopped we had to put our belongings on top of the beds. We were told not to take lumber scraps or otherwise we would get into trouble. The administration promised us furniture at that time. I couldn't believe this promise so I gathered scraps of lumber from here and there and tried my best to build some crude furniture for the home. . . .

The evacuee described the somewhat primitive early medical facilities and treatment provided to residents at Manzanar. Among other things, he stated:

The hospital was housed in Block 1-2-2, a two-bed hospital at that time. The clinic was located in the next room, 1-2-1. The doctors then were Dr. G. and Dr. T. They deserve a lot of credit for their untiring medical aid to the evacuees. In spite of the lack of facilities and equipment they performed surgery and gave constant medical attention to the sick.

As more evacuees came, the hospital began to take up most of Block 7. There were residents in Block 7 but they were moved elsewhere to accommodate hospital patients and to provide larger rooms for surgical and clinical work.

Dental work was established rather late as there was no equipment at first. . . .

The evacuee observed that the camp's administrative staff was housed in Block 1-8 during the early days. He commented about the first canteen:

At first the canteen was run by a Caucasian group as a branch of the Fort Ord canteen. During those early days, the canteen had a tremendous turnover in business. The canteen was located in Block 1-9-4 and it was jammed full from the time it opened until it closed.

After the WCCA had determined the wage policy for the camp, the evacuee joined the Manzanar police department. He described some of his experiences on this job:

I then took a job on the police force as one of the patrolmen. I took this job principally because I thought I would get a uniform and shoes and a horse on which to ride around the Center. This job as policeman had many drawbacks, such as constantly having to tell new evacuees, and old ones too, not to go beyond certain boundaries. Thus we created enemies.

The unoccupied barracks were constantly frequented by lovers at night so we had to patrol the lonely outposts and stop those things. I know how young couples feel when in love, so I did not discourage them but told them to keep off my beat. There were many complaints coming in to the police stations about such conduct so we were 'elected' to stop them if we could.

On the police force we worked eight full hours a day with one day a week off. Those who worked at the desk usually got Sundays off. There were three shifts, with each crew going on single shift two weeks before changing.

Imagine working from midnight on till eight in the morning! I felt as if I worked two days instead of just eight hours during that shift. It was one of the most thankless jobs, but I managed to stick on until I found out there was no chance for promotion. I tried pretty hard, but I guess I didn't have the right connections, for newcomers got better ratings than some oldtimers.

It sure seemed funny when we had orders to apprehend any lumber thieves. Here were most of us taking lumber to build furniture for our own homes. This was a bone of contention between the evacuees and the police force.

Then you ran into things like this. There was an instance when we had orders from the hospital to keep all visitors away from the hospital between certain barracks where the contagious disease cases were. One woman had a daughter who was sick with measles and the mother was staying with her child during the period of quarantine. This was supposed to be two weeks. Long before it was over I saw her in Block 15, waiting with the crowd for the new incoming evacuees. She had no business there but what could I do? I didn't want to create a scene as I knew this woman was a blabber. Fortunately the doctor saw her and told her to go back to the hospital. I don't blame this woman for wanting to greet her relatives as they came to Manzanar, but at the same time she broke a hospital rule. She might have spread measles to other people's children. Anyway, this woman has got no 'cabeza' (head).

The evacuee went on to describe the mess halls during the early days at Manzanar:

I had one helluva time trying to make my son eat. He just wouldn't touch anything or do anything except look around at the people. You see, we've never taken him to a cafeteria or restaurant regularly back home. The noise and confusion distracted his mind from the food. . . . Our family is not the only one which had trouble making children eat. It has happened in the majority of the families with small children. . . .

Sometimes we eat at home and my sons eat much better there than at the mess all. On the other hand, we (my wife and I) can eat in peace and need not hurry through our meals as we do when we eat at the mess hall. Yes, for the simple truth is that the mess hall workers don't like late and slow eaters as they want to hurry and get out of the kitchen as quickly as possible.

Regarding the dust and windstorms at Manzanar the evacuee observed:

I can readily sympathize with the Middle west 'dust-bowl' victims. We in Manzanar sure experienced what the 'dust bowl' victims underwent. Several times after I had washed and hung the clothes out to dry, a sudden wind would whip up and the ensuing dust storm would blacken the clothes. And worse yet, the sand and dust would get in the clothes and it was worse to wash them over than it was the first time. I felt like cursing, but what could I do but wash them over.

Concerning gossip among the evacuees at Manzanar and its impact on morale in the camp, the evacuee pointedly noted:

Japanese people are known to be gossips, especially women. Any little thing is subject for gossip. It is no wonder some people go batty from staying cooped up like this.²³

Togoro Mizutani Family

In his aforementioned report prepared for the WCCA in April 1942 Milton Silverman reported that experiences of the Togoro Mizutani family that was evacuated from Los Angeles to Manzanar on April 2. He observed that it was "a typical Japanese group whose experiences mirrored those of many thousands of others throughout the early days of evacuation and relocation." In his report, Silverman included portions of interviews with family members, and he accompanied them during the first 24 hours they were in camp, recording their experiences and impressions.

In 1900 Togoro had emigrated from Japan to the United States, settling in the Fresno, California, area where he would work in vineyards and orchards for 20 years. With the aid of the Japanese consulate, Togoro brought Kaneo from Japan in 1917 to become his

23. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, April 25, 1944, Report No. 233, "Early Days At Manzanar (By An Evacuee)," RG 210, Entry 16, Box 348, File 63.318, No. 13.

"picture bride." After the family, which had grown to include three children, spent a year in Japan in 1924, the Mizutanis returned to the Fresno area. In 1929, with the onset of the Great Depression, the family moved to Inglewood, near Los Angeles, where Togoro became a nurseryman. In 1940 the family moved to Sawtelle in West Los Angeles.

For three months after the Pearl Harbor attack, the Mizutanis "continued life almost without change." War affected them as it affected "every Japanese and non-Japanese family in West Los Angeles," but there were "few 'incidents' to tell the Mizutanis they were no longer part of the American people."

On March 18 Tatsumi, the Mizutani's 21-year-old son was fired from his job at a grocery store in Santa Monica. According to Silverman, Tatsumi stated:

All the Japanese were being fired all over town. Didn't seem to make any difference, aliens or citizens, we were all canned. So there I was — no job, no money. We heard about Manzanar, of course, and when I found out they were taking volunteers, and that there was work up there, well, I volunteered.

Leaving his second-hand car at home, he drove with a friend in the automobile caravan to Manzanar on March 23. There was little work to do at Manzanar during his first few days at camp. Tatsumi stated:

Only a couple of the fellows got assignments. Nobody was being paid anything, but we wanted to work anyhow. If you didn't have something to do, you got thinking and worrying and losing your temper over the dust. We just loafed around all day, and watched the card games at night. Then I got a job as sanitary inspector — I know the fellow who's personnel manager here — and at least I could keep busy. Well, a little busy. I looked at the mess halls, and checked the cooks and the waiters, and tried to get things cleaned up — nobody paid much attention, and some of those guys offered to swing on me — but I had something to do.

Finally, when it looked like it wasn't going to be too bad, I wrote to the family, told them what it was like, and asked them to come up as soon as they could.

Fusako, Tatsumi's younger sister who was studying business administration at the University of California, Los Angeles, informed Silverman that the family decided to volunteer to go to Manzanar after receiving her brother's letter. She observed:

We knew we'd have to go somewhere eventually, and my father and mother were getting pretty worried about somebody — well, doing something to us — and so we decided to move.

We'd been hearing about other Japanese being stabbed or killed up at Stockton, and we found out some Japanese had their trucks burned — with all their furniture on it. So this way, with the Army sort of protecting us and Tat already started up there, it looked like the best thing to do.

After volunteering to go to Manzanar, the Mizutanis had one week to sell their furniture. Fusako noted that many people in Los Angeles

would just go down the telephone book, call up every number under a Japanese name, and ask if they had anything to sell. Then they'd come over right away and look at it and make an offer. Most of the offers were really terrible, and if we wouldn't accept it, they would get insulting and tell us we were lucky to get anything. Some people were pretty nice, but most of them — ugh!

Most of the Mizutani furniture was less than a year old, but they received only "about one-third" of what they expected.

Thus, Togoro and Kaneo Mizutani and their daughter Fusako boarded the "special 'family' train" at Los Angeles on the morning of April 2. After a 10-hour trip, the train arrived at the Lone Pine railroad station. Silverman related:

There was no welcoming committee to greet them, just a half dozen townspeople and local reporters, drivers of the waiting busses that would take them to Manzanar, and the soldiers — a dozen military police armed with rifles and sub-machine guns.

While the passengers in the train "packed the windows to stare at the towering, snow-covered mountains to the west, and while a nurse, a doctor and ambulance driver went through the train to find one baby with German measles," the "long process of unloading started." Helped down the car stairs by soldiers, the "evacuees came out of one car at a time, each carrying his own baggage roll and suitcase," "each stopping for a face-to-face meeting with the breathtaking mountains, and then on to the waiting busses." The busses headed north "up the highway to Manzanar, to the guarded entrance, over the dusty, rutted new road and up the street skirting the camp to the induction station."

As the passengers disembarked from the busses at Manzanar, they were met by "a long line of earlier arrivals, a line leading into the building set aside for induction and registration." "Watching from an outer ring, and kept there by a few soldiers carrying bayoneted guns, were scores of others — men whose families hadn't shown up yet, men and women and children who had come in the day or the week before."

After standing in line for 20 minutes the Mizutanis reached the first desk inside the induction center, and "then — with Tat's capable assistance — they moved rapidly." A

Japanese girl registered the family on a card, listing their names and former address, taking the registration tag they had brought from Los Angeles (an FBI card, equipped with fingerprints and various information) and giving them instead new registration tag (without fingerprints), assigning them family quarters (Block 6, building 3, room 3), and sending them on to the second desk. Here a crew of Japanese boys counted noses, hauled three sets of brown army blankets from a huge stack, and dumped them on a counter.

Registration, at least for the time being, was completed. All the Mizutanis had to do was pick up three heavy loads of blankets, find their luggage which had been dumped somewhere outside, and then find block 6, building 3, room 3.

Tatsumi helped his family find their quarters, and several Japanese boys picked up the blankets and joined the procession. The group "slowly climbed the steep, dusty slope, jumping across little excavation ditches, walking boards across big ones, ploughing through mounds of dust, passing building after building." The new Mizutani address was more than half a mile from the induction center.

Inside their new quarters, the Mizutanis sized up their future home. It was

a room 20 feet wide, 25 feet long, constructed of bare boards. There was no ceiling to cover the rafters. There were four sliding windows and one door. Inside were ten metal cots, a brand new Coleman oil heater, two light sockets and one light bulb in place.

As the Mizutanis looked at their quarters, Fusako looked at her brother in hopeless despair. Tatsumi told his family:

See, these ten beds — well, if there're only three in a family this kind of room is for two families. But if there are four or more — like us — we can have it all to ourselves. I'll get six of these beds taken out of here.

Tatsumi and the two other Japanese young men brought "puffy straw-filled tick" mattresses and placed them on the cots.

Then the Mizutanis went to dinner in a nearby mess hall. Served "in semi-cafeteria style," dinner consisted of "baked fish with tomatoes, white sauce, carrots, potatoes and sizzling hot coffee." On each table were "bowls of cole slaw and lettuce, bread, jelly, canned cream, sugar and a pitcher of water with slight but unmistakable traces of Manzanar dust suspended on it."

After dinner, the elder Mizutanis returned to their room while Tatsumi and Fusako "with borrowed flashlight, went back to the induction building to find their luggage." The evacuees "were still coming in, lined up and waiting, old folks, women and children. They stayed patiently, even though the last ones — including mothers with babies in their arms, cold and tired, without food since the box lunches [on the train] at noon — waited until after 10 o'clock."

Among those still being processed were old family friends — the Charles Miyaji family from Venice. The children of Charles and his wife were daughter Tatsuko, a graduate of Santa Monica Junior College, and son Masanobu, a senior in chemical engineering at the University of California, Los Angeles. Both young people were volunteers who had come to Manzanar earlier and were working in the administration building. The young Mizutanis and the young Miyajis arranged for the two families to share the same quarters, and the Miyaji family moved into block 6, building 3, room 3. The problem of privacy was solved temporarily with "a rope and a blanket."

Besides being a sanitary inspector, Tatsumi was also a member of the camp entertainment committee. The night his family arrived at Manzanar, a camp dance was scheduled in the recreation building. The general idea, he said, was "to have a get-together between the Japanese from Los Angeles and the Japanese from Bainbridge Island." The social occasion, however, was largely a failure. Silverman noted that the

Bainbridge younger set did not attend. Only a few of the Los Angeles crowd appeared, for most were still helping the new arrivals get settled, but a dozen couples — with the inevitable stag line — came to the recreation building to dance to the special collection of phonograph records. It was jive, jive, and jive. Rhumbas, tangos and even the sweet waltzes were jeered off the program.

By order of the camp management, the dance ended at 10 o'clock. At 10:30 the Miyajis and the Mizutanis and most of the camp residents were in bed.

Soon after midnight, a "south wind" began howling, and the next morning the sun "came up through a dirty haze of dust." The Mizutanis awoke to a "grimy world." Dust and dirt were "on their beds, on the floor, in their hair, crunchy between their teeth. The latrines closest to their quarters had not yet been connected with water pipes. Thus, they braved the wind and went to the south border of the camp "where a big water pipe (serving also as the official boundary) had been tapped every few blocks with faucets."

They washed the grime off their hands and faces, but "new dust was plastered on before they could dry themselves." Giving up, the family — "eyes squinted, handkerchiefs or hands over their mouths" — made their way to their mess hall.

According to Silverman, there were

no windows in the mess hall, only fine wire screens, but fortunately the screens were on the east and west sides of the building, and the south wind blew the dust clouds right past them. Breakfast — prunes, hash, coffee, jam and bread — brought a general upswing in spirits. Hundreds of family groups, eating together around the big tables, were gathered there; they were all wind-buffed, all grimy, all hungry.

Young Japanese girls stood at the serving tables, passing out small bottles of milk to the children as they passed by, and offering fruit juice to mothers carrying small babies.

In his role as sanitary inspector, Tatsumi Mizutani observed that the dishwashers were dirty. The plates came "through their hands still covered with bits of grease and collected coatings of dust." They were "passed out in that condition, still half-wet, to late diners just getting into line."

After breakfast, the young Mizutanis walked to the new post office that had been established on April 1. For reasons of speed and efficiency, the Manzanar post office had been established as a branch of the Los Angeles post office, "making possible an oddity — a two-cent rate for a 223 mile trip, whereas a letter from Manzanar to Lone Pine, only 9 miles away, would cost three-cents." Two of the clerks at the post office were Japanese,

both regular postal employees from Los Angeles and San Francisco "with civil service ratings, both 'on leave.'" Officials had received requests to open a postal savings bank service, because many of the evacuees had "brought hundreds or even thousands of dollars in currency with them." Many others had defense stamps and bonds.

In back of the post office, the desert, according to Silverman, stretched off to the south — "miles and miles of mesquite and rabbit brush, some of it higher than a man." Off to one side were the new barracks being constructed for the military police. To the other, "marked by dense clouds of dust near the ground, were nearly a hundred Japanese workmen clearing out the desert brush with hoes, rakes and axes."

The young Mizutanis walked to the "temporary little hospital only a few buildings away" to receive their compulsory smallpox and typhoid vaccinations. Working in two teams, the four doctors and four nurses, all Japanese, administered the vaccinations under the guidance of Dr. James Goto, who had been a surgeon at the Los Angeles General Hospital prior to the evacuation.

Tatsumi and Fusako Mizutani next walked to the canteen stocked with soft drinks, candy, cigarettes, cigars, pipes, smoking tobacco, gum, stationery, soap, toiletries, baby foods, and "standard" medicines. While there, one army clerk reportedly exclaimed:

Everything will be O.K. if we can just keep up on pipes and cokes. . . . We've gone through dozens of pipes, and 120 cases of soft drinks in two days. Getting lots of special orders, too. The Japs want wash basins and boots and sweatshirts and especially dust goggles. We'll try to get 'em in town.

The young Mizutanis returned to their family quarters to find that their parents had "started to make a home out of the bare room." Wood picked up from the scrap pile "had become needed shelves." Nails were turned "into clothes hooks." A mirror "was fastened to the wall, surrounded by an array of brushes, combs, cosmetics and similar paraphernalia." On top of the oil stove were "a battered teapot and a package of tea."

According to Silverman, evacuees throughout the camp were making similar interior improvements. Few families had brought curtains, but many "prepared substitutes out of colorful dish towels." Woodworkers, "at least one amateur or professional in a family, turned out tables, stools, chairs, benches, shelves, necktie racks, cupboards, and 'geta' — simple 'shoes on stilts' each made from three pieces of wood and a few inches of cord, ideal for elevated transportation over dusty ground between room and showers."

Many windows, according to Silverman, had a decoration "slightly surprising to spot in an an evacuation camp for suspected aliens." These included "red, white and blue service flags with one, two or even three stars to signify sons serving in the United States Army." In many rooms were photographs of "a son in army uniform."

Other rooms, especially the men's barracks, indicated that "college freshmen lived there." Walls were plastered with "college pennants — California, Stanford, U.C.L.A., Southern California, Washington, Oregon and a dozen different junior colleges." There were "clipped pages from *Esquire*, sketches by Petty, photographs that would scandalize any American or Japanese mother, rooters' caps, football trophies, an examination paper with a

heavily-circled A-plus, a few tattered textbooks brought along 'just in case,' new issues of Life, the sporting section of the Los Angeles Times." Outside, collegiate residents nailed placards to building walls with "titles of their own choosing — 'Penthouse #4,' 'The Island Club,' 'Pesthouse,' 'Love Nest,' 'Waldorf Astoria, Jr.'" Only a few of the signs were written in Japanese. Tatsumi told Silverman that while most "of our crowd can speak at least a little Japanese" few "can read or write it."

For lunch on their first full day at camp, the Mizutanis had chili, potatoes, turnips, salad, bread, pickles, and tea. The wind let up around noon, and the evacuees "began breathing again without benefit of handkerchief filters."

Tatsumi told Silverman that one of the most pressing problems facing Manzanar was what should be done with "the Japanese from Terminal Island." "They don't want to mix with the Los Angeles Japanese. And if we get some from San Francisco and San Diego and Sacramento, we're going to have still more trouble." Eventually "we'll have to realize there are a lot of 'grass widows' and 'temporary orphans' here — wives and children of men who've been picked up by the FBI and sent to concentration camps." If we have any trouble here, they will "probably be the ones to start it."

Even a "casual once-over at Manzanar," according to Silverman "revealed a startling absence of men between the ages of 20 and 50, a situation that emphasized the staggering number of children." Children were everywhere, playing in the streets and around the barracks, falling into excavations, and standing "along the big water pipe that ran down the southern boundary of the camp."

On the other side of the pipe line, workmen were "throwing houses into place" for the military police "with fascinating speed." Many of the workmen were friendly, bantering and joking with their audience. Some, however, "talked loudly in an accent which they fondly believed was 'pidgin-Japanese.'" Other workmen — "many more than a small minority" — had "filthy, obscene barbs in their talk." They "hooted about the illegitimacy of the Japanese, they compared Japanese with various animals — to the advantage of the latter, they extended coarse invitations to the attractive Japanese girls, they dared the children to place their hands across the pipe-line boundary," hinting that the bayonet-armed military police would then cut their arms off.

Although work had been promised to all evacuees who entered Manzanar, Silverman noted that jobs had been found for only 800 of the more than 2,000 evacuees in the camp. Most of these were part-time jobs, providing work for two or three hours a day. At any one time, therefore, "more than 1500 were standing idle." As of April 3, less than "half a dozen" work projects using Japanese personnel had been started. Approximately "two dozen" young men and women were working as clerks, stenographers, typists and general assistants in the administration building. About the same number were serving in the "Japanese information center — i.e., complaint bureau — under the direction" of Dave Itami, a former Los Angeles newspaperman who had been educated in Japan and at UCLA and George Washington University. Several hundred were clearing nearby desert land, "doing work in hours that two tractors could have accomplished in minutes." "A few hundred others were acting as messenger boys, porters, and general cleaner-uppers, working harder at finding work than at doing it." Other evacuees were cooks, waiters, and dishwashers, most of them occupied only three hours a day. Some worked in the

temporary hospital and the canteen. A "few score men had what came closest to full-time hard work — pruning the hundreds of old Manzanar apple trees."

Under the supervision of Ted Akahoshi, one of the few Japanese aliens given a responsible post at Manzanar, the pruning crews were "rapidly transforming the shabby old orchard into a semblance of its former glory." A graduate of Stanford University in 1913, Akahoshi had been manager of the Los Angeles Produce Merchants Association before the war. Tako Shima, a Los Angeles nurseryman who had spent four years working in apple orchards near Bakersfield, served as foreman of the pruning crews.

The young Mizutanis went to the administration building where Fusako applied for a job. The "major-domo" at the entrance of the building was Elbert Nagashima, a graduate of the University of Southern California in 1938 and, until several weeks before coming to Manzanar, a member of the maintenance staff at Paramount Studios. He passed Fusako to the personnel registration desk, where a crew of Japanese girls were interviewing applicants. There were many more applicants than jobs, but since Fusako listed shorthand, typing, and accounting among her skills, her registration blank was placed in a "special pile," and she was told she might get a job in "a week or two."

According to Silverman, farther back in the administration building — "not readily attainable by Japanese visitors" — were the offices of Clayton Triggs, the camp manager, and Ellis Pulliam, his first assistant. Together with the other administrative workers, many of whom were former WPA officials, Triggs and Pulliam were responsible "for everything that went on inside the boundaries of Manzanar." They were "swamped by every imaginable variety and degree of problem." In many cases, they had "pressing problems to solve but could find no answers." In others, they had the "answers ready, but were blocked by policy, lack of policy, precedent or lack of precedent — for example, the serious threat of delinquency coming from the lack of privacy in crowded barracks was uncovered by policy." Sometimes, the "apparently complete apathy or ignorance of supposedly cooperative agencies was to blame."

One problem facing Triggs and Pulliam was the disposition of the automobiles that the evacuees had driven to Manzanar. The cars were parked in an open field, and their distributor caps were removed and stored. As a result of the fierce dust storms, the cars' exterior finishes and engines were deteriorating. Pulliam thought that the vehicles could be used on the coast and had asked the Army "three times for somebody to come down and appraise the cars, and make a fair deal with the Japanese." Nothing had been done to date, and the dust kept "on wrecking them."²⁴

24. In late April, the Army responded to Pulliam's requests, sending two officials and two "disinterested appraisers" to Manzanar to purchase the evacuees' automobiles. Appraisals were based on the prices listed in the manufacturers' *Blue Book*. Before the appraisers arrived several evacuees sold their vehicles to members of the construction crew. The *Manzanar Free Press* reported on May 2 (p. 5) that the Army planned to "put to immediate use all cars manufactured after 1937." In case the sale of the vehicles was not completed, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, acting as the fiscal agent of the government, was authorized to store the cars at the owner's risk. The newspaper reported on May 6, (p.4) that "Ranging from a Model 'T' Ford, vintage 1925, to a 1941 Chevrolet, 150 automobiles belonging to first arrivals at Manzanar have been sold to the Army, carpenters, and workers here." All vehicles would be removed during the week. Four autos were not sold, because the owners decided not to sell.

Pulliam also voiced his concerns about the school situation to Silverman. He had contacted the state Board of Education, requesting that they start schools at Manzanar early to provide the children with something productive to do. However, the board insisted that it would not start schools at the camp until September, leaving many of the children with considerable idle time.

Between Manzanar and the people of Owens Valley and "ordered to provide protection to both," according to Silverman, were "Lieutenant Harvey Severson and his company of the 747th Battalion of Military Police." The company had been sent to Manzanar from Fort Ord two days before the first Japanese arrived at Manzanar. Severson claimed that his men "don't like this job," because they had "been trained and educated to kill Japs, and here they're supposed to protect them." The majority of the men in the military police company were from Texas, Montana, South Dakota, Iowa, North Carolina, and the New England states. Many of the military police had never seen Japanese people before. Thus, the Japanese "were strange to them, and so were California, the deserts, the Indians from the reservation farther north, [and] the huge snowy Sierra."

During the first days of the camp, the military police had "a chance to meet some of the Japanese — particularly the Japanese girls." When the evacuees began arriving in large numbers, however, the soldiers were "ordered not to talk to their charges." The military police were limited "almost entirely to guard duties, guarding the entrance to the camp, patrolling its borders, standing by when each trainload of Japanese arrived and assisting in the first registration and induction." When off duty, they were not permitted to visit the camp. "To them, more than to the Japanese," according to Silverman, "Manzanar was a concentration camp."

To alleviate the stress and boredom of the military police, Dr. Charles W. Anderson, chairman of the disaster relief committee of the Inyo County Red Cross chapter, was hired to provide a canteen and recreation facilities for the police. Anderson was a Canadian gynecologist who had practiced medicine in Los Angeles for many years prior to establishing his medical office in Bishop in 1935.²⁵

Art Koura

A letter by Art Koura in the collections of the Bainbridge Island Historical Society in Washington provides insight into the experiences and emotions of a rural evacuee from the Puget Sound region following his entry to Manzanar during its early days of operation. Koura, a strawberry farmer on the island at the time of evacuation, later became a decorated veteran of the all-Japanese 442d Regimental Combat Team. In a letter dated April 27, 1942, he wrote:

Today is our twenty-seventh day at Manzanar and all the people from Bainbridge are doing very nicely. Our reputation is very good because we have tried to cooperate in every way possible to make this an ideal camp. I also like to report that practically all able bodied men and women from home are doing some sort

25. Appendix 25, "The Silverman Report," "Project Director's Report," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. I, pp. A-178-217, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 71, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

of work. The girls and ladies are doing such work as kitchen workers, nursery teachers, office girls, nurses helpers at the hospital and many other work in that line. The boys are doing such work as freight hands, truck drivers, camp maintenance, carpenters job, plumbers crew, warehouse clerks and many other odd jobs.

To put our group who are able just about 100 per cent on the working list the old men folks went out to prepare the land for farming. It is the government's plans to make a huge government farm in this valley. I will not actually be working on the farm but I will be greatly interested in its progress because I am working in the Production office as a senior clerk. . . .

Naturally all of us do grumble . . . at different treatments because no matter what happens camp life can't be like home life, but deep in our hearts we are very grateful for the civilized and human way of handling our country has handled this unpleasant task. The greatness of the power of the United States is even clearer to us now and we have every confidence that United States will eventually bring peace to the world with its victories.

The thought that in about three weeks the strawberry season will begin, and I won't be there to help, just about breaks my heart. . . .²⁶

Shiro Nomura

Shiro Nomura, a historian and curator of the Manzanar collection and exhibit at the Eastern California Museum, wrote a series of articles in that institution's *Inyo Museums News Bulletin* between October 1974 and February 1977 concerning his experiences as an evacuee at Manzanar after entering the camp in May 1942. Nomura's parents had emigrated to San Francisco from Hawaii in 1905, and the family was living on a farm in Southern California when Executive Order 9066 was issued. Hoping to keep its extended family members together during the ensuing evacuation, his family had stored many of its belongings in a garage after being evicted from its farm and moved in with relatives in Los Angeles. Originally told that they would go to the Santa Anita Assembly Center, the family was told on the eve of its departure that it would instead be sent directly to Manzanar. The change of instructions meant unpacking and again preparing to leave within 48 hours. Nomura reminisced about this period of uncertainty:

. . . . Further apprehension and fear was aroused for we had heard that Manzanar was in the middle of a God-forsaken desert land. We had seen pictures of the Sahara Desert so we had an idea what it would be like. Our new orders were to take leather hiking boots, heavy clothing, sleeping bags and canned and dried foods. The boots were not only 'made for walking' but for protection against rattlesnakes. The womenfolk were all appalled. The heavy clothing was for the severe winters ahead and the canned and dried foods were for 'emergency food.' A compulsory campout.

26. Art Koura to Mr. Bunkheimer, April 27, 1942, Manuscript Collections, Bainbridge Island Historical Society, Bainbridge Island, Washington.

Nomura observed that the evacuees going by train to Manzanar did not leave from the recently-completed Union Station in Los Angeles. Instead they departed from the train yard near the old Santa Fe depot. Concerning this aspect of the evacuation, he noted:

Talking in low tones and casting furtive glances at the towering MP's, members of families and friends huddled in small groups trying to keep up their spirits. Suddenly at an order barked by the sergeant, the MP's moved in with rifles and bayonets and herded the people like cattle into a large group and unmindful of families and children, proceeded to split them up into small groups. The people already frightened and uneasy were momentarily panicked by the unemotional attitude of the military men in dispensing of their duties. Tempers flared as the menfolk in trying to protect their young confronted the soldiers until the officers intervened and restored order by commanding the soldiers to regroup them into family units. . . .

During the trip to Manzanar the train cars were switched at Barstow. Nomura noted:

As we neared an unknown junction [Barstow] the MPs going from car to car instructed our guards (two guards with rifles in each car) to have us draw our shades during the switching of cars. Apparently the fear of 'white Indians' surrounding and circling the train, whooping and hollering in their hopped-up '36 Fords and attacking 'the yellow pioneer settlers.' I stole a peek from behind the blinds only to find a few passerbys who had stopped curious to the drawn shades. . . .

Nomura went on to describe the evacuees' arrival at Lone Pine and subsequent transfer to buses for the ride to Manzanar:

We reached our transfer point outside of . . . Lone Pine sometime during mid-afternoon. Awaiting us were more military personnel and city officials We grabbed our hand baggage and prepared to board the many Greyhound buses which had been activated to take us on the final leg of our journey. Having learned well from their first encounter, the guards warned us to stay together in family units. . . . Carefully grouping us by seat count the guards (some of the guards had mellowed) assisted the old and the young into the buses as there was a mild scramble for the window seat by the youngsters. . . .

Nomura related his first experiences at Manzanar upon the arrival of his family at the camp:

Shortly, we saw what appeared to be at first a great ball of dirty fog off in the distance but as we approached the camp, it turned out to be one big massive dust storm kicked up by the famous Manzanar wind. We were soon engulfed in it and with visibility near zero the buses turned off Highway 395, moved past the guard house and into camp. We never saw the guard towers with mounted machine guns nor the barbed wire fences till the next day although we experienced the probing searchlights that first night. The strong wind picked up rice-sized sand from the construction area and pelted the sides of the buses like buckshot as it made its way past the barracks.

The buses lined up in the middle of a firebreak between blocks 14 and 15 and we were greeted by the earlier arrivals who in spite of the wind were out to see if their friends or relatives were aboard. . . .

After alighting from the bus, we were directed to mess hall #15 to be registered and to be assigned apartments and army blankets. We were assigned apartments according to size of family and couples without children were forced to share apartments with only sheets or bedspreads, makeshift partitions were put up for a minimum of privacy separating total strangers. This was very embarrassing and degrading situation for most of these unfortunate people. Although we were cramped with six adults in a small room we were of one family which made living endurable. . . .

Nomura had vivid memories of his first morning at Manzanar. His description of his experiences and emotions were undoubtedly representative of many evacuees:

The first morning at Manzanar I awoke with a start to the sharp clanging of bells which seemingly came directly from outside our window in the barracks building. The clanging was instantaneously taken up by other bells off in the distance. This was a new experience, with more to come. . . .

The wind from the previous night had left a film of fine dust over everything. . . . The fuel in the oil stove (the only permanent fixture) had burned itself out sometime during the night and the room was like a cold storage. . . .

Shivering with cold, I sat on the edge of the metal cot and surveyed the room which was to be our permanent residence for an unknown period of time. . . . The cruel transition of living habits and lifestyle from a civilized society to this degrading situation was hard to understand. As I looked around the bare room I could see why the room had lost its heat. The 2" x 4" studs hurriedly and unevenly nailed together stared back at me unashamedly in their stark nudity. The widely spaced 1" x 10"s with their countless knotholes and cloak of tarpaper were hardly adequate to keep the cold out.

Thru the open ceiling I could see the many 2" x 4" cross beams stretching across the room. Exposed above the beams were the 1" x 6"s running parallel the length of the roof and covered with heavy duty roofing paper. Our chandelier was a single 100-watt bulb screwed into a chain switch fixture, dangling forlornly and attached to some black and white wires which ran the length of the roof. Beads of tar hung from the ceiling like small tear drops between the loosely nailed boards. . . . The door was built of flimsy 1" x 4"s and in lieu of door knobs, every door in camp had an identical common latch

The incessant clanging of the bells soon had the rest of the family stirring. . . . The bell was a large brake drum hung from the corner of each mess hall and the noisy clanging was the daily call to chow. . . .

The first morning to greet us was cold, clear and windless. After hurriedly dressing, I grabbed my towel and toiletries and headed for the latrine. I hadn't

really noticed the night before, but the building was divided into two rooms of which the smaller was the shower room with six shower heads and a small dressing area. The main room consisted of eight stools (no partitions) four on each side of a 4 foot wall which housed the plumbing. Lacking in privacy, but a great place to sit and discuss the war. Along the wall near the entrance was the 'community wash basin.' It was a long metal trough with 4 sets of hot and cold faucets with only two drains. Needless to say, it took a while to get accustomed to this whole new set up.

After this initial experience, I joined the family for our first breakfast in camp. We laughingly discussed our morning's impressions. . . .

Nomura went on to discuss the impact of camp life on traditional family life:

Noticeably, as time went by, families dining together became fewer. The young took to eating separately with friends. To reprimand or discipline was difficult in the close confinement of apartments. To send a child off to bed without supper was impossible with so many mess halls available. Encountering the daily carefree atmosphere and the independency bred of irresponsibility the rift of the traditional close-knit families started to surface. . . .

After their first breakfast at Manzanar, the Nomura family began cleaning their quarters and making their residence more hospitable. Nomura noted:

Hearing of our arrival, my nephew Carl, one of the early volunteer residents, dropped by to greet us and to give us a few tips. He managed to get us brooms, mops and hose sorely needed for cleaning. Scrap lumber was available in the blocks still under construction, but Carl warned us of the Patrol. He brought us some lids of cans to cover the knotholes in the floor. . . . On one of these [evacuee] arrival days, a resident [Hikoii Takeuchi] who had been gathering scrap lumber in an area which was still under construction, was shot by an Army guard. Returning with an armload of 'scrap pieces,' he evidently did not understand nor hear the order to halt and was shot as he advanced towards the guard. The victim and the guard were removed immediately to avoid a confrontation with the group waiting for the buses. The bullet wound [to the stomach] proved to be superficial and the immediate action by the internal security department (manned by camp personnel) prevented a major issue. . . .

Summing up his feelings and reactions to Manzanar during his first days in camp, Nomura echoed what many evacuees must of felt as they contemplated their status. He observed:

I recall spending the early days in camp trying to understand the circumstances which led to our 'incarceration behind barbed wires.' What had we done to deserve it? The freedom enjoyed and taken so much for granted had suddenly been stripped from us with some signatures on the bottom line of a lot of legal words in small type. Was the teaching of democracy from grade school so shallow and meant only for others? Were my neighbors really so sad to see us leave, or only waiting to pick up what we were forced to leave behind? Our

stored belongings disappeared. Who were my real friends? With the highway (so near) paralleling the camp, we would sit by the fence looking out at the unchanging landscape, pondering over the many unanswered questions running through our minds. The cliché 'so near and yet so far' must have been born inside Manzanar. The cars and buses, close enough to touch would teasingly slow down, curious to the activity in our camp.²⁷

27. Shiro Nomura, "Inside Manzanar During World War 2," *Inyo Museums News Bulletin*, Part 1, October 1974, Part 2, November 1974, Part 3, December 1974, Part 4, January 1975, Part 5, February 1975, in "Manzanar WW II Camp," Subject History, Vertical Reference Files, Eastern California Museum.



Photo 7: Construction of barracks, Manzanar; photo by Clem Albers, April 2, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.



Photo 8: Construction begins at Manzanar; photo by Clem Albers, April 2, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.



Photo 9: Manzanar War Relocation Center under construction, 1942, looking west.



Photo 10: Barracks under construction, 1942, Manzanar War Relocation Center, looking west.



Photo 11: Evacuees at Lone Pine train station awaiting bus to take them to Manzanar; photo by Francis Stewart, May 29, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.



Photo 12: Vaccination of newcomers, Manzanar; photo by Clem Albers, April 2, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.



Photo 13: Evacuees checking in at Manzanar; photo by Clem Albers, April 2, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.



Photo 14: Evacuee on cot in barracks, Manzanar; photo by Clem Albers, April 2, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.



Photo 15: Unpacking, Yamashita and Takai girls, Manzanar; photo by Clem Albers, April 2, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.



Photo 16: Doorway of Block 5, Building 2, Apartment 4, Manzanar; photo by Clem Albers, April 4, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.



Photo 17: Manzanar Post Office; photo by Clem Albers, April 2, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.



Photo 18: Manzanar Free Press office, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Dorothea Lange, July 2, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.



Photo 19: Impounded evacuee automobiles, Manzanar; photo by Clem Albers, April 2, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.



Photo 20: Registering for work, Manzanar; photo by Clem Albers, April 2, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MANZANAR WAR RELOCATION CENTER - 1942-1945

As soon as the Manzanar site was selected, the Western Defense Command hurriedly began development of plans and specifications for construction of the camp.¹ Bids for the general contract to build the camp were opened by the U.S. District Engineer's Office in Los Angeles on March 5, approximately one week after the site for Manzanar was selected. The following day, Griffith and Company of Los Angeles received the general contract for construction of the temporary buildings and structures that would form the core of the camp at Manzanar, including installation of plumbing equipment and fuel oil lines.

During subsequent weeks, other contracts were let by the Corps of Engineers for construction of basic facilities at Manzanar, including water and sewage disposal systems, electrical, telephone, fire, and police signal systems, and buildings and structures (military police, administration, hospital, warehouses, industrial, oil storage, observation or watch towers, and fencing). Each of these contracts was supervised by the U.S. District Engineer's Office in Los Angeles. Funding for the construction was provided from the President's Emergency Fund.²

While construction of the Manzanar facilities was underway, the War Relocation Authority and the War Department reached an agreement on May 18, 1942, for administrative transfer of the camp from the WCCA to the WRA effective June 1. The construction program originally conceived by the WCCA and the WRA for relocation or reception centers was based on the requirements of Sections 5 and 7 of the Memorandum of Agreement that had been negotiated by the WRA and the War Department on April 17, 1942. Section 5 of the agreement stated that construction "of initial facilities at Relocation Centers (Reception Centers)" would be "accomplished by the War Department." The initial construction would include "all facilities necessary to provide the minimum essentials of living, viz., shelter, hospital, mess, sanitary facilities, administration building, housing for relocation staff, post office, store houses, essential refrigeration equipment, and military police housing." War Department construction would not include "refinements such as schools, churches and other community planning adjuncts." Section 7 of the agreement provided that after taking over existing reception centers, such as Manzanar, the WRA would operate them and "be prepared to accept successive increments of evacuees as construction " was "completed and supplies and equipment" were delivered.³

Thus, while Manzanar came under WRA administration on June 1, construction of the basic facilities at the camp continued under the Corps of Engineers in order "to meet

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1. No plans, specifications, drawings, or contracts for the initial construction of Manzanar were located during research for this study.
 2. "Final Report, Operations Division," E. J. Utz, Chief, Operations Division, March 1946, p. 16, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 223, File No.24.052B, "Final Reports, 'Final Report, Operations.'"
 3. "Memorandum of Agreement Between the War Department and War Relocation Authority," April 17, 1942, and "Transfer Agreement Between War Department and War Relocation authority Pertaining to Manzanar Relocation Area," June 1, 1942, printed in U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 239-40, 46-47.

minimum living requirements." After the basic facilities were completed, the WRA undertook various construction and remodeling projects at Manzanar within its Construction and Improvement Program, primarily using evacuee labor to conduct the work "under a force account system." The WRA construction projects included new buildings and structures, additions to existing structures, utility extension, remodeling, and refrigeration improvements.

Some the initial land improvements at Manzanar, including land clearing and development and construction of irrigation and drainage facilities, streets, roads, and bridges, were carried out by contract under the supervision of the Corps of Engineers. Most of these improvements, however, would be conducted later by the WRA using evacuee labor.

On June 8, 1942, about one week after the WRA assumed administration of Manzanar, Lieutenant General DeWitt and Colonel L. R. Groves of the Office of the Chief of Engineers agreed on "Standards and Details — Construction of Japanese Evacuee Reception Centers."⁴ The standards were issued to provide "uniformity of construction" and "to obviate the necessity of miscellaneous correspondence in connection with construction of Reception Centers in Relocation Areas." The standards were to be followed "in all future construction and to the extent possible in current construction of Japanese Evacuee Reception Centers." This document, along with its several supplements, outlined the basic general facilities to be provided by the Corps of Engineers. Although many of the basic facilities at Manzanar were completed or in process of construction by the time that the standards were approved, they influenced the completion of the basic construction at Manzanar under the Corps of Engineers.⁵

Virtually all construction under the Corps of Engineers was conducted by contract. In some cases, delays in the delivery of building materials slowed construction projects. Because the Engineers' services were needed elsewhere, arrangements were made whereby WRA forces assumed responsibility for construction when the materials were finally received. Short and hurried time schedules, employment of inexperienced workmen, inclement weather, and use of lower grade materials all made "for a low standard of construction, which, it soon developed, raised many problems in connection with operation and maintenance."⁶

The *Final Report, Manzanar* contained an "Engineering Section" which detailed the "story of the construction of the Manzanar War Relocation Center, its maintenance, and operation from March 1942, to November 1945." The section was prepared by Arthur M. Sandridge,

4. See Chapter Five of this study for more information concerning the adoption of the "Standards and Details."

5. See Memorandum, "Additional Construction — Japanese Reception Centers," To the Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, U.S.E.D., June 23, 1942, for required additional construction at Manzanar by the Corps of Engineers to conform with the "Standard and Details" after the WRA took over administration of the camp. RG 210, Entry 38, Subject-Classified General Files of the San Francisco Regional Office, 1942, Box 50, File No. 670, "Engineering and Construction, 1942, General (Thru November)."

6. War Relocation Authority, "Record of Construction of War Relocation Authority Centers," August 1, 1943, Prepared by the Engineering Section of the Washington Staff On the Basis of All Existing Records As Of June 30, 1943, p. 2, RG 210, Entry 2, Headquarters Basic Documentation: General, 1941-46, File, "Washington Office Records, Washington Documents, Engineering Section — Operations Division."

senior engineer at Manzanar from June 16, 1942 to February 15, 1946, and Oliver E. Sisler, Superintendent, Maintenance and Construction, from October 12, 1942 to February 15, 1946. The report divided the construction story of the camp into three sections: (1) the "basic construction" of camp facilities, including buildings and structures, water, sewage disposal, electrical, telephone, and fire/police signal systems, and initial land improvements, constructed under the supervision of the Corps of Engineers of the Los Angeles District; (2) WRA construction, including major new construction, utility extension, remodeling, and refrigeration improvements, performed under a force account system primarily using evacuee labor; and (3) land improvements, including clearing and development, irrigation and drainage, streets and roads, bridges, and fencing. Except where otherwise noted, this chapter will be based largely on the information found in the "Engineering Section" of the *Final Report, Manzanar*.⁷

"BASIC CONSTRUCTION" UNDER THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS

Buildings and Structures

General Group. Griffith and Company of Los Angeles were the general contractors for all temporary buildings and structures, collectively referred to as the "general group," at Manzanar. This construction, which provided the housing and necessary support facilities for the evacuees, included the installation and furnishing of all plumbing equipment and fuel oil lines. Construction of the "general group" began in mid-March 1942, and Blocks 29-36, the last blocks to be completed, were opened to evacuees for occupancy during mid-June. The type size, use and number of buildings constructed as part of the "general group" were as follows:

7. "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 989-1064, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports." In addition to the "Engineering Section," information on construction and buildings at Manzanar may be found in "Appraisal Report, Buildings, Improvements, and Designated Personal Property, Manzanar Relocation Center, Manzanar, California," April 26, 1946, and "United States Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, Manzanar Relocation Center, Manzanar, California, Fixed Asset Inventory, November 15, 1945." These two documents, hereinafter referred to as "Appraisal Report" and "Fixed Asset Inventory," may be found in RG 210, National Archives and Records Administration, Archives I, Washington, D.C.; Record Group 49, Records of the Bureau of Land Management, San Francisco Regional Office, Division of Land Planning, Records Related to the Disposal of Manzanar and Tule Lake War Relocation Centers, 1945-48, Boxes 918-919, Manzanar-Service Record Cards to Manzanar — Inventories, National Archives and Records Administration, Pacific Sierra Region, San Bruno, California; and Record Group 270, Records of the War Assets Administration, California, Real Property Disposal Case Files, Box 89, National Archives and Records Administration, Pacific Southwest Region, Laguna Niguel, California.

TYPE	SIZE IN FEET	USE	NUMBER
Barracks	20 x 100	Evacuee	504
Mess halls	40 x 100	Evacuee	36
Bath and latrines	20 x 30	Evacuee	72
Recreation halls	20 x 100	Evacuee	36
Ironing rooms	20 x 28	Evacuee	36
Laundries (cement floor)	20 x 50	Evacuee	36
Warehouses	20 x 100	Storage	40
Car garages (no floors)	20 x 100	Government cars	2
Truck garages (no floors)	20 x 100	Government trucks	2
Total			764⁸

The buildings were grouped in uniform block arrangement. Each block consisted of 15 barracks and a mess hall in "exact 40-feet-apart locations." In addition, each block had two latrines (men and women), a laundry room (20 feet x 40 feet), and an ironing room between the rows. The men's latrine had eight flush toilets, while the women's had twelve. Each latrine had a shower room (12 feet x 12 feet) with an average of seven shower nozzles, and each laundry room had 12 laundry tubs for clothes washing "by hand, scrub board method."⁹

The temporary buildings and structures in the "general group" were "regular Army Theater of Operations (T.O.) type of construction, supported on precast concrete blocks, 14 in. x 14 in. x 8 in." The blocks were "placed on 10-foot centers down the sides and through the center." Girders were constructed of "2 in. x 6 in. material, spiked together to form 2 in. x 6 in. for the outside and 6 in. x 6 in. for the center span, supported 2 in. x 6 in. floor joist spaced 2 feet on centers." The floors were "1 in. x 6 in. tongue and groove or 1 in. x 6 in. shiplap." The walls "were framed from 2 in. x 6 in. material spaced 8 feet on centers." A "2 in. x 4 in. nailing girt, spaced half the distance between the top and bottom plates, furnished center nailing for the sheeting that was applied vertically." The rafters were "of 2 in. x 4 in. material spaced 48 inches on centers with a double 1 in. x 6 in. ceiling joist or cord, and 2 in. x 6 in. knee bracing on every other set of rafters." The roof was sheeted "with 1-inch random width sheeting and covered with 45-pound roll roofing." The walls and gables "were covered with 15-pound building paper, held in place by 3/8 in. x 2 in. lath or batts." The "barrack-type buildings were equipped with sliding 4-light sash windows, size 36 in. x 40 in., and 12 sash on each side." The warehouse group had "the same type window but was reduced to six windows to each side with a 5 ft. x 7 ft. double door in each end."¹⁰

8. "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 995-96, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

9. "project Report No. 64," October 30, 1942, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 70, Files, "Manzanar Project Reports."

10. "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 995-96, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports," and "Project Report No. 3," June 15, 1942, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 70, File, "Manzanar Project Reports."

Military Police Group. Griffith and Company constructed 12 buildings that comprised the "military police group" located south of the Manzanar evacuee camp area. Construction of the "Military Post was typical of the general group in the Center" with several exceptions. Thus, construction of these buildings was sometimes referred to as "modified mobilization type." The exterior walls were covered with "1 in. x 10 in. drop siding," and the "interior walls and ceilings were lined with 1/2-inch sheet rock." All exterior walls were painted as "a protection against the weather." The four barracks buildings were designed to house 200 men. The officers' quarters, designed to house 12 officers, included seven bedrooms, one lounge, and a toilet, while the guard house included a gun room and a "cage." The motor repair building, or garage, was an open shed designed for 8 trucks and automobiles. The recreation building was designed for a capacity of 60 persons, while the mess hall was designed to feed 120 men at one time. The type, size in feet, and number of buildings in the "military police group" included:

TYPE	SIZE IN FEET	NUMBER
Barracks	20 x 100	4
Officers' quarters	20 x 100	1
Administration and store room	20 x 100	1
Recreation building	20 x 100	1
Mess hall	20 x 100	1
Guardhouse	20 x 50	1
First aid station	20 x 28	1
Bath and latrines (cement floors)	20 x 30	1
Motor repair building (cement floors)	31 x 79	1
Total		12 ¹¹

Administration Group. Twelve buildings, constructed south of Block 1 by Griffith and Company, constituted the "administration group." The administration building (labeled in the chart below as "Administration buildings,") was an "L"-shaped building constructed by placing together two pre-existing 20- foot x 100-foot structures. The interior of the structure had interior offices separated by partitions. This building, completed in late July or early August 1942, was located near the main entrance to Manzanar and was the principal administrative building for the camp.

The buildings in the "administrative group" were constructed similar to those in the "military police group" with two exceptions. The reception building, built to accommodate visitors to the camp who wished to meet evacuees, and the service station were "of the

11. "Final Report, Operations Division," E. J. Utz, March 1946, p. 19, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 223, File No. 24.052B; "Engineering Section, *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, p. 997, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports;" "Transfer of New Construction," Owens Valley Reception Center, November 5, 1942, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 315, File No. 43.503 #1, "November 1942 — December 1944;" and "Manzanar War Relocation Center," Inspected by C. H. Powers, Hervey Brown, Jr., Lt. R. M. Newberry, H. H. Moore, and Thomas C. Ray, November 57, 1942, Record Group 338, Records of U.S. Army Commands, 1942 —, Western Defence Command and 4th Army, Wartime Civil Control Administration and Civil Affairs Division, Central Correspondence, 1942-46, Box 56, File No. 323 3/32, "Manzanar (Riot)," National Archives and Records Administration, Archives I, Washington, D.C.

same construction as those in the general group." The type, size in feet, use, and number of buildings in the "administration group" included:

TYPE	SIZE IN FEET	USE	NUMBER
Administration buildings	40 x 100	Offices	2
Administrative service station	20 x 30	Storage	1
Family apartment buildings	20 x 100	4 apartments each	2
Men's dormitories	20 x 100	6 apartments each	2
Women's dormitories	20 x 100	6 apartments each	2
Provost building	20 x 100	Community government	1
Mess hall	20 x 100	Dining room	1
Reception building	20 x 100	Visitor reception	1 (police station)
Total			12 ¹²

Hospital Group, Including Children's Village. When the first evacuees arrived at Manzanar, it did not have a permanent hospital facility. A temporary facility was established on March 21, 1942, in Block 1, Building 2. "Apartment 2" was used for the hospital facility, and Apartment 3 served as a temporary ward containing five beds. On April 13 the hospital was moved into a barracks building partitioned into units containing ten beds each, as well as an operating room, pharmacy, laboratory, x-ray room, sterilizing room, utility room, linen room, record room, and kitchen. Four more barracks were eventually acquired for additional patients.¹³

On July 22, 1942, the Manzanar hospital moved into a permanent 250-bed facility (having 563,087 square feet of floor space) west of Blocks 29 and 34, and on September 12 a formal dedication ceremony was held. The "hospital group" included 19 buildings that were constructed by Griffith and Company. The administrative building was divided into offices, an out-patient clinic, an ear, nose, and throat clinic, a pharmacy, sterilizing room, laboratory, and facilities for x-ray, minor surgery, and surgery.¹⁴

The hospital buildings were of "the same type of construction as the general group with the exception of the heating plant." This building was "wood frame construction with the walls and roof covered with galvanized corrugated iron." All other buildings within the "hospital group" were "spaced a minimum of 50 feet apart and connected with covered walks" and were "of wood-frame construction with wood floors covered with linoleum." The covered walks were "8 ft. 3 in. from the finished floor to the top of the plate line, with an overall width of 6 ft. 7 in."

12. "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 997-98, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports;" and "Project Report No. 23," July 16, 1942, and "Project Report No. 25," July 24, 1942, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 70, File, "Manzanar Project Reports."

13. "Progress Report of the Manzanar Hospital," n.d., Box 15, File, "WRA-Hospital," Coll. 122, Department of Special Collections, UCLA.

14. *Ibid.*; and "Project Report No. 12," June 30, 1942, and "Project Report No. 51," September 17, 1942, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 70, File, "Manzanar Project Reports."

The walks connecting the hospital administration building with the wards, mess hall, and morgue "were closed on the sides with double-hung windows spaced, approximately, 9 feet on centers." The "walks connecting the nurses' and doctors' quarters to the ward walks were open on the sides with a hand rail extending the full length of each walk."

The heating system consisted of three "Kewanee 60-H.P. oil-fired steam boilers, equipped with Johnston automatic oil burners, and all necessary piping valves, pumps, and radiators for complete and adequate heating of all buildings, and for washing and sterilizing in all wards, operating rooms, offices, clinics, and laundry." The Children's Village (orphanage) buildings were in a separate building group, and each building was heated "by oil-burning space heaters." The hot water system for the hospital group consisted of "one 60-gallon H.C. Little automatic hot-water heater for each building."¹⁵

The Children's Village was an orphanage for evacuated Japanese children located in the firebreak south of Block 29. One of the buildings was a girls dormitory, one a boys dormitory, and a third contained a mess hall, administrative offices, and staff housing. As the three buildings comprising the Children's Village were nearing completion in mid-June 1942, it was reported that these structures were "larger than the standard barracks, having porches at each end." Compared with the evacuee barracks, the village buildings were "superior in construction, having double flooring, double walls, ceiling, double partitions, inside showers and toilet facilities."¹⁶

The type, size in feet, capacity, and number of buildings in the "hospital group" included:

TYPE	SIZE IN FEET	CAPACITY	NUMBER
Administration	255 x 147		1
Obstetrical ward	25 x 150½	35 beds	1
General wards	25 x 150½	37 beds each	4
Isolation wards	25 x 150½		2
Mess hall	40 x 60		1
Doctors' quarters	20 x 100	5 doctors	1
Nurses' quarters	20 x 100	23 nurses	1
Hospital laundry	20 x 100		1
Hospital morgue	23 x 33½		1
Heating plant	40 x 38		1
Warehouses	20 x 100		2
Children's village	25 x 150	33 beds each	3
Total			19 ¹⁷

15. "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 998-99, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

16. "Project Report No. 3," June 15, 1942, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 70, File, "Manzanar Project Reports."

17. "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, p. 999, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

Miscellaneous Group.

Refrigerator Warehouses — Two refrigerator warehouses were constructed under a contract sublet by Griffith and Company to Hugh Robinson and Sons of Los Angeles in the warehouse area south of Block 2 and west of the "administrative group" area in July 1942. The two structures "had an overall size of 20 ft. x 100 ft. with approximately 7 ft. 6 in. ceilings." The refrigerator rooms "proper were 20 ft. x 80 ft. with 7-ft. ceilings, and were insulated with 6 inches of Palco-wool on the sides, ceilings, and floors." The doors at each end were "3 ft. 6 in. x 6 ft. 6 in." and had "4 inches of Palco-wool for insulation." The interiors of the rooms were sealed with "1-inch tongue-and-groove ceilings." The exterior finish was "1-inch sheeting covered with 15-pound building paper and 3/8 in. x 2 in. batts to hold the paper in place." A 20-foot x 40-foot annex (sometimes referred to as the "reefer house"), connecting the two structures, "was used for meat cutting and the sorting of fruits and vegetables."

Each warehouse had "four evaporator condensers, recold humid-air type." Operating on defrost they "maintained a 34-degree to 36-degree temperature in the meat refrigerator, and 38- to 40-degree temperature in the vegetable refrigerator."

The compressor and condensing units were housed "in a 10 ft. x 10 ft. room, an integral part of the refrigerator rooms." The compressors were "Brunner, model E, Type C, driven by a 7 1/2-H.P. 220-volt, 3-phase Fairbanks Morse electric motors." Drayer Hanson condensing units, "model 11/4-inch, L-3, 1/4-H.P.," were used on both units.¹⁸

Net Garnishing or Camouflage Buildings — Five buildings were constructed at Manzanar by the Q.R.S. Neon Corporation of Los Angeles for "garnishing or camouflaging" nets for Army use. Three of these buildings were of uniform size and construction: 300 feet x 24 feet with an overall height of 18 feet from the finished floor to the plate line. Two buildings had additions that served as offices: 12 feet x 20 feet with shed roofs.

The camouflage buildings exhibited "heavy construction" techniques. Posts "measuring 6 in. x 12 in. on 10-foot centers supported a double set of 2 in. x 6 in. rafters bolted to each side of the post." The rafters were "tied together with a 2 in. x 6 in. cord and 2 in. x 6 in. knee braces, extending from approximately 2 feet below the plate line forming a modified form of scissors truss." Intermediate "2 in. x 6 in. rafters with 2 in. x 6 in. cords and spaced 2 feet on centers completed the roof framing." The roof "was covered with 1-inch random-width sheeting laid diagonally and covered with 90-pound roll roofing."

The walls were constructed with "two horizontal 2 in. x 6 in. nailing girts and 2 in. x 6 in. verticals spaced on 2-foot centers." The sides were "covered with 10-inch drop siding from the floor to 10 feet above." The ends were "covered from the floor to the ridge." The walls were braced "with 2 in. x 6 in. bracing." Cement floors were constructed throughout the buildings.

Another building in this group, typical in construction detail except for size, was "24 ft. x 100 ft. with an adjoining open shed for storage 60 ft. x 100 ft." This shed had "8-foot walls

18. "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 1000-01, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

open on one side, and covered on one side and one end with 10-inch drop siding." "Two-by-six rafters, spaced on 4-foot centers were sheeted with 1-inch random-width sheeting and roofed with roll roofing." A wood floor "of 1 in. x 6 in. sheeting" was constructed in this addition.

A fifth structure in the camouflage buildings group was a cutting shed, "150 ft. x 24 ft. 6 in." All the materials necessary for the fabrication of the nets were processed in this building. It was constructed of "2 in. x 4 in. floor joists with 1 in. x 6 in. shiplap flooring, 2 in. x 6 in. studding 8 feet long, spaced on 4-foot centers, 2 in. x 6 in. knee braces with every forth [sic] set of rafters." The rafters were "2 in. x 6 in., spaced 3 ft. 4 in. on centers." One side was left open while the other side was sheeted from the floor to the plate line with 10-inch drop siding." Both ends "were sheeted from the floor to the ridge with the same material."¹⁹

Oil-Storage Tanks and Platforms — Griffith and Company constructed 37 oil-storage tanks and platforms — one in each block of evacuee barracks and one at the military post. The structures were built for the storage of fuel oil for distribution through pipe lines to the hot-water heaters (and later the ranges) in the mess halls, to the hot-water boilers in the boiler rooms attached to the latrines, and to the boiler in the rooms attached to the laundries. Fuel oil was also stored in the tanks for daily distribution to the evacuees for use in the spare heaters in their barracks.

The storage-tank platforms rested on "12-in. x 12-in. concrete piers projecting approximately 12 inches above the natural grade, and of sufficient depth to insure a solid footing." Four posts, "6 in. x 6 in. x 5 ft., spaced 7 feet on centers with a 6 in. x 6 in. cap projecting 2 feet beyond the posts, formed the bents for a deck or floor of 3 in. x 10 in. x 12 ft. Douglas fir." A gable roof, covered with roll roofing, covered the platforms. The roofs were "open on the gables" and were "supported by 2 posts, 4 in. x 4 in. x 5 ft., at each corner with 3 intermediate studs of 2 in. x 4 in. material." Plates, "2 in. x 4 in.," and ties were used for support and for bracing the roof. The "under-structure" was braced "horizontally and diagonally with 2 in. x 6 in. material."

Twelve of the cylindrical galvanized iron tanks had a capacity of 2,450 gallons, while 25 of the tanks had a capacity of 1,250 gallons. Two 6,000-gallon reinforced concrete tanks at the hospital boiler house were used for fuel storage for the hospital. These tanks were buried below grade.²⁰

Observation or Watch Towers — According to the *Final Report*, Manzanar eight wood observation or watch towers were constructed on the perimeter of the camp by Charles I. Summer, a contractor in Lone Pine. The eight watch towers, however, were not all built at the same time. After War Relocation Authority officials visited Manzanar on May 7, 1942, as negotiations were underway for transfer of the center from the WCCA to the WRA, John H. Provinse, chief of the WRA Community Services Section, reported to Milton Eisenhower that it was proposed

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 1001-02.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 1002-03.

to install during the coming week 8 observation and guard towers on the project in order to facilitate the military patrol work. Inasmuch as our direction of effort should be away from surveillance of these people as enemies or as anything else than participant American citizens, it seems extremely undesirable to establish such guard towers. Mr. Fryer [who accompanied Provinse] said that he would do everything he could to prevent their erection. In case they are erected while the project is still in Army control, they could be removed after the War Relocation Authority takes over, or they could be allowed to remain without being used. The military contingent at the present time consists of one company of 99 men and patrols are established around the external confines of the project. . . .²¹

Despite WRA opposition, however, four watchtowers were constructed on the perimeter of the center by late July 1942. On July 31, Manzanar Director Roy Nash observed:

. . . . Four towers with flood lights overlook the Center; the Relocation area is the whole 6,000 tract of which the Center is but a part.

. . . . There is a company of Military Police stationed just south of the Center, whose function it is to maintain a patrol about the entire area during the day; and to man the towers and patrol the Center at night. A telephone is being installed in each tower so that if a fire breaks out, it can immediately be reported. The whole camp is under the eyes of those sentries. . . .²²

During August 31 to September 2, 1942, P. J. Webster, Chief, Lands Division, for the WRA in San Francisco conducted an investigation of Manzanar, focusing on claims of lax security at the relocation center. Among other observations he reported to his superiors on September 7:

I asked Captain Archer and Lt. Buckner of the Military Police whether they thought it was possible for the Japanese to leave the Relocation Center and fish or swim. They said they had heard that the Japanese were doing some fishing and swimming west of the Center, but if this were true they were doing it at a very great risk to their personal safety. They said that there were about 120 soldiers in their unit, and that this made it difficult to post an adequate guard on the west side, twenty-four hours a day. At the present time there are 11 guard posts being maintained on a 24 hour basis. . . . I inspected the guarding service along the west line, which is approximately 7/10 of a mile in length. This area is patrolled, but so lightly that a person could go over the line without being noticed. This is particularly true because there is a trash-burning dump a little distance from the west boundary of the Center. In connection with this dump, a long trench has been excavated and the dirt therefrom forms a long barrier about five feet high. If

21. John H. Provinse, Community Services Section, War Relocation Authority to Milton S. Eisenhower, Director, War Relocation Authority, May 8, 1942, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 293, File No. 41080 #1, "Individual Centers (Manzanar Relocation Center)," May-June 1942.

22. War Relocation Authority, San Francisco Regional Office, "Manzanar From The Inside," p. 10, by Roy Nash, Director, Manzanar War Relocation Project, Manzanar, California, Vertical Files, "Manzanar," Inyo County Library, Independence, California.

a person gets over this barrier he can proceed a considerable distance to the west, out of sight of anyone patrolling the west boundary. Furthermore, at night there are no search lights along the west boundary. . . .

Another statement which Lt. Buckner made emphasizes the attitude of the Military Police and also that they take the patrol service with the utmost seriousness. He said that he, personally, would not be willing to attempt to cross through the beam of light thrown by one of the four search lights now installed for a thousand dollars, even though he had on his soldier's uniform. . . .

Realizing that the patrolling of the west side was not satisfactory, Captain Archer, over a considerable period of time, has been trying to get additional watch towers and search lights. His request has just been approved and plans are now under way for the installation of four more towers, which will make a total of eight. When this installation is completed there will be a tower at each corner, and at the middle point of each of the four sides of the Center. Twelve powerful search lights will be installed which will throw a broad beam of bright light around the entire Center. When this is completed it appears very unlikely that any Japanese will leave the Center without permits during hours of darkness.²³

On August 11, 1942, Lieutenant Colonel Claude B. Washburn of the WCCA inspected the security arrangements at Manzanar. He reported that three guard towers were "needed in back" [west side] of the center. "Guards in [the] rear walk[ed] through brush" and were "unable to see much of their area." "One man alone" had "no protection against attack."²⁴

The last four observation or watch towers at Manzanar were completed by early November 1942. An inspection report by WRA and military officials on November 5-7, 1942, noted that there "Should be 8 [watch or observation towers] at this center." The eight towers in use were "weatherproofed." Searchlights on four of the towers (Nos. 1-4) were wired, while those on four (Nos. 5-8) were not wired.²⁵

The towers, as completed by Summer, were supported on "24 in. x 24 in. concrete piers embedded in the ground a sufficient depth to insure a sound footing" to "take care of the weight and wind load." Each pier had anchor straps to secure the "6 in. x 6 in. corner posts." The towers were "8 feet square at the base and 6 feet square at the top." The corner posts, "6 in. x 6 in., were of Douglas fir." Each tower had two platforms. The lower one (30 feet high), "6 ft. x 10 ft., was enclosed with 2 in. x 6 in. joists and 2 in. x 6 in. flooring with

23. "Report of Investigation at Manzanar Relocation Area, August 31 to September 2, 1942," P. J. Webster, September 7, 1942, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 68, File, "Manzanar, Report of Investigation."

24. Lt. Col. Claude B. Washburne, Chief, Inspection and Fiscal Division, WCCA, "Notes On Manzanar," August 11, 1942, RG 338, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Wartime Civil Control Administration and Civil Affairs Division, Central Correspondence, 1942-46, Box 12, File No. 323.3, "Manzanar."

25. "Manzanar War Relocation Center," Inspected by Powers, *et al.*, November 5-7, 1942, RG 338, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Wartime Civil Control Administration and Civil Affairs Division, Central Correspondence, 1942-46, Box 56, File No. 323 3/32, "Manzanar (Riot)." Also see "Transfer of New Construction," Owens Valley Reception Center, November 5, 1942, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 315, File No. 43.503 #1, "November 1942 — December 1944."

1 in. x 8 in. shiplap and two sash windows, 2 ft. x 3 ft. 6 in., were installed on each side. "The upper platform (40 feet high) was "8 ft. x 12 ft. with 2 in. x 8 in. girders, 2 in. x 6 in. joists, and 2 in. x 6 in. flooring." A railing of "2 in. x 4 in., with 2 in. x 4 in., posts encircled this platform." The towers were "securely braced, both horizontally and diagonally." A "2,000 candle power searchlight was mounted on each tower."²⁶

Fencing — Installation of the fencing at Manzanar is not well documented, and many of the documents appear to provide conflicting information. On July 31, 1942, Roy Nash, director of Manzanar, stated:

The Relocation Center is that district, approximately a mile square, in which all the buildings of Manzanar are located. It is fenced with an ordinary three-strand barbed-wire fence across the front [east side along the highway] and far enough back [west] from the road on either side to control all automobile traffic. Four towers with flood lights overlook the Center; the Relocation area is the whole 6,000 tract of which the Center is but a part.²⁷

The aforementioned inspection of Manzanar conducted on November 5-7, 1942, by WRA and military personnel contained minimal information on fencing. The inspection report stated:

Under contract - 1 side and 1 end completed - balance in 1 week. Net garnish area - completly (sic) enclosed - including timekeeper's shelter and entrance gates.²⁸

In connection with the inspection, the Corps of Engineers prepared a "Transfer of New Construction" form dated November 5, 1942. This document stated that a five-foot- high, five-strand, two-point barbed wire fence, mounted on wood posts, which would eventually run for 19,388 linear feet around the camp, was only half complete.²⁹

The *Final Report, Manzanar* notes that the C. J. Paradise Company, a contracting in Los Angeles, removed "5,000 lineal feet of old fencing" from the Manzanar site and installed "18871 lineal feet of new fence of 5-strand barbed wire around the boundaries of the Center area [evacuee residential area]." This fence "was contracted for through the U.S. Engineers."³⁰

26. "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 1,003-04, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports." For further data on the towers, see "Explanatory Notes," in the aforementioned "Appraisal Report," April 26, 1946.

27. War Relocation Authority, "Manzanar From The Inside," p. 10, by Roy Nash, Vertical Files, "Manzanar," Inyo County Library.

28. "Manzanar War Relocation Center," Inspected by Powers, *et al.*, November 5-7, 1942, RG 338, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Wartime Civil and Civil Affairs Division, Central Correspondence, 1942-46, Box 56, File No. 323 3/32, "Manzanar (Riot)."

29. "Transfer of New Construction," Owens Valley Reception Center, November 5, 1942, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 315, File No. 43.503 #1, "November 1942 — December 1944."

30. "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar* Vol. III, pp. 1,004, 1,046, RG 21, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

The aforementioned "Fixed Asset Inventory" listed three fencing categories at Manzanar that "were acquired" from the WCCA "at the time that the War Relocation Authority took possession of the lands from the War Department."³¹ The categories, as listed in the aforementioned "Appraisal Report," were:

1. Boundary Fence, camp area boundary lines, 5 strands of double barbed wire, 19,380 feet
2. Fence, motor pool area, 5 strands of double barbed wire, 1,020 feet
3. Fence, camouflage building area, 5 strands of double barbed wire, 715 feet³²

The aforementioned "Explanatory Notes" attached to the "Appraisal Report" provide additional information on the fencing at Manzanar. The "Notes" state that the "boundary fence of the main portion of the camp is built of 5 strands of medium heavy barbed wire on sawed fir posts." The fences around the motor pool and camouflage building areas had "a good many rough posts made of locust wood which, although smaller than the sawed posts, is more durable." Some of these latter fences had "7 or 8 wires - a few only 4 wires," but the "average of each enclosure" was selected "as the best method of appraising the value." The number of posts for each category of fencing was: boundary fence, 1,174 posts; motor pool area, 61 posts; camouflage building area, 44 posts.³³

Water and Sewage Disposal Systems

Water. Initially, the water supply for the Manzanar camp was provided on a temporary basis by a water tank located west of Block 24. The tank, which had a capacity of 98,000 gallons, was emptied an average of 15 times each 24-hour period. Because of the inadequacies of this system, construction was begun on a new concrete basin reservoir located northwest of the camp along Shepherd Creek on May 22, 1942.³⁴

The permanent water supply system for Manzanar, which was completed in July 1942, was constructed under contract by Vinson and Pringle, a construction firm in Los Angeles. The system consisted of a concrete dam and settling basin on Shepherd Creek, "approximately 3,250 feet north and west of the Center in T 14 S, R 35 E, Sec. 9." Water was carried through an open cement-lined flume from the settling basin to the storage reservoir. Water passed through a chlorinator on the way to the reservoir. The reservoir, "120 ft. x 180 ft. with a capacity of 540,000 gallons," was constructed "with 45-degree earth embankments reinforced with wire mesh and lined with concrete." Two "14-inch calico gates regulated the water within the reservoir." One gate "emptied into a control spillway and the other emptied into a 14-inch supply line."

31. "Fixed Asset Inventory," November 15, 1945, Land and Fencing, Account No. 34, p. 2.

32. "Appraisal Report," April 26, 1946, p. 29.

33. *Ibid.*, "Explanatory Notes," Fences, (Page 29), Account #34.

34. Ralph Brooks, Director, Works and Maintenance, WCCA to John Heinmiller, Resident Engineer, U.S. Engineers Division, April 23, 1942, RG 210, Entry 48, Subject-Classified General Files, 1942-46, Box 232, File No. 91.025, "United States Engineers Division (U.S.E.D.) General."

Water was carried from the reservoir through "4,650 feet of 14-inch welded steel pipe into a 90,000 gallon steel storage tank." An "8 ft. x 22 ft. chlorinator house of temporary frame construction" was built adjacent to the storage tank for the housing of a "H. T. H. chlorinator machine, Clayton valve, sand traps, meters, and a 6-inch by-pass line." The water line from the reservoir to the storage tank was laid "in the open ditch that carried the temporary water supply into the camp area." This line was insulated by "covering it with an earth fill." Drainage facilities were provided by the "installation of hexagonal wooden culverts placed below the level of the pipe line."

The pipe line and the steel storage tank were constructed by the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power. The pipe line was insulated and the wooden drainage culverts were installed by the C. J. Paradise Company of Los Angeles.

A 12-inch distribution main of welded steel pipe, equipped with 12-inch Sparling meter having a capacity of 2,000 gallons of water per minute, carried water from the storage tank to branch mains throughout the center. The water distribution main system consisted of 5,170 feet of 12-inch, 6,340 feet of 10-inch, 8,822 feet of 8-inch, 29,745 feet of 6-inch cast-iron pipe and 706 feet of galvanized steel pipe. All service lines were "of galvanized iron pipe ranging in size from 3/4-inch to 2 1/2 inches." A total of "40,266 lineal feet of pipe" was used for the system.

An emergency standby system was installed to supplement the water supply "during freezing weather and in the event of a bad fire, which would necessitate the use of more than the normal amount of water supplied by Shepherd Creek." The standby system was installed at well 75 and consisted "of one 10,000-gallon redwood storage tank, and two 4-inch 50 horse power motor driven Fairbanks Morse booster pumps." Water was pumped through a master meter into the storage tank "by the City of Los Angeles pump with a 75 horse power electric motor." The water was pumped from the tank into the mains by the Fairbanks Morse booster pumps. To facilitate the control of water within the center, "34 6-inch, 20 8-inch, 15 10-inch and 8 12-inch gate valves" were installed throughout the water system.

At the time of its completion, the water system provided a daily supply of 1,500,000 gallons of water from Shepherd Creek to the camp. The remainder of the creek's flow went to the Owens River.

Fire protection was provided by the installation of 84 fire hydrants in the center. Additional protection was afforded the hospital by installation of an automatic sprinkler system, consisting of 522 sprinkler heads, placed in seven ward buildings, the hospital mess, and the covered walks. A 3-inch pipe was used in the covered walks, while a 1-inch pipe was used in the wards and mess hall.³⁵

Sewage Disposal. The sewage disposal system at Manzanar, consisting of a collection and outfall system and a sewage treatment plant, was constructed by Vinson and Pringle of

35. "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 989-91, 1,047, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports;" and "Project Report No. 19," July 8, 1942, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 70, File, "Manzanar Project Reports."

Los Angeles. Considered to be one of the most modern sewer systems of its time in California, the system cost some \$150,000 to construct.³⁶

The sewage treatment plant was located approximately 1,000 feet east of the evacuee residential area in T 14 S, R 35 E, SW 1/4 of Sec. 12. Construction of the system was commenced in April 1942, but it was not completed until mid-summer. During the construction period, a temporary septic tank "100 ft. x 20 ft. x 6 ft.," was used, with excess waste being "allowed to run over the desert waste land." All sewage entering this tank was treated with chlorine.³⁷

The collection system within the center "consisted of 2,500 lineal feet of 18-inch, 1,100 lineal feet of 15-inch, and 26,502 lineal feet of 8-inch vitrified clay pipe." A siphon was constructed to carry the outfall line under the Los Angeles Aqueduct. This siphon consisted of two 12-inch cast-iron pipes encased in concrete.

After leaving the outfall sewage line, the raw sewage entered the treatment plant which was located on one acre of land and had a designed capacity of 1,250,000 gallons per day. The plant consisted of seven units: (1) grit chamber; (2) scum and distribution box; (3) clarifier; (4) control house; (5) digester; (6) chlorine contact tank; and (7) sludge beds. Each unit with the exception of the control house and sludge beds was constructed with concrete. At the plant liquid and solid wastes were separated and treated. Any gas extracted went into boilers to be used for heating, while solid wastes passed through a chlorinator and into sludge pits where evaporation converted them into a substance used for fertilizer.³⁸

At the treatment plant sewage first passed through the grit chamber which was equipped with bar screens. Then it entered the parshall flume where the metering and extension of the chlorination system occurred. The sewage left this unit to enter the distribution box, consisting of two calico gates.

The clarifier unit was a tank constructed of concrete, 60 feet in diameter and 9 feet in depth. The tank, with a rate of flow that varied from 500 to 1,750 gallons per minute, was equipped with a mechanism to process the sewage.

The control house, a "32 ft. x 58 ft. frame building with concrete floors, rustic siding and roll roofing," contained an office, laboratory metering gauges, and chlorinator control equipment. Manual and automatic control chlorinators were used, each having a maximum capacity of 200 pounds of chlorine per unit for each 24 hours. Each tank was equipped with a meter to register the flow of chlorine within its working range.

36. "Project Report No. 23," July 16 1942, and "Project Report No. 63," October 30, 1942, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 70, File, "Manzanar Project Reports."

37. "Project Report No. 23," July 16, 1942, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 70, File, "Manzanar Project Reports," and C. G. Gillespie, Chief, Bureau of Sanitary Engineering, California Department of Public Health to Ralph P. Merritt, Project Director, November 17, 1943, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 226, File No. 63,030, "Sewage Disposal."

38. "Project Report No. 23," July 16, 1942, and "Project Report No. 63," October 30, 1942, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 70, File, "Manzanar Project Reports."

The sludge and scum pumps were housed in a concrete pit, "16 ft. x 14 ft. x 5 ft., with a frame roof covered with roll roofing to protect them from the weather."

The sludge digester was the "2-stage type, 40 feet in diameter with 22 feet 6 inches overall water depth." The water depth "in the upper compartment was 12 feet 3 inches and the lower compartment was 10 feet." The digester was arranged "with a horizontal concrete tray separating the lower and upper compartments which were operated in series." Intensive mixing was provided "in the upper compartment followed by quiescent settling in the lower compartment." The two compartments were connected by exterior piping.

The chlorine contact tank was made of reinforced concrete with reinforced concrete baffle walls. The dimensions of the tank were "8 ft. x 16 ft. 6 in. x 38 ft.," and it was "equipped with three standard manhole frames and covers." A "6-inch cast-iron pipe to the scum pump line removed any collection of material in the bottom of the tank." An 18-inch cast-iron influent pipe "served the contact tank from the clarifier." The chlorinated sewage was removed to the drainage area through an 18-inch vitrified clay pipe.

Four sludge drying beds, 50 feet x 100 feet, were constructed. The ground surface was leveled, and dikes or berms 3 1/2 feet high were constructed. Six inches of sand was placed in each bed. The sludge was carried to these beds through a 6-inch cast-iron pipeline.³⁹

Electrical, Telephone, and Fire/Police Signal Systems

Electrical System. Electrical power was supplied to Manzanar by the Los Angeles City Bureau of Power and Light from its power station on nearby Cottonwood Creek. The system consisted of 58,400 lineal feet of overhead distribution lines that provided service to 730 buildings. A master switch controlled the entire camp, and a master meter registered all electricity used within the camp. In addition to lighting the buildings, 190 alley and street lights were served. To service the camp, 79 transformers were installed, ranging in size from 2 kVA to 37 1/2 kVA.⁴⁰

Telephone System. The telephone system was installed by the Interstate Telegraph Company. Telephone wires were strung across arms that were installed on existing power poles. The system included a 40-line switch. To complete the project seven miles of "3-circuit #9 wire" and seven miles of "2-circuit #12 N.B.S. copper wire" were installed.⁴¹

Fire/Police Signal System. A signal system adequate to meet the needs of both the "Fire Protection and Internal Security" sections was installed by the Interstate Telegraph Company under contract with the U.S. Signal Corps. Outside installation included cross arms and "approximately 1,500 feet of lead covered cable and 20,700 lineal feet of 2-wire telephone line." "Inside plant and station equipment" included installation of an additional

39. "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 991-93, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

40. *Ibid.*, p. 994.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 994.

strip of ten jacks in the existing switchboard and "21 telephone instruments, drops, protectors, and appurtenances."⁴²

Land Improvements

Initial land improvements at Manzanar were carried out under contract by the C. J. Paradise Company of Los Angeles. Streets, alleys, and building sites were graded and given a light coat of penetrating oil to permit passage of motor vehicle traffic and enable construction operations to proceed. "No primary grading of the streets or drainage structures," however, was conducted by this firm.⁴³

STATUS OF CONSTRUCTION AT MANZANAR WHEN THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY ASSUMED ADMINISTRATION ON JUNE 1, 1942

When the War Relocation Authority assumed administration of Manzanar on June 1, 1942, George H. Dean, a Senior Information Specialist in the WRA's office in San Francisco, undertook assessment of conditions at the relocation center. After his inspection, he issued a lengthy report describing both the administrative operation and the physical conditions of the camp which then housed 9,671 evacuees. Among his observations on the physical conditions and status of construction at Manzanar were the following:

The War Relocation Authority, in acquiring the Manzanar project, took over a plant consisting of 724 wooden barracks buildings, a hospital group and a children's center. . . .

In many instances, especially on those days when heavy arrivals of evacuees occurred, assignments to the barracks have been made perhaps inevitably in an indiscriminate manner, resulting in serious overcrowding in some of the buildings. Many cases existed of eight and ten persons of various ages being housed in a single apartment, sometimes two and three separate family units. This has resulted in a health and sanitation problem, and in some scattered instances in an unsatisfactory moral situation.

Floors and walls of the barracks reflected considerable deterioration, large cracks developing from the drying out of the lumber under the heat and low humidity in this area. They were, and are, rough and difficult to keep clean, and on some days as high as nine complaints have been received at the engineering office on floors giving way. Linoleum and felt padding had been ordered for installation in all barracks and mess halls, and the installation in the messes had been completed on June 1. The remainder of the work of laying the linoleum in the barracks will be performed by Japanese labor, but this had to be postponed as white union labor would not work on the project simultaneously with Japanese labor.

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 994-95.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 1,004.

Barracks were turned over to the evacuees without steps and it has been necessary to construct 2,232 sets of steps on which work was about 75 percent complete when lumber supplies were shut off. Considerable difficulty has developed from plumbing valves sticking. Because of the peculiar type of valve used, it is hard to replace them. On the whole, however, the amount of plumbing disorder is not abnormal for a community of this size.

Electrical installations and overloading of the lines because of the large usage of electrical devices, such as irons, heaters and radios, by the evacuees have created a serious fire hazard in all of the barracks. Wiring is openly strung in the buildings. The evacuees have more than five and a half miles of electrical cord connected to electrical accessories. Most of this cord is in good condition at the present time, but with continual overloading of the wires it will deteriorate abnormally quickly. Numerous daily blowing of fuses is evidence of the overloading. . . .

The water supply is not entirely completed. . . . Tests conducted in May revealed a rather high degree of pollution and a trace of B. coli. There has been a comparatively high incidence of dysentery within the project and studies were being made to determine whether this was attributable to pollution of the water supply. . . .

Dishwashing equipment was inadequate and unsanitary. Additional equipment had been ordered prior to June 1 and is in the process of installation. Dr. Harrison, chief of the 5th Public Health District, described the dishwashing situation as the most serious health menace in the project. The supply of hot water, both in the kitchens and wash rooms is adequate under normal usage but is insufficient to meet peak loads.

Sewage from the project is siphoned under the aqueduct east of the camp and spread out over the open land. A disposal plant was commenced by the army prior to June 1 and is under construction. Sectional drainage problems exist and water collects under some of the barracks. Garbage collection generally is handled satisfactorily. It is dumped in an open pit east of the project, burned and buried. No attempt is made to use the wet garbage but plans were being drawn for hog and chicken projects to utilize this waste. . . .

On June 1 no provision had been made for buildings to house the carpenter shop, repair shops, plumbing shops, equipment sheds, or a lumber yard. The shops are being temporarily housed in warehouse buildings. . . . No landscaping work had been done prior to June 1, except for a limited, voluntary improvised project in front of the guayule experiment and plant propagation stations. The absence of landscaping was due to the lack of both equipment and stock. In this respect, the project was substantially as it was when the land first was cleared of the native sagebrush growth. Neither had steps been taken looking towards dust palliation. The project possessed no sprinkler wagon and a limited amount of hosing was done by hand. With the destruction of the natural ground cover, the dust problem is acute on windy days. . . .

The men and women's lavatories were without partitions. . . .

In operation on June 1 were twenty mess halls, each accommodating approximately 500 persons. Sixteen additional block mess halls, completed insofar as physical construction is concerned, were inoperative because of the lack of plumbing facilities and mess equipment. The hospital, personnel and high school messes had not been built. . . .

The hospital facilities at Manzanar on June 1 consisted of a 10-bed improvised hospital in one of the barracks buildings, an isolation ward, an out-patients' clinic and a children's ward. . . .

. . . . Manzanar has a single 500-gallon fire engine borrowed from the United States Forest Service. The fire department crew consisted of a fire chief, three Caucasian [sic] captains and thirty Japanese firemen split among three eight hour shifts. The camp is without a fire alarm system or an inter-barracks telephone system over which the occurrence [sic] of fires might be reported. There is not a telephone to the hospital. During the night, the camp is patrolled by one Japanese for each area of three blocks. For the patrolman to report a fire it would be necessary for him to go by foot to the fire station. Each squad is drilled one hour daily in the use of the fire equipment and extinguishers.

Foamite extinguishers have been installed in the hospital units, each boiler room, laundry building and mess kitchen. Buckets of sand have been placed in the boiler room in each block; all available water barrels with buckets have been placed at strategic locations throughout the center, and residents have been instructed in the use of the improvised equipment until the fire department arrives. Locks have been ordered for fuse boxes to prevent solid fusing with pennies or other devices. Open fires are not allowed without a permit and no permits are issued on windy days after 2 p. m.⁴⁴

CONSTRUCTION AT MANZANAR UNDER THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

After the initial 'basic construction' at Manzanar was completed by contractors working under the supervision of the Corps of Engineers, additional new construction, remodeling of existing structures, utility system extension, and refrigeration and land improvements became the responsibility of the relocation center's Engineering Section. Arthur M. Sandridge, who was appointed by the War Relocation Authority as Senior Engineer at Manzanar in June 1942, provided leadership for this section until February 1946. Sandridge was responsible to the Assistant Project Director in charge of Operations when that position was filled. Otherwise, he was responsible directly to the Project Director. The

44. "Conditions at Manzanar Relocation Area," June 1, 1942, by George H. Dean, Senior Information Specialist, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 293, File No. 41.080 #1, "May — June 1942." Also see R. N. Cozzens, Assistant Regional Director to Roy Nash, Project Director, July 16, 1942, for a list of engineering and construction problems "needed to bring Manzanar camp up to standard for minimum requirements that the Army should have provided." RG 210, Entry 38, Box 50, File No. 670, "Engineering and Construction 1942, Manzanar."

responsibilities of Sandridge included general supervision of the engineering program at Manzanar "so that the efficiency and standards of the section could be maintained for the operation, maintenance, and construction of the Relocation Center." He was also responsible for conducting a training program for supervisors and other appointed WRA personnel in the Engineering Section designed to acquaint them with the policies and methods for training Caucasian and evacuee employees in their respective units. Prior to leaving Manzanar in February 1946, Sandridge observed:

Very few of the Japanese in this Center were carpenters, plumbers, electricians, or trained for the other building trades. This necessitated the small appointed personnel, 8 to 14 people, to train and supervise the evacuees in construction and maintenance for this Center. To obtain a comparison of what this involved, imagine a city of 10,000 people without contractors or repair shops, where the city Engineer's office staff was responsible for training employees, operating the water and sewage plant system, electric distribution, steam plant for the hospital, all hot water boilers, distributing oil for cooking and heating, and doing all the repair work for the entire plant or city, and at the same time to construct houses complete for a staff of approximately 190 employees and their families, a chicken farm for 10,000 chickens, a hog farm for 500 hogs, to construct streets and roads, and an irrigation system for 350 acres of agricultural land developed for growing vegetables for the resident's food supply.

The problems of organizing and training crews for this work was more difficult, due to the fact the evacuees were only paid \$16 to \$19 per month but were furnished quarters and food whether they worked or not.

This program was carried out only by cooperation of the appointed personnel and the evacuees. A great many evacuees worked because of personal loyalty and respect for their supervisors.

Many of the evacuees learned trades such as, surveying, drafting, carpentering, plumbing, painting, refrigerator repairing, boiler and pump operating and to become electricians. . . . The maintenance problem was difficult for several reasons: first, because the temporary buildings deteriorated very fast and required constant repairs; second, because the original plans and construction, especially the utilities, were not planned for easy operation and maintenance. The electrical system had only one main switch which necessitated shutting off the electricity for the entire Center when any repairs were to be made. . . .

The water mains had valves for each six blocks which made it difficult to repair broken mains. . . .

Since the Center was laid out on a hillside with the hospital and blocks 6, 12, 18, and 24 at a higher elevation without any check valves in the water mains, consequently, they had a maximum water pressure of 26 pounds which would decrease to 16 pounds or below when the metal storage tank was low. This caused back siphon, making it necessary to install siphon breakers in the hospital and endangered the fire protection sprinkler system which was designed for 50 pounds pressure. This factor also made it necessary to maintain constant close

supervision over the operation of the high pressure steam boilers. The lower part of the Center had an average pressure of 65 pounds which was adequate.⁴⁵

New Construction

Staff Housing. In January 1943 Manzanar had nine family and 16 single apartments housing 29 WRA employees, one U.S. Post Office employee, and 22 dependents. Thirty-six WRA employees and 42 dependents lived in Independence, five miles north of the camp, Lone Pine, 12 miles south of the camp, and Cartago, 25 miles south of the camp. Seventy-seven employees and nearly 50 dependents were living in what Project Director Merritt described as "evacuee barracks so unsatisfactory that many employees have quit due to housing conditions."⁴⁶ Accordingly, the WRA determined in June 1942 to build wood frame housing for up to 250 staff members based on plans provided by the Farm Security Administration, including a combination of apartments for families and dormitories for single or married staff without children.⁴⁷

Between January 15, 1943, and March 31, 1944, the WRA erected 19 buildings, having a combined area of 32,000 square feet, to house the center's appointed personnel at a cost of \$110,633. The staff housing units, although temporary structures, were more substantial and commodious than the evacuee barracks, including among other things refrigerators, electric ranges, and space heaters.

Of the 19 buildings "14 were of the 4-family unit type, 3 were dormitories, and 1 was a central laundry." One of the "4-family unit type" structures served as a residence for the project director. Eighteen of the structures were constructed south and adjacent to the "administrative group." One four-family unit was built near the hospital group" for use by the center's Chief Medical Officer and appointive nurses.

The four-family unit staff buildings were divided into two two-bedroom and two one-bedroom apartments. Each apartment had a kitchen, living room, and bath. These staff buildings were "20 ft. x 94 ft., supported on three rows of concrete piers spaced 10 feet on centers the full length of the building." Girders "of 6 in. x 10 in. Douglas fir, built up from 2 in. x 10 in. timbers, supported 2 in. x 6 in. floor joists spaced 24 inches on centers." All walls and partitions "were framed from 2 in. x 4 in. Douglas fir excepting the dividing partitions between the apartments." The partitions were constructed with "2 in. x 8 in. plates, top and bottom, with staggered 2 in. x 4 in. studding spaced 24 inches on centers." The double partitions, as well as all water pipes for the adjoining baths and kitchens, were "sound-deadened with Kimsul insulating felt."

45. "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. V, pp. 1,536-40, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 73, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

46. Ralph P. Merritt, Director to Dillon S. Myer, Director, WRA, January 10, 1943, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 312, File No. 43.500, "Construction and Maintenance of Centers (General)."

47. "Materials for War Relocation Authority Community Facilities," June 16 and August 5, 1942, RG 210, Entry 16, Boxes 311 and 313, respectively, File No. 43.500, "Construction and Maintenance of Centers (General)."

The rafters were "2 in. x 4 in. spaced 48 inches on centers with a 1 in. x 6 in. placed flat and midway between each set of rafters." The "1 in. x 6 in. redwood sheeting was securely nailed to the rafters and to the 1 in. x 6 in. which acted as a stiffener for the roof." Roofing was "the split-sheet type, each sheet overlapping the preceding sheet by more than half the width of the roll giving a double thickness to the whole roof."

The building exteriors were covered "with 1 in. x 6 in. V shiplap." A "1 in. x 3 in. sloping water table was placed around the building[s] 4 inches below the finished floor line, and the space below this point was boxed in with 1 in. x 6 in. redwood sheeting, forming a tight base to keep out cold, trash, animals, and the like."

All floors were "single thickness 1 in. x 4 in. tongue-and-groove Douglas fir." The "interiors of these buildings were lined with 3/8-inch plaster board," and "awning-type windows" were "used throughout." Cabinets were installed in each kitchen.

The three dormitories were "the same in type," as the four-family unit staff buildings. Each dormitory was "24 ft. x 140 ft. in size," and each building contained "10 double- and 3 single-bedrooms, 2 shower rooms, 2 toilets, 1 bathroom, 1 linen room, and 1 furnace room." The latter was used as a utility room and was equipped "with 2 double - compartment cement wash trays and a hot-water boiler."

The staff housing building at the hospital for the nurses and the Chief Medical Officer was "of the same type of construction, but was built 10 feet longer, 20 ft. by 104 ft." It contained "a 1-family apartment consisting of a kitchen, living-room, bath, and two bedrooms." The nurses' portion of the structure was divided into "3 double- and 6 single-bedrooms, 2 bathrooms, 1 central living room, and a small kitchen."

The laundry building for the staff housing units was 16 feet x 20 feet and was equipped with tubs and a hot water heater.

Heating for the staff housing buildings, except for the dormitories, was supplied by "H.C. Little oil-burning space heaters." Hot water for the kitchens and bathrooms in the apartments was supplied by a "60-gallon H.C. Little automatic oil-burning hot-water heater, located in a 6 ft. x 8 ft. outside boiler room, built as an integral part of each building." Fuel for the space heaters and hot-water boilers was piped "from a 100-gallon tank centrally located outside and adjacent to each building." Flues were "of 22-gauge galvanized metal, one-piece construction."

The three dormitory buildings were heated from a "central heating plant" installed within the heater room of each structure. This plant consisted of "an H.C. Little D.A.C., size 2, oil burner with forced draft." The heat was forced through "overhead ducts into each room, and was regulated by wall registers." Hot water was supplied by a "60-gallon H.C. Little automatic oil-burning hot-water heater located in the utility room."

All staff housing buildings were supplied "with 120- and 220-volt electrical current, the former for lighting and the latter for cooking." The buildings were "painted two coats on

the exterior wall, interior trim, and floors." The ceilings and interior walls were "painted with cold-water paint or kalsomine."⁴⁸

Gymnasium-Auditorium. The gymnasium-auditorium, generally referred to as the auditorium, consisted of 14,140 square feet of floor space, and was constructed between January 28, 1944, and September 30, 1944, at a cost of \$30,355. The building was located in the firebreak between Blocks 7 and 13 and faced west to B Street.⁴⁹ A ceremony for laying the cornerstone of the building was held on February 19, 1944. The ceremony featured musical numbers by the camp band and the high school chorus, a flag raising ceremony led by George Nishimura, high school student body president, and an address by Project Director Ralph Merritt and a response Kiyoharu Anzai, chairman of the Block Managers Assembly.⁵⁰ This structure, constructed with plans provided by the Farm Security Administration, was the only building of the proposed "school group" to be constructed. Construction of other units for the schools was canceled, and "the school buildings that were used were provided by remodeling existing barrack-type buildings." Construction of the auditorium, which was expected to take three months, was delayed by labor shortages resulting from evacuee relocation and seasonal leave and absence of many young evacuee men who were serving in the military.⁵¹

Construction of the auditorium was supervised by O. E. Sisler, construction superintendent with direct supervision assigned to J. W. Lawing assisted by K. Kunishage, an evacuee resident at Manzanar. Construction of forms for the footings was commenced in early February 1944 by a crew of internees under the foremanship of I. Sakata. The mill work for the door jambs, casings, and interior finish was prepared in the carpenter shop in Warehouse 34 by Jimmy Araki and his evacuee crew. Electrical work was installed by R. D. Feil and an evacuee electrical crew. The plumbing and hot water systems were installed by K. Bowker and an evacuee plumbing crew. Painting and interior decorating was performed by J. Nakahama and an evacuee painting crew.⁵²

The gymnasium-auditorium building was "classified as gymnasium type A." The aforementioned "Appraisal Report" noted that "the best of materials were used in this building." "Even the under floor and the inner sheeting" were constructed "of No. 1 fir and cedar lumber, much of it practically clear of knots or sap." It had an overall width of "118 ft. and a length of 119 ft." The main auditorium floor was "80 x 96 feet square." The stage at the east end of the main floor was approximately four feet high and "22 feet deep with an overall width of 30 feet." On each side and adjacent to the stage were dressing rooms

48. "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 1,005-08, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports," and Memorandum, A. M. Sandridge, Sr. Engineer to Ralph P. Merritt, Project Director, February 17, 1944, Box 13, Folder, "WRA Engineering," Coll. 122, Department of Special Collections, UCLA.

49. *Manzanar Free Press*, January 5, 1944, p. 1.

50. *Ibid.*, February 8, 1944, p. 1; February 12, 1944, p. 1; February 19, 1944, p. 1; and February 23, 1944, p. 1.

51. *Ibid.*, February 23, 1944, p. 1; and "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, p. 1,008, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports." Also see Lee C. Poole, Chairman, Community Auditorium Committee to Mrs. Lucy Adams, Assistant Project Director, Community Management Division, March 8, 1944, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 220, File No. 18.010.

52. *Manzanar Free Press*, February 12, 1944, p. 1.

that "provided space for equipment and stage trappings." A "wooden truss, supported on each end by wooden columns, supported the proscenium arch which had a clearance of 12 feet from the finished floor."

One-story shed-type sections were constructed along "the full length of the main section, and, on each side" of the building. These sections housed "the toilets, dressing-rooms, lockers, and offices." The "one-story shed-type section on the south side" of the building "extended 40 ft. 9 in. beyond the east end and was used as a health unit."

The auditorium building was built "on piers placed approximately 8 feet on centers each way." Girders were "of 6 in. x 10 in. material with 2 in. x 6 in. floor joists, spaced 12 inches on centers." All floors were "double." The subfloor was "of 1 in. x 6 in. Douglas fir shiplap laid diagonally," while the finished floor was "1 in. x 4 in. tongue-and-grooved Douglas fir, sanded and varnished."

The walls of the main section of the building were "of double thickness of 1" lumber" and "20 feet high." Posts, "12 in. x 12 in., supported five Pratt-type wooden trusses." The trusses were constructed with "split ring connectors and bolts." The ceiling joists were "of 2 in. x 6 in. material." Roof purlins were "2 in. x 10 in. lap jointed at each end and solid at each lap." Diagonal sheeting "was laid over the purlins," and "split-sheet roofing was applied, mopped on with hot asphalt."

A "shed-type roof" was built "over the stage," using "2 in. x 12 in. joists spaced on 24-inch centers with 2 rows of solid bridging." "Sheeting of 1 in. x 6 in. shiplap was laid," and "split-sheet roofing was mopped on."

A concrete porch was built across the (west) front of the building "for an entrance to the three sets of double doors." Above the porch was a "moving picture projection booth, 8 ft. 6 in. x 30 ft. 11 in." The booth was divided into two rooms — "one for the machines and other for the rewinding of the films." Both rooms were "lined with fireproof asbestos board." Two inside stairways led from the main floor to the booth, providing "access and a means of escape in case of fire."

The one-story shed section, housing the toilets, dressing rooms, locker rooms, and health unit, was constructed "with 2 in. x 4 in. studding, with 2 in. x 12 in. rafters spaced 24 inches on centers, and bridged with solid blocking, sheeted and roofed, the same as for the other portions of the building."

The exterior wall finish was "1 in. x 6 in. V shiplap painted to protect it from the weather." The interior wall finish was "of the same material." The auditorium ceiling was finished with "1/2-inch fibre board applied to the ceiling joists flush with the underside of the bottom cords of the trusses." All ceilings in other portions of the building were "of the same material."

Heating for the building was provided by "H.C. Little forced draft automatic oil heaters." The heaters were placed "in the most strategic points." Two were under the stage and "forced the heat directly into the main auditorium through screened grills." Two others "were placed at the front, in the room adjacent to the main floor, and supplied heat in [the] main room." Two others were connected "to overhead ducts and forced the hot air

through the grills into the toilets, shower rooms, and offices." The dressing rooms and the health unit were provided with "independent space heaters."

The hot-water system consisted of a "250-gallon Hanson boiler located under the stage and connected with necessary piping running from this point to the health unit, showers, wash rooms, and toilets."

Electric wiring was installed "for the proper illumination and operation of all equipment including four Trane 15 P. projector fans installed in the ceiling of the auditorium." Special "footlights and overhead lighting were provided for the stage."⁵³

The still-unfinished auditorium was first used for a performance of the operata "Loud and Clear," written and directed by Louis Frizzell, the Manzanar high school music instructor, on June 16, 1944. Two days later the graduation ceremony for 177 high school students was held in the auditorium. Visitors from Bishop, Big Pine, Independence, and Lone Pine attended the operata, and more than 1,000 persons attended each event. During the following three months, construction of the auditorium was completed. Considerable "finish carpenter work" and installation of heating units and hot air ducts, as well as painting and landscaping, was completed by September 30.⁵⁴

Poultry Farm. The poultry farm, consisting of 16 buildings having an aggregate floor space of 29,528 square feet, was constructed between July 8, 1943, and December 31, 1943, at a cost of \$21,784. The complex was located "south and west of the Center, adjacent to the fence surrounding the Center." The building complex consisted of two warehouses connected at one end, eight brooder houses, and six laying houses.

The warehouse and office building "was of U-type construction with an overall area" of nearly 3,800 square feet. The warehouse or feed storage space was located "in the two wings, each wing being 20 ft. x 60 ft. with a total floor area of 2,400 sq. ft." The office and egg-storage rooms were "each 16 ft. x 20 ft.," and the dressing and packing room "which connected the two wings was 20 x 30 ft." A butane-fired scalding kettle, used for dressing poultry, was installed in the latter room.

The building was built with "a continuous concrete footing which projected 6 inches above the finished floor line." All floors were "of concrete, troweled to a smooth finish." The walls were constructed "of 2 in. x 4 in. studding plates." The studding was "cut 7 feet long and spaced 2 feet on centers." The walls were completed "by 1 in. x 6 in. sheeting covered with 15-lb. building paper held in place with 3/8 in. x 2 in. batts."

53. "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. II, pp. 1,008-11, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports," and "Explanatory Notes," in "Appraisal Report," April 26, 1946. Construction details relating to the auditorium building may be found in RG 210, Entry 16, Box 315, File No. 43.503 #1, "November 1942 — December 1944." An "Auditorium Ceiling Plan," dated April 17, 1944, may be found in RG 210, Entry 48, Box 220, File No. 18.010, "Auditorium Ceiling Plan."

54. *Manzanar Free Press*, June 3, 1944, p. 1; June 10, 1944, p. 1; June 17, 1944, pp. 1-2; June 21, 1944, p. 1; and September 30, 1944, p. 1. Also see Ralph P. Merritt, Project Director to Dillon S. Myer, Director, War Relocation Authority, June 13, 1944, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 315, File No. 43.503 #1, "November 1942 — December 1944."

The rafters were "of 2 in. x 6 in. material with 2 in. x 4 in. cross ties and bracing spaced 3 feet on centers, covered with 1 in. x 6 in. redwood sheeting and split-sheet roll roofing." The windows were "4 ft. x 2 ft. 4 in. frameless, awning type."

The eight brooder houses were "14 ft. x 24 ft., divided into two equal-sized rooms, each being large enough for the brooding of 500 baby chicks." The floors and foundations were "concrete with the foundation walls projecting 6 inches above the finished floor as a protection against flooding from the storm waters." The studding was "of 2 in. x 4 in. material, spaced 2 feet on centers, cut 6 ft. 6 in. for the back wall and 7 ft. 6 in. for the front wall, making a shed-type roof." The rafters were "2 in. x 4 in. material, spaced on 4 feet centers with 2 in. x 4 in. supports running at right angles to the rafters." Roof sheeting was "1 in. x 6 in. redwood covered with split-sheet roll roofing."

The walls were sheeted with "1 in. x 6 in. shiplap, painted to protect it from the weather." The windows were the "frameless awning type." "Kerosene-burning brooders" were used, vented "through the roof with 6-inch galvanized piping." Outside runs constructed "of chicken netting and wood posts" were constructed the full length of each brooder building. The runs were "16 feet wide and were divided in the center with fencing of the same type."

The six laying houses were each "20 ft. x 192 ft., divided into eight units per building." Each unit had an area of "20 ft. x 24 ft., large enough for the housing of 175 hens." The floors and foundations were "of concrete, the foundation projecting 6 inches above the finished floor" for ease in cleaning.

The walls were framed from "2 in. x 4 in. material, cut 7 feet long and spaced 2 feet on centers with 2 in. x 4 in. plates, top and bottom." The siding was "1 in. x 6 in. shiplap while the roof was framed with 2 in. x 4 in. rafters and 2 in. x 4 in. cords, each set braced to form a truss." They were spaced "4 feet on centers and sheeted with 1 in. x 6 in. redwood." "Split-sheet roll roofing" was used. The dividing partitions "between each unit was 1 in. x 6 in. shiplap with 2 in. x 4 in. studding." Each section was provided with "a 2 ft. x 2 ft. roof vent equipped with a trap door for the regulation of heat and air." "Sufficient roosts and laying boxes" were installed "to adequately care for the maximum number of hens housed in each section." The exteriors "of all buildings were painted to protect them from the weather."

"Outside runs, 20 ft. x 24 ft., of 2-inch mesh chicken wire and wood posts" were constructed for each section or compartment. "Wood feeding troughs" were built "for the feeding of mash and other feed."

Each building in the group was provided with running water "piped in from the center mains" and lighted by electricity "from the connections to the lines within the Center."⁵⁵

Root Cellar. A 2,600-square foot (26 feet x 100 feet) root cellar was constructed between July 5 and October 28, 1943, at a cost of \$1,438. The cellar, located in the area west of the

55. "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 1,011-14, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

former camouflage factory buildings, was designed to provide storage for approximately four tons of root vegetables grown on the Manzanar farm.

Three-fourths of the structure was below ground surface. An excavation was made "6 feet in depth and sufficient in size to receive the building." A continuous footing of concrete was poured across the ends down both sides." Two footings "running lengthwise and spaced 10 feet in from the outside line of the building" were constructed. A "2 in. x 6 in. mud sill was bolted to the outside footings and 2 in. x 6 in. studding 8 feet long, spaced 18 inches on centers with a double 2 in. x 6 in. plate" was installed.

A "2 in. x 6 in. plate" extended through the interior of the building and rested on the interior footings. From this plate and extending to "6 in. x 6 in. girders that supported the rafters, 4 in. x 6 in. posts were placed spaced 10 feet on centers and securely braced with knee braces to the 6 in. x 6 in. plates." Two rows of these posts, "3 feet from the center line of the building, acted as supports for the rafters."

The rafters of the building consisted of "2 in. x 6 in. Douglas fir with 2 in. x 6 in. Douglas fir cords." The roof sheeting was of "1-in. Douglas fir securely nailed." The roof was "90-lb. mineral-surfaced felt roofing."

A center runway, "6 feet wide," extended the "full length of the building" and was "flanked on both sides with storage bins." The bins were equipped "with 1 in. x 6 in. wood floors with 1-in. spacing between the boards which rested on 2 in. x 6 in. floor joists spaced on 24-inch centers raised sufficiently from the ground to allow free circulation of air." Ten bins were installed on each side of the runway, "partitioned off with 1 in. x 6 in. boards with a 1-inch space between each."

Air vents were installed over each bin. They were "2 feet square and extended 2 feet above the finished roof." They were equipped with "manually operated dampers."

The inside of the exterior wall was covered with "1 in. x 6 in. boards from floor to plate line, spaced 1 in. apart."

The outside of the exterior walls was covered with "1-inch random sheeting from the top plate line half way to the mud sill." From this point, an "air vent extended from the front of the building down both sides and connected with a 3 ft. x 3 ft. tunnel vent located in the center of the rear end." The air vent around the building was built by "placing 2 in. x 4 in. supports cut on a 45-degree angle and attached to the studding at a point corresponding to the exterior wall sheathing." The "air-vent rafters or supports were covered with heavy building paper to prevent moisture from entering the building."

A "double refrigerator-type door, 6 ft. x 8 ft.," was installed in one end of the root cellar.

A dirt ramp was graded from "regular grade to the building entrance," providing "easy loading and unloading facilities for produce delivered to and from the building." The building was connected with an electric line to provide light.

The root cellar construction was completed "by back filling around the walls" and "covering the roof with a layer of straw topped off with 8 inches of clay."⁵⁶

Hog Farm. The hog farm, constructed between September 1, 1943, and April 30, 1944, at a cost of \$7,615, was located "2,600 feet from the southwest corner of the Center."

The hog farm's feed storage building was "20 ft. x 80 ft. with the floor and footings of concrete." The footings projected "6 inches above the finished floor" to prevent water from entering the structure and damaging the stored feed. The walls were "8 feet in height, framed with 2 in. x 6 in. studs and plates." The studdings were placed "4 feet on centers with one 2 in. x 6 in. horizontal nailing girt spaced half the distance between the top and bottom plates." Double doors, "6 ft. x 8 ft. were placed in each end." The siding was "1 in. x 8 in. D.F. sheeting covered with 15-lb. building felt held in place by 3/8 in. x 2 in. batts."

The rafters were "2 in. x 4 in. Douglas fir spaced 4 feet on centers." Each set was trussed with "2 in. x 4 in. cords and braced with knee braces on each third set." The roof was sheathed "with 1 in. x 12. Douglas fir and covered with 90-lb. mineral-surfaced roofing."

The farrowing pens and houses were constructed as a unit. They were "sheds 4 feet high on the back and 6 feet high on the front." Studs, "2 in. x 4 in., were used with 1 in. x 6 in. sheeting." The roof was "covered with 45-lb. roll roofing." Each house was divided into "six pens or sections 8 ft. by 5 ft. each with doors both front and rear connecting to outside pens." The pens on one side were provided "with cement floors for feeding." A "concrete gutter or trough, 12 inches wide and 4 inches deep" extended "the full length of the feeding platforms." This gutter was used as a catch trough for non-edible material.

Three hog houses, each "20 feet square, with a partition" equally "dividing the floor space" were constructed. The structures were built from "rough 1-inch material with 2 in. x 4 in. posts." They had "shed-type roofs, 4 feet high on the low side and 6 feet high on the high side." Each house was surrounded "by board panel fencing." The fencing consisted of "2,070 lineal feet," using "250 posts, 4 in. x 4 in. x 6 ft." and "8,280 lineal feet of rough 1 in. x 6 in. material was used in the paneling." Additional pens were built in which "864 lineal feet of 30-inch hog-fencing and 108 4 in. x 4 in. x 8 ft. posts were used." A "4,310 sq. ft." concrete platform or deck was constructed for feeding.

Water was piped from George Creek to concrete watering troughs in each pen. An electric line was extended from the center to the hog farm to provide electricity for lighting.⁵⁷

Industrial Latrines. Two industrial latrines, having a combined floor area of 768 square feet, were designed and constructed by Ryoza F. Kado, an evacuee stonemason, in the warehouse section of the industrial area at Manzanar between September 8 and November 1, 1943, at a cost of \$2,433. The latrines were each "16 ft. x 24 ft. with a center partition separating the men's section from the women's." The foundations and floors were concrete. Studdings, "2 in. x 4 in. x 8 ft. and spaced 2 feet on centers," were covered with "1-inch sheathing and building paper held in place by 3/8 in. x 2 in. batts."

56. *Ibid.*, pp. 1,014-16.

57. *Ibid.*, pp. 1,016-17.

The roof was framed from "2 in. x 4 in. material." The rafters were placed on "3-foot centers, sheathed with 1-inch material, and roofed with split-sheet roll roofing." Windows were of "the frameless awning type, size 4 ft. x 2 ft. 4 in.," while the doors were made "from the material on hand." The women's section was equipped with "five toilets, a wash basin, and a floor drain." The men's section was equipped with "three toilets, two urinals, a wash basin, and a floor drain."

Cold water was supplied by tapping "the main water line," but no "hot water facilities" were provided. A small "oil-burning space heater" was installed in each room as a protection against freezing during periods of extreme cold."⁵⁸

Garage. A garage was constructed "in the motor pool area 60 feet west of the old garage" between November 20, 1944, and April 23, 1945, at a cost of \$2,301. The construction was "justified by an acute shortage of space for the repair and maintenance of automotive equipment."

The garage had "a frontage of 48 feet and a depth of 30 feet," with "concrete floors, footings, and a 6-inch concrete curb to keep storm waters from flooding the floors." The garage was divided "into three stalls of equal size — one stall for lubrication, one for washing, and the other for painting."

The walls of the garage "were 12 feet high, framed from 2 in. x 6 in. lumber, spaced 2 feet on centers and covered with 1 in. x 6 in. V shiplap." The roof was constructed by placing "double 2 in. x 6 in. rafters or plates over the outside walls and 2 center partitions." Studding, "2 in. x 6 in., placed 2 feet on centers, supported these rafters or plates." The framing "was completed by purlins of 2 in. x 8 in. material, spaced 2 feet on centers and blocked solid over the rafters and down the center of each span." Sheeting "of 1 in. x 6 in. material laid at right angles to the joists and covered with split-sheet roll roofing, mopped on," completed the roof construction. The partitions were "of 2 in. x 6 in. studding spaced 2 feet on centers and sheathed on one side with 1 in. x 6 in. V shiplap from the floor line to the ridge."

Each stall was provided "with a 12 ft. x 12 ft. door opening equipped with accordion folding doors, made in four sections and supported by an overhead track." Windows were "the double-hung type, 3 ft. 4 in. x 5 ft. 6 in."

The garage was heated by an "H.C. Little D.U. 46 oil-burning heater installed in a 6 ft. x 6 ft. addition," located in the rear or west side of the building. An automatic fan in the heater circulated hot air to each stall via ducts.

An air-driven "Weaver heavy duty twin-post hoist" was installed in the lubrication room. Water was piped into the building for use in washing equipment and cleaning floors, the latter having sumps and floor drains which were connected to the sewer mains. The garage was connected with lines adjacent to the building for electricity and operation of tools and equipment. Each room was equipped with a work bench.

58. *Ibid.*, pp. 1,017-18.

The exterior walls, window trim, and doors was painted to protect the lumber from the weather.⁵⁹

Addition to Appointed Personnel Mess Hall. An addition to the appointed personnel mess hall that had been built under the supervision of the Corps of Engineers was constructed between May 1 and July 1, 1943, at a cost of \$1,680. The addition was justified "to provide adequate accommodations" for the expanding staff at Manzanar. The addition was "of the same type construction as the old section, with dimensions of 20 ft. x 100 ft." The foundation was "of concrete blocks with 4 in. x 6 in. girders and 2 in. x 6 in. joists."

The east side of the original mess hall was removed, and the "top plate was reinforced by the addition of 4 in. x 6 in. girders, supported by 4 in. x 6 in. posts spaced 8 feet on centers." The roof was "gabled the same as the old section with one end of the rafters resting on the center girder." This "formed a gutter through the center of the building which was raised in the center in order to drain the water in the rear and front."

The north end, or kitchen section, was "re-arranged for the convenience of the cooks and kitchen help." A storage room, office, scullery, and utility room and bath were added. Additional hot water facilities were provided by construction "of a 9 ft. x 22 ft. room with a concrete floor, where a Hanson boiler that was not being used in one of the blocks was moved in and connected to the existing piping," thus assuring "an adequate supply of hot water for cooking, dish washing, and cleaning."⁶⁰

Rock Sentry Houses and Police Posts. Three rock sentry buildings, having a combined floor area of 284 square feet, were designed and constructed by Ryoze F. Kado, an evacuee stonemason, during a several month period probably beginning in late August 1942, although the *Final Report, Manzanar* states that they were constructed between October 1, 1943, and May 10, 1944, at a cost of \$700. Two of the structures (both of which are extant) were located in the center and one was built at the entrance of the military police post south of the center. The larger of the two stone structures in the center, generally referred to as the rock sentry house, was located at the two-way entrance to Manzanar just off U.S. 395 and was used by the military police to control access to and from the camp. The smaller of the two structures, generally referred to as the rock house, was located west of the rock sentry house in the center of the two-way entrance road to the camp opposite the police station and was used by the center's internal police force.

The stone structures in the center were located at an extension of 1st Street, which ran east-west inside the camp past the "administrative group" of buildings. This street extended outside the camp to U.S. 395 to serve as the main entrance to the facility. An earlier entrance to the camp was located 650 feet north of 1st Street in the vicinity of Block 7. Manzanar Director Nash wrote to the District Engineer of the California Division of

59. *Ibid.*, pp. 1,018-20.

60. *Ibid.*, pp. 1,021-22.

Highways on August 14, 1942, requesting permission to move the entrance, and construction probably began the following month.⁶¹

Stone for these structures, as well as other landscaping projects at Manzanar, was obtained by Japanese crews who were permitted to leave the center with white escort and travel the area within five or six miles of the center to collect rock.⁶² The three structures were "all constructed of native stone, hand cut, and set in cement mortar." The first of the three structures to be built was the military police sentry house "at the main gate of the Center." The structure was "13 ft. x 13 ft. x 9 ft. on the outside," while the "inside measured 11 ft. x 11 ft. x 8 ft." The internal police "post in the Center" measured "8 ft. x 10 ft. x 8 ft.," and the sentry house at the military police camp measured "5 ft. x 7 ft. x 7 ft."⁶³

The outside walls of the three rock structures were built "on a batter of approximately 1 1/2 inch per foot of rise," but the inside walls were built "plumb." In three walls windows were installed and a "glass-paneled door [was placed] in the fourth." Floors and floor joists were "of wood." The roofs were "of hip type with 2 in. x 4 in. rafters and 1 in. x 6 in. sheathing covered with cedar shingles."

Each building was equipped with inside electric lights and "canopied exterior lights." The exterior lights were necessary for "the identification of persons entering or leaving the Center or Military Post at night."⁶⁴

Children's Village Heater Room. A "H.C. Little automatic oil-burning hot-water heater" had been installed originally in a room adjacent to the living and sleeping quarters in the Children's Village. As a safety measure, the heater was moved to "a 6 ft. x 6 ft. outside room adjacent to the main building." This new room was constructed "with a cement floor, with 2 in. x 4 in. studding spaced 2 feet on centers covered with 1-inch sheathing and 15-lb. building paper." The roof was "shed type with 2 in. x 4 in. rafters and 1-inch sheathing covered with roll roofing."⁶⁵

Boiler Room at Military Post. To provide an adequate supply of hot water for the kitchen and mess hall at the military post, a "shed-type room, 7 ft. x 10 ft.," was constructed on

61. Roy Nash, Project Director to Harry Brown, Jr., Senior Engineer, June 15, 1942, and Roy Nash, Project Director to S. W. Lowden, District Engineer, California Division of Highways, August 14, 1942, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 224, File No. 43.500, "Construction of Centers (General), Repairs — Maintenance — Wiring — Landscaping — Electrical;" and "Quarterly Progress Section, Manzanar Relocation Center, July 1 — September 30, 1942, Box 24, File, "WRA — Reports — Project Reports Office, October 1942," and "Quarterly Report of Manzanar WRA Project, October — December 1942," Box 25, File, "Reports — Project Reports, December 1942," Coll. 122, Department of Special Collections, UCLA.

62. "Report of Investigation at Manzanar Relocation Area, August 31 to September 2, 1942," P. J. Webster, September 7, 1942, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 68, File, "Manzanar, Report of Investigations."

63. "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, p. 1,021, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports." Also see "Project Report," October 1942, p. 101, Box 24, Folder, "WRA-Reports — Project Reports, October 1942," Coll. 122, Department of Special Collections, UCLA.

64. "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, p. 1021, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

65. *Ibid.*, pp. 1,021-22.

the east side of the kitchen between June 1 and July 5, 1944, for \$100. The Army supplied a boiler (Pan American type 40B, size 185) that was installed by the WRA.

The small boiler room had a concrete floor. The studdings were "of 2 in. x 4 in. material spaced 2 feet on centers and sheathed with 1 in. x 6 in. V'shiplap." The roof was "of 2 in. x 4 in. rafters and 1 in. x 6 in. sheathing covered with 90-lb. mineral-surfaced roofing."⁶⁶

Gas Service Station. A small gas service station was constructed at Manzanar between November 1 and December 6, 1942, for \$125. The station was necessary to "expedite the servicing of the automotive equipment" and to provide "storage for the oil and grease." The one-room building was constructed approximately 50 feet west of the motor pool office.

The 10-foot x 16-foot structure was built with "a concrete floor projecting 4 feet beyond the front side of the building." It had "2 in. x 4 in. rafters spaced 2 feet on centers with 1-inch sheathing covered with building paper." The roof was "shed type with 2 in. x 6 in. rafters spaced 4 feet on centers extending 4 feet beyond the front wall forming a canopy or shade for changing tires."

The walls were "7 feet in the on the low side and 8 feet on the high side or front." "Casement type sash windows" were installed "in the back wall and a sash of the same type was used on each side of the door," which was placed in the center of the front wall. The station featured a work bench, oil-drum-rack, and tire racks. Electric lines were extended from the motor pool office to provide light for servicing automobiles after dark or for emergency calls during the night.⁶⁷

Oil Distribution Sheds. Thirty-six oil distribution sheds were constructed between April 8 and December 2, 1943, at a cost of \$1,014. The sheds were constructed in each block on the south side of the oil distribution tanks, "to house the oil containers and distributing cans," "protect them from dust, dirt, and inclement weather," and "provide a regular storage place as protection against fire." The sheds were "4 ft. x 6 ft. x 5 ft. enclosed on two sides and one end, with a door on the other end."

The sheds were framed with "2 in. x 3 in. studding in the corners and 2 in. x 2 in. plates, top and bottom." The siding and roof were "of 1 in. x 4 in. tongue-and-groove flooring, applied vertically to the wall." The roof was sloped "6 inches for drainage, then covered with 90-lb. roll roofing." The exteriors were painted as a protection against the weather.⁶⁸

Dehydration Plant. A 233-square-foot dehydration plant was constructed between July 29 and September 30, 1943, at a cost of \$428. The plant, located in the area west of the former camouflage factory buildings and near the aforementioned root cellar, provided facilities for processing surplus vegetables raised on the Manzanar farm. The structure consisted of a drying room built "with 2 in. x 4 in. material for framing and covered with 1 in. x 4 in. tongue-and-groove flooring." The room was "fitted with racks for holding the ventilated

66. *Ibid.*, pp. 1,022.

67. *Ibid.*, pp. 1,022-23.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 1,023.

trays." The equipment for drying or dehydrating consisted of "an oil-fired furnace or blower that forced the hot air into the room through ducts."⁶⁹

Rice Malt Room. A rice malt room was constructed between October 16 and December 17, 1943, at a cost of \$233. The room was used for preparation of rice malt used in making "miso, a Japanese food, to supplement the mess hall diet." This room was built in the north end of "camouflage building 4" and was "12 feet square with 7-foot ceilings." It was framed with "2 in. x 4 in. material and ceiled inside and out with 1 in. x 4 in. tongue-and-groove flooring." Hot-air ducts and electric lights were installed. Electric power was connected from a line in the former camouflage building, while the hot-air ducts were connected to a heater and blower used in the camouflage building for vegetable dehydration.⁷⁰

Men's Latrine in Block 15. The original men's latrine in Block 15 was severely damaged during a wind storm, requiring reconstruction during June 14-26, 1943, at a cost of \$121. Small portions of the west and south walls were left standing and "had to be replumbed and braced." The "wrecked section was torn apart and cleaned of nails that were re-used in the reconstruction." Little new material was necessary "since the plumbing to the boiler installations was not damaged."⁷¹

Duck Boards for Food Warehouses. To comply with WRA regulations governing food storage, duck board were constructed in the food warehouses between August 1 and October 6, 1944 at a cost of \$236. The boards were constructed "with three 2 in. x 6 in. stringers, 8 feet long and spaced one inch apart to allow for ventilation." By placing the panels (each eight feet long and four feet wide) side by side "various sized platforms could be arranged to suit the requirements of the crated or sacked foods that were placed upon them."⁷²

Garbage Can Wash Rack. A garbage can wash rack was constructed adjacent to the hospital boiler house, providing steam daily cleaning and sterilizing "250 garbage cans" on a daily basis. A concrete platform, "18 ft. x 35 ft.," was built, and two steam and hot-water cleaners were installed. The cleaners consisted of "a circular steel pipe perforated to allow for the flow of steam and hot water." The cans were placed, "with the bottom side up, over these rings and a flow of hot water and steam was applied, cleaning and sterilizing the can in one operation." Grease and garbage removed was washed "into a grease trap and sump that was connected to the main sewer line."⁷³

Hospital Incinerator. A hospital incinerator was constructed to provide a sanitary method for disposal of contaminated refuse from the hospital, morgue, and operating room. This structure was constructed with "native stone with outside dimensions of 8 ft. x 8 ft. x 6 ft. and a stack 12 feet high of the same material." The incinerator contained a "fire box, 4 feet

69. *ibid.*, pp. 1,023-24.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 1,024.

71. *Ibid.*, pp. 1,024-25.

72. *Ibid.*, pp. 1,025.

73. *Ibid.*

in width and 5 feet in depth, with an overall height of 3 ft. 6 in." A grate "of 1 1/2-inch pipe raised 16 inches from the bottom" was installed. The space beneath the grate acted as an ash depository and regulated the draft through two sheet-metal doors that were installed on the ash depository. Two similar doors were placed on the fire box. As a safety measure to prevent the spread of fire, a cement slab was laid "extending 4 feet on each side of the incinerator and 10 feet out in front."⁷⁴

Utility Extension Construction

In addition to the new construction projects, the WRA expanded the existing utility systems at Manzanar to accommodate the needs of the relocation center during 1942-45.

Staff Housing. The new staff housing constructed by the WRA was built in an area removed from existing power lines and utilities. Thus, it was necessary to "install five new poles complete with cross arms, insulators, brackets, and guy wires." The installation included "920 lineal feet of primary wiring, 2,850 lineal feet of secondary wiring, six 50-K.V.A., two 15-K.V.A., one 37 1/2-K.V.A., and one 7 1/2-K.V.A. transformers."

To provide water and fire protection for the staff housing area it was necessary to install "1,323 feet of 3-inch and 270 feet of 2-inch black iron pipe, and 830 feet of 1 1/4-inch galvanized iron pipe, including bibbs and gate valves." Three "3-inch" and two "6-inch" fire hydrants were installed.

The new sewer lines consisted of "1,025 feet of 8-inch, 510 feet of 6-inch, and 1,294 feet of 4-inch vitrified clay pipe, as well as six brick-lined manholes complete with cast-iron rings and covers."⁷⁵

Poultry and Hog Farms. Five poles and 1,924 lineal feet of electric wire were installed to provide light for the poultry farm. Eight poles and 5,200 lineal feet of wiring were used to light the hog farm.

To supply water and fire protection to the poultry farm, "1,777 feet of 4-inch and 65 feet of 2-inch black iron pipe, 95 feet of 1-inch galvanized iron pipe, and four 3-inch fire hydrants" were installed.

Water for the hog farm was supplied from George Creek through "800 feet of 8-inch concrete irrigation pipe into a concrete box or tank 10 feet square and 6 feet deep." The water was carried from the tank to the feeding pens "through 250 feet of iron pipe." From the feeding pens the water was distributed through "415 feet of 1-inch pipe and 195 feet of 1/2-inch pipe."⁷⁶

74. *Ibid.*, p. 1,026.

75. *Ibid.*, pp. 1,026, 1,028.

76. *Ibid.*, pp. 1,028-29.

Garage. Electric lighting and power for the new garage was provided by extension of "approximately 750 feet of wire from a 15-K.V.A. transformer located on a pole at the south end of the reefer house." A "1-inch water line of 100 lineal feet" was extended from the original garage and connected with water piping installed in the new structure. Disposal of sewage was provided by installation of "400 lineal feet of 4-inch vitrified clay sewer pipe and one brick-lined manhole."⁷⁷

Well 169. Well 169 was dug to provide "a stand-by source for domestic water supply in the event that Shepherd Creek should freeze over during the winter months, and to increase pressure in the mains in case of fire." A "9 ft. x 9 ft. frame building with concrete floor and base" housed a "20-H.P. Pomona pump and motor, complete with 6-inch suction pipe and one 20-H.P. 220-volt I.C. switch and one 20-H.P. 220-volt magnetic starter."

To connect the well with the mains, "400 lineal feet of 6-inch steel pipe, complete with fittings," was laid. For electrical connections to this pump, "3,200 lineal feet of overhead wire and one 15-K.V.A. transformer" were installed.⁷⁸

Reservoir Enlargement. The "storm reservoir" on Shepherd Creek was enlarged from 540,000 gallons to approximately 900,000 gallons (several maps indicate 800,000) to provide an adequate supply of domestic water for Manzanar. The reservoir enlargement was accomplished by raising the concrete-lined embankments "to a sufficient height."⁷⁹

Recreational Facility Construction

Provision for recreational facilities at Manzanar under WRA administration was the responsibility of the Community Development Committee, composed of appointed staff and evacuees and charged with the "overall planning of the physical facilities of the camp." The Community Services Section, also composed of staff and evacuees, organized recreation programs and events which took place at these facilities.⁸⁰

Although the Community Development Committee did not exist before the WRA took over the camp, some minimal recreational facilities had been provided by the WCCA prior to June 1, 1942. For instance, the WCCA designated Building 15 in each block for recreation. On June 13, 1942, the WRA reported that every four blocks were grouped together in a zone in which each Building 15 served a particular recreational purpose. One building served as an adult activity center, a second as a children's center, a third for arts and crafts, and a fourth as a library. The exceptions were Block 1, where Building 15 was

77. *Ibid.*, p. 1,029.

78. *Ibid.*, p. 1,029.

79. *Ibid.*, p. 1,030.

80. "Community Development Committee," February 3, 1943 RG 210, Entry 48, Box 224, File No. 43.500, "Construction of Centers (General), Repairs — Maintenance — Wiring — Landscaping — Electrical."

used by the Boy Scouts, and Block 2, where Building 2 served as a men's sports center since the entire block was occupied by men.⁸¹

Soon after assuming administration of Manzanar on June 1, 1942, the WRA began construction of recreational facilities in an effort to make the camp more hospitable for the evacuees. Using evacuee labor, a stage was constructed adjacent to Mess Hall 8 in June 1942. The following month an elevated sand-filled wrestling arena was built west of Block 10, and the foundation for a judo arena in the firebreak between Blocks 10 and 16 was laid. The completed judo arena included a wood floor covered with sawdust that had a canvas stretched over it to hold the sawdust in place. In July 1942 an area southwest of Block 12 was graded for an outdoor theater. Improvised facilities built informally in July by evacuee volunteers included a basketball court in which baskets were nailed to trees in the firebreak between Blocks 10 and 11 and a dancing area in Block 23 created by stringing up lights. Six basketball courts were built that month, but it is not known if these were improvised courts or more substantial courts built by WRA work crews.⁸²

Other athletic facilities, for which construction dates are not available, were built in a sports field in the firebreak between Blocks 8 and 14. These facilities included formal basketball, volleyball, and tennis courts. Clay-like soil was trucked into the camp from the Owens River for use on the surface of the basketball and tennis courts. Other firebreaks were utilized for numerous baseball diamonds and two football fields, complete with goal posts.⁸³

Construction of recreation facilities continued in August 1942 when a 40-foot x 60-foot concrete stage and benches for 2,000 people were built for an outdoor theater, and a 100-yard-wide area on the southwest side of the camp was cleared for a 9-hole golf course. In addition, evacuees built a "furo," or Japanese-style bath, in the men's shower room in Block 6. Constructed with cement rather than traditional wood, the "furo" could fit eight people in its 105-degree water. The following month, "furos" were built in Blocks 10, 12, 17, 22, 23, and 29. By October 30 half of the blocks in the center had baths. Evacuees also built a sand box for children in Block 17.⁸⁴

The completed outdoor theater was used twice, once in the fall of 1942 when Dillon S. Myer, Director of the War Relocation Authority, addressed the high school assembly on the opening of the school, and a week later for dedication ceremonies for the theater. After these two events, the theater was deemed too far from the center of the camp. Thus, a 20-

81. A. G. Nelson, Chief, Recreation Section to Mr. Temple, Director, June 13, 1943, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 293, File No. 41.080, "Individual Projects (Manzanar Relocation Center)."

82. Director, Works Division to Roy Nash, Project Director, June 5, 1942, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 228, File No. 76.010, "General Recreational Problems," and "Project Report No. 21," July 13, 1942.

83. "Community Activities Section, *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 832-34, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

84. *Ibid.*, pp. 831-35, and "Project Report. No. 29," August 3, 1942; "Project Report No. 42," August 25, 1942; "Project Report No. 61," October 22, 1942; and "Project Report No. 64," October 30, 1942, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 70, File, "Manzanar Project Reports."

foot x 30-foot stage, for which construction dates are not available, was built against the recreation building in Block 16.⁸⁵

By 1943 Manzanar was experiencing a shortage of building space for recreational activities because of the need to remodel so many structures for school classroom space. As a result, Blocks 3, 4, 9, and 10 had no recreation halls, and it became necessary to have the recreation halls in Blocks 6, 14, 18, 27, 29, and 35 serve four blocks each. In addition, temporary recreation halls were established in the ironing rooms in Blocks 9 and 22 to serve four blocks each as well.⁸⁶

A kendo arena (35 feet x 60 feet), complete with a small dressing room, was constructed in the spring of 1943. However, interest in this traditional Japanese sport waned after many evacuees born in Japan were sent to the Tule Lake Relocation Center in 1943-44. In April plans were developed to build a baseball diamond in the firebreak between Blocks 19 and 25, and a quarter-mile track west of Block 36. By the spring of 1943 the Community Activities Section had organized an extensive recreation program, including: (1) a woodcraft shop in Block 4, Building 15; (2) an art center in Block 12, Building 15; (3) a flower making class in Block 26, Building 15; (4) three sewing classes in Blocks 16, 26, and 28, Buildings 15; (5) a music hall in Block 24, Building 15; and (6) a library in Block 22, Building 15.⁸⁷

The aforementioned "Appraisal Report," prepared in April 1946 listed a variety of recreational facilities at Manzanar. Among those described were 27 basketball courts, 2 double tennis courts, 2 wood slides, 5 wood swing set units, and 6 softball fields, each with a wood backstop behind home plate. Evidently four other baseball or softball fields had backstops constructed of rough poles and scrub lumber. A wooden observation tower (8 feet x 12 feet and 12 feet in height) was constructed between Blocks 19 and 25 to provide space for scorekeepers and guards on duty at the ball games.⁸⁸

Remodeling Construction

Warehouse Reflooring. The original flooring installed in the 40 warehouses at Manzanar was "of single thickness, 1 in. x 6 in. shiplap." Because of the "constant wear and tear," it was necessary for the WRA to refloor 30 of these buildings, each having an area of "1,881

85. "Community Activities Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 836-37, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

86. A. G. Nielson, Supervisor, Community Activities Section to Lucy W. Adams, Assistant Project Director, Community Management February 23, 1943, and A. G. Nielson, Supervisor, Community Activities Section to Block Manager, March 30, 1943, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 228, File No. 65.000, "Recreational Facilities (Community Activities)."

87. Ralph P. Merritt, Project Director to A. G. Nielson, Supervisor, Community Activities Section, April 12, 1943, and A. G. Nielson, Supervisor, Community Activities Section to Ralph P. Merritt, Project Director, April 17, 1943, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 228, File No. 67.000, "Recreational Facilities (Community Activities)," and "Community Activities Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, p. 834, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

88. "Explanation Notes," in "Appraisal Report," April 26, 1946. Also see "Fixed Asset Inventory," Other Investments, Account No. 39, Items 23-26, 28.

square feet." Reflooring required "approximately 2,351 square feet of 1 in. x 4 in. Douglas fir flooring per building." Material for the new flooring was supplied by the Corps of Engineers.⁸⁹

Interior Lining of Partitions in Evacuee Buildings. The evacuee barracks were originally constructed with three cross partitions of plywood running from the ceiling to the ridge, supported by 2 inch x 4 inch studding plates and cross ties. No interior linings or ceilings were provided for the walls, floors, or ceilings. After inspecting the barracks the WRA determined that "four apartments to a building were insufficient in number to accommodate the family groups included in a population of 10,000 persons." In addition, it was found that "the walls, flooring, and ceilings afforded too little protection against the cold winds and dust prevalent during the winter months and early spring."

To provide more hospitable living quarters for the evacuees, the Corps of Engineers supplied building materials to the WRA, with the exception of plasterboard, for partitions and floor covering. Beginning in June 1942, the walls and ceilings in 460 barracks buildings were lined with celotex plasterboard, and an "average of two partitions per building" were added to make additional apartments. The floors in all apartments were covered with "Mastipave floor covering." Mastipave, a substitute for linoleum (sometimes referred to as Pabco), was installed in black, but occasionally in red, on barracks floors. Thirty-six mess halls were "ceiled with plaster board," and twenty mess halls had their floors covered with Mastipave. Approximately "3,780 square feet of plaster board and 222 square yards of Mastipave floor covering" was used in each of the 460 barrack buildings. The 36 mess halls required "5,564 square feet of plaster board and 445 square yards of Mastipave floor covering per building."

Each of the 30 recreation halls required "3,564 square feet of plaster board." In 20 of the halls 222 square yards of Mastipave was used to cover the floors.⁹⁰

The new partitions in the barracks were not completed until July 1942, but by using evacuee labor, all 36 blocks were far enough along to be occupied by June 30, 1942. After the partitions were completed, it was reported that Manzanar had a total of 2,250 "apartments" for 10,500 evacuees — 1,100 for three to five people, 870 for five to six people, and 280 for seven people. All floors in the barracks were covered with linoleum by October 30, 1942, and the walls and ceilings were lined with plasterboard by November 1942. Remodeling work in the mess halls advanced incrementally, with 31 in operation by July 1942, 32 in August, 35 in September, and 36 in October.⁹¹

89. "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, p. 1,030, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

90. *Ibid.*, pp. 1,030-31. Also see "Project Report No. 3, June 15, 1942, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 70, File, "Manzanar Project Reports." During the same period, 350 partitions were installed in the women's latrines. "Project Report," October 1942, Box 24, File, "WPA — Reports — Project Reports, October 1942," Coll. 122, Department of Special Collections, UCLA.

91. "Project Report No. 3, " June 15, 1942; "Project Report No. 13," June 30, 1942; "Project Report No. 15," July 15, 1942; "Project Report No. 23," July 16, 1942; "Project Report No. 26," July 24, 1942; "Project Report No. 29," August 3, 1942; "Project Report No. 51," September 18, 1942; "Project Report No. 57," October 6, 1942; and "Project Report No. 64," October 30, 1942; Entry 4b, Box 70, File, "Manzanar, Project Reports." Also see Ernest K. Shelbe Major, Corps of Engineers, Contracting Office to Roy Nash, Project Director, July 10, 1942,

Relocation and Records Offices. Because the Relocation and Records offices in Block 1, Buildings 4 and 5, respectively, "depended on each other for data concerning evacuee records," more space and safer storage were needed. As a result, an addition or annex, "20 ft. x 40 ft., typical T.O.-type construction," was built connecting the two buildings. The annex was partitioned into three rooms for use of the Relocation Officer and his assistant. Partitions in the two buildings were rearranged to provide more convenient work space for both the Relocation and Records offices.

Eventually all of the barracks buildings in Block 1 were converted into administrative office space.⁹²

Electrical and Plumbing Use of Warehouse 5. Warehouse 5 was remodeled to "handle the maintenance program more efficiently and release space for other use." A board partition was constructed dividing the electrical and plumbing warehouse into two sections. The north section of the building was used by the electrical unit and for storage of plumbing supplies. One corner, "12 ft. x 16 ft., was partitioned off for an office." The remainder of the space was utilized for storage of electrical and plumbing supplies on wood shelves. The south section of the building was left vacant.⁹³

Hospital. The original hospital ward floors and most of the enclosed walks were constructed without floor covering. Because of "excessive mopping and cleaning," the floors "soon became badly worn and in need of either replacing or extensive repairing." Thus, "Mastipave floor covering was laid in seven wards, each having a floor space of 25 ft. x 150 ft., and in 500 lineal feet of enclosed walks." The work required "3,100 square yards of Mastipave and 200 gallons of linoleum paste."

The original hospital interior walls and ceilings had no "covering." To keep the building clean, it was found necessary to cover the walls and ceilings with plasterboard. This job was difficult, because the overhead sprinkler system and other overhead piping necessitated use of additional furring and blocking to leave the sprinkler system exposed below the ceiling line. Approximately "3,500 square feet of plaster board and 2 in. x 3 in. material for furring and backing" was used.

As Caucasian doctors replaced evacuee doctors who relocated, it became necessary to remodel the doctors' quarters. The Caucasian doctors requested housekeeping facilities which had not been supplied to the evacuee doctors occupying the building. The remodeling work, which took place during the summer of 1942, included conversion of

RG 210, Entry 48, Box 224, File, "Construction of Centers (General), Repairs — Maintenance — Wiring — Landscaping — Electrical," and War Relocation Authority, *Second Quarterly Report*, July 1 to September 30, 1942, p. 63.

92. "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, p. 1,031, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports," and "Project Report No. 23," July 16, 1942, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 70, File, "Manzanar, Project Reports." Also see "Fixed Asset Inventory," November 15, 1945.

93. "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, p. 1032, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

the building into four apartments and the installation of sinks, kitchen cabinets, and storage closets.⁹⁴

Schools. Under the terms of the aforementioned construction standards for relocation centers agreed upon by the Corps of Engineers and the War Relocation Authority, the Corps was not responsible for the construction of schools. To carry out its responsibility for the construction of schools, the WRA turned to the Farm Security Administration for assistance. The FSA had constructed housing and community facilities for poor rural communities and migrant workers since its establishment during the Depression and housing for defense plants and military training centers since the military buildup for World War II had begun.

In June 1942 the FSA provided Manzanar with plans for two elementary schools, a junior high school, a senior high school, and a combination gymnasium and auditorium to be used by both the junior and senior high schools. A shortage of contract labor made it necessary for the WRA to plan on using evacuee labor under the supervision of a FSA contract engineer to construct the schools. A site was cleared west of Block 36 in June 1942, and construction was expected to begin in July. Delays in the start of construction resulting from unavailability of materials resulted in postponement of anticipated school construction until 1943. In the meantime, temporary school facilities were established in vacated barracks in Blocks 1 and 7.⁹⁵

Plans for the schools at Manzanar included ten classroom buildings, one gymnasium, one shop building, one library for the junior and senior high schools, and nine classroom buildings and one assembly building for the two elementary schools. However, as it appeared that building materials for the schools might not become available in 1943, the Manzanar administrators made a special request to WRA director Dillon Myer for permission to "go ahead" with construction of certain school facilities which were necessary to meet California standards for accreditation. Among these were a high school auditorium, as well as shop and science facilities. Myer approved construction of the needed facilities, and the Manzanar administration made plans for the construction of the new buildings as well as the remodeling of existing facilities.⁹⁶

After the War Production Board revoked authorization for construction of new buildings for schools in the relocation centers, the Manzanar camp administrators determined to convert existing temporary barracks into school rooms. To meet "minimum standards with regard to space requirements, lighting, heating, and sanitation" for the fall semester of 1942, Block 7 was remodeled for the high school and Block 16 was remodeled for the

94. *Ibid.*, pp. 1,032-33.

95. "Materials for WRA Community Facilities," June 16, 1942, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 311, File No. 43.500, "Construction and Maintenance of Centers (General)," and "Project Report No. 3," June 15,, 1942; "Project Report No. 21," July 13, 1942; and "Project Report No. 45," September 10, 1942," RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 70, File, "Manzanar Project Reports."

96. Ralph P. Merritt, Project Director to Dillon S. Myer, Director, WRA, January 10, 1943, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 312, File No. 43.500, "Construction and Maintenance of Centers (General)," and Robert L. Brown, Acting Project Director to Dillon S. Myer, Director, WRA, February 6, 1943, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 224, File No. 43.500, "Construction of Centers (General), Repairs — Maintenance — Wiring — Landscaping — Electrical."

elementary school. In these buildings "54 partitions, 20 ft. x 8 ft.," were removed and "41 new partitions [were] constructed." To provide sufficient lighting, 312 additional windows were installed. To provide separate entrances to the individual classrooms and to comply with fire regulations, "155 new doors" were installed. Approximately "90 additional lighting fixtures" were added to provide adequate light for night classes. Mastipave floor covering was laid in five buildings. The woodwork in all classrooms was painted, and the walls and ceilings were kalsomined. Shelving was installed in the supply rooms, and 30 drinking fountains were installed. Oil-fired space heaters, connected to outside oil supply tanks, were installed in 42 classrooms in the converted school buildings.

A 4-burner electric range, refrigerator, and sink were installed in the south half of Block 16, Building 8 for the use of adult English classes. These "installations were considered necessary by the Education Section to augment and develop an adult English program where English was taught functionally to Issei men and women through classes in family cooking, food, nutritive values, and child development, as stipulated by the WRA Washington Office."

A high school homemaking program was developed in Block 7, Building 10. This building was converted "into a model 2-room apartment," including a "4-burner electric range and a refrigerator." The ironing rooms in Blocks 2 and 7 were remodeled for use as clothing rooms for high school students. Chemistry and physics classes were conducted in the remodeled laundry room in Block 7.

In addition to the remodeling efforts for the elementary and high schools, facilities were provided for preschool classes in several locations at Manzanar. These included: Block 1, Building 14; half of Building 15 in Blocks 9, 20, 23, and 32; one-third of Building 15 in Blocks 17, 30, and 31; and Block 11, Building 15.⁹⁷

Mattress Factory in Warehouse 25. To facilitate evacuee relocation a cotton mattress factory was developed in Warehouse 25 as an occupational training program for Manzanar residents who had no trade. In addition to the occupational training provided, the manufacture of cotton mattresses made it possible "to replace the old straw ticks and thus eliminate a fire hazard."

Warehouse 25 was remodeled to accommodate the cotton mattress factory. Remodeling of the warehouse consisted of "reinforcing the underpinning and girders and laying a 1 in. x 4 in. floor over the original flooring." Work benches were constructed, and a motor-driven blower and shredding machine were installed. To operate the electrical equipment, an additional 25-K.V.A. transformer was installed.⁹⁸

Community Hostel. In November 1942 construction of a community hostel was commenced in Block 34, Building 15 to provide treatment and care for patients whose illnesses, including mental impairment and physical disabilities, did not require hospitalization, thus relieving the crowded conditions at the hospital. The building that

97. "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 1,033-34, RG 210, entry 46, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

98. *Ibid.*, pp. 1,034-35.

was remodeled for the hostel was located east of the hospital and sufficiently close for the convenience of the hospital staff. The remodeling work was completed on March 11, 1944. "A barrack-type building, 20 ft. x 100 ft.," the hostel was partitioned into three sections. One section was for men, one for women, and one in between housed baths, toilets, and a diet kitchen. A "H.C. Little hot-water heater" was installed to provide hot water for the bathrooms and kitchen, and wooden ramps with hand rails were installed at all doors.⁹⁹

Warehouse 36. After a fire destroyed the maintenance office and store room on July 28, 1944, the north half of Warehouse 36 was remodeled for use as a maintenance office. Plaster board was installed on its ceiling and walls, and additional windows were added. Mastipave floor covering was laid on the floor, and the ceiling and walls were kalsomined. The south half of the building was fitted with shelving and bins for storage of equipment, supplies, and materials.¹⁰⁰

Appointed Personnel Recreation Building. Because many of the WRA appointed personnel at Manzanar did not have automobiles or other means of transportation to nearby towns, an "existing barrack-type building [in Block 1] was remodeled" to provide recreational facilities for these people. Partitions were relocated, and the building was divided into three rooms. The south room was used for floor games and other activities, the center room for light refreshments, and the north room for cards, reading, and table games. In the refreshment room a serving counter, sink, and four booths with tables and benches were installed. A butane hot water heater was installed to supply hot water for dishwashing and the wash rooms. The floors were covered with Mastipave, and the walls and ceiling were kalsomined.¹⁰¹

Canteen and General Store. While Manzanar was under the administration of the WCCA, a canteen and general store was established in Block 8, Building 14. The WRA obtained plans for additional stores for Manzanar from the FSA in 1942, but the new buildings were later considered unnecessary and their construction was canceled. After the WRA took over administration of the camp, several new services, such as shoe repair, barber, and beauty shops, which had been temporarily housed in a warehouse, were moved into Block 27, Building 14 in July 1942.¹⁰²

99. Memorandum, Solon T. Kimball, Acting Project Director, Community Services Division to Harvey M. Coverley, Acting Regional Director, November 14, 1942, RG 210, Entry 38, Box 50, File No. 670, "Engineering and Construction 1942, Manzanar," and Ralph P. Merritt, Project Director to Dillon S. Myer, Director, WRA, June 13, 1944, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 315, File No. 43.503, "Construction and Maintenance of Centers — Manzanar."

100. "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, p. 1,036, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

101. *Ibid.*

102. "Project Report No. 9," June 22, 1942; "Project Report No. 15," July 1, 1942; "Project Report No. 45," September 10, 1942; "Project Report No. 25," July 23, 1942; RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 70, File, "Manzanar Project Reports;" War Relocation Authority, *Second Quarterly Report*, July 1 to September 30, 1942, pp. 63-64; and Robert L. Brown, Assistant Project Director to Arthur M. Sandridge, Senior Engineer, October 20, 1943, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 224, File No. 43.500, "Construction of Centers (General), Repairs — Maintenance — Wiring — Landscaping — Electrical."

Under the WRA, the consumer needs of the evacuees were served by Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises, Inc., established on September 2, 1942. This organization was operated by evacuees in space rented from the WRA.

Block 8, Building 14 continued in use as a canteen and general store by Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises under the Business Enterprises Section. The badly worn floor was replaced by a new one. The walls and ceiling were "covered with plaster board so as to make the building more easily heated, to keep perishables from freezing in winter, and to eliminate dust that sifted in through cracks and around windows of unlined walls."¹⁰³

By August 1944 Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises, in addition to operating the canteen and general store, supervised a variety of shops that it had established throughout the camp. These shops included: a shoe repair shop in the Block 3 ironing room; a watch repair shop in the Block 10 ironing room; a laundry and dry cleaning shop in the Block 10 ironing room; a dry goods store in Block 21, Building 14; a beauty shop in the Block 15 ironing room; a barber shop in the Block 21 ironing room; a sporting goods store and flower shop in Block 16, Building 1; a photo studio in the Block 30 ironing room; a fish store in the Block 18 ironing room; a dress shop in the Block 32 ironing room; an American Express office in Block 1, Building 6; a gift shop in Block 16, Building 15; and an outdoor movie theater in the firebreak between Blocks 20 and 21.¹⁰⁴

Motor Pool Office. The original motor pool office built under the supervision of the Corps of Engineers was located in a portion "of a barrack-type building in block 2 which was not conveniently located to the garage and storage lot." To provide adequate space for this office a building used by the Corps of Engineers was moved adjacent "to both the fenced parking lot and the garage." Two existing partitions in the building were rearranged, and one partition was added. Floors were patched and the walls and ceilings were kalsomined. A counter was built in the dispatcher's office and electric wiring extended from the power line adjacent to the building.¹⁰⁵

Administration Building. The administration building was originally constructed without any wall or floor covering and was divided into four large offices. To eliminate dust and dirt and to make the building more easily heated, the interior walls were lined with plasterboard and the floors were covered with Mastipave. Because of the increasing number of appointed personnel and the continual addition of administrative duties at Manzanar, it became necessary to divide the interior of the administrative building into smaller offices using plasterboard partitions, thus affording more privacy.¹⁰⁶

103. "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 1,036-37, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

104. "Project Report No. 44," September 2, 1942, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 70, File, "Manzanar Project Reports;" F. W. Thunberg, Senior Engineer to Dillon S. Myer, Director, WRA, May 22, 1943, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 312, File No. 43.500, "Construction and Maintenance of Centers (General);" and "Organizational Chart," August 27, 1944, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 229, File No. 69.030, "Cooperative Stores (General)."

105. "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, p. 1,037, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 62, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

106. *Ibid.*, pp. 1,037-38.

Butcher Shop. The "reefer house" between the two refrigerator structures was remodeled during the summer of 1942 to provide more storage space and facilitate the handling of meat storage. The original meat-hanging racks were removed and replaced with racks of heavier material, thus doubling the capacity of the original installation.

During the summer, the temperature in the room housing the refrigeration machinery for meat and vegetable storage often rose to a point where it interfered with normal operation of the equipment. Accordingly, the interior of the room housing the refrigeration machinery was "lined with plaster board and a 16-inch suction fan was installed in each room to draw in outside air."¹⁰⁷

Shoyu Factory. A "shoyu factory" was established in the ironing room and laundry building in Block 1 to make shoyu, "a Japanese food manufactured from soybeans and used in the mess halls to supplement the regular food." To provide sufficient space for the factory, an addition was constructed connecting the two buildings.

The addition was "of regular army T.O.-type construction with 2 in. x 4 in. rafters spaced 4 feet on centers." The roof and walls were sheathed "with 1-inch material." The roof was covered with "15-pound building paper." A cement floor was laid and a floor drain was installed that connected with the sewer line.¹⁰⁸

Equipment Shed 4. Equipment Shed 4 was used by the Agriculture Section at Manzanar for storage of seed and fertilizer. It was originally built with the front side open to store farm equipment. However, for the storage of seed and fertilizer, the front side was closed in to keep out rain, snow, and dust.

Studding of "2 in. x 6 in. material was placed 4 feet on centers with horizontal cross ties also spaced 4 feet on centers." Sheathing "of 1 in. x 12 in. was used, the whole exterior was recovered with 15-lb. building paper, and a new roof of 90-lb. felt was applied." Large louvers were installed in each end of the building to provide ventilation.¹⁰⁹

Evacuee Post Office. A plasterboard partition was changed in the evacuee post office to provide more work and storage space. During the remodeling work, approximately 200 square feet of additional shelving was installed.¹¹⁰

Engineering Office. Additional office space was needed in the Engineering Office for drafting and relief of overcrowded conditions. Partitions were changed to make use of an additional 16 feet of the building for a drafting room. The room was equipped with files for plans and maps, and new equipment, such as drafting tables, a blueprinting machine, and a washing tray, were added. A new door opening was made, connecting the main

107. *Ibid.*, p. 1,038.

108. *Ibid.*, pp.1,038-39.

109. *Ibid.*, p. 1,039.

110. *Ibid.*

office with the drafting room. A partition was moved to provide more space in the Senior Engineer's office, and the lighting fixtures were rearranged to provide better lighting.¹¹¹

Police Station. The original reception building in the Administrative Group was remodeled by the WRA for use as a police station. As part of the remodeling effort, a concrete floor was constructed, and a jail cell and three partitions was installed. The new station was occupied by the Manzanar internal police department during late July 1942.¹¹²

Conversion of Camouflage Factory Buildings. After the Army terminated the camouflage net project in December 1942, the buildings that had been used for the factory were turned over to the WRA and adapted for various uses. One of the buildings, an open-sided wood-floored shed that was 24 feet x 150 feet with 8-foot high walls, was converted into a warehouse. Another building, a concrete floored shed 24 feet x 100 feet with 18-foot high walls, was converted to a garage for automotive and heavy equipment. Three partially open concrete floored sheds, each 24 feet x 300 feet, were converted into carpenter, plumbing, and electrical shops.¹¹³

Warehouse 31. In August 1942 the WRA began construction of a 300-foot x 50-foot building adjoining the camouflage net factory to serve as a garment factory for the manufacture of work clothes in the camp and for sale outside of Manzanar. At the same time cement floors were poured in Warehouse 31 for additional factory space, and power sewing machines were installed in the warehouse. Construction of the new building adjacent to the camouflage factory never progressed beyond the foundation because of a shortage of materials, and in March 1943 the WRA determined that the garment factory facilities in Warehouse 31 were sufficient.¹¹⁴

Guayule Lath House. A "guayule nursery experiment" was commenced at Manzanar during the spring of 1942, under the direction of the California Institute of Technology. The project, which was taken over by the U.S. Forest Service on June 1, was designed to "find a suitable method to produce rubber in the shortest possible period." The work was carried out in the guayule lath house constructed south of Block 6 during July 1942. As

111. *Ibid.*, pp. 1,039-40.

112. "Project Report No. 26," July 24, 1942, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 70, File, "Manzanar Project Reports."

113. Ralph P. Merritt, Project Director to Dillon S. Myer, Director, WRA, January 16, 1943, and Dillon S. Myer, Director, WRA to R. B. Cozzens, Field Assistant director, WRA, February 24, 1943, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 315, File 433.503, "Construction and Maintenance of Centers — Manzanar."

114. "Project Report No. 40," August 22, 1942; "Project Report No. 45," September 10, 1942; and "Project Report No. 54," September 24, 1942, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 70, File, "Manzanar Project Reports;" War Relocation Authority, *Second Quarterly Report*, July 1 to September 30, 1942, p. 64; and R. B. Cozzens, Assistant Field Director, WRA to Kenneth G. High, War Production Board, March 10, 1943, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 224, File No. 43.500, "Construction of Centers (General), Repairs — Maintenance — Wiring — Landscaping — Electrical."

the project progressed, the building was expanded to twice its size later that month, finally measuring 104 feet x 136 feet.¹¹⁵

Refrigeration

According to the *Final Report, Manzanar*, refrigeration for the Manzanar relocation center under the WRA was supplied "by electrically operated equipment of different sizes and types for storage buildings, mess halls, and appointed personnel quarters."

Vegetable and meat storage was provided in two refrigerated warehouses "with a storage capacity of approximately 11,000 cubic feet." Each warehouse was equipped with "four evaporator condensers of humid-air type." The compressors were "Brunner, model E, type E.C., driven by 7 1/2-H.P., 220-volt, 3-phase Fairbanks Morse electric motors." Drayer Hanson condensing units were used, equipped with "1/4-H.P. Pacific Pumping Co., 1 1/4-inch water pump." Mess halls within the center and at the military post were equipped with 35 20-cubic-foot refrigerators: 32 Supercold, 2 Viering, and 1 Catalina.

The 40-cubic-foot refrigerators in the mess halls, at the hospital, and at other locations. These refrigerators included: 37 Ward, 1 Supercold, and 1 Barker Bros. In addition, there were three 50-cubic-foot Hussman-Ligionier boxes for replacements, and a 4-body Market Forge, model 5MA, forced-air type unit, with York compressor was installed at the hospital morgue.

Exclusive of the morgue unit and the refrigerated warehouse, there were 77 commercial refrigerators in the center. Domestic or household installations comprised 90 units:

NUMBER	SIZE IN CUBIC FEET	MAKE
63	8	Coldspot
7	7	Westinghouse
2	9	Westinghouse
11	7	Frigidaire
6	9	Frigidaire
1	3	General Electric ¹¹⁶

115. F. Tayama and Joe Ito, Project Research to Ned Campbell, Assistant Project Director, July 1, 1942, Box 6, File, "WCCA — Production (Agriculture and Industry)," Coll. 122, Department of Special Collections, UCLA, and "Project Report No. 14," July 1, 1942, and "Project Report No. 25," July 24, 1942, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 70, File, "Manzanar Project Reports."

116. "Engineering Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 1,040-41, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

LAND IMPROVEMENTS

The Manzanar War Relocation Center comprised an area of 5,464.09 acres. The entire acreage was in Township 14 S, Range 35 E, except the garbage pit which was located in Township 14 S, Range 36 E. The acreage components were:

LOCATION	AREA IN ACRES
Project bounded area	5,414.90
Well 75 (150 ft. x 600 ft., along the east right of way of U.S. 395)	2.07
Well 92	.72
Pipeline to Well 92	1.9
Road to Well 92	1.7
Road to sewage treatment plant	5.3
Main trunk-line sewer pipe	5.1
Sewage treatment plant	6.3
Sewage outfall ditch	6.2
Garbage pit east of Owens River	19.9
Total	5,464.09 ¹¹⁷

The program for land improvements at Manzanar consisted of (1) clearing and developing; (2) irrigation and drainage; (3) streets and roads; (4) bridges; and (5) fencing.

Clearing and Developing

Most of the land to be developed at Manzanar had once been covered with orchards or farms. Thus, "extensive further development was not needed." The relocation center's program consisted of clearing sage and smaller brush and leveling the land for irrigation. Because of wind erosion of the light sandy soil, leveling of agricultural land was a major project. Approximately 360 acres were cleared and improved. Of this total, approximately 80 percent of the center area and 1 percent of the agricultural land was cleared and developed under the Corps of Engineers prior to June 1, 1942. The remainder of the area was cleared and improved by the WRA Agricultural and Engineering Sections after that date.¹¹⁸

Irrigation and Drainage

Approximately 12.3 miles (67,162 feet) of irrigation ditches and pipelines were constructed for agricultural purposes by the WRA. The water from George, Bairs, and Shepherd creeks was distributed for irrigation through pipelines and ditches by gravity. These creeks were fed by melting snow, resulting in considerable fluctuation of the streams. George and

117. *Ibid.*, p. 1,042.

118. *Ibid.*, pp. 1,042-43.

Shepherd creeks flowed year-round, but Bairs Creek dried up in late summer. Because of the fluctuation and insufficient supply of water for late crops (Shepherd Creek, for instance, fluctuated from a maximum of 47 second-feet during early summer to a minimum of 3 second-feet during the winter), the Manzanar irrigation system was supplemented by the City of Los Angeles' water and "power wells" in the area. Wells 76 and 95 supplied water for the fields south of the center, and Well 92 for a portion of the fields north of the center. Because of crooked casing, Well 99 in the north area could not be used.

The WRA Engineering Section constructed a concrete dam on Shepherd Creek and distributed water from there to farm-area ditches through open laterals lined with rock and concrete. The laterals were approximately 6 feet wide at the top, 3 feet wide at the bottom, and 3 feet deep. Wood flumes were constructed over "coulees" in this system. The farm area had a system of open ditches lined with rubble and concrete. The ditches were approximately 3 feet wide at the top, 1 foot wide at the bottom, and 1 1/2 feet deep with wood gates for controlling the water.

A concrete dam was constructed on George Creek and "connected by 7,450 feet of 12-inch concrete pipeline with the control box." This watercourse, in turn, connected with the existing system on Bairs Creek, from which the outlet emptied into open ditches lined with rubble and concrete that distributed water to the south fields. Wooden gates were installed in these ditches for controlling the water.

The pipelines and ditches constructed for irrigation by the WRA cost approximately \$27,980. The types of irrigation lines included:

CONSTRUCTION	SIZE IN INCHES	LINEAR FEET
Pipelines		
Concrete	12	9,740
Concrete	10	700
Concrete	8	2,015
Steel	12	3,129
Steel	8	1,676
Total		17,260
Ditches		
Open Concrete-lined		49,902
Total		67,162 ¹¹⁹

Streets and Roads

There were approximately 14 miles of oiled-surface streets in the Manzanar center and 1 1/2 miles of oiled-surface roads in the farm area outside of the fenced center area. Approximately 5 1/2 miles of dirt roads were constructed in the farm area and to the reservoir and sewage treatment plant.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1,043-44.

The cost for street and road construction was low due to the type of sandy soil which required little additional gravel before the surface could be oiled. Because of the center's topography and the small amount of rainfall, the streets and roads were elevated very little above the adjacent ground, thus making it unnecessary to install many drainage structures. All surfacing of streets and roads at Manzanar was "by the penetration method using M.C. 2 asphalt, except at the entrance to the Center from highway 395 and the one block on First Street, which was road-mixed to carry heavy traffic of large freight trucks."

The Corps of Engineers contracted "for surfacing 151,808 square yards" on "parts of different streets" at a cost of \$14,574. The WRA surfaced new streets and roads for the staff housing area, completed surfacing of streets in the center, and constructed and surfaced roads in the farm area. The penetration coat of M.C. 2 asphalt that was applied cost approximately 2 1/2 cents per square yard.¹²⁰

Bridges

The WRA constructed two bridges and a cattle guard on roads outside of the center. These structures were:

1. A bridge constructed on the farm road over the north fork of Shepherd Creek was 12 feet long and 20 feet wide. The structure had stone masonry walls and a wood superstructure and deck. Its cost of construction was \$250.
2. A bridge constructed on the farm road over the south fork of Shepherd Creek was 12 feet long and 15 feet wide. The bridge had stone masonry walls and a wood superstructure and deck. Its cost of construction was \$150.
3. A cattle guard constructed on the road to the sewage treatment plant was 9 feet long and 14 feet wide. Railroad steel rails were installed on "6-inch centers laid on timber stringers placed on concrete abutments." The structure cost approximately \$200.¹²¹

Fencing

The WRA constructed fences for the poultry and hog farms. Existing fences were repaired at the cattle farm as part of the camp's maintenance program. Girdner and Loftis, *Great Betrayal*,¹²² The aforementioned "Appraisal Report" stated that the fence around the chicken ranch consisted of 4-7 strands of double barbed wire and was 2,360 feet in length, while the fence at the hog farm consisted of 5-7 strands of double barbed wire and was 1,740 feet in length.¹²³ The aforementioned "Fixed Asset Inventory" noted that the fences in the poultry and hog farm areas were constructed by the WRA from wire already at the

120. *Ibid.*, p. 1,045.

121. *Ibid.*, p. 1,046.

122. *Ibid.*, p. 1,046.

123. "Appraisal Report," April 26, 1946, p. 29.

site. Posts for the fences were cut by the evacuees. The posts were five feet in height and varied between 3" and 6" in diameter.¹²⁴

Landscaping, Gardens, Parks, and Picnic Areas

In a speech on July 31, 1942, Roy Nash, Project Director at Manzanar, described the drab, monotonous setting of the camp. He noted:

There is nothing beautiful about Manzanar except its background of the Sierra Nevada. The sun rising out of Death Valley looks down upon a square mile of barracks arranged in nine great wards separated by wide fire breaks, each made up of four identical blocks. In each block, sixteen identical buildings 20 x 100 feet, of the simplest board and tar paper construction; what the Army calls the 'Theatre of Operations' type. Fourteen are living quarters, one of double size - a mess hall, the last a recreation hall. In the center of each block are latrines and shower baths with abundant hot water, for men and for women; a wash-house with tubs where clothing can be laundered; an ironing room where they can be dried.¹²⁵

A project report on October 30, 1942, provided a description of Manzanar that indicated the transitory nature and military-like conformity of its construction and physical layout. The report stated:

Outwardly the Center presents the same monotonous, drab, ugly tarpaper appearance: straight lines, uniform block arrangements, 15 barracks and a mess hall in exact 40-feet-apart locations; each block with two latrines, a laundry room and ironing room between the rows. . . . There is very little in the physical construction of Manzanar to indicate permanence; the entire Center impresses one with its temporary nature.¹²⁶

In addition to the efforts of evacuees who worked on WRA improvement projects conducted by the camp Public Works and Community Activities sections, many evacuees at Manzanar undertook personal projects to beautify their surroundings. To make the camp more hospitable, evacuees at Manzanar undertook efforts to improve their surroundings by planting lawns and small flower gardens adjacent to their barracks and larger "Victory Gardens" in firebreaks. Some evacuees also built Japanese-style rock gardens and parks. The result was the transformation of a monotonous, drab, and barren camp landscape into a community that took pride in its appearance.

After assuming administration of Manzanar, the WRA requested that the Farm Security Administration design a park for the camp that could accommodate at least 1,000 people. However, it is not known if the design was provided, and no such park is evident in

124. "Fixed Asset Inventory," November 15, 1945, Land and Fencing, Account No. 34, pp. 2-3ff.

125. War Relocation Authority, "Manzanar From The Inside," pp. 1-2, by Roy Nash, Vertical Files, "Manzanar," Inyo County Library.

126. "Project Report No. 64," October 30, 1942, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 70, File, "Manzanar, Project Reports."

maps or photographs of the camp. In addition, the Soil Conservation Service prepared a planting plan for Manzanar, entitled "A Program of Conservation Operations," which recommended use of 21,000 trees and 25,000 shrubs as a response to the large amount of dust blown around the camp area resulting from its sandy soil, arid climate, and high winds. While the camp administration did carry out some planting and landscaping projects, it did not fully implement the planting plan.¹²⁷

Meanwhile, the evacuees went forward with their own camp beautification efforts. As early as June 15, 1942, a Victory Garden was planted in the firebreak between Blocks 11 and 17, and by July lawns were being planted between barracks. The area around the main administration building, which was described by a visitor as "beautiful," had also been landscaped by July. That month Ryoza Kado, a professional rock garden artist, had four young evacuees working under him to construct gardens in the camp.¹²⁸

A project report written on August 8, 1942, stated that the "[t]ransformation of sagebrush covered semi-arid land into a green-studded landscape has already made considerable headway." The report noted that 155 lawns had been planted between barracks, six fish ponds stocked with carp had been constructed and several "picturesque rock gardens bordered with local shrubbery have contributed to the elimination of 'dustspace' (open ground)." In addition gardens had given "the center an increasingly 'green' appearance."¹²⁹

One of the best examples of the evacuees' beautification efforts at Manzanar was the Japanese Cherry Park located in front of the Children's Village. In September 1942, F. M. Uyematsu, owner of Star Nurseries in Montebello, California, agreed to donate approximately 1,000 Japanese cherry trees as well as a large number of shrubs and plants to the camp for landscaping purposes. The WRA secured a military permit for him to travel to his nursery and bring the trees to Manzanar in his own truck during late 1942. Uyematsu, who was a member of the camp Community Development Committee, supervised the planting of the trees in what became known as Japanese Cherry Park.

Rose Park, located in the firebreak between Blocks 33 and 34, was also constructed in 1942. This park included rosebushes, 100 different types of flowers, and a Japanese tea house.¹³⁰

127. Lawrence I. Hewes, Jr., Regional Director, Farm Security Administration, U.S. Department of Agriculture to Roy Nash, Project Director, July 13, 1942, and R. A. Petrie, Assistant to the Regional Director, WRA to Roy Nash, Project Director, July 24, 1942, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 224, File No. 43.500, "Construction of Centers (General), Repairs — Maintenance — Wiring — Landscaping — Electrical."

128. "Project Report No. 3," June 15, 1942; "Project Report No. 14," July 1, 1942; "Project Report No. 17," July 1, 1942; and "Project Report No. 25," July 23, 1942; RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 70, File, "Manzanar, Project Reports;" and Carl J. Thye, Senior Engineer, WRA to Ralph P. Merritt, Project Director, August 20, 1945, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 315, File No. 43.503, "Construction and Maintenance of Centers — Manzanar."

129. "Project Report No. 32," August 8, 1942, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 70, File, "Manzanar Project Reports."

130. "Project Report No. 14," July 1, 1942, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 70, File, "Manzanar Project Reports;" Ned Campbell, Assistant Project Director to Elmer M. Rowalt, Acting Regional Director, WRA, September 16, 1942, and Ralph P. Merritt, Project Director to H. Brown, H. McConnell, and William Katsuki, March 20, 1943, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 224, File No. 43.500, "Construction of Centers (General), Repairs — Maintenance — Wiring — Landscaping — Electrical."

One of the most prominent landscaping projects by the evacuees at Manzanar was the construction of Merritt Park by Kuichiro Nishi during a ten-month period in 1943. The park, which was named in honor of Project Director Ralph P. Merritt, covered a large area and included rock gardens, ponds, at least one rustic wood bridge, and a gazebo.

Nishi designed a memorial stone for the park, on which were inscribed Japanese characters, dedicating the park "to the memory of fellow Japanese Immigrants" who, although ushered to "this place with the breaking of friendly relations between the two countries" "have come to enjoy this quiet, peaceful place." He dedicated the park "for the enjoyment of the people and to the memory of the time of our residence here."¹³¹

Merritt questioned the propriety of putting Japanese characters on the stone, believing that it would "not make for friendly understanding" with the people of the Owens Valley, upon whom "we must depend to maintain the park in later years."¹³² It is not known if the memorial stone was included in the park.

During the time that Merritt Park was under construction, the WRA determined that it would not sponsor construction of additional parks at Manzanar because of the shortage of materials and a lack of funds. In the future, materials for new parks and landscaping projects would have to be provided by evacuees, although the WRA would allow them to use surplus government materials. In order to maintain the parks already constructed, the landscapers Nishi and Uyematsu, who were on the payroll of the Public Works Section, would each be allowed a team of three evacuees to assist them in this task.¹³³

Other landscape improvement projects at Manzanar included the development of picnic areas in and around the camp. When the barbed wire fence on the south side of the camp was moved out 100 yards, bringing Bairs Creek into the southwestern corner of the camp, work was begun in July 1942 to create a picnic area, including landscaping, paths, rustic bridges, and open air fireplaces. The picnic area became so popular with the evacuees that permits had to be issued for its use. During 1943 an area in the northern part of the camp was also developed as a picnic area with a large fireplace built by the Public Works Section, and after the evacuees were permitted to leave the center area, two more picnic areas were developed, one about one-half mile north of the camp and the other along George Creek, about one mile from the south fence.¹³⁴

131. "Translation from Japanese to English, Memorial Stone," RG 210, Entry 48, Box 224, File No. 43.500, "Construction of Centers (General), Repairs — Maintenance — Wiring — Landscaping — Electrical."

132. Ralph P. Merritt, Project Director to Lucy W. Adams, Assistant Project Director, Community Management, n.d., RG 210, Entry 48, Box 224, File No. 43.500, "Construction of Centers (General), Repairs — Maintenance — Wiring — Landscaping — Electrical."

133. Robert L. Brown, Assistant Project Director to Arthur M. Sandridge, Senior Engineer, June 24, 1943, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 224, File No. 43.500, "Construction of Centers (General), Repairs — Maintenance — Wiring — Landscaping — Electrical."

134. War Relocation Authority, "Manzanar From The Inside," p. 5, by Roy Nash, Vertical Files, "Manzanar," Inyo County Library; and "Community Activities Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 831-32, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

On August 4, 1943, the *Manzanar Free Press* reported that a new entrance sign for Manzanar had been placed in a "little rock and cacti garden constructed by Mr. Kado and his crew." The words "Manzanar War Relocation Center" were written "on the beautiful 3 1/2 x 6 foot sign with an antiqued background." Located near the highway, the sign was supported "by two 12 x 12 inch posts" that were ten feet in height.¹³⁵

Cemetery

Most of the people who died at Manzanar were cremated or buried at places other than the camp. However, a number were buried in the camp cemetery, located on the west side of the barbed wire fence enclosing the center area.

The first recorded burial in the Manzanar cemetery was Matsunosuke Murakami on May 16, 1942. Official correspondence indicates that 28 people were buried in the cemetery during operation of the camp. According to a staff memorandum on June 28, 1945, fifteen burials remained in the cemetery, the most recent being December 19, 1944.¹³⁶

On July 24, 1943, the *Manzanar Free Press* reported that the center of the Manzanar cemetery had been selected as the site for construction of a monument by members of the Town Hall Committee and the Buddhist and Christian "priests." At the request of the committee, R. F. Kado, manager of the masonry department, agreed to construct the monument. He had "years of experience on masonry work and has shown his ability on the hospital garden and guard-house entrance."¹³⁷

Funds for the construction of the monument, which cost approximately \$1,000, were raised by evacuee contributions. One side of the obelisk bore the date and place of the monument. The Japanese characters inscribed on the other side of the monument translate to English as "This is the place of consolation for the spirit of all mankind."¹³⁸

In late August 1943 a well-attended service was held to dedicate the monument. Mr. Senkichi, an evacuee, was the master of ceremonies. Other speakers included Father Steinbach, pastor of the Catholic Church at Manzanar, Rev. Oda, the camp's Buddhist priest, Project Director Merritt, and Town Hall chairman Kiyocharu Anzai. A letter of thanks and a memento were presented to Kado for constructing the memorial obelisk.¹³⁹

135. *Manzanar Free Press*, August 4, 1943, p. 3.

136. Memorandum, Margaret D'Ille, Counselor to Lyle G. Wentner, Assistant Project Director, June 26, 1945, and Lyle G. Wentner, Assistant Project Director to John H. Provinse, Chief, Community Management Division, June 27, 1945, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 226, File No. 62.120.

137. *Manzanar Free Press*, July 24, 1943, p. 1.

138. "The Monument of Manzanar," Speech by Ralph P. Merritt, Annual Banquet of Museum Association of Eastern California, Bishop, California, April 23, 1948, Box 48, File, "Statements (Addresses) Re: Japanese, Relocation, etc., by various people, v.d.," Coll. 200, Department of Special Collections, UCLA.

139. *Manzanar Free Press*, August ?, 1943, p. 1.

As Manzanar was closing in late 1945, relatives of the 15 persons who remained buried in the cemetery were contacted concerning their wishes for the deceased. As a result nine bodies were removed from the cemetery and reburied elsewhere.

On January 7, 1946, nearly two months after the camp closed, Project Manager Ralph Merritt asked A. M. Sandridge, Senior Engineer - Public Works, to install a fence around the cemetery. His memorandum stated:

Will you please put a three-wire fence, with posts 4 feet high, around the smallest area of the Manzanar Cemetery necessary to enclose the remaining six graves. Have your men smooth out places where bodies have been dug and removed. Leave markers only on the six graves in which there are bodies. Leave a small opening in the fence about two feet wide for people to enter. . . .

The little graves to the north of the cemetery are not to be included. These are the burying places only of pets.¹⁴⁰

140. Ralph P. Merritt, Project Director to A. M. Sandridge, Senior Engineer — Public Works, January 7, 1946, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 226, File No. 62.120.



Photo 21: Manzanar War Relocation Center, camouflage net buildings on right; photo by Dorothea Lange, July 1, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.



Photo 22: Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Dorothea Lange, July 1, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.



Photo 23: Manzanar War Relocation Center from guard tower, 1943; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.



Photo 24: Barracks, Manzanar War Relocation Center, looking west; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California.



Photo 25: "Ironing Room, Laundry Room, Women's Latrine, Men's Latrine," Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California



Photo 26: Street scene, 1943, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.



Photo 27: Barracks, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California.



Photo 28: Children's Village, looking west, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Studio, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California.



Photo 29: Mrs. Nakamura and two children, 1943, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.



Photo 30: Hospital, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California.



Photo 31: Monument in cemetery, 1943, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.



Photo 32: Military police camp, looking west, Manzanar War Relocation Center, 1942; David Kruse Photograph Collection.



Photo 33: Administration Building, Manzanar War Relocation Center.



Photo 34: Auditorium, ca. 1944, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California.



Photo 35: Guard tower, looking west, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California.



Photo 36: Pool in Merritt Park, 1943, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.



Photo 37: Guard tower, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California.



Photo 38: Guard tower, looking west, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California.



Photo 39: "Maintenance Crew," Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California.



Photo 40: Three evacuee boys, guard tower, and barbed-wire fence on perimeter of residential area, looking west, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California.



Photo 41: Reservoir Stilling Basin, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California.

CHAPTER NINE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE EVACUEE POPULATION AT THE MANZANAR WAR RELOCATION CENTER

The historical background of the persons of Japanese descent who were evacuated to the Manzanar War Relocation Center provides a context for understanding the range of experiences and resentments that they brought with them to the camp. The historical development and the socio-economic characteristics of the prewar communities from which the Manzanar evacuees came, as well as the generational, social, economic, and political divisions that emerged in those communities prior to World War II, offer a contextual framework to better understand the strains and stresses that would plague the relocation center's operation, particularly during its first nine months of operation. The backgrounds of the evacuees, in addition to their experiences during the evacuation process, had a significant impact on their reactions and responses to life within the confines of the camp throughout the war.

JAPANESE/JAPANESE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES OF ORIGIN

The military's statistics and the population reports in *The Manzanar Free Press*, various War Relocation Authority documents, and other academic studies, although offering some conflicting numbers, provide a picture of the extensive evacuee population buildup at Manzanar during its first several months of operation. Following the arrival of some 80 "volunteer" evacuees from Los Angeles on March 21, 1942, the center's population increased rapidly, reaching a total of 3,302 by April 4. In its first issue on April 11, the *Manzanar Free Press* reported that 800 evacuees, including family members of the "volunteers," arrived from Los Angeles via a military-escorted caravan of private vehicles on March 23. An additional 500 evacuees from Los Angeles and 9 from Palo Alto arrived on March 25. On April 1, 227 evacuees arrived from Bainbridge Island in Puget Sound, near Seattle, Washington, and on April 3 and 4, 1,000 and 900 persons arrived from the Los Angeles Harbor area (primarily the Terminal Island, San Pedro, and Long Beach vicinities), respectively. The Bainbridge Islanders had been evacuated under Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1 and taken by train directly to Manzanar, because the Puyallup Assembly Center on Washington state fairgrounds was not ready for occupancy and Manzanar was the nearest reception or relocation center to their homes that was in operation. Those from Los Angeles Harbor area were evacuated under Civilian Exclusion Order No. 3.¹

The evacuee population of Manzanar more than doubled as a result of Civilian Exclusion Orders Nos. 7, 8, and 9. On April 29, 1942, the *Manzanar Free Press* reported:

1. *Manzanar Free Press*, April 11, 1942, p. 1; U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 363; and Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs, Wartime Civil Control Administration, Statistical Division, "Exclusion Dates, Number Evacuated, and Destinations of Japanese By Civilian Exclusion Order," RG 83, Western Regional Office, Berkeley, California, Records of Adam Poli, 1941-46, Box 2, File, "Procedure — Japanese Evacuee Study."

Within three days Manzanar doubled its population from 3309 to 7181. On 3 consecutive afternoons, Sunday, Monday and Tuesday caravans of busses brought new settlers in groups of 927, 973 and 1972 respectively.²

Two earlier issues of the newspaper indicated that the people affected by these three civilian exclusion orders included Japanese/Japanese American communities in western and northern Los Angeles County. The newspaper stated that the affected communities included the "District of Santa Monica Mountains [Santa Monica bay area], [a] portion of Beverly Hills, the San Fernando Valley, Westwood, Sawtelle, Burbank, Glendale, Universal City, Hollywood and N. Hollywood."³

Civilian Exclusion Orders Nos. 32 and 33, the exclusion date of both being May 9, 1942, provided for evacuation of persons from southeast central and north Los Angeles, respectively. Most of the evacuees under the former order were sent to the Pomona Assembly Center, but 390 were dispatched to Manzanar. The majority of the evacuees under the latter order were sent to the Santa Anita Assembly Center, but 413 were sent to Manzanar.⁴

Civilian Exclusion Order No. 66 (exclusion date — May 17, 1942) provided for evacuation of between 1,600 and 1,700 persons from the Little Tokyo and Boyle Heights sections of East Los Angeles. Of this total, 865 were sent to Manzanar, the majority of the others being transported to the Turlock Assembly Center in central California.⁵

Civilian Exclusion Order No. 92 (exclusion date — May 30, 1942) provided for evacuation of more than 1,640 persons from the Fair Oaks area (Florin community) in Amador County east of Sacramento. While the majority of these people were sent to the Fresno Assembly Center, 399 were transported to Manzanar.⁶

Civilian Exclusion Order No. 97 (exclusion date — May 30, 1942) provided for evacuation of 164 persons from the French Camp community on the southern outskirts of Stockton in San Joaquin County, California, to Manzanar.⁷

In addition to the arrival of these large evacuee contingents at Manzanar, War Department records indicate that small numbers of evacuees from various prewar communities were

2. *Manzanar Free Press*, April 29, 1942, p. 1.

3. *Ibid.*, April 22, 1942, p. 1, and April 26, 1942, p. 1.

4. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 363, and Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, "Exclusion Dates, Number Evacuated, And Destinations of Japanese By Civilian Exclusion Order," RG 83.

5. U.S. War Department *Final Report*, p. 364, and Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, "Exclusion Dates, Number Evacuated, And Destination of Japanese By Civilian Exclusion Order," RG 83.

6. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 365, and Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, "Exclusion Dates, Number Evacuated, And Destinations of Japanese By Civilian Exclusion Order," RG 83.

7. U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, p. 365, and Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, "Exclusion Dates, Number Evacuated, And Destinations of Japanese By Civilian Exclusion Order," RG 83.

transferred to Manzanar from other assembly and relocation centers during the spring and summer of 1942, primarily because their relatives were there.⁸

The last major contingent of evacuees to enter Manzanar was a group of 65 persons sent from the Santa Anita Assembly Center on October 26, 1942, because that center was closing. The *Manzanar Free Press* reported that this group was transported on two busses. Although "a few of the 65 new residents are relatives of Manzanites," the newspaper noted that "a majority of them are hospital patients and aged people."⁹

A chart entitled, "State, County, and Size of Community Prior to Evacuation, By Center: Evacuees to WRA in 1942," in *The Evacuated People: A Qualitative Description*, a statistical study of the evacuee population in the relocation centers prepared by the WRA Relocation Planning Division's Statistics Section in 1946, lists the total population of Manzanar as 10,056. Nearly 98 percent of the relocation center's evacuee population was from California. Of the total population, 8,828 (or approximately 88 percent) were from Los Angeles County, and 7,207 (or approximately 72 percent) were from Los Angeles City. Other California counties from which more than 10 evacuees came included: Alameda (20); Fresno (25); Kern (13); Orange (77); Riverside (35); Sacramento (370); San Diego (59); San Francisco (81); San Joaquin (178); San Luis Obispo (18); Santa Barbara (16); and Ventura (14). In addition to the evacuees from California, 226 persons were from Kitsap County, Washington, and one evacuee was from southern Arizona.¹⁰

The aforementioned WRA publication also includes a statistical chart (a copy of which may be seen on the following page) entitled, "Age by Sex and Nativity: Manzanar, January 1, 1943." As of that date, the evacuee population at Manzanar was 10,121. Of this total, 5,754 (or 56.9 percent) were male and 4,367 (or 43.1 percent) were female. There were 3,573 (or 35.3 percent) foreign born aliens, often referred to as first generation immigrants and known as Issei, of which total 2,304 were male and 1,269 were female. There were 6,548 (or 64.7 percent) American-born evacuees, frequently referred to as second-generation Japanese Americans and known as Nisei, of which total 3,450 were male and 3,098 were female. More than 80 percent of the Issei were between 35 and 64 years of age, while more than two-thirds of the Nisei were between 10 and 29 years old.¹¹

8. See, for instance, *Manzanar Free Press*, July 20, 1942, p. 2, and July 24, 1942, p. 1.

9. *Ibid.*, October 29, 1942, p. 1.

10. U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Evacuated People*, pp. 61-66. Also see U.S. War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 363-65, and Toshio Yatsushiro, "Political and Socio-Cultural Issues At Poston and Manzanar Relocation Centers — A Thematic Analysis," 2 vols., Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1953, Vol. II, p. 343.

11. U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Evacuated People*, p. 102. A few of the American-born persons listed in this chart may have been Sansei, or third generation Japanese Americans.

TABLE 37g.—AGE BY SEX AND NATIVITY: Manzanar, January 1, 1943 (Number and Percent)

Note: Includes evacuees on short-term and seasonal leave.

AGE	N U M B E R									P E R C E N T								
	TOTAL			AMERICAN BORN			FOREIGN BORN			TOTAL			AMERICAN BORN			FOREIGN BORN		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
TOTAL	10,121	5,754	4,367	6,548	3,450	3,098	3,573	2,304	1,269	100.0	56.9	43.1	64.7	34.1	30.6	35.3	22.8	12.5
Under 5	808	449	359	800	446	354	8	3	5	7.9	4.4	3.5	7.9	4.4	3.5	0	0	0
5-9	633	325	308	631	323	308	2	2	-	6.2	3.2	3.0	6.2	3.2	3.0	0	0	-
10-14	764	366	398	753	364	389	1	2	9	7.5	3.6	3.9	7.4	3.6	3.8	.1	0	.1
15-19	1,340	703	637	1,338	697	641	2	6	16	13.6	7.0	6.6	13.3	6.9	6.4	.3	.1	.2
20-24	1,498	791	707	1,472	773	697	26	16	10	15.0	7.9	7.1	14.7	7.7	7.0	.3	.2	.1
25-29	966	490	476	914	471	443	52	19	33	9.6	4.9	4.7	9.1	4.7	4.4	.5	.2	.3
30-34	605	254	351	394	210	184	211	44	167	6.0	2.5	3.5	3.9	2.1	1.8	2.1	.4	1.7
35-39	659	333	326	160	106	54	499	227	272	6.4	3.2	3.2	1.5	1.0	.5	4.9	2.2	2.7
40-44	724	405	319	45	32	13	679	373	306	6.9	3.9	3.0	.4	.3	.1	6.5	3.6	2.9
45-49	453	236	217	29	19	10	424	217	207	4.4	2.3	2.1	.3	.2	.1	4.1	2.1	2.0
50-54	470	336	134	0	5	3	462	331	131	4.6	3.3	1.3	0	0	0	4.6	3.3	1.3
55-59	524	451	73	-	-	-	524	451	73	5.2	4.5	.7	-	-	-	5.2	4.5	.7
60-64	400	373	27	1	1	-	399	372	27	4.0	3.7	.3	0	0	-	4.0	3.7	.3
65-69	176	169	7	-	-	-	176	169	7	1.8	1.7	.1	-	-	-	1.8	1.7	.1
70-74	63	57	6	1	1	-	62	56	6	.7	.6	.1	0	0	-	.7	.6	.1
75 & over	18	16	2	2	-	2	16	16	-	.2	.2	0	0	0	0	.2	.2	0

* Less than 0.05 percent.

Figure 19: Table 37g — Age by Sex and Nativity, Manzanar January 1, 1943

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPANESE/JAPANESE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES OF EVACUEE ORIGIN

With the exception of the Bainbridge Island evacuees and one evacuee from southern Arizona, the entire Manzanar evacuee population (nearly 98 percent) came from communities in California. Approximately 88 percent of the Manzanar evacuees came from Los Angeles County. Thus, this section will provide an overview of the historical development of Japanese/Japanese American communities in the state of California, Los Angeles County, and Bainbridge Island.

California

Settlement Patterns and Occupational Characteristics. Despite the growing protests of white supremacists, as discussed in Chapter One of this study, the flow of immigration from Japan to the United States remained relatively unaffected until 1907-08, when agitation from white supremacist organizations, labor unions, and politicians resulted in the "Gentlemen's Agreement," curtailing further immigration of laborers from Japan.¹² A provision in the agreement, however, permitted wives and children of laborers, as well as laborers who had already been in the United States, to continue to enter the country. Until that time, Japanese immigrants had been primarily male. The 1900 census indicates that only 410 of 24,326 Japanese in the United States were female. From 1908 to 1924 Japanese women continued to immigrate to the United States, some emigrating as "picture brides."

In Japan, arranged marriages were the rule. Go-betweens arranged marriages between compatible males and females, based on careful matching of socio-economic status, personality, and family background. With the advent of photography, an exchange of photographs became a first step in this long process. Entering the bride's name in the

12. Further information on the historical background of the Japanese population on the west coast may be found in U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Wartime Exile*, pp. 1-96.

groom's family registry legally constituted marriage. Those Japanese males who could afford the cost of traveling to Japan returned there to be married. Others resorted to long-distance, arranged marriages. The same procedure that would have occurred if the groom were in Japan was adhered to, and the bride would immigrate to the United States as the wife of a laborer. Not all Issei were married in this manner, but many were.

Those hoping to rid California of its Japanese population thought the Gentlemen's Agreement would end Japanese immigration. Instead, the Japanese population of California increased, both through new immigration and through childbirth. Anti-Japanese groups, citing the entry of "picture brides," complained that the Gentlemen's Agreement was being violated. A movement to totally exclude Japanese immigrants eventually succeeded with the Immigration Act of 1924. That legislation completely curtailed immigration from Japan until 1952 when an allotment of 100 quota immigrants per year was designated. Despite this legislation, thousands of immigrants from Japan would continue to enter the United States as "non-quota immigrants" — relatives of citizens.

The pattern of immigration has left its mark on Japanese communities in the United States. While immigrants before 1924 were uniformly young, the delay in immigration of women resulted in many marriages in which the husband was considerably older than the wife. Immigration of women between 1908 and 1924 also meant that the majority of children (Nisei) were born within a period of 20 years, 1910-30. Thus, the Japanese population in the United States became bi-modal — an age group for the original immigrants and another for their children. This development influenced the ways in which Japanese communities were organized. For example, Japanese communities experienced the need every 25 years or so to have facilities and organizations oriented to children, with long periods of time when such facilities were not needed. Large numbers of Nisei would enter the job market at the same time, and they would have children at about the same time.

Most Japanese immigrants entered the United States through San Francisco. Thus, the newcomers tended to concentrate in the San Francisco Bay area. The second largest port of entry for the Japanese was Seattle, Washington, followed by Portland, Oregon. Approximately 75 percent of the 2,000 Japanese aliens enumerated as residents of the United States in 1890 settled near the ports-of-entry in California or Washington. Ten years later, according to the 1900 census, 42 percent of the country's alien Japanese lived in California, 23 percent in Washington, and 10 percent in Oregon.

In 1890, 590 of California's Japanese residents lived in San Francisco, while 184 resided in Alameda County and 51 in Sacramento County. A scattering of Japanese residents appeared throughout California, with the smallest number in the southern California area. Little is known about these early Japanese immigrants. It is speculated that they worked for the railroad, performed common labor, or performed miscellaneous tasks, such as chopping wood for domestic service. By 1890 the move into agricultural work had begun in the Vacaville area in Solano County in northern California, and labor contractors were beginning to gather new immigrants to work in industries such as the railroads, oil fields, and agriculture.

By 1900, the same northern California counties had the largest numbers of Japanese, but the population had increased tremendously with movement into other parts of the state as

agricultural work drew immigrants to what were then rural areas. San Francisco had 1,781 Japanese, Sacramento County 1,209, and Alameda County 1,149. In addition, Monterey County had 710, Fresno County 598, San Joaquin County 313, Santa Clara County 284, Contra Costa County 276, and Santa Cruz County 235.

In many communities, *nihonmachi* (Japanese sections of town) were developed, with the establishment of small businesses catering to the needs of immigrants. These ethnic enclaves, popularly called "Little Tokyos," were outgrowths of long-standing socio-economic forces and pressures. Discriminatory zoning restrictions segregated the Japanese and excluded them from the better residential districts. Areas considered undesirable by the white population were left to minority groups and developed into various ethnic communities. Historically, "Little Tokyo" communities developed as a result of the natural affinity of the immigrants for their own people. Inability to speak English brought people together where their native tongue could be spoken freely without embarrassment or conspicuousness. These communities provided many of the needs and services which were unobtainable elsewhere. Because of their inability to communicate easily with the American population at large, the Issei depended more heavily on these centers than did the Nisei or Sansei (third generation Japanese).

By 1900, southern California had a Japanese population of approximately 500, with the largest concentration in the steadily growing urban area of Los Angeles County. Ulysses Shinsei Kaneko, a resident in San Bernardino County, became one of the first Japanese naturalized in California in 1896. Businesses in towns and cities had been in operation for almost a decade. Buddhist churches and Japanese Christian churches had been established earlier. Japanese had purchased property, and a few Nisei children had been born.

At the turn of the 20th century, trades of the Japanese in urban California included domestic service and businesses catering to other Japanese — boarding houses, restaurants, barbershops, bathhouses, gambling establishments, and pool halls. Although Japanese communities were emerging in urban areas, labor contractors continued to draw immigrants away from the cities to work for the railroads, canneries, and farms in rural areas of the state.

Some Japanese immigrants initiated their own enterprises and industries. These included industries the Chinese had pioneered in earlier years. Fishing and abalone industries developed at White Point and Santa Monica Canyon in Los Angeles County and at Point Lobos in Monterey County. Kinji Ushijima, also known as George Shima, continued the reclamation work begun by Chinese in the Sacramento/San Joaquin Delta. Shima eventually reclaimed more than 100,000 acres of land for agricultural use with the help of large labor crews.

Between 1900 and 1910, Japanese began to purchase property and establish farms, vineyards, and orchards. All-Japanese communities developed in agricultural areas in central California, including Florin in Sacramento County (which the Japanese called *Taishoku*), Bowles in Fresno County, and the Yamato Colony at Livingston in Merced County.

By 1910, a significant change had occurred in the California Japanese population, which then numbered 41,356. Movement to the southern part of the state had undergone a

marked increase, and the number of women in the Japanese community was steadily increasing. By the late 1920s, females would constitute one-third of the Japanese population. Los Angeles County became the most populous Japanese settlement by 1910, with 8,461, and has remained so to this day. A major stimulus for the move south was the rapid expansion of the Los Angeles area during the southern California boom period. Many Japanese also migrated to Los Angeles after the disastrous San Francisco earthquake in 1906.

San Francisco remained the second most populous area in California, however, with a Japanese population of 4,518 in 1910. Sacramento County was third with 3,874, Alameda County was fourth with 3,266, Santa Clara County was fifth with 2,299, and Fresno County was sixth with 2,233. Other counties having more than 1,000 Japanese included Contra Costa, Monterey, and San Joaquin. The large increases in the population reflected the unrestricted immigration of male laborers until 1908, entrance of Japanese women into the United States, and resultant increase in the birth of children. Numerous Little Tokyos had been established in California, ranging from Selma's one block of businesses catering to Japanese in Fresno County to whole sections of town in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Jose.

The Japanese population of Los Angeles County more than doubled by 1920, increasing to 19,911, more than three times as many as the next most populous county, Sacramento, with 5,800. California's total Japanese population numbered 71,952. The most populous counties after Los Angeles and Sacramento were Fresno (5,732), San Francisco (5,358), Alameda (5,221), and San Joaquin (4,354). Other counties with Japanese populations in excess of 1,000 included Monterey, Orange, Placer, San Diego, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, and Tulare. The population increase was the result almost totally of the immigration of women and the birth of children. By the early 1920s the economic basis of the Japanese community had been established in agriculture and its offshoots — wholesaling, retailing, and distributing. The Japanese organized their produce and flower industries vertically, resulting in a system in which all operations were owned and operated by Japanese, from raising the plants to retail sales. Such ventures resulted in organizations such as the Southern California Flower Market in Los Angeles, the California Flower Market in San Francisco, Lucky Produce in Sacramento, and the City Market in Los Angeles. Cooperatives, such as Naturipe in Watsonville, Santa Cruz County, were organized to improve growing, packing, and marketing of crops produced by Japanese farmers.

Small Japanese businesses became numerous in California by the early 1920s. Many of the "city trades" were directly tied to rural occupations, particularly agricultural labor. Businesses such as boarding houses, hotels, restaurants, barber shops, and gambling houses were dependent on the constant traffic of single male laborers, who traveled a circuit in California from one crop to the next, from the Imperial Valley near the Mexican border to the Sacramento Valley in northern California. Other city businesses were also oriented towards farming interests. For example, a number of Japanese entrepreneurs operating general merchandise stores had regular routes to the surrounding countryside, taking orders and making deliveries for food and other supplies. Examples of this service included the Kamikawa Brothers in Fresno and Tsuda's in Auburn.

During the 1910s, Japanese farmers became important producers and growers of crops, and this trend continued during the 1920s. Agricultural efforts included truck farming

along the Pacific coast, in the San Joaquin Valley, and in southern California; grapes and tree fruit in the San Joaquin Valley and southern California; strawberries in numerous locations; and rice in northern California.

By 1930 California's Japanese population numbered 97,456. Los Angeles County still had the most Japanese, almost doubling its population during the 1920s to 35,390. The county had nearly 40 percent of the state's Japanese population, and it had more than four times as many Japanese as did the second county, Sacramento, which had 8,114. Again the increase can be attributed to immigration of Japanese women as well as the birth of children. Because immigration was totally curtailed in 1924, however, the birth of children probably was the more important reason. Another source for population increase was migration from other parts of the country. Japanese residents, for example, moved to Los Angeles County during the 1930s because of relatively better economic opportunities during the nationwide depression.

Despite the nation's economic downturn, the 1930s were a time of growth for most *nihonmachi* throughout California. Almost every agricultural area with a population of Japanese residents had a flourishing Japanese section of town. Cooperatives established in previous years were functioning at their peak. Nisei children were in schools and beginning to enter the labor market. This subtle change can be noted in such things as Japanese-language newspapers adding English sections to their publications, and Japanese church youth organizations being organized.¹³

The 1940 census provides considerable detail on the nature and economic structure of Japanese communities in the state of California prior to Pearl Harbor. According to the census there were 126,947 Japanese residents, foreign-born and citizen, in the United States. Of this total 73.8 percent lived in California. The tendency toward geographic concentration in the state was evident. Whereas there had been two counties in the state with no Japanese in 1910, by 1940 there were 11. Seven counties — Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Francisco, Alameda, Fresno, San Joaquin, and Santa Clara — contained 67,137 or 71.64 percent of the state's Japanese population. Los Angeles County, the leading county, had 39.34 percent of the state's total. The Japanese were becoming increasingly urbanized. Almost 90 percent of the urban Japanese population of California resided in Alameda, Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, San Joaquin, and Fresno counties.

In California, 11,646 (28.8 percent) of the employed Japanese worked as laborers on farms — the most important single source of employment. Of every ten employed Japanese, two worked on a farm for wages and one as an unpaid family farm laborer.

There were 5,807 Japanese (14.4 percent) reported as farmers or farm managers. The number of Japanese engaged in agriculture as laborers was more than double the number of managers and owners, contrary to the generally held opinion that the Japanese contribution to agriculture was primarily managerial. Of the Japanese male population employed in California, more than half were engaged in agriculture, either as farm

13. Waugh and Yamato, "A History of Japanese Americans In California," in Waugh, Yamato, and Okamura, *A History of Japanese Americans in California*, pp. 162-67, and Nishi, "Changing Occupation of the Japanese in Los Angeles County," pp. 26, 45-47.

operators or as laborers. Of the native-born males slightly over a third were employed as farm laborers.

Approximately 4,600 (11.4 percent) were employed as clerical, sales, or kindred workers, and 4,217 as proprietors and managers. Of the 5,656 employed as service workers about four-sevenths were in domestic service. Approximately 17 percent were employed as non-farm workers, of whom 3,605 were common laborers, 2,717 operatives and kindred workers, and 681 were skilled workers or foremen.

Between the native-born and the foreign-born Japanese, differences in the occupational pattern were more marked than those in the industrial pattern. The employment pattern of the alien Japanese in the younger age groups resembled more closely that of the native-born than that of the older foreign-born. The chief differences were those resulting from ownership. Approximately 21 percent of the native-born were managers and proprietors as compared with 37 percent of the foreign-born.

For Japanese women the most important occupations were farm labor and domestic service. Over a third (36 percent) of the foreign-born females were employed as farm laborers and 28 percent of the native-born females as domestic service workers.

There were 5,135 Japanese-operated farms in California in 1940, with a total of 226,094 land acres. The farm holdings, including buildings, were valued at \$65,781,000. Compared with a general average of \$16,331, Japanese farms averaged \$12,810 in value. The typical Japanese-operated farm was considerably smaller than the average, 44 acres as compared with 230. Almost 30 percent of all Japanese farms were in Los Angeles County, and almost 85 percent were in Alameda, Fresno, Imperial, Los Angeles, Monterey, Orange, Placer, Sacramento, San Diego, San Joaquin, Santa Clara, and Tulare. About 70 percent of the operators rented their farms, about 25 percent were owners or part owners, and slightly less than 5 percent were managers. In 1941 Japanese farmers cultivated 205,989 acres of commercial truck crops, amounting to 42 percent of the state acreage in that category. In value, Japanese production was estimated to be between \$30,000,000 and \$35,000,000 or about 30-35 percent of all commercial truck crops grown in California. Although the Japanese operated only 3.9 percent of all farms in the state and harvested 2.7 percent of all cropland harvested, they produced: (1) 90 percent or more of the state's snap beans for marketing; celery, spring and summer; peppers, and strawberries; (2) 50-90 percent of the state's artichokes; snap beans for canning; cauliflower; celery, fall and winter; cucumbers; fall peas; spinach; and tomatoes; and (3) 25-50 percent of the state's asparagus, cabbage, cantaloupes, carrots, lettuce, onions, and watermelons.¹⁴

Community Structure. Japanese American community organizations have been in existence in California since 1877, serving the changing needs of their members. The first Japanese American community organization of record in the United States was the Gospel Society or Fukuin Kai, established in October 1877 in San Francisco. The Gospel Society offered English classes, operated a boarding house, and provided a place for Japanese to meet. With the influence of Caucasian Christians, the religious orientation of the society developed. Out of this organization eventually came the Japanese Christian churches, some of which were established as early as the 1890s.

14. House Report 2124, pp. 91-130.

The Issei established three principal types of organizations in the communities they settled. These organizations included churches, political/social organizations called by various names, and Japanese-language schools. Churches, whether Christian, Buddhist, or Shinto, were the focus of activity for most Japanese communities, and often were the earliest organizations to be established. Subsequently, churches expanded beyond religious services as women's organizations (*fujinkai*) became active, and youth groups were established with the advent of children. The churches provided both religious sustenance and the context for social life. It is estimated that before World War II, 85 percent of Japanese were Buddhist. Possibly the sole Japanese American community with only a Christian church was Livingston (Yamato Colony) in the San Joaquin Valley. During the World War II evacuation, churches served as storage centers for personal property left behind by evacuees and as hostels for returning evacuees. The churches themselves organized into umbrella groups, such as the Buddhist Churches of America, the Japanese Evangelical Mission Society, the Holiness Conference, and the Northern and Southern California Christian Church federations.

The political/social organizations were organized under different names, depending on the community. Some of these names were *doshikai*, *kyogikai*, and *nihonjinkai* (Japanese Association). All Japanese were assumed to belong to political/social organizations which dealt with issues affecting the total Japanese American community. Often they had their own offices or buildings for conducting business and holding meetings. Association leaders were spokespersons for the community in dealing with the larger community, and worked as intermediaries to settle differences of opinion or conflicts. Decisions were traditionally made by male members of the organization. Sometimes, a women's group (*fujinkai*) was attached to this organization. Many of these organizations dissolved with the onset of World War II evacuation. Properties were signed over to the Nisei, and records were lost or destroyed.

As Nisei children grew older, the Issei-organized Japanese language schools flourished throughout California as the older generation sought to pass on its native language and cultural traditions to its children. The first Japanese language school of record in the state was Shogakko in San Francisco, established in 1902. By the 1930s, virtually every Japanese American community had its own *nihongakko* (Japanese language school) operated by a church or Japanese association. Some communities had two or more schools. Occasionally, both Buddhist and Christian churches in a community supported their own Japanese language schools. Teachers were often church ministers, their wives, or well-educated persons in the community. Occasionally, as in Fresno, Guadalupe, and Sacramento, a dormitory was built in conjunction with the Japanese language school where children of busy parents would live.

Persons originating from the same area in Japan formed *kenjinkai*, which were social organizations designed to support, aid, and acquaint fellow *kenjin* (persons from the same prefecture). Social services in the form of financial aid, informal counseling, and care for the sick or injured were functions of these groups. Communities had one *kenjinkai* if the Japanese American community was primarily composed of people from the same area of Japan. If the community was large, such as Los Angeles, many *kenjinkai* existed, reflecting the different geographic origins of the immigrants.

In agricultural areas, cooperatives to grow, ship, and market agricultural products emerged, giving Issei farmers greater control over their economic destinies. Such organizations included Lucky Produce in Sacramento, Naturipe in Watsonville, the California Flower Market in San Francisco, and the City Market in Los Angeles.

The Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) emerged as the largest Nisei organization during the pre-World War II years. Organized in 1930 with headquarters in San Francisco, the JACL gained prominence as a political organization during the period leading up to World War II as the Nisei sought to assimilate with the larger American society.¹⁵

Los Angeles County

1869-1930s. The first Japanese to come to the Los Angeles area probably arrived as early as 1869 and took up residence in San Marino at the Molino Viejo, or Old Mill. The census of 1870 records two young men, "T. Komo" and "I. Noska," aged 18 and 13, respectively, who were employed as servants in the household of Judge E. J. C. Kewen that resided at the Old Mill. The two Japanese men apparently left the area by 1880, because the 1880 census did not list any persons having Japanese ancestry.

In 1880 Los Angeles, the largest settlement in southern California, had a population of nearly 11,000 persons, but apparently none of these people were Japanese. Dependent primarily on agriculture, Los Angeles also had some small industry. Southern California, however, had a superlative climate, railroad communications with the eastern United States were bringing people during the mild winters, and Los Angeles was becoming a popular tourist destination during the 1880s. The realization that many people would eventually settle in the area caused a sharp skyrocketing of land values in Los Angeles and other southern California settlements. Land prices climbed steadily and by 1884 the Los Angeles economy was beginning to boom.

That year some 24 or 25 Japanese men moved from San Francisco to Los Angeles to take advantage of the area's growing scarcity of labor. During the height of the boom years (1887-88), there were about 70 Japanese in Los Angeles who had come to the city in search of work. Perhaps, the most famous was Charles Kame, who was probably Shigeta Hamonosuke. He was the first independent Japanese businessman in Los Angeles, so far as is known. About 1886-87 he opened a restaurant on First Street, near the center of the downtown area, and did well enough to sell out two years later. Before 1890 he had left Los Angeles, perhaps to return to Japan. During this period, other Japanese engaged in carpentry, the bamboo business, and Japanese art stores in the city.

By 1888 a Japanese boarding house, known to Americans as the Japanese YMCA, was established about a block from Kame's restaurant. It is likely that the majority of Japanese in the city lived there during the late 1880s. By 1889, with the collapse of the Los Angeles

15. Waugh and Yamato, "A History of Japanese Americans In California," in Waugh, Yamato, and Okamura, *A History of Japanese Americans in California*, pp. 168-70. Also see John Modell, *The Economics and Politics of Racial Accommodation: The Japanese of Los Angeles, 1900-1942* (Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1977) for material on the Japanese population in Los Angeles.

real estate boom, the boarding house had gone out of existence, and the Japanese population in the city had declined to about 40 persons.

After 1893 the number of Japanese residents in Los Angeles increased year by year until there were at least 150 by 1900, and a tiny but moderately prosperous Japanese community emerged in the city. This period witnessed the rise of a Japanese "restaurant era" in the city, the number of such Japanese-owned restaurants rising from two or three in the early 1890s to 16 in 1896. The restaurants were the most significant Japanese economic activity in the city before 1900, outdoing the Japanese-owned art and curio stores and bamboo furniture stores. By 1900 there was a shoemaker, a barber, and a bathhouse owner who were Japanese. In 1896 a new boarding house was opened, and in 1898 a hotel was opened. Virtually all Japanese living in the city were employed by these businesses. In 1897 the Japanese Association of Los Angeles was established.

In 1896 the Santa Fe Railroad hired a few Japanese workers in Los Angeles, and by 1899 the Southern Pacific followed suit and used Japanese workmen. These laborers engaged in such work as track maintenance and boxcar cleaning.

Terminal Island, an island in Los Angeles Harbor about three-quarters of a mile wide and three and one-half miles long, had become the headquarters for the fishing industry in southern California by the turn of the 20th century. A dozen Japanese abalone fishermen settled on the island around 1901. Other fishermen came after the San Francisco earthquake in 1906, and by the summer of 1907 several hundred Japanese fishermen had moved to the island, many of them having emigrated from fishing districts of Japan with previous experience in that line of work. Between 1907 and 1910 three fish canneries began operation, and many one-story fisherman's houses were built by the canneries.¹⁶ According to the 1910 census, there were 4,238 Japanese in the Los Angeles City, of whom 3,372 were men fifteen years old or older and 531 were women in the same age group. Of the total Japanese population, 3,937 had been born in Japan and 301 had been born in the United States. Of the 4,225 Japanese whose ages were known, only 127 were more than 45 years old.

During the period between 1910 and 1915, the Japanese residents in Los Angeles continued to expand throughout the city into small enclaves outside the downtown area. Some Japanese established nurseries and other business ventures outside the downtown area.

During 1910-15 "Little Tokyo" emerged near the center of Los Angeles City, boasting a steadily increasing number of Japanese-owned businesses in what had become the principal Japanese retail shopping area. Approximately 135 rooming houses of various sizes had been established in city by 1915, because the majority of Japanese were bachelors who generally lived in hotels or boarding houses. Of the 7,444 Japanese in the city by 1915 some 2,000-3,000 lived in "Little Tokyo." The American Bank in the area hired a Japanese cashier, D. Kiyowara, between 1909 and 1913 to take care of Japanese depositors. In 1913 the Yokohama Specie Bank opened a branch within a block of the Japanese retail district.

16. Waugh, Yamato, and Okamura, *A History of Japanese Americans in California*, p. 182, and Bloom and Riemer, *Removal and Return*, p. 158.

In August 1915, a consul was appointed for the Japanese community of Los Angeles. The first man to be chosen for the post was Ujiro Oyama, who established his consulate in the German-American Bank Building in downtown Los Angeles. The consul was a significant figure for the Japanese, because they would be denied American citizenship until 1952. As aliens, they were obliged to depend upon the Japanese government whenever they had difficulties in America, and the representative of that government was the consul.

In 1916 there were about 3,000 Japanese domestic workers in Los Angeles, of whom 2,660 were employed by Americans and about 400 were employed by Japanese. There were about 1,000 other service workers in Los Angeles, such as delivery boys and porters in stores. Japanese firms employed 848 such men. They usually worked for grocery or dry goods stores, hotels, laundries, or restaurants as errand boys and runners.

In 1916 approximately 349 Japanese were employed by Japanese-owned manufacturing firms, such as a recently-established box factory and a paper carton factory. American-owned manufacturing plants employed 126 Japanese. The railroads employed about 140 Japanese laborers in Los Angeles, the principal employers being the Pacific Electric, Santa Fe, and Southern Pacific railways.

In 1916 the approximate Japanese population in Los Angeles County was about 15,000. There were probably well over 8,000 Japanese in the labor force of the county, more than half of these being engaged in agricultural pursuits. Though several hundred, perhaps thousands, were self-employed in small businesses, corporations, and partnerships, the majority were wage-earners.

In 1916 there were about 300 Japanese gardeners in southern California, most of whom were in the Los Angeles City. Japanese-style gardens became popular in the city during the 1920s, and the type or kinds of plants which went into the gardens were often selected by the gardeners themselves. Rock gardens in southern California were apparently a Japanese innovation. Wishing to be near their work, Japanese gardeners began to congregate in little settlements of their own in the suburbs. As they cared for the semi-tropical flora which helped to make southern California distinctive, they contributed uniquely to their adopted home, leaving their mark on the city and county landscape.

Japanese farming in Los Angeles County received a setback in 1913 when the state's Alien Land Law was passed. This law was aimed at the expanding Issei-dominated Japanese agricultural pursuits, because only aliens ineligible for citizenship were prohibited from owning land. At the time land owned by Japanese in Los Angeles County amounted to some 3,828 acres. Only Imperial County, where irrigation canals had made desert cultivation possible since 1901-02, rivaled Los Angeles County in the extent of Japanese-owned acreage. There were 3,514 acres owned by Japanese in that county when the land law was passed. In the six other southern California counties only 1,080 acres were owned by Japanese. The average value of Japanese-owned land in Los Angeles County was about \$192 per acre, for a total value of Japanese-owned lands of approximately \$732,000.

While the Alien Land Law was a setback for Japanese farmers, they developed innovative means to farm without owning land in fee simple. Leased land was made available after some question of legality was resolved, at least to the satisfaction of California's jurists,

and in time it was decided that minor children (Nisei) could own land with their parents as guardians.

The preference for farming among first generation Japanese reflects their cultural traditions and economic backgrounds. They could not compete effectively with white Americans in large scale farming endeavors which required heavy outlays of capital, organization, and business skill. In small cropping, however, such as vegetables, berries, and certain varieties of deciduous fruits, the Japanese found their optimum advantages. They were well adapted to a system of agriculture demanding maximum use of hand labor. The arduous labor associated with raising vegetables and berries never appealed to the Caucasian American, and Japanese control of this facet of farming in the county was as much due to the unwillingness of white Americans to enter this field as it was to the competitive strength of the Japanese. The Caucasian farmer, with his taller stature unsuited to the long hours of squatting and stooping required in truck farming, was at a physical disadvantage. Family enterprise, so characteristic of the farm economy in Japan, was carried over to the United States. Women and children commonly labored in the fields and contributed substantially to the farm income. Moreover, women and children could be effectively used in small crop farming because of the general lightness of the commodities and the need for more delicate skillful handling in the planting, weeding, picking, sorting, and packing processes.¹⁷

By 1916 Japanese farmers were cultivating 15,800 acres of land in Los Angeles County, the majority being leased land. About 80 percent of the vegetables handled by the Los Angeles produce companies were grown by Japanese, and the produce companies distributed 90 percent of the vegetables consumed by Los Angeles City. Thus, approximately three-fourths of the fresh vegetables consumed in Los Angeles were grown by Japanese farmers. The peak for Japanese farm production in Los Angeles County was reached in 1912, the year before passage of the Alien Land Law, when \$8,816,000 of produce was grown by Japanese in Los Angeles County and a total of \$9,471,725 was produced by Japanese in all of southern California. With the advent of World War I and the rise in price of such crops as beans and sugar beets, the Japanese agriculturists moved outside Los Angeles County in order to grow more specialized crops. In 1916 Japanese in southern California grew \$15,000,000 in produce on their farms, of which \$5,100,000 was grown in Los Angeles County.

In 1916 there were 1,321 Japanese farmers in Los Angeles County. Of this total, 499 farmed from one to ten acres, 783 from ten to 100, and 39 had farms of more than 100 acres. Of the 499 farms under ten acres, 66 were nurseries (Japanese owned 45 percent of the nurseries in Los Angeles City) and 81 were cut flower farms. Most Japanese farmers were involved in raising vegetables or berries. There were 678 vegetable farmers and 404 berry growers, as well as 29 cattle ranchers, 29 hog ranchers, and nine poultry farmers. Only 14 farmers were growing citrus fruits or grapes.

Japanese residents in the county were also engaged in agricultural-related businesses. About ten percent of the produce companies in Los Angeles were Japanese-owned by 1915, and there were 52 Japanese-owned grocery stores.

17. Nishi, "Changing Occupance of the Japanese in Los Angeles County," pp. 33-34.

In 1916 there were approximately 4,500 Japanese farm laborers in Los Angeles County, including an estimated 500 migrants who were in the county at different times depending upon the crops that were being harvested. Most laborers, however, remained on the same farms throughout the year. Japanese farmers employed 2,756 Japanese laborers for farm work, while American farmers employed only 81 Japanese. There were an additional 1,500 Japanese migrant laborers in southern California who worked from the Imperial Valley cantaloupe fields in early spring to the lemon groves of Ventura County in later months. Some migrants who found employment in Los Angeles County during the summer months would sometimes winter in the city from late November to late January. In the extensive citrus groves American growers employed 1,200 Japanese, while in the Japanese-owned groves 85 men were sufficient for the small amount grown by Japanese. Between 1910 and 1920 the Los Angeles Japanese community changed in several significant aspects, the most important change being the ratio of men to women. Whereas the ratio of men to women had been about eight or nine to one in 1910, it declined to two or three to one by 1920.

Another significant change in the Los Angeles Japanese community during the 1910s was the increase in the number of Nisei children who were attending American public schools. In 1916 about 200 were in kindergarten and 220 were in grammar school in Los Angeles City. While the Japanese American children in this period attended the city's public schools, most went to Issei-organized Japanese language schools for two hours in the afternoon to learn to read and write Japanese and have practice in learning to speak the language properly.¹⁸

The Japanese community on Terminal Island expanded rapidly during World War I and the years immediately thereafter. In 1916 Fisherman Hall was built and became the community center. A Baptist Mission was constructed that same year, and a grammar school was established in 1918. The community, which was known as East San Pedro, or Fish Harbor, grew as more canneries were constructed. Japanese fishermen moved to the island after a destructive fire on the mainland nearby; there was some migration from Monterey; and after the Alien Land Laws were passed, some farmers who had fishing experience in Japan turned again to fishing. By 1925, the growing Fish Harbor community extended into the nearby cities of San Pedro, Long Beach, and Wilmington and consisted of some 3,000-4,000 residents, the size it subsequently maintained until the war. The economy of the entire community was dependent upon fishing. Women, older men, and some children worked in the canneries as fish cleaners and packers, while able-bodied men engaged in catching sardines, mackerel, tuna, and other fish for canning. The Japanese fishermen included individuals who were crew members having no occupational property, equipment owners, and boat owners. By 1931 the Japanese controlled 30-40 percent of the total amount of fish landed in Los Angeles Harbor, including 70 percent of the albacore, 60-70 percent of the bonita, 75 percent of the mackerel, 35-40 percent of the sardines, and 30-35 percent of the tuna.

18. Except where otherwise noted the material in this section on the development of the Los Angeles Japanese/Japanese American community to the 1910s is based on William M. Mason and John A. McKinstry, *The Japanese of Los Angeles* (Los Angeles, History Division of the Los Angeles County Museum of Natural History, Contribution No. 1, 1969), pp. 1-36. Also see Chotoku Toyama, "The Japanese Community in Los Angeles" (M. A. Thesis, Columbia University, 1926), pp. 6-12, 58-62.

The fishing fleet on which the Japanese worked operated from the docks in Fish Harbor and took on supplies there. Tuna Street, leading to the wharf, was the business center of the Japanese community. It was lined with Japanese shops, grocery stores, pool halls, barber shops, soft drink parlors, a dry goods store, a meat market, restaurants, and other service facilities. Most numerous were the restaurants, serving both island residents and many cannery workers who came from the mainland. The businesses were operated as family enterprises by Issei who lived in rooms behind their shops. Some of the buildings were owned by Nisei, but the land could not be purchased and had to be leased from the Los Angeles Harbor Authority. Separated from the remainder of the Japanese community in Los Angeles and somewhat isolated on the island, the main language of the island's residents was Japanese, and traditional Japanese patterns of behavior, customs, and attitudes continued to thrive, particularly among the Issei. Many Japanese cultural and sport activities, such as judo, kendo, sumo, and Boy's Day celebrations, remained popular on the island, reflecting continuing Japanese traditions.¹⁹

An academic study of the Japanese/Japanese American community in Los Angeles in 1937 presented the results of a census conducted by the Japanese consulate of Los Angeles two years before. According to the 1935 census, the population of Japanese origin living in Los Angeles County totaled 32,714. Of this total, 58 percent were Issei and 42 percent were Nisei. Several Japanese concentrations were located within Los Angeles City. The largest and most concentrated Japanese community, with a population of 4,370 was centered approximately one block east of the Los Angeles City Hall in downtown Los Angeles. The center of this community, known as "Little Tokyo," was the business and cultural center of the Japanese communities in southern California. In this section most of the buildings were owned and virtually all of the stores were operated by Japanese. Almost all of the leading Japanese associations and organizations had offices in the area. A whole range of Japanese articles were found in Little Tokyo, including curiosities, dry-goods, books, magazines, foods, herbs, and toilet articles. Japanese from many parts of southern California went to Little Tokyo for shopping, community meetings, socialization, and amusement.

The next largest Japanese enclave in Los Angeles was located just east of Little Tokyo in Hollenbeck Heights, sometimes also referred to as Boyle Heights or East Los Angeles. In addition to the 2,554 Japanese who lived in this area, members of other minority groups, including blacks, Russians, and Mexicans, also resided there. This area was "the most convenient residential district for any Japanese business men" who had "offices or stores in 'Little Tokyo'."

The academic study described other areas of Japanese concentration in Los Angeles. These areas included:

Another section of Los Angeles where Japanese, together with Negroes live, is the Thirty-Fifth Street district, which covers an area bounded by Vermont Avenue, Western Avenue, Jefferson Boulevard, and Thirty-seventh Street. This district has

19. Waugh, Yamato, and Okamura, *A History of Japanese Americans in California*, pp. 182-83; Bloom and Riemer, *Removal and Return*, pp. 158-61; and Kanichi Kawasaki, "The Japanese Community of San Pedro, Terminal Island, California" (M. A. Thesis, University of Southern California, 1931).

an adjoining area enclosed by West Twenty-eighth Street, Jefferson Boulevard, Western Avenue, and Arlington. In these two areas live 2,235 Japanese.

Two other more or less distinct Japanese communities are found about West Tenth and Virgil Avenue in which 3,000 Japanese live. There is also a Japanese community in Hollywood. Here, the area is large, but the population is not dense. This area extends from Hollywood Boulevard to Melrose Avenue, and from Van Ness to Highland Avenue. It is almost ten blocks square, but only 723 Japanese live in it.

In addition to the above, there are several small Japanese districts in the City of Los Angeles, such as the Christian Church district which is situated about East Twentieth Street and South San Pedro Street; Belvedere District, and Vernon district; but the number of Japanese living in each of these is less than 500.

The study also discussed the characteristics of the Japanese residents and enclaves in the city and their demographic relationship to the wider community. It noted:

In general, the Japanese are tenants, paying their rents punctually and keeping the houses clean. However, because of the unwillingness of the owners and the antagonistic attitude of American neighbors, as well as the more or less unconscious inferiority complex of the Japanese, the Japanese feel uncomfortable in new neighborhoods where Japanese are not found. They, therefore, usually move into districts where other Japanese have already settled. Thus the existing districts become more congested and noticeable.

Geographically, the Japanese communities, in general, are located in somewhat low areas, at the foot of a hill, in a valley, or the like. Another significant point is that the houses in which Japanese live are old and small; formerly those sections were inhabited by Americans of the middle class, but the gradual migration of racial groups, as well as the city development, had made the former residents move to other sections, seeking better environment.²⁰

In 1935, the same year that the aforementioned census was conducted by the Los Angeles Japanese consulate, the National Labor Relations Board surveyed 157 farms in the Los Angeles County, estimated to comprise 10.1 percent of the county acreage devoted to vegetables and berries. The board reported on the Japanese-operated farms:

Among the smaller farms a great deal of the work is done by the Japanese growers and their families, whose assiduity and intensive culture of their land are reflected in a greater volume output per acre. These smaller farms, with their family reservoirs of labor, lend themselves more readily to the production of money crops which require greater care and attention, such as strawberries and celery. . . .

20. Fumiko Fukuoka, "Mutual Life and Aid Among the Japanese in Southern California with Special Reference to Los Angeles" (M. A. Thesis, University of Southern California, 1937), pp. 4-7.

On the farms of 10 acres or under, the family does 75.2 per cent of the labor, while on the farms of over 100 acres, the per cent of work done by the family is 34.2. This latter percentage for work done by members of the family on farms over 100 acres in size seems inordinately high, but the underlying explanation of this is that a large number of the bigger farms are cooperative enterprises run by as many as eight families working together.²¹

1940. The 1940 census indicated that the Japanese population of California had decreased from 97,456 in 1930 to 93,717 in 1940. The number of Japanese in Los Angeles County had increased slightly from 35,390 in 1930 to 36,866 in 1940. Of the 1940 population, 30,112 (81.7 percent) were classified as urban and 6,754 (18.3 percent) as rural. Of the urban population, 23,321 lived in Los Angeles City, and of this total, 14,595 had been born in the United States and were citizens, while 8,726 or 37.4 percent were foreign-born or aliens.²² The leading suburban communities in Los Angeles County that had more than 1,000 Japanese residents included the Compton, Downey, Inglewood, and Pasadena townships. The Los Angeles County Japanese population contained almost a third of all Japanese and Japanese Americans in the United States, and it was by far the largest prewar Japanese population center in the nation.²³

Urban Settlement: Distribution — By 1940 the Japanese residing in Los Angeles County were centered in seven relatively compact communities. The most prominent of these settlements, according to Nishi in his doctoral dissertation, entitled "Changing Occupance of the Japanese in Los Angeles County, 1940-1950," was "the Central area with its well known 'Little Tokyo' centering on First Street and extending eastward to Central Avenue and westward to Los Angeles Street."²⁴ According to Bloom and Riemer in their published study, entitled *Removal and Return*, the Little Tokyo area was

the small triangle of highest concentration within Central area-Little Tokio [Tokyo]. Within a few blocks of the intersection of East First and San Pedro streets were to be found cultural, religious and professional services for the Japanese American population of Southern California. On holidays and Saturdays, Japanese Americans congregated in Little Tokio [Tokyo] from all over the region, much as rural dwellers visit the county seat. Hotels and restaurants for Japanese Americans without families were in Little Tokio [Tokyo], and just outside were numerous eating and lodging places run by Japanese Americans for transients and the residents of a deteriorated area.²⁵

According to Nishi, the Issei constituted a limited market and the Nisei preferred to shop in the larger business centers of the city. Therefore, the economic bases of Little Tokyo

21. National Labor Relations Board, "Los Angeles County Vegetable Growers Survey" (Typescript, University of California, Berkeley, [1935], pp. 3-5.

22. Census statistics are listed in House Report 2124, pp. 97, 99-100.

23. Bloom and Riemer, *Removal and Return*, pp. 7-13, and Nishi, "Changing Occupance of the Japanese in Los Angeles County," pp. 30-32, 45-46, 193.

24. Nishi, "Changing Occupance of the Japanese in Los Angeles County," p. 47.

25. Bloom and Riemer, *Removal and Return*, pp. 24-25.

were threatened until the exclusively Japanese-oriented businessmen broadened their trade to include more non-Japanese customers. Around this core of concentrated Japanese business and professional activities was a gradual spreading out of shops, offices, and residences especially to the south and also slightly to the east and west.

The six other concentrations of Japanese in Los Angeles, according to Nishi, "were primarily residential communities, often including a small business section with a grocery store handling a variety of Japanese foods, a barber shop, drug store or general merchandise store, other miscellaneous shops and services, and invariably, a local language school and church." The primary function of the small business center was to cater to the needs of the Japanese in the vicinity.

Four separate areas of Japanese concentration immediately surrounded Little Tokyo. They had a less varied line of shops and offices because of their greater reliance on the Little Tokyo center. One of these areas was a large concentration known as the Boyle Heights-East Los Angeles area that was virtually adjacent and to the east of Little Tokyo. This area, which exhibited "great ethnic diversity, had a large number of Japanese Americans in trade, especially produce trade." "It had the advantage of providing a place of residence not actually in Little Tokio [Tokyo] but readily accessible to it." Two smaller areas to the west and southwest of Little Tokyo, known as the "Westside" or "West Jefferson" and "Olympic Areas" were compact communities of tradespeople, particularly produce operators, and many contract gardeners serving middle-class white homes nearby. The Hollywood-Virgil Area northwest of Little Tokyo resembled West Jefferson and Olympic in occupational characteristics, but was less compact. These smaller points of Japanese concentration each had retail shops and service establishments for the ethnic community.

Two areas in Los Angeles City were further removed from Little Tokyo and thus formed distinctive and relatively independent communities. One of these areas was West Los Angeles, located east of Santa Monica and north of Venice and Culver City. In this area Sawtelle had a large population of Japanese contract gardeners who served the middle- and upper-class homes of Beverly Hills, Santa Monica, and West Los Angeles. The other area was the Japanese community in the Los Angeles Harbor vicinity, covering portions of San Pedro, Wilmington, and Long Beach. In this area of concentration, which included the Terminal Island community, the Japanese population worked almost exclusively in fishing and fish canneries. The western half of Terminal Island, Los Angeles City Census Tract 294, had almost all of the island's residents, a total of 3,831. Of this total, 2,253 (59.8 percent) were classified as "other nonwhites," most of whom (2,051) were Japanese.

In addition to the seven areas of concentration in Los Angeles City, areas to the north and east of the city in the foothill communities of Glendale and Pasadena contained small scattered enclaves of Japanese gardeners and domestics serving upper-class residences. Scattered Japanese floraculturalists and farmers were found in the San Fernando Valley north of Los Angeles.²⁶

Urban Settlement: Occupational Structure — The prewar occupational structure and socio-economic characteristics of the Japanese in Los Angeles reflected the values as well as the limitations of the Issei. The Issei, who generally adhered closely to Japanese cultural

26. *Ibid.*, p. 25, 158, and Nishi, "Changing Occupance of the Japanese in Los Angeles County," pp. 47-48.

institutions, transplanted traditions, social practices, folkways, and language, established strong patriarchal family organizations. Capital and financial control were in their hands and many substantial business enterprises were developed by them. Closely-held family businesses, at a time of restricted opportunity, served as tight little economic units. Over a period of several decades the Issei had achieved occupational stability and an assured economic position in the Japanese community but no socio-economic pattern had emerged for the younger more Americanized and acculturated Nisei.²⁷

The 1940 census reported 17,005 employed workers of Japanese ancestry in Los Angeles County, of whom 29.2 percent were native-born males, 43.0 percent foreign-born males, 13.6 percent native-born females, and 14.2 percent foreign-born females.²⁸ The large urban and rural non-farm Japanese population tended to enter small businesses where a considerable degree of independence could be enjoyed. The predominance of the Japanese in growing truck and market crops carried over into marketing as they controlled distribution and sales of those agricultural products. The bulk of the farm produce grown in the county was handled in two large wholesale markets — Union Wholesale Terminal Market at Seventh and Central Avenue and the Los Angeles City Market at Ninth and San Pedro Streets — located in the aforementioned "Central Area - Little Tokyo" area in the downtown section of Los Angeles City. The estimated value of business conducted in the Los Angeles City Market was \$30,000,000 in 1930 and \$50,000,000 in 1934. Of these sums, the Japanese were responsible for \$16,000,000 and \$35,000,000, or more than one-half of the total. Caucasians, Chinese, and Japanese shared in the ownership and management of the City Market, whereas the Japanese participated in the business transactions but were not represented in the management of the Terminal Market. In 1934 an estimated \$10,000,000 of the total \$70,000,000 business in the Terminal Market was attributed to the Japanese.²⁹

In 1936 it was estimated that about 500 Japanese were employed in the Terminal Market and some 700 in the City Market. They were engaged in every phase of the marketing business: commission merchants who sold farm produce on a commission basis; dealers who sold produce bought from farmers at wholesale; brokers; cash buyers; hauling men; office workers and book-keepers; and cashiers. Approximately 70 to 80 percent of the Japanese employed in the two produce markets were Nisei. Thus, while larger numbers of Issei were involved in farming, higher proportions of Nisei were found in produce marketing, their proficiency in English permitting them a wider choice of occupations. Aside from farming, retailing vegetables and fruits was the most important single occupation of Nisei men in the county. One survey, for instance, found that 3,110 or 75 percent of the total number of Nisei employed in the city in 1934 worked in some phase of produce marketing. Of this number 2,750 operated retail fruit and vegetable stands, 203 engaged in wholesale marketing, and another 157 in the retailing of produce in chain-markets. Issei employed in produce marketing numbered 1,097. About 1,000 retail fruit

27. Nishi, "Changing Occupance of the Japanese in Los Angeles County," pp. 60, 170-74.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

29. Isamu Nodera, "A Survey of the Vocational Activities of the Japanese in the City of Los Angeles" (M. A. Thesis, University of Southern California, 1936), pp. 103-06.

and vegetable stores were operated by Japanese in Los Angeles County, or 75 per cent of all such stores, with five as the average number of employees.³⁰

The growing and marketing of flowers in Los Angeles County was also Japanese-controlled by 1940. To a lesser extent the same chain of control from producer to wholesaler and retailer was evident in the nursery business. The Japanese flower growers organized the Southern California Floral Market Association (incorporated in 1914), establishing a floral market in Los Angeles on Wall Street near Seventh. In 1934, an estimated \$1,500,000 to \$2,000,000 business was conducted at this market.³¹

By 1939-40, there were 64 Japanese retail florists in Los Angeles City. In addition, there were 13 in Glendale, 10 in Pasadena, 5 in West Los Angeles, and a number of others in scattered districts around the city.³²

By 1940 Japanese-owned independent grocery stores or markets, specializing in Japanese foods and products, were a distinctive occupation in the ethnic enclaves in Los Angeles. Because of market limitations, however, these stores were generally restricted in number and growth.³³

Cafes and small restaurants provided employment for significant numbers of people in the Japanese community in 1940. Some 928 persons were employed in eating and drinking establishments. The majority of the eating places serving Asian foods were concentrated in Little Tokyo. Of the 56 restaurants that were listed as Japanese food houses within the city in 1939-40, 51 were in Little Tokyo and the other five were close enough to be considered within the sphere of that community. This concentration demonstrated the dependence of Little Tokyo on the Japanese trade. In addition there were 223 cafes, restaurants, and bars operated by Japanese who were listed in the Los Angeles City Directory.³⁴

Wholesaling and retailing were the most significant urban occupations of the Japanese in Los Angeles. Although much of this trade was narrowly based on the limited Japanese consuming market, there was an apparent trend toward enlarging the scope to include white Americans and other races. According to the census, 5,831 or 34.3 percent of the employed workers 14 years old and over in the county were reported to be in the wholesale and retail trades. This occupational distribution was not unusual considering the motives and factors underlying the type of work they might consider entering. Beginning with the earliest immigrant groups, the Japanese strove to become independent farm operators or owner-operators of a small business or trade and, until such economic status could be attained, they continued the struggle for improvement.³⁵

30. Nishi, "Changing Occupance of the Japanese in Los Angeles County," pp. 49-50.

31. Nodera, "Survey of Vocational Activities of the Japanese in the City of Los Angeles," p. 82.

32. Nishi, "Changing Occupance of the Japanese in Los Angeles County," p. 51.

33. *Ibid.*

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 52-54.

The fishing industry provided a significant area of employment for many Japanese on Terminal Island in the Los Angeles Harbor area. The 1940 census reported 768 Japanese American fishermen on the West Coast. Almost all of them (740) were in California, and over 70 percent (556) were in Los Angeles County. The rolls of the Southern California Japanese Fishermen's Association, to which most of the fishermen belonged, listed 537 members in December 1941. Of these, 373 were Issei and 164 (30.5 percent) were Nisei. While able-bodied males engaged in fishing operations, as previously noted, women, older men, and some children worked in the canneries as fish cleaners and packers.³⁶

The Japanese in Los Angeles, with their tradition of love of nature and their appreciation for gardens, engaged in gardening enterprises. Various estimates during the years preceding World War II indicate that there were between 1,500 and 2,500 Japanese gardeners in the city, several hundred being employed on large estates as gardeners or caretakers. One study estimated in 1941 that approximately "a fifth of all independent [Japanese] male workers in Los Angeles County, i.e., those classified as employers or own-account workers, were contract gardeners."³⁷ The majority of these gardeners were older Issei. Less than 30 percent of the contract gardeners were Nisei, and one-fifth were Issei under 45 years of age. Although the average income was low (\$100-\$300 per month in 1940) and the work was considered menial, the independence enjoyed by the Issei gardeners and the relatively small capital investment required to begin business operations made this occupation appealing.³⁸

Personal service occupations accounted for more than 2,500 jobs or approximately 15 percent of the Japanese employed in Los Angeles County in 1940. Almost 1,600 domestics, serving either as day workers or resident workers, worked in the county. Such jobs were relatively numerous among both Issei and Nisei men and women. Single people were more likely to enter these occupations, although married couples frequently made their living from it. Young people, particularly those attending college, availed themselves of this form of employment, exchanging services in homes for room and board and on occasion a small allowance. Upon arriving in the United States, immigrants frequently took such jobs as temporary expedients until more desirable work could be found.³⁹

Hotels, boarding houses, and apartments provided employment opportunities for nearly 450 Japanese residents in Los Angeles in 1940. Japanese-owned and managed boarding houses and hotels in the large cities on the Pacific Coast played an important role in the earlier days of immigration, often serving as employment agencies or recruiting centers for labor as well as providing jobs to migrants and a place to board. The usual custom was to reduce lodging costs by utilizing family members as unpaid laborers. In 1939-40 there were 389 such businesses in the city, the majority of which were clustered in Little Tokyo and vicinity. This community was the original nucleus of Japanese boarding houses and

36. Bloom and Riemer, *Removal and Return*, p. 162.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 117. Also see Nodera, "Survey of Vocational Activities of the Japanese in the City of Los Angeles," p. 96.

38. Bloom and Riemer, *Removal and Return*, pp. 96, 116.

39. Nishi, "Changing Occupance of the Japanese in Los Angeles County," p. 56.

hotels in the city and was largely responsible for stimulating the growth of that ethnic enclave.⁴⁰

In addition, numerous Japanese-operated cleaning establishments in Los Angeles County in 1940 provided employment for several hundred Japanese, the majority being Issei. Other personal services, such as barbers and beauticians, provided an additional several hundred jobs.⁴¹

Professional, skilled, and semi-skilled employment provided jobs for about 600 Japanese in the county in 1940. These positions tended to be monopolized by the Nisei, whose opportunities for pre-professional training and preparation were greater by virtue of their having attended American schools and colleges. Their education and exposure to American society resulted in an increased degree of Americanization and desire for social acculturation and economic assimilation. The Japanese in these occupational categories were generally English-speaking and had dropped many Japanese traditions. The Nisei's dislike for farming, gardening, and manual labor or taking over many business enterprises established by their parents turned them toward white-collar or professional work which they generally regarded as superior in status. Many Issei urged and aided their American-born children to train for these presumably more dignified positions and often made great sacrifices to give them the advantages of a higher education in spite of the fact that many professional fields and administrative positions continued to be closed to the Nisei. As a result of continuing discrimination in these fields, few Japanese Americans entered teaching, law, or engineering, or achieved positions of responsibility before Pearl Harbor. The patronage of those who entered professional fields, such as medicine, law, dentistry, and pharmacy, was largely Japanese, thus forcing the Nisei professionals to return to the Japanese enclaves from which they wished to leave.

Adequately trained Nisei who hoped to obtain positions in Caucasian firms or offices rather than in the Japanese community were generally unable to obtain professional employment before the war. As a result, many of them were obliged to work in fields other than those for which they had been trained.⁴²

Rural Settlement — In 1940, 6,041 of the 17,005 Japanese gainfully employed in Los Angeles County (35.5 percent) were engaged in agriculture, compared with 47.8 percent for the entire state. Most Japanese were employed in family farming enterprises. Unpaid Japanese family farm laborers constituted 64.3 percent of all males and 78.1 percent of all females in the unpaid farm labor categories in the county.⁴³

In 1940 Japanese farmers in Los Angeles County operated a total of 1,523 farms with 28,670 acres, slightly less than five percent of the total farm acreage in the county. Approximately 90 percent of the farms were tenant-operated and another three percent were managed by Japanese. The remainder were worked by part or full owners. Cash

40. *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 57-60, and Bloom and Riemer, *Removal and Return*, pp. 13-24, 25-30.

43. Bloom and Riemer, *Removal and Return*, p. 78.

tenancy prevailed, although it had been preceded by some sharecropping. The low proportion of farm owners, 7.4 percent, can be explained by the California land laws prohibiting aliens ineligible for citizenship from purchasing or leasing land and by the fact that in 1940 there were few American citizens of Japanese ancestry who were of legal age and thus eligible to own land. Another problem facing Japanese farmers in Los Angeles County was the unwillingness of many landowners to sell, because they anticipated speculative increases in land values with the growth of the city. High rentals were thus a unique feature of most Japanese farming in southern California and only a willingness to live below American standards, primarily by the Issei, made it possible for them to operate such high-priced land.

Accustomed to and willing to work long hours, most Japanese engaged in intensive agricultural methods. Their land holdings averaged 18.8 acres in contrast to 47.8 acres for farms in the county as a whole. The agricultural commissioner for the county later stated that "while the Japanese farm 26,000 acres they produce a croppage equal to 36,000 acres."⁴⁴ Small crops, intensively cultivated, required a heavy expenditure of labor but small requirements in land, machinery, equipment, and capital. These characteristics were typical of Japanese-operated farms. The high rent paid provided further evidence of their ability to obtain high profits per acre. Short term leases and uncertainty concerning their renewal also encouraged intensive practices.

By 1940 the degree of agricultural intensity permitted utilization of high priced lands within the largely urbanized areas of Los Angeles County with small and fragmented holdings distributed chiefly on the ring of the city. The major areas of concentration of Japanese-operated farms were the Dominguez Hills area between Los Angeles and Long Beach, including the Compton and Downey townships, the Culver City-Venice-Santa Monica area southwest of the city along the coast, the Inglewood-Gardena-Hawthorne-Torrance area south of the city along the coast, the Palos Verdes Hills area south of the former along the coast, and the San Fernando Valley northwest of the city.⁴⁵

By concentrating on vegetables and berries, the Japanese farmers achieved a near monopoly in those crops in Los Angeles County. Whereas Japanese farmers accounted for 42 percent of the commercial truck crops grown in California during 1941, they harvested approximately 64 percent of the acreage (29,235 of 45,475) in truck crops, 87 percent (5,565 of 6,363) of the market garden variety of vegetables, and 81 percent (1,792 of 2,225) of the berries in the county in 1941. Altogether, Japanese farmers harvested 68 percent (36,592 of 54,063) of these three categories of crops. The position of the Issei farmers had become economically stronger over the years, a factor that paradoxically made them more vulnerable to the old and ugly racist slurs that Asians were unassimilable. Japanese truck farmers, in particular, more firmly entrenched than ever in the state's agricultural system, aroused widespread envy in California's agricultural areas.⁴⁶

With few exceptions Japanese farmers rarely entered into large-scale agricultural enterprises, such as citrus fruit, ranching, dairying, or general farming. They were

44. *Hearings Before the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration*, p. 11722.

45. Nishi, "Changing Occupance of the Japanese in Los Angeles County," pp. 35-38.

46. *Ibid.*, pp. 36, 40-41, 43-44, and Rolle, *California: A History*, p. 587.

relatively successful in poultry production, finding a specialized and profitable field in chick sexing which they almost monopolized as a result of skill and proficiency. Of the 138 certificates granted in California by the International Baby Chick Association to chick-sexers in 1941, 96 were given to Japanese.⁴⁷

Other specialized fields of agriculture in which the Los Angeles County Japanese predominated were flower growing and nurseries. One survey, for instance, found that flower farms accounted for over 10 percent and nurseries about 20 percent of the total number of farms in the county.⁴⁸ Flower growing and vegetable farms tended to be located in suburban districts or on the outer periphery of Los Angeles City. Although the Japanese were more numerous in the raising of outdoor grown cut-flowers than hothouse varieties, they also competed with other Americans in growing most types of cut-flowers.⁴⁹

More nurseries tended to be located within the city limits. For example, The *Kashu-Mainichi Yearbook and Directory for 1939-1940* listed 89 nurseries in the city.⁵⁰ In addition, 22 nurseries were listed in Gardena, 13 in West Los Angeles, 8 in Venice, 6 in Culver City, and small numbers in numerous incorporated cities within the county. The Japanese engaged in both retail and wholesale nursery businesses, specializing in small garden plants, ornamental shrubs and trees, and bedding plants, such as celery and tomatoes for farmers or bedding plants for flower growers.⁵¹

Summary: Pre-World War II Economic Trends in Los Angeles County Japanese/Japanese American Community — By 1940-41 the Issei in Los Angeles County appeared to have achieved a ceiling and were undergoing a process of retrenchment. Although their economic achievements had been rapid and substantial, very few had acquired more than a "petty bourgeois" or small farmer status. These few were powerful in the wholesale produce business, import-export trade, and finance. Most Issei males in business operated small enterprises with low capital investment that survived because of the unpaid labor of the entire family. The reserves of the business lay in the working power of the family, and the operation of the enterprise was a way of life for the entire family. The physical juxtaposition of residence and business was only one sign of this. The Issei proprietor thought of his business almost as an extension of himself.

Under these conditions, Nisei sons of men in substantial enterprises were being prepared to continue their fathers' businesses, as were sons of men in fishing and agriculture. However, some Nisei recognized that many of the stores, especially the general merchandise shops in the ethnic enclaves, had a declining patronage of Issei and were therefore based on a long-term economically unsound foundation. More acculturated, the Nisei were frustrated with traditional ways and practices of the Japanese community and

47. *Hearings Before the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration*, p. 11816.

48. Bloom and Riemer, *Removal and Return*, p. 71.

49. Nishi, "Changing Occupance of the Japanese in Los Angeles County," p. 42.

50. *Kashu-Mainichi Yearbook and Directory for 1939-1940* (Los Angeles, Japan-California Daily News, 1940).

51. Nishi, "Changing Occupance of the Japanese in Los Angeles County," p. 42, 45.

anxious to broaden their contacts and economic and occupational opportunities in the broader spectrum of American society.

Before the war, the Nisei were moving into clerical, professional, and skilled and semi-skilled work. In contrast to the Issei, who strove for the security and prestige of an independent enterprise, the Nisei aspired to white-collar work and had come to overvalue the importance of a "clean" job. The Nisei population was highly educated even by the standards of California, and in college they tended to specialize in practical lines such as the physical sciences, business administration, and preprofessional training, while deemphasizing teaching, the humanities, and the social sciences — fields largely closed to them. One of the most serious frustrations of the Nisei was their inability to find work that would use their training. The Issei-dominated vernacular Japanese press in the years before the war was burdened with self-reproach about this aspect of the "Nisei problem."

The evacuation from the west coast would shatter the securities and ambiguities of the Los Angeles Japanese/Japanese American community. The meager savings of small entrepreneurs and farmers would be wiped out, and the Nisei would be relieved of the possible alternative of taking over the parental businesses and farm enterprises.⁵²

DIVISIONS IN JAPANESE/JAPANESE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES OF EVACUEE ORIGIN

Three Major Groups — Issei, Nisei, Kibei

At the time of evacuation the people of Japanese ancestry living in the United States were divided into three major groups — the Issei, or immigrant Japanese born in Japan; (2) the Nisei, American-born and American-educated children of the Issei; and (3) the Kibei, born on American soil but educated wholly or partially in Japan. Although individual variations of personality within these categories were sometimes more important than the generalizations which could be made about each group, the basic facts about the three groups provide invaluable insights into the background, attitudes, behavior, and generational/political divisions among the evacuated people.⁵³

Issei. At the time of Pearl Harbor nearly one-third of Japanese living in the United States were Issei. These people had been born in Japan and were aliens in the United States, because American law prevented them from obtaining citizenship. Most of them, however, had lived on this side of the Pacific for more than 25 years, had raised families and established businesses or farming operations here, and intended to stay in their adopted land for the remainder of their days.

With some exceptions, these immigrant Japanese had arrived in the United States between 1890, when Japanese immigration into the continental United States began on a significant scale, and 1924, when immigration was forbidden by the Immigration Act of 1924. The

52. Bloom and Riemer, *Removal and Return*, pp. 30-31.

53. See Broom and Kitsuse, *Managed Casualty*, pp. 1-11, for more information on the social and cultural background of the Japanese/Japanese American population before evacuation.

majority of the men had come to America before 1908, when the Gentlemen's Agreement, curtailing further immigration of Japanese laborers into the continental United States, took effect. Thus, most Issei males were passing from middle life into old age when war broke out in 1941. The Issei women had reached this country somewhat later — predominantly in the decade between 1910 and 1920 with many entering as "picture brides" after the men had become financially able to send back to their native prefectures for wives — and had an average age of about 52 at the time of evacuation.

Had it not been for their race, Americans would probably have welcomed the Issei as desirable newcomers. Their high standards of literacy, education, industry, thrift, family ideals, community cooperation, respect for law, and desire for self-improvement were qualities admired by most Americans.

Although many Issei had come from the Japanese peasantry, a significant proportion were younger sons from middle-class families. Of the men still alive and in America in 1940, 80 percent had received, before leaving Japan, the equivalent of an American high school education; 10 percent had been to college in Japan or the United States; most of the others had been to primary schools. However, the Issei had started near the bottom of the American economic ladder — as section workers on railroads, common laborers in mines and lumber camps, domestics in the homes of the well-to-do, and especially as harvest hands in the fruit orchards and vegetable fields of the agricultural West. The cultural background and character traits of the stable and adaptable Issei, however, insured that many would not remain in the lower economic and social stratas of American society. Some had never risen above this station and were still following the seasonal harvests up and down the Pacific Coast states as late as 1941. Many, however, as a result of years of hard work and frugal living, had moved up the economic ladder, acquiring a stake in the land, an equity in the wholesale or retail marketing of agricultural products, or a small business in one of the larger west coast towns or cities. A few had risen to positions of prominence and wealth in the Japanese business community.

During the 1910s and 1920s the Issei had built families and businesses, while nurturing sentimental, traditional, and economic bonds with their adopted country. Some who failed, or had made the money they had come to earn, returned to Japan. The majority of the hardy and successful, however, remained to build stable community life, adapt to American modes of living and business practices, and provide American education for their children. The peak of the birth rate occurred in 1921, insuring that the majority of their offspring, the Nisei, were barely on the verge of maturity at the time of Pearl Harbor. After the Immigration Act of 1924 was passed and the alien land laws were enacted in the 1910s and early 1920s, overt agitation and persecution of Issei by anti-Asian groups quieted down. Few Nisei, therefore, had much first-hand experience with violent discrimination except in getting white collar and professional positions prior to Pearl Harbor.

From the time of their arrival in the United States at the end of the 19th century, the Issei had experienced a series of legal and extra-legal attacks which necessitated the development of self-sufficient communities wherever there were significant numbers of persons of Japanese ancestry in rural or urban areas. Like other immigrant groups, Issei sought out people from their own country and particularly from their own prefecture. In

their early days in America, they often worked in gangs under a boss who served them as business manager and negotiator with employers. Later when they married, they drew together into communities either in scattered rural districts or in congested city areas. The Issei created closely knit communities, and the highly organized communities, their bonds tightened by the need to unite against discrimination, made the Japanese known as a people who stuck together. During the years just before Pearl Harbor, some of the more well-to-do and progressive Issei were moving into better residential districts in the cities, away from the older Japanese ethnic urban enclaves.

Like other immigrant groups, the Issei clung tenaciously to their native language and often depended on their American-born children to aid them in affairs outside the Japanese community that required a knowledge of English. They also tried to pass on their language and cultural values and traditions as a heritage to their children, emphasizing home and religious instruction and establishing Japanese language schools to supplement the Nisei's public school education. Their emphasis on respect for age and family ties created a strong and tight discipline within the family unit until the maturing Nisei began to rebel and reach out to the wider spectrum of American society for the independence they saw other American adolescents enjoying.⁵⁴

In its *War Relocation Authority: A Story of Human Conservation* the WRA described the general outlook of the Issei at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. The publication noted in words that some might challenge:

. . . . Speaking very broadly, the west coast Issei in the spring of 1942 were a tired, hapless, and bewildered group of people who retained a sentimental attachment for the Japan they had known as children or adolescents in the earlier years of the century but who wanted nothing more acutely than to live out the rest of their lives [in the United States] in comfort and in peace.⁵⁵

For the Issei, who were subjected to a barrage of restrictions, harassments, and indignities — including the precipitous internment of their leaders in federal detention centers — the effect of Pearl Harbor and its aftermath was a pronounced increase in social solidarity. For them, the repressive measures enacted by the government represented only the latest and most serious of a long series of discriminatory actions, and they responded in their customary manner — with cultural retrenchment.⁵⁶

Nisei. In contrast with their parents, the Nisei, who made up approximately two-thirds of the persons of Japanese ancestry on the west coast at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, were predominantly an adolescent and young adult group. American-born and educated, the Niseis were citizens of the United States. They were "completely American in speech, dress, and manner; and far more inclined than the average Issei to seek out WRA

54. U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Impounded People*, pp. 24-27. Further information on this topic may be found in Yatsushiro, "Political and Socio-Cultural Issues at Poston and Manzanar Relocation Centers: A Thematic Analysis."

55. U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Story of Human Conservation*, pp. 2-3.

56. Arthur A. Hansen and David A. Hacker, "The Manzanar Riot: An Ethnic Perspective," *Amerasia Journal*, 11 (Fall 1974), p. 124.

personnel and give free expression to their opinions." "In all but a few cases, their language was distinctively American as were the clothes they wore, the games they played, the social customs they followed, and the entertainments they enjoyed—sometimes to the consternation of their parents."

Because most of the west coast Issei married and settled down to family responsibilities comparatively late in life, the age gap between them and their American-born children was uncommonly pronounced. An abnormally high percentage of the Issei, as compared with the total population of the country, were between the ages of 15 and 25 when they entered relocation centers. An even more strikingly low percentage of them had passed the age of 30, and only a few hundred were over 35.

Despite the numerical superiority of the Nisei, the Issei "exercised an influence in the evacuee population out of all proportion to their numbers." According to the WRA, this

was partially due to their greater maturity and stability as well as to the prestige which age and parenthood traditionally command in Japanese communities. But it was also due, perhaps in even greater measure, to the plain fact that practically all of the nearly 40,000 Issei were adults while a substantial majority of the Nisei were under 21. Actually, if adults alone are considered, the Issei evacuees . . . outnumbered the American citizen group by a margin of almost four to three.

After the Nisei had proved themselves mature and responsible, the Issei had expected to relinquish gradually the control of the community, family, and business to them. Most Nisei, however, were still of high school or college age at the time of Pearl Harbor, so that this was still for the future. The children, for the most part, had distinguished themselves in the public schools to the pleasure of their parents, and they were kept busy with school and chores at home and a round of picnics and other social activities sponsored by the language school, Buddhist and Christian church organizations, prefecture societies, produce companies, Boy and Girl scouts, and Japanese teen-age clubs — programs and cultural agencies established by the Issei to undermine the Americanization process.

Among the older Nisei were some who were called "regular Issei type," while among the Issei were men and women with the point of view of "typical Nisei." Generally, however, the major lines were by generations. The older Nisei often argued among themselves and rebelled against community and Issei control. The conservative Issei leadership as represented by the Japanese Association was still unshaken, but more and more young Nisei businessmen were organizing their own service clubs and chambers of commerce to do business outside the Japanese community without consulting the associations. These efforts widened the social distance between Issei and Nisei and represented a potential challenge to the ethnic group's solidarity.

Despite these efforts to break away from the traditional Japanese community, the Nisei found themselves returning to the Japanese American community during the years before the war. Socially, the Nisei encountered barriers to their assimilation into the larger society and found it necessary to participate in social organizations, residential patterns, and marital arrangements along ethnic lines. Economically, they discovered upon graduation from high school and college that most available employment opportunities existed within their own communities. Thus, while the Nisei returned to the community perhaps more

from necessity than desire, the result was a partial restoration of their ethnicity and a consequent maintenance of group solidarity.⁵⁷

The majority of the Nisei, according to the WRA, "were far from psychologically prepared for the shock of evacuation when it came in the early months of 1942. Although it was widely recognized among the west coast Japanese population that war with Japan might mean serious restrictions on the freedom of the Issei, most Nisei persisted in believing throughout January and February 1942 that their American citizenship would protect them from similar treatment. When it became clear that all persons of Japanese descent on the west coast would be evacuated, the Nisei community was "hit as it had never been hit before in its history." Some were "stunned" and "unable to express their own thoughts about it coherently for many months to come," while a few "were deeply and permanently embittered." As they entered the centers, the traumatized Nisei "were impassive, shy, uncommunicative." Some "were openly sullen and resentful." "But in the minds and hearts of nearly all, to a great or less degree, according to the WRA, "there were trouble and confusion and sharply conflicting emotions."⁵⁸

Kibei. Technically a subgroup of the Nisei, the kibei had been born on American soil, but had received all or part of their education in Japan. Applied literally, the term Kibei denoted any Nisei who had gone to Japan, for however short a time, and had returned to America. In some instances the term was employed to describe any Nisei, whether he had gone to Japan or not, who "spoke Japanese . . . preferably to English and who otherwise behaved in what the Nisei regarded as a 'Japanesque' manner." But its usual meaning was restricted to those whose residence in Japan exceeded two years and who received a portion of their education there. Prior to the war, the ratio of the Kibei to "pure" Nisei over 15 years of age was about 1 to 4. Some 20,000 persons of Japanese descent on the west coast were in this category.⁵⁹

Many Kibei, especially those whose stay in Japan was brief, experienced little difficulty in adjusting to the American milieu, and their behavior was indistinguishable from that of other Nisei. Other Kibei chose to repress their Japaneseness and exhibited hyperbolic American behavior. But for those who had spent considerable time in Japan, the situation was somewhat different. Diverse reasons had led the Issei to send one or more children to Japan — to please the child's grandparents, to take off some of the parents' economic burden until they had established themselves, to be cared for if one parent had died, to learn Japanese language and culture to prepare for economic and social success within the ethnic community in America. Upon their return to the United States, the Kibei were regarded somewhat as outcasts by the more Americanized Nisei who often derided or even scorned them for their linguistic and social ineptitude. The Issei, on the whole, applauded them as "model" Japanese children. A few Kibei, however, condemned their parents for having sent them to Japan, because when they returned to America they were handicapped by their relatively poor English and "un-California-like" manners. The Kibei

57. *Ibid.*, pp. 121-2; U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Impounded People*, pp. 29-30; and U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Story of Human Conservation*, pp. 3-6.

58. U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Story of Human Conservation*, p. 6.

59. Hansen and Hacker, "Manzanar Riot: Ethnic Perspective," pp. 122-23; Broom and Kitsuse, *Managed Casualty* pp. 5-6; and U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Story of Human Conservation*, p. 6.

were mostly non-assimilationists once they returned to the United States. They formed their own clubs and recreational groups, actively led Buddhist and other cultural organizations, and willingly joined the community business structure. Kibei women tended to marry either Kibei or Issei men. For these reasons, the Kibei strengthened group solidarity in the Japanese/Japanese American community.⁶⁰

The Kibei had certain advantages over both Nisei and Issei — characteristics which earned them respect as well as disdain at various times in the Japanese/Japanese-

American community. They were, on the average, older than the Nisei, and, although they were much younger than the Issei, the recency of their education in Japan tended to make them more vigorous and effective exponents of modern Japanese ideology and cultural thought — sentiments that frequently earned the contempt of the more Americanized Nisei and offended the cultural traditions of the older Issei. Their generally superior bilingualism also operated in their favor. The medium of communication among the older Issei was primarily Japanese, of which most Nisei had imperfect control, while a working knowledge of English, which most Issei lacked, was essential in negotiating with the Caucasian community.⁶¹

Political Divisions

Conservatism and Pro-Americanism as Represented by the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL). The Japanese American Citizens League emerged as the largest and most influential Japanese American political organization in the United States during the years prior to World War II. Despite its influence, however, its philosophical emphasis on assimilation with the wider society and Americanization was controversial within the Japanese- American community, having both avid supporters and ardent detractors.⁶²

The roots of the citizens league movement began during the summer of 1918 with an informal study group consisting of six college-educated Nisei in San Francisco calling itself the American Loyalty League. Several years later, a similar group formed in Seattle under the leadership of Clarence Arai. In May 1923, led by Fresno dentist Thomas T. Yatabe, a statewide American Loyalty League was formed with the help and support of the Issei-run Japanese associations. After an initial burst of activity, this organization began to fade in the late 1920s, with only the Fresno chapter retaining its initial vigor. Arai visited California in 1928, reinvigorating the movement. As a result of a series of meetings, the JACL emerged. The first national JACL convention took place in Seattle in 1930. Organized by older Nisei who emphasized loyalty, patriotism, and citizenship, the JACL emerged largely as a response to xenophobia expressed by white Americans. With passage

60. Hansen and Hacker "Manzanar Riot: Ethnic Perspective," p. 123, and U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Impounded People*, p. 31.

61. Thomas and Nishimoto, *Spoilage*, p. 370.

62. Data on the history of the JACL may be found in Bill Hosokawa, *JACL in Quest of Justice* (New York, William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1982); Mike Masaoka and Bill Hosokawa, *They Call Me Moses Masaoka* (New York, William Morrow and Company, 1987); and Niiya, ed., *Japanese American History*, pp. 182-85. While these sources are authored by JACL "insiders," they provide a useful overview of the establishment and historical development of the organization.

of the Immigration Act of 1924, Japanese immigration was cut off, and those Issei living in the United States had no chance of becoming naturalized citizens. Thus, the Issei looked to their American-born children, the Nisei, as United States citizens, to secure the future of Japanese America.

By the spring of 1942, the JACL claimed to have a membership of approximately 20,000 in nearly 300 communities throughout the country. Membership was confined to American citizens but not necessarily to persons of Japanese descent. The great bulk of the membership, however, were Nisei who lived in the three Pacific Coast states. Some 650 members lived in the Los Angeles area.⁶³

Unsympathetic with the Issei's desire to have Nisei interpret to other Americans what Issei understood as good in Japanese culture, the JACL was a reaction against the Japanese orientation of the Issei leadership. It considered its function to be that of aiding Nisei to solve those mutual problems which could not be settled by individual effort. Because of their heritage of social and economic problems caused by American hostility toward the Issei, the JACL Nisei hoped through organization not only to establish an economic and political status for themselves and protect their own civil rights as American citizens, but also to alleviate and improve Issei status in America. Essentially, the JACL Nisei turned their backs upon Japan and tackled the problems of life in America for all persons of Japanese descent.

Although its members were regarded as the future leaders of Japanese Americans, the JACL was seen by some "as part of an elite network in the Japanese community." The conservative Issei, cynical from their long experience with American racism, often viewed the JACL critically and skeptically. They questioned whether the Nisei should, or ever would, be permitted by Caucasians to forget that they were Japanese.

Many of the founders of the JACL organization held professional degrees and thus attracted Nisei of similar status. Not surprisingly, since the group drew members of higher social position, the politics of the JACL was conservative and Republican. The conservatism may also have stemmed from an assessment of its power — given the organization's small size and the distinctly dependent position Nisei found themselves in relation to both their parents and the larger community, a strategy of conciliation made more sense than one of angry protest. An example of this strategy was the successful campaign the JACL funded during the 1930s to press for American citizenship for Issei World War I veterans. Lobbyist Tokutaro (Tokie) Slocum, who would later be an evacuee resident at Manzanar, pressed loyalty and patriotism to extremes to secure passage of the Nye-Lea Bill. Many in the organization felt that the only way to gain acceptance in the United States was to become 100 percent American and to discourage anything that might cast doubt upon their loyalty.

While the JACL may have seemed bold and rash to some Issei, there were some college-age Nisei at the time of Pearl Harbor who dubbed the JACL as reactionary and criticized it for its frequently close relations with conservative pro-American organizations, such as the American Legion, chambers of commerce, Daughters of the American Revolution, and

63. U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Story of Human Conservation*, p. 5, and Hansen and Hacker, "Manzanar Riot: Ethnic Perspective," p. 125.

similar groups. JACL leaders often derided such Nisei, some of whom joined Young Democrat clubs, in turn, as intellectuals, leftists, radicals, or even communists.⁶⁴

The pro-American ideology that the JACL adopted placed the organization in a difficult position in the period preceding Pearl Harbor. As loyal Americans, JACL members were recruited by government officials to act as informers on their own community as relations between the United States and Japan worsened. War with Japan was a distinct possibility, and the government wanted to ensure that it could effectively contain those Japanese in America who were thought to be "suspicious." From the JACL point of view, to refuse the government's request could be interpreted as a sign that Japanese Americans were disloyal. Cooperation, they felt, was the only way that the Nisei could demonstrate their patriotism and ensure the safety of their community.

As war with Japan became a distinct possibility and thus placed Japanese American loyalty in question, Mike Masaoka, one of the JACL's most prominent spokesmen who would become the league's first full-time staff person as national secretary in 1941, believed that a statement on how he felt about America needed to be made by the organization. Born in 1915, Masaoka had grown up in Salt Lake City, become a Mormon, and graduated from the University of Utah. The Japanese American Creed, written by Masaoka for approval by the JACL national convention in 1940, was his solution. The creed, which symbolized all that the JACL stood for, read in part:

I am proud that I am an American citizen of Japanese ancestry, for my very background makes me appreciate more fully the wonderful advantages of this nation. I believe in her institutions, ideals, and traditions; I glory in her heritage; I boast of her history; I trust in her future. She has granted me liberties and opportunities such as no individual enjoys in this world today. . . .

Although some individuals may discriminate against me, I shall never become bitter or lose faith, for I know that such persons are not representative of the majority of the American people. True, I shall do all in my power to discourage such practices, but I shall do it in the American way: above board, in the open, through courts of law, by education, by proving myself to be worthy of equal treatment and consideration. . . .

Because I believe in America, and I trust she believes in me, and because I have received innumerable benefits from her, I pledge myself to do honor to her at all times and in all places; to support her Constitution; to obey her laws; to respect her flag; to defend her against all enemies, foreign or domestic; to actively assume my duties and obligations as a citizen, cheerfully and without reservations whatsoever, in the hope that I may become a better American in a great America.⁶⁵

Togo Tanaka, a national officeholder in the JACL and the English language editor of the Los Angeles-based *Rafu Shimpō* and a future evacuee resident at Manzanar, also zealously

64. U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Impounded People*, p. 30.

65. Niiya, ed., *Japanese American History*, pp. 184-85.

advertised the Americanism of the organization and repudiated the local Issei leadership during the prewar period. According to Roger Daniels, a noted historian in the field of Japanese American history, Tanaka, in a speech in early 1941, "insisted that the Nisei must face . . . 'the question of loyalty' and assumed that since the Issei were 'more or less tumbleweeds with one foot in America and one foot in Japan,' real loyalty to America could be found only in his generation."⁶⁶ Tanaka consistently voiced this sentiment editorially, joined on the newspaper's editorial board by Fred Tayama and Tokie Slocum, both future evacuee residents at Manzanar.⁶⁷

JACL leaders were summarily seized and interrogated by federal authorities in the wake of Pearl Harbor. Tanaka, for instance, was arrested under a presidential warrant and placed in Los Angeles jails for eleven days. Such persecution, however, only prompted JACL leaders to redouble their efforts to prove their loyalty as American citizens. They fought their campaign on two fronts. On one hand, they utilized the limited political influence they possessed to alleviate personal hardship and to exonerate the Japanese-American community from the most irresponsible charges of subversion being leveled against it. More ominously, as previously noted, they cooperated with the authorities as security watchdogs. Earlier in the fall of 1941, the JACL in Los Angeles had organized the Southern California Coordinating Committee for Defense, the function of which was to report to federal intelligence officers about the "subversive" activities of members of the Japanese population. This activity gave rise to bitter criticism of the JACL leaders as "in-us" or stool pigeons. After Pearl Harbor, the coordinating committee was replaced by a more militant Anti-Axis Committee, headed first by Fred Tayama and later by Tokie Slocum (and also including future Manzanar evacuees Togo Tanaka, Joe Grant Masaoka, and Tad Uyeno), to serve as a liaison with the FBI to help flush out "potentially dangerous" and pro-Fascist Issei and Kibei.⁶⁸

As the pressure for drastic measures to rid the west coast of all persons of Japanese descent increased in early 1942, so did the professions of loyalty, the purchase of war bonds, and Red Cross activities of the JACL. The JACL leaders realized keenly that their reaction to evacuation was the acid test of their future status in the United States, and they resolved to prove their worth as American citizens beyond all possibility of reasonable doubt. The league supported the early calls for voluntary evacuation of all adult Japanese from certain coastal areas with generally unqualified cooperation, while at the same time undertaking efforts to have Nisei exempted from mandatory evacuation orders. Masaoka elaborated on the organization's stand in testimony before the Tolan Committee. The league was "in complete agreement" with any policy of evacuation "definitely arising from reasons of military necessity and national safety." But if evacuation were "primarily a measure whose surface urgency cloaks the desires of political or other pressure groups who want us to leave merely from motives of self-interest," then members of the league felt that they had "every right to protest and to demand equitable judgment on our merits as American citizens." One day before the official announcement of mass evacuation was made on March 3, the JACL urged the Japanese in America to face the future without panic and to avoid sacrificing property at "ridiculous prices." All were

66. Daniels, *Concentration Camps*, p. 26.

67. Hansen and Hacker, "Manzanar Riot: Ethnic Perspective," p. 124.

68. *Ibid.*, pp. 124-25.

urged to await definite government orders, noting that the "greater our cooperation with the government, it can be expected that the greater will be their cooperation with us in the solution of our problems."⁶⁹

When the government's decision on mass evacuation was announced, the JACL determined to support evacuation, taking the line that the relocation centers represented the cause of democracy and supported the military defense of the nation. Saburo Kido, the national president of the JACL, reportedly observed:

Never in the thousands of years of human history has a group of citizens been branded on so wholesale a scale as being treacherous to the land in which they live.

We question the motives and patriotism of men and leaders who intentionally fan racial animosity and hatred. . . [But] we are going into exile as our duty to our country because the President and the military commander of this area have deemed it a necessity. We are gladly cooperating because this is one way of showing that our protestations of loyalty are sincere.⁷⁰ During meetings in March and April 1942, the JACL leaders invited the WRA to take them under its wing in a kind of junior partnership, the league supporting the WRA program in return for more favorable treatment for the Nisei. Masaoka recommended that the WRA and the JACL work together to turn the relocation centers into indoctrination camps for the implementation of the JACL creed.

The decision to cooperate with federal government officials was controversial, as many voices repudiated the league as a "spokesman" for the Japanese population. In the eyes of some elements of the Japanese community, particularly the Issei, the JACL were viewed as the people who led them from the freedom of civilian life to the "prison-like" assembly and relocation centers. Many Issei resented the manner in which JACL leaders, whom they regarded as young and irresponsible, seemed to arrogate the role of community spokesmen. Angered by JACL's complicity with the FBI, they criticized JACL for toadying to white racist Americans and selling the Japanese cause "down the river."⁷¹ Many of the Issei felt that the older Nisei in the JACL had attempted to save themselves from evacuation at the expense of Issei.⁷² The Kibei were disturbed that the JACL apparently had forgotten that they too were American citizens, and many believed that JACL leaders were informing on them as well as on Issei. Some Nisei were disgruntled that the JACL should presume to "represent" the community. Some leftist Nisei groups, angered by the league's unapologetic patriotism, "looked upon J.A.C.L. as a large organization controlled by a small minority of 'reactionary' businessmen who used the body as a means of getting business connections and personal prestige." Whatever their

69. Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, pp. 185-95.

70. *Oakland Tribune*, March 9, 1942, quoted in Thomas and Nishimoto, *Spoilage*, p. 21.

71. Rita Takahashi Cates, "Comparative Administration and Management of Five War Relocation Authority Camps: America's Incarceration of Persons of Japanese Descent During World War II" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1980, pp. 371-72.

72. Thomas and Nishimoto, *Spoilage*, p. 21.

grievances against the JACL, many Issei, Kibei, and Nisei generally believed that the league had sacrificed the community's welfare for its own aggrandizement.⁷³

JACL members were among the first volunteers to go to the assembly and relocation centers, including Manzanar. In several camps, JACL leaders were the targets of threats and physical violence and had to be removed from the camps for their own protection. Because of the controversy surrounding the JACL, its membership dwindled to some 10 active chapters and about 1,700 members during the war.⁷⁴

With the onset of evacuation, the JACL moved its headquarters to Salt Lake City in 1942. In its newspaper, the *Pacific Citizen*, the league continued to justify its position even after most Japanese had been evacuated to relocation centers. In one editorial on June 4, 1942, for instance, the JACL leadership observed:

When military authorities announced that west coast Japanese, regardless of citizenship, would be uprooted from their homes and placed in government-supervised settlements for the duration of the war, the citizen Japanese announced that he was willing to cheerfully co-operate with the dictates of military necessity. Although realizing that he could have protested and fought evacuation and subsequent orders from the standpoint that his rights as an American are no different from the rights of Americans unaffected by evacuation, the majority of U.S.-born Japanese took the position that no personal hardship would be too great if it contributed to the final American victory.

Although thousands of their American-born Japanese brothers were already fighting in U.S. khaki, these Americans were willing as all Americans must be, to sacrifice their homes, their businesses and their normal lives toward the winning of the war.

The fact that these American Japanese have co-operated fully and are continuing to co-operate fully without questioning the military orders is proof, we think, of the essential loyalty of these citizens. Army officials have indicated that the cooperation of the American-born Japanese has done much to avert the ugliness of forced evacuation.

Should the American-born Japanese have protested the orders and declined to co-operate, they would have created a situation necessitating the use of thousands of additional soldiers and officers in carrying out evacuation, soldiers and officers urgently needed by America on the fighting fronts of the war.

The first thought of all Americans must be for the war, and the winning of the war. The attitude of the American citizen Japanese during evacuation has demonstrated that they are willing to sacrifice everything for the war.⁷⁵

73. Hansen and Hacker, "Manzanar Riot: Ethnic Perspective," p. 125.

74. Niiya, *Japanese American History*, p. 183.

75. *Pacific Citizen*, June 4, 1942, p. 4, in Library, Japanese American Citizens League National Headquarters, San Francisco, California.

After the war, the WRA observed that it was doubtful whether the JACL's creed and position on evacuation reflected the attitudes held by a majority of the evacuees, a majority of the Nisei, or even a majority of the rank-and-file members of the organization.⁷⁶

Leftist Anti-Fascism as Represented by Communist-Affiliated Labor Organizations. By the mid-1920s, Issei Communists, influenced by the international labor and socialist movements, organized Japanese Workers Associations in New York City, Seattle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. In 1927 Karl G. Yoneda, a future volunteer evacuee resident at Manzanar, joined both the Los Angeles-based Japanese Workers Association (JWA) and the American Communist Party, and quickly became one of the area's foremost leaders in labor organization. Born of Japanese immigrant parents from Hiroshima Prefecture in 1906, Yoneda passed his first seven year of life in Glendale, north of Los Angeles, where his parents eked out a living in truck farming. In 1913 he was taken to Japan and spent the next years of his life there. After World War I, he attended high school in the city of Hiroshima. Attracted by progressive ideas, he read the writings of noted socialists and anarchists and participated in pro-labor activities. In 1926 he returned to the United States in order to avoid being conscripted by the Japanese military. Seven years later he married fellow Communist Elaine Black, a Caucasian who was active in labor organization activities in southern California.⁷⁷

With the assistance of the American Communist Party's Trade Union Educational League, the Los Angeles-based JWA formed the Japanese Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee of Southern California in 1928 to organize specifically Japanese field hands. In 1929 this committee was disbanded and its members joined the newly formed Communist-led Trade Union Unity League-Agricultural Workers Industrial League, which eventually organized and led numerous strikes in California agricultural areas.

In spite of continual run-ins with police and immigration authorities, Yoneda and his comrades sought to bring Japanese workers under the wing of the labor movement through these and other Communist-affiliated bodies.

During the mid-1930s Yoneda moved to San Francisco, joining the longshoremen in 1936. As a result of a maritime strike in 1934, Harry Bridges, a left-wing labor organizer, emerged as leader of the west coast longshoremen, switching their affiliation from the more conservative American Federation of Labor (AFL) to the more radical Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in 1937. Other leftist-oriented progressive unions also switched their affiliation, among them the San Francisco and the Seattle Alaska Cannery Workers unions, both of which had large Asian memberships. During the late 1930s, Yoneda was an active member of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU). He was also active as a CIO organizer and elected union official of the San Francisco Alaska Cannery Workers Union Local 5. In the competition between the AFL and the CIO, the CIO had a special appeal to Japanese American workers. As a champion of industrial unionism, the CIO admitted all workers, regardless of race, in any given

76. U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Story of Human Conservation*, p. 5.

77. For more information on the background and activities of Elaine Black, see Vivian McGuckin Raineri, *The Red Angel: The Life and Times of Elaine Black Yoneda, 1906-1988* (New York, International Publishers, 1991).

industry. As an advocate of racial equality, the CIO denounced the AFL policy of racial exclusion. Hence many Issei, Nisei, and Kibei workers joined the American labor movement for the first time through membership in CIO-affiliated unions.

Besides his activities in the American labor movement and the American Communist Party, Yoneda's life was tied closely to Japan. Throughout the 1930s, Karl engaged in numerous anti-militarist and anti-fascist activities with regard to Japan. As an underground worker, he helped to print, edit, and distribute thousands of anti-fascist leaflets and pamphlets destined for Japan. He participated in countless political rallies and demonstrations against Japan's military actions in China and joined boycotts of Japan-made goods in protest. From 1933 to 1936 he edited the *Rodo Shimbun*, official organ of the Japanese section of the American Communist Party, in which he wrote frequent editorials against Japanese militarism. The Japanese government not only banned the sale and distribution of the newspaper in Japan, but kept surveillance of Yoneda's activities through its consular staff in San Francisco.

With the coming of World War II, Yoneda never wavered in his anti-fascism. The American Communist Party, ostensibly fearful of harboring fifth columnists, suspended all Japanese members and their spouses after Pearl Harbor. However, neither this suspension nor the subsequent mass evacuation of Japanese Americans dampened his anti-fascist ardor. He tried to enlist for military service immediately after Pearl Harbor, but was rejected. On March 23, 1942, he, along with many JACL members, entered Manzanar as an early volunteer evacuee. Although authorities attempted to prevent his Caucasian wife from entering the camp, she succeeded in her determination to join her husband and son who were required to evacuate. At the camp, Yoneda emerged as one of the leaders of a faction of the evacuee population that advocated working with the WRA administration to press for improved living conditions and help in the war effort against the Axis powers. Although diametrically opposed to much of the pro-Americanism espoused by the JACL leaders, Yoneda supported their cooperative efforts with government authorities. In his mind, the global struggle against fascism had the highest priority. Everything else was secondary, so that he chose to cooperate with his own government, even though it stripped him of his rights. Though disagreeing with the need for evacuation, Yoneda believed that Japanese Americans should first work to defeat fascism in Japan and Germany and then address the wrongs inflicted on them by the United States government. He was among the first Nisei at Manzanar to volunteer for the U.S. Military Intelligence Service and served for much of the war as a propagandist and translator in the China-Burma-India Theater.⁷⁸

78. Further information on Yoneda's activities, as well as the role of the American Communist Party in labor organization in the prewar Japanese/Japanese American community, may be found in Karl G. Yoneda, *Ganbatte: Sixty-Year Struggle of a Kibei Worker* (Los Angeles, Resource Development and Publications, Asian American Studies Center, University of California, Los Angeles, 1983), and Niiya, ed., *Japanese American History*, pp. 362-63. Also see the Karl G. Yoneda Papers in the Japanese American Research Project Collection, Collection No. 2010, in the Department of Special Collections at the University Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

PREWAR JAPANESE/JAPANESE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES AND EVACUATION EXPERIENCES OF MANZANAR EVACUEE POPULATION

One of the best sources of data on the prewar Japanese/Japanese American communities and evacuation experiences of the Manzanar evacuee population are the community analysis reports prepared by Dr. Morris E. Opler. On July 1, 1943, Opler, an anthropologist from Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, was appointed as Social Science Analyst at Manzanar. He served in that position until November 16, 1944, when he was transferred to the Office of War Information in Washington, D.C. As the relocation center's community analyst, as he came to be known, Opler studied the evacuee population and advised the Project Director on the "thinking of the evacuees," recommending "courses [of action] by which the administrative contacts with evacuees might be shaped toward more expeditious acceptance of the policies of the Authority by the evacuees." According to the *Final Report, Manzanar*, Opler's "approach to his problem was historical rather than one of development of broad contact with current situations and the forecast of community response."⁷⁹ Although Opler's informants were not necessarily "typical" evacuees or representative of the entire range of opinions and attitudes held by the evacuee population at Manzanar, they nevertheless provide a rich source of data useful in understanding the evacuees' prewar communities and reactions and attitudes toward the government's evacuation and relocation program. Opler, unlike most WRA community analysts, adopted an adversarial position vis-a-vis the Project Director, in this case Ralph Merritt, who was not only opposed to having the WRA assign a community analyst to Manzanar, but also attempted to have Opler dismissed from his post. While at Manzanar, Opler chose to live among the evacuees in their barracks rather than dwelling among the appointed personnel in their upgraded quarters. In spite of having no legal training, Opler assisted in the preparation of several test cases to the government's evacuation program officially attributed to the work of Nisei attorneys.⁸⁰

After Opler arrived at Manzanar to become the relocation center's community analyst, he undertook a series of studies of economically and geographically defined groups of persons of Japanese ancestry in the camp. The purpose of these studies was to "throw light on the background and present situation of the residents of Manzanar." According to Opler, the "time of evacuation, the manner of evacuation, the losses incurred in evacuation, the amount that has been salvaged from evacuation, the degree of specialization involved in the type of work carried on before evacuation, all have much to do with present attitudes and with resistances to relocation." Bitterness often existed in proportion to the loss, strain, and inconvenience suffered at the time of evacuation. Therefore, such studies threw "much light upon our problems, and may be a direct aid in the formulation of wise remedies and policies." The studies, according to Opler, also shed "some light on the history and meaning of Manzanar as well." Thus, the studies, many of which were lightly edited versions of the evacuees' own words, provided insight into the character of the Japanese/Japanese American communities from which evacuees came to Manzanar, along with their internal rivalries, divisions, stresses, and strains, and enabled a

79. "Community Analysis: A Statement Prepared by Ralph P. Merritt, Project Director," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 801-802, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

80. Personal communication from Dr. Arthur A. Hansen, Professor of History, California State University, Fullerton, September 3, 1996.

better understanding of the range of resentments and reactions to evacuation that the evacuees brought with them.⁸¹

Terminal Island

One of the first geographical groups that Opler studied, and one to which he devoted considerable attention, was sizable contingent of evacuees from Terminal Island. According to Opler and other investigators, the Terminal Island evacuees probably suffered more heavily in the evacuation than any other occupational or locality group.⁸² After conducting a number of interviews with evacuees from Terminal Island, Opler observed on February 9, 1944:

There has been much discussion, both among the evacuees and among members of the appointed personnel, concerning the separatism of the Terminal Islanders. Part of the strong solidarity and in-group feeling of the Terminal Islanders is a pre-evacuation matter. They were isolated geographically, of course. Their vocation was a specialty and so there was a community of work, dress and food habits that other sections of the Japanese population of Southern California did not share. There were previous ties which bound the people together too. A large percentage of the elders had come from Wakayama Ken in Japan and were familiar with the fishing industry from the Orient.⁸³

But, in addition to these pre-evacuation factors, there is the fact that the Terminal Islanders were subjected to a different treatment during evacuation. Evacuation orders affected them before they were felt by others, and were far more drastic in respect to them. Economic losses were enormous. Scarcely a Terminal Island family was untouched by internments. Hence the Terminal Islanders brought to the Center a common fund of bitterness and an attitude of defiant hostility which still further set them off from the general population at Manzanar and somewhat repelled many of the other evacuees at first. . . .

To document "the aspect of the separatism which developed during evacuation," Opler prepared a report, entitled "The Terminal Island People, Their Evacuation and Their Experiences at Manzanar." In his introductory comments, Opler observed that whether "or not some of the descriptions are exaggerated, whether or not the grievances have grown with repetition, the attitudes they reflect are a reality and have been significant for registration and other events." The report was based on a slightly edited interview with an

81. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, March 20, 1944, Report No. 222, "The Flower Growers of San Fernando, Their History, Their Evacuation and Their Present Position (By an Evacuee)," by Morris E. Opler, introductory comment, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 348, File No. 63.318 No. 12, and Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, October 30, 1944, Report No. 247, "The Farmers of the San Fernando Valley: Pre-Evacuation and Evacuation Experiences," by Morris E. Opler, introductory comment, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 348, File No. 63.318, No. 15.

82. Bloom and Riemer, *Removal and Return*, pp. 158-97.

83. Supporting documentation for this topical analysis may be found in Harold Josif, "Description of Terminal Island Society Taken from a Paper on Japanese Immigrant Communities," pp. 1-12, RG 210, Entry 8, State and Local Government and Private Publications, Box 8, File, "Josif, Harold."

evacuee who offered a lengthy account of the hardships experienced by the Terminal Islanders:

. . . Of course, all of the tragedies and anxiety can not be expressed in mere words but perhaps I can give a glimpse of what occurred as it has been related to me by approximately a dozen persons. Their stories, except in personal details, are all very similar.

The evacuee observed that Terminal Island "had over 3,000 Japanese residents who lived quietly and in a law abiding manner there through the decades." The "peace and serenity" was gone, however, after December 7, 1941. That day

was Sunday, a holiday, when numerous 'Fish Harbor' people went to the mainland, San Pedro, to visit or to see the movies. . . Upon hearing what had occurred that day, the aliens who tried to get home via the ferry-boat were detained by the soldiers who took them to the immigration station to be investigated. Even the children were questioned. Although some persons tried to tell the soldiers that they lived on the Island, they, at first, were told to go back to San Pedro from where they had come. Some of the Issei had to stay overnight in jail. On December 7, after dark and through the early morning of the next day, all of the business men and a few fishermen were taken by the F.B.I.

After that day, the fishermen, both aliens and citizens, were not allowed to go out to fish. . . The majority of the women cannery workers were afraid to go back to their jobs, even though their canneries asked them to return. Thus money was not made after this but was only spent.

Because their fishing vessels lay idly anchored at the wharves, the men had to go every day to see that the boats would not become rusty or scaled with barnacles. Often these men were attacked by the Filipinos, who ganged up on them and beat them. Finally the fishermen were too scared even to go out to see what had happened to their boats. While this happened to the men, the women were often insulted by the Slavs, their former fellow cannery workers.

On Terminal Island, there is only a grammar school. To go to the secondary schools, the students had to cross to the mainland by ferry. After the war commenced, in order to go to school, the students had to show their birth certificates to the soldiers every day. Once the students were detained in the corral to the ferry-boat. The soldiers prevented them from attending school. . . Some of the students did not attend the schools because they were afraid to leave their homes - afraid something would happen to them.

This life of terror continued for about one month. Then another blow came. On February 2, 1942, early in the morning, all of the fishermen were apprehended by the F.B.I. Even the bed-ridden fishermen were taken, literally dragged from their beds. . . The F.B.I. always, it seemed, asked how much money one had in his possession. They would order the victim to hold his hands up in the air and then would search for different objects. Actually the F.B.I. acted as though they were

hold-up-men. The women and children were too frightened to shed even a tear. But after the men were gone and the first shock was over they were able to cry. The fishermen were taken either to the county jail or to the immigration station. Then later they were transferred to internment camps in Montana and North Dakota. As the men went to their destinations by buses, the women and children craned their necks, trying to find their loved ones and to wave a brave goodbye, for they did not know when they would meet again.

On the following day the F.B.I., or men who pretended that they were the F.B.I., came again to search the homes. They went through the houses from the roof-tops to the cellars and searched every nook and corner. They even flipped the pages of the encyclopedia, children's school books, and they also looked at the bank books. The most pitiful thing that happened was the way the men who posed as the F.B.I., or perhaps they may have been the F.B.I., went through the homes of the bachelors who had been apprehended the day before. When they thought that they weren't watched they would take money. This money was there because these men had been afraid to put their savings in the bank as a result of the freezing of assets. Besides money, it was found that they also took other valuables. The only thing the bachelors had left were the clothes on their backs.

After the fishermen were taken, relatives and friends from Southern California tried to see and help the women, but they were halted at the drawbridge in San Pedro. Only the Nisei were allowed to cross the bridge. After the internment of the fishermen, the women aged greatly because they had to endure so much suffering and despair. . . .

The great majority of the people of Terminal Island lived in homes built closely together and of the same style. These were leased from the fish canneries. It was hard on the women when the canneries asked for rent, especially when they had made no money since the beginning of the war. There were people who did not have much to eat during those days because their pride did not allow them to ask for aid. . . .

At this time, the Terminal Island branch of the J.A.C.L. (Japanese American Citizens League) had the good intention of helping the Nisei get back their old jobs of fishing, but the plans did not go through. Before long, the organization told the people that to insure their safety, they should wear individual snapshots and they should become members of the J.A.C.L. The people trusted the organization, therefore they did what they were told. They paid one dollar for the picture and three dollars for the initiation fee into the J.A.C.L., which was claimed to be a better proof of citizenship than the birth certificate. Ironically enough, in ordinary days, the initiation fee had been one dollar.

The J.A.C.L. also charged three dollars for the service of notifying the Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Alien Registration Division of the change of address of an alien. This service elsewhere was conducted by the post office clerks free of charge. No one knew what happened

to this money that was collected. . . . That is the reason so many of these Terminal Island people do not like the group.

It was said that the Navy Department wanted to make the people move out before February 24, but the Department did not have jurisdiction over the civilians. Therefore the Navy Department and the Justice Department purchased Terminal Island from the residents, it is said. The leases on the Island were on the month to month basis although a few individuals might have had longer leases which were still in effect, for leases running from 1 to 5 years had formerly been written. The Harbor Department gave the people 30 days to evacuate after the Navy Department purchased the land, but on February 25, 1942 the Navy Department ordered the 48 hour evacuation. It came about this way.

It was February 24. The silence of the night was punctuated by sharp gunfire, the explosion of bombs, the alarm of the air raid sirens and flashes from the guns. The people of Terminal Island thought that surely the war had commenced on the coast. Panic stricken were the people - the 2,000 women and children of the Island whose fathers and husbands, 600 of them, had been taken away.

The next day, February 25, after the residents spent an anxious and terrifying night, much rumor and talk was circulating. Then the San Pedro evening paper, the "New Pilot" and also the "Los Angeles Times" told of the 48 hours notice given persons of Japanese ancestry to evacuate Terminal Island. After dark, that same day, the soldiers brought notices of evacuation to each house; they took the signatures of the people to make sure that they received the order. This meant that the people had to be off the Island by midnight, February 27. The suddenness of the notice to evacuate left the people numb. This came about a month after the men were interned. How to pack, what to pack, what to leave, what to sell? Or to get out and save your skin! Despair!

. . . . There were many families who were not able to pack much because of the lack of boxes and other things to store possessions in. Neighbors could not help each other because everyone was too busy tending to his own packing.

The following day the junkmen swarmed over the Island. How they knew that there would be a field day for them no one knew, but they were there to make bargains with the evacuees, bargains that would have been laughed at on ordinary days. But today, any price, even though outrageously low, was better than leaving the household furniture and other belongings lying in the house to be stolen. The bitter tears at seeing each dear possession sold were tragic, but this was the only way; there was no way of storing things because of the lack of transportation. Private trucking concerns asked too much money to cart the belongings to safety. In nearly all of the homes, after the junkmen were gone, stood pianos, the only objects that were too heavy for the buyers to take. . . .

. . . . In many cases there was not enough time for the people to sell belongings to pack them. . . . Numerous individuals , , , , had to sell their world possessions cheaply. One woman sold both her refrigerator and cooking stove for \$10. She

sold all of her furniture in the same tragic fashion. . . . Another lady who was considered lucky sold her piano, worth \$400, for \$20.

What had happened to the fishing vessels? Those, too, were sold too cheaply or were left by the people. The women did not know how to sell the ships because their husbands, who really knew their value, were gone. Therefore they sold them at such ridiculously low prices that they could not even cry over the loss when they realized what they had done.

The value of the fishing vessels on the average were as follows: "jig" boats, the eight, ten, twelve horse-power boats were worth \$1,000; forty horse-power boats were worth \$4,000 to \$5,000; and the local tuna boats were valued at \$25,000. They were sold at much below these prices, depending upon the condition of the boats.

There were many petty thieves, persons who had no sense of sympathy but who took advantage of those who were being mistreated. They sneaked into the homes from the back and took the valuables while the inhabitants were busily salvaging or selling their belongings in the front of the house.

One woman went to the bank to draw out money. While she was gone her sewing machine and other light belongings were taken. Some of the women were afraid to leave their homes, therefore they put their belongings together so as to guard them until they were ready to leave. It was said that one woman worked so hard that a few days after evacuation she died of exhaustion.

The Sugiyamas [an assumed name for one of the families] went to the Baptist Church to seek shelter and transportation. From there they, along with about sixty others, were taken to the Chuo Gakuen (Central Japanese School) in Boyle Heights, Los Angeles, California. This was one of the shelters provided for the people by the Japanese churches and language schools in Los Angeles, Compton, Torrance, and Gardena. The people were divided into small groups and sent to these places. Of course, there were others who rented private homes or hotel rooms because they wished to live near their friends or relatives. Such persons who did rent homes spent much money on rent and food. But the sentiment in Los Angeles County was against the evacuees, so that lodging places were hard to find. Those who went to live in the above mentioned shelters did get food donated by the Japanese farmers and friends. This food the women cooked for themselves and the children. Because there were no beds, they had to sleep on the floors until their evacuation to Manzanar.

During this period of evacuation the people were helped the most by Miss S., a Caucasian lady of the Baptist Church. This lady is looked upon as a savior, an angel, because of her unselfishness, kindness, and honesty. . . . The Terminal Island people will always remember her and cherish the love that she gave them. . . . The F.B.I. had her followed because they thought she was a suspicious character for helping the Islanders in their distress. . . .

After leaving Terminal Island and after being mistreated by the Filipinos, the Mexicans, the Slavs, the Jews, and other Caucasians, the people had no place to go. They lived in terror and hopeless despair for weeks. They thought they would be killed any minute and fear did much to change their feelings towards society.

These "Fish Harbor" people were among the first family groups to arrive in Manzanar. And after they had suffered so much because of the evacuation they were due for more hardship here. The essential facilities of the Center were not ready. Many persons were hurt falling into ditches dug for pipes and stumbling over tree stumps in the dark. Added to this, the weather conditions in this desert land were not exactly morale lifting. The frequent dust storms, the sharp cold wind, the cold barrack rooms, the drab brown of the immediate surroundings made the people more resentful, bitter, cynical, and insecure. Everything looked so temporary here. There were no planned activities yet, no books to read. There were not enough jobs, no schools, no security. Only boredom, and tenseness.

Energetic boys and girls with nothing to do, too restless to stay home, would wander aimlessly about the Center and think over the 48 hours evacuation, the internment of fathers, and evidences of race prejudice to which they had been subjected.⁸⁴ Opler submitted a number of similar reports on the Terminal Island people based on personal interviews with evacuees at Manzanar. While each report noted unique experiences and reminiscences, they verified cumulatively the essential details of the Terminal Island evacuation that resulted in the despair, disillusionment, anger, bitterness, and resentment that characterized this group at Manzanar.⁸⁵ One report related the story of a 20-year-old man on Terminal Island whose attitudes had changed considerably as a result of the evacuation. The report, based on an interview with a Nisei who had become acquainted with the young man, stated in part:

. . . . Where once he was an average American-minded citizen he became very anti-American. Not that he would go out and blow up factories and act like a movie saboteur, but anti-American in the sense that he had lost his faith in America. His faith and his trust. To be persecuted because of his ancestry and to be treated as if they were less than human with no feelings was more than he and most of the others could stand. It's hard to be treated as they were without becoming bitter. It would seem that his troubles were enough for so young a boy. But no, he was sent here to camp, and his troubles seemed to just begin. . . .

84. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, February 9, 1944, Report No. 163, "The Terminal Island People, Their Evacuation and Their Experiences At Manzanar (Written by an Evacuee)," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File No. 61.318, No. 9.

85. See, for instance, Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, October 25, 1943, Report No. 73, "Terminal Island During Evacuation," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File No. 61.318, No. 4; Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, January 4, 1944, Report No. 122, "At Manzanar and Before (From a Nisei in His Early Twenties)," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File No. 61.318, No. 7; Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, February 10, 1944, Report No. 166, "The Terminal Island Evacuation (By a Terminal Island Fisherman)," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File No. 61.318, No. 9; and Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, February 18, 1944, Report No. 201, "The Evacuation of Terminal Island (By a Terminal Island Nisei)," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File No. 61.318, No. 11.

After he and his family arrived in Manzanar, most of the Terminal Island people were housed in the same blocks, therefore they were in constant touch with each other. He lived in the environment of bitterness for which the Terminal Islanders were noted. They nursed their bitterness along, never forgetting, always remembering what they had and how much they lost. . . . The younger people went around in "gangs" and generally stuck with their own crowd.⁸⁶

Several of Opler's reports related to the prewar reputations of the Terminal Island youth and their formation of gangs once they arrived at Manzanar. The reputation of the Terminal Island youth, as well as their geographical isolation from the rest of the Japanese community in Los Angeles, set them apart. One Nisei, for instance, told Opler:

Before the war, Terminal Island kept pretty much within itself, as hardly any group outside of them could mingle with them.

If any visiting baseball team went to play the Island team, they were treated very unsportsmanlike and sometimes threatened with bodily harm. This happened especially if the visiting team was ahead in the game. So there was an unwritten gentlemen's agreement among the various clubs in Southland to avoid playing with the Terminal Islanders.

I heard many Nisei girls say that, "I wouldn't think of going around with a Terminal Island boy." Even fellows avoided the Niseis from the island. In fact, many fights occurred when some Terminal Island boys went to dances in Los Angeles.

Terminal Island boys now rate pretty highly in Manzanar with the girls as compared to before the evacuation. This is principally because the island teams win most of the sport contests held here. The Islanders want to win regardless of anything. They'll threaten umpires or players in order to win. It is a good thing to win, but it takes a lot to lose in a sportsman like manner. This is not in the Terminal Island team.

Terminal Island teams would not be so strong if they had been divided when evacuation started. They are the largest group of any evacuees [sic] from one section.

At first, they terrorized the center in gangs. Sure, "in unity there is strength but divided we fall," that is what Abraham Lincoln said and it seems the Terminal Island boys are applying it here. Another reason why Terminal Island boys are popular with Nisei girls is that Manzanar is made up of evacuees from all parts

86. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, December 15, 1942 [3], Report No. 107, "The Case of a Terminal Islander (From a Nisei)," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File No. 61.318, No. 6.

of California. There is the Florin group from the North, West Los Angeles, Venice, Glendale, San Fernando, and very few from Los Angeles proper.⁸⁷

Some youth from Terminal Island formed "Zoot suit" gangs at Manzanar as an expression of their rebellion. Zoot suit gangs originated among Mexican and black young men in Los Angeles during the prewar years, but they also became popular among some Japanese (particularly on Terminal Island and in Little Tokyo) and Filipinos. The gangs were characterized by long hair, exaggerated baggy clothing, and use of unique slang. One Nisei informed Opler that such gangs became popular among the Terminal Islanders at Manzanar:

The Japanese that copied the zoot suits frequented the 'Lil'Tokyo' streets. I believe the Exclusive Twenty Club boys were the earliest [Japanese] groups to wear zoot suits. The Dunbar boys were next in wearing those styles.

After evacuation, the Exclusive Twenty Club was scattered in various centers, but, the clothes that they wore took hold in various centers, especially in the Manzanar Center. The Terminal Island Niseis went for the zoot suit styles in a big way. They draped all kinds of pants to conform with the style.⁸⁸

Gangs, such as the Dunbar Boys, would cause considerable trouble to WRA officials at Manzanar, particularly during the camp's first year of operation.

Little Tokyo — East Los Angeles

Opler also compiled a series of studies on the experiences and attitudes of evacuees at Manzanar that had come from the Little Tokyo-East Los Angeles area. In one report, dated October 26, 1943, Opler interviewed a Nisei mother who characterized herself as "an average Nisei . . . woman, 25, married, with a four year old daughter." Her father was an Issei, and her mother was a Nisei, but she considered herself a Nisei. She observed that her story was "like hundreds of other nisei girls, with slight variations:"

. . . . I was brought up from the time I was about 3 or 4 until my 'teens by Caucasian Nuns (Catholic, my mother was a Catholic, and so are we) because Mother died, and left Father with a good-sized family (seven of us), ranging from less than a year to about 10, whom he could not take care of and support at the same time. Therefore, my background from childhood was strictly American, with no Japanese customs and restrictions. . . . I went to the grammar school the Nuns conducted, then on to the public high school. I graduated from Los Angeles High School in Los Angeles, with neither high honors, nor, on the other hand, at the foot of the class, but just as one of 500 or so other students, ready and eager to go into the world to make use of the high ideals and teachings we had received.

87. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, November 18, 1943, Report No. 94, "The Terminal Islanders at Manzanar (From a Nisei)," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File No. 61.318, No. 5.

88. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, November 17, 1943, Report No. 93, "Reflections of a Nisei on Zoot Suits," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File No. 61.318, No. 5.

Eight months or so after graduation, I met and married another 'nisei' from Florin. . . . He had come to Los Angeles when he was 19 to establish a wholesale fruit and vegetable business. When I met him he was 24 years old, and already quite established in his business, through four years of hard work. We were married and a year later our daughter was born. About this time he felt that he could expand his business, so with more heart-breaking work and sacrifice, he was really established.

Now, we were really well situated and settled, even according to American standards. We lived in a nice home, had a new car, and a growing business, with enough money for the necessities of life with a few luxuries added, but not enough to squander foolishly. . . . now that I was married, and had a beautiful daughter, and a young, ambitious and fairly successful husband, I for once felt the sense of security, love and protection that I had been unconsciously longing for. As our second, and third years of marriage came and went, my husbands' business became better and better and he had big plans for future operations, when — bang — all of a sudden — Pearl Harbor — and the smashing of all our hopes and dreams.

The nisei evacuee reflected on the impact of Pearl Harbor and evacuation:

One cannot imagine the bitter despair and unhappiness of those first days and weeks. People, ignorant people, instead of letting us lick our wounds in peace, knocking at our door, asking if we had anything to sell, cheap, as if we were junk men or something, trampling, and handling our belongings as if we had no feelings at all. . . . The humiliation and degradation of those days will never leave us. . . . I sometimes thought I could not stand the heartbreak in my husbands' eyes. Ten years of blood and sweat went into his business, and he was just about ready to sit back, and ease up a little, to enjoy his well earned fruits, when he had to give up and sell out. . . .

When evacuation came, and things were in such a confused state, and we were in a panic, we thought it best to get rid of her [their daughter's] furniture, as we thought we could not take it along with us. We sold it for a song. . . .

The greatest blow to her was when we were forced to give away all her toys. I didn't want to sell them, so I just gave them away to the neighbor children. . . .

Maybe these are little things compared to many which have happened, the heartache and misery, the thousands on thousands of dollars which were lost through evacuation, but the little things piled on each other, day by day, caused more heartbreak in us, then the one clean break of evacuation. Evacuation, on the whole, was a big, stunning blow that numbed us. But when we recovered from the shock we were actually in camp, learning to take it as a matter of course. But it is these little irritations, constantly chafing us, that keep us a little bitter, with a sense of frustration. . . .

. . . . On the whole, most of us took it [evacuation] as a matter of course; we were neither too bitter nor too happy about the whole affair. I think some of us

(especially those of us who came from the Los Angeles area and the immediately surrounding towns) were a little relieved to be away from the minor irritations, i.e., insults and slander, and the small humiliations unthinking people heaped upon us after Pearl Harbor. . . .

Not only were things like that common occurrences, but we had to take being refused a ride on the street car by the conductor, who in normal times wouldn't have thought to insult us so openly. . . .

Not only were we afraid for ourselves, but for our children, husbands, and parents. Personally, I always thought I could take care of myself when such things came up, as I am completely Americanized, and can give tit for tat, but when your children and especially our parents (most of whom are law-abiding, unassuming people, who could not understand why they were spoken to and insulted the way they were, but just took it in silence) were made miserable and unhappy, I think many of us tried to act as a buffer for them, so that they might be a little more relieved in a situation which was no fault of theirs nor, as a matter of fact, any fault of ours. The Nisei mother observed that many "of us will not have any more children for some time, as under the circumstances, when we have no home to go to, no real security, nor the atmosphere of safety in which normal happy children should be brought up, we feel it is best not to bring any more into the world." She elaborated:

. . . . Many will say, there's nothing to prevent you from having one, as there are hospital accommodations, etc. at the camp. Yes, I admit that. Excellent accommodations, in fact, but how many of us would care to go through life having to admit we were born in a 'concentration camp'. I know they are called 'relocation centers,' but in actuality, they are concentration camps. I, myself, would rather not have another child if it had to be born in camp. I'd much rather wait until I am out again, free, and on my own, settled in a community of understanding and sympathetic Americans, to bring up my family in an atmosphere of trustfulness and love, and free of the prejudices and hate that we have known. Maybe I am being idealistic, but no matter how hard hit and bitter we were about evacuation, our ingrown American teachings and traditions were never downed.

Despite her disillusionment and frustration, the Nisei evacuee reflected on her continuing loyalty to the United States. Noting that loyalty had never been an issue for her, she stated:

. . . . America is the land of my birth, the only land I know, I have never been in Japan, nor have I had any desire to go; I feel I belong here, and here I wish to remain. You don't stop loving your father if he gives you a sound thrashing for something that wasn't your fault. You admit it was wrong and try to forgive him. So it is with most of us. We think evacuation wasn't the solution to the problem, but as long as the Administration thought it was best, we have tried to understand and take it, and when the time comes for our release, we shall try to pick up the threads of our former life and live in the true American traditions,

and bring up our children, too, on these same traditions, of justice, equality and the pursuit of happiness.⁸⁹

Opler prepared a second report based on an autobiographical sketch with this Nisei woman. In this sketch of her experiences, she related how she and her husband had arrived at Manzanar and discussed the quandaries in her mind as to the meaning of evacuation. Prior to the war, she observed that their lives were "set in a complete pattern." Then

suddenly and shockingly, without any notice, the war started. Things were in a confused state. People were becoming panicky. There was talk of evacuating all Japanese out of the state. I hoped and prayed we at least — as citizens, would be allowed to remain. But to no avail. My husband sold his business while the selling was good. When evacuation was confirmed, we decided to move north to the so-called 'white (free) zone.' But even there we were not allowed to stay in peace. We were ordered to evacuate to the Tale Lake center. While we were there, my husband went to the Montana Sugar Beet fields on furlough. Returning to camp he decided he would go out again in the spring and stay 6 or 7 months. I decided to apply for transfer to the Manzanar Center where my folks were, since I had no relatives or friends in Tale. My transfer was recommended, and I reached Manzanar early in the spring. . . .

After being at Manzanar for two years, this Nisei mother observed:

I often sit and wonder how I ever came to be in a camp full of Japanese, aliens and citizens alike, with nothing much in common between them and myself except the color of our skins. What had I, or as a matter of fact, what had the rest of them done, to be thrown in camp, away from familiar surroundings, and familiar faces? What had there been in my life that made such a thing happen? I suppose the only answer is, the accident of my birth — my ancestry. There is no other logical answer. . . .

. . . . So we are looking forward to that day when we will again be 'free citizens' and lead once more a normal life. Maybe some day I may be able to find an answer to why we were put in camps. Even now I can find no answer, no event in my life to make me realize WHY?⁹⁰

Opler gathered other stories of arbitrary treatment and discrimination encountered by evacuees from the Little Tokyo-East Los Angeles area that contributed to the anger and bitterness of those people. On April 24, 1944, he prepared an account of a Nisei who had grown up in Fresno where his father's laundry business was located in "Chinatown." Because 90 percent of his father's business came from "Chinese," it "hit rock bottom" in

89. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, October 25, 1943, Report No. 75 "A Nisei Mother Looks at Evacuation," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File No. 61.318, No. 4.

90. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, April 1, 1944, Report No. 225, "Up to Now," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 348, File No. 61.318, No. 12.

1931 when "Japan started the war against China and took over Manchuria." The Chinese tongs in Fresno "forbade any dealing with Japanese."

Because his mother had a cousin living in Los Angeles, he "hitch-hiked" to the city, "getting a ride with a produce truck." The cousin found him a job "in a retail produce market as an apprentice with a salary of sixty dollars a month, room and board." Within six months he had "saved over two hundred dollars," so he sent for his parents and brothers. The family rented a house near the wholesale produce markets..

The Nisei man encountered racial slurs and slights as he worked in Los Angeles during the 1930s. He remembered being called a "Jap" and being told to go back where he came from. He observed:

When someone said something like this it sure used to get my blood boiling as I didn't know how to speak Japanese enough to be called a 'Jap.' I resented it very much as I thought I was as good as any other American citizen.

In time I got used to being called a 'Jap' by some 'ignorant whites.' I realized that if I argued every time with ornery customers when I was called names, there wouldn't be much business left, so I learned to control my temper.

Things were pretty tough in Los Angeles during the years 1932 to 1934, but we managed [to] live by the skin of our teeth.

I wanted to go to college and take up law but my obligation to help the family was stronger so I remained working. My father wanted us to start some kind of a business of our own, but somehow we could never get enough capital to start a business. I learned through my associations with fellow fruit-stand workers that speaking English only was a handicap in getting better wages and good jobs.

I tried to get jobs with American concerns but found that only janitorial jobs were open and some concerns said right out that they 'had nothing for Japs'. . . . This kind of treatment jolted my ideals and so I took to learning to speak Japanese in earnest. Now I speak Japanese pretty well for I have really applied myself to it. In fact, I worked on it so hard that I believe my English slipped back.

Although the account did not discuss the Nisei's experiences in the late 1930s and at the time of evacuation, Opler noted in the foreword of the report that

in 1939 the young man was able to found a business of his own, and it too, collapsed at evacuation. At the Project [Manzanar] the young man has been restless, volatile and unstable. He has sampled work in almost every Department of the Center. It is possible that his disorganization has gone too far, and that what he seeks is behind, and not before him.⁹¹

91. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, April 24, 1944, Report No.232, "Growing Up in Fresno: An Autobiographical Account (By an Evacuee)," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 348, File No. 61.381, No. 13.

Several other reports prepared by Opler illustrated the discriminatory and brutal treatment experienced by evacuees in the Little Tokyo-East Los Angeles area that contributed to their anger, bitterness, and anti-social behavior at Manzanar. One report, entitled "Arbitrary Treatment by F. B. I. Men," was related by an evacuee who was a friend of two Nisei and one Issei from Little Tokyo. The report stated:

It was the night of December seventh 1941 in the LIL' TOKYO section of Los Angeles. Three Japanese fellows were walking home from Broadway when they were stopped by four F.B.I. agents who got out of a sedan. This happened between Los Angeles and San Pedro streets on East First street. The F.B.I. men asked the trio what nationality they were — whether they were Chinese or Japanese. They asked them what they were doing out so late at night. It was only 9:30 P.M. and the men were nearly home. There were no curfew laws in effect yet. When they replied that they were Japanese, the F.B.I. men told the trio to get inside the car or they would be black-jacked. The trio didn't have any alternative other than to comply. After the trio got into the car, they were driven to an empty auto-park behind the Paris Inn Cafe. Then the Japanese boys were told to get out. They did so and then the F.B.I. men beat the holy day-lights out of them. One of the G-men told the trio to make a run for it, all the while holding onto his hip-pocket as though getting ready to draw his gun out. The trio refused to run away so then they were taken to Central Jail. There again the fellows were subjected to further punishment until one of the policemen interfered, telling the G-men that they had enough beatings already.

The trio were later transferred to Lincoln Heights jail to be booked on some trumped up charge about late hours or something. Their trial came up about a week later and when it did they were dismissed immediately.⁹²

Two reports by Opler linked the discrimination experienced by Japanese in the Little Tokyo-East Los Angeles area with the rise of zoot suit gangs in those sections of the city. One report, as previously noted, indicated that the "Japanese that copied the zoot suits frequented the 'Lil' Tokyo streets."⁹³

Another report prepared by Opler related the story of a young man from the Little Tokyo-East Los Angeles area who had become a gang member at Manzanar, in part because of the chaos and turmoil he had experienced during the evacuation. An evacuee who had known the young man for some time told Opler:

One boy, a neighbor here, is a good example of what the 'zoot suits' have done to him. He is a member of one of the more 'famous' gangs of Manzanar.

In Los Angeles, where he was born and raised until evacuation, he was more than a model boy and son. He was the oldest boy in a family of two boys and

92. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, November 3, 1943, Report No. 80, "Arbitrary Treatment by F.B.I. Men (From an Evacuee)," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File No. 61.318, No. 4.

93. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, November 17, 1943, Report No. 93.

two girls. He was a hard working fellow helping his father, who owned a wholesale produce firm in the Los Angeles market. Working as an all-around man, he sold, bought and received the produce. At that time he was about 20 years of age and the pride of his dad. He knew that by working hard he not only helped his dad, but himself at the same time, for he was learning the business inside out and preparing for the day when he might have to run it himself. He was an extremely ambitious boy. He actually never went out with a girl, which is in itself amazing, for he was twenty, a city boy and not too poor. But he just was 'too busy.'

After evacuation, when he landed in camp he seemed to become completely different. Not that he became vicious or bad, but from a quiet, conservative boy, he really became a model 'pachuco' boy, with haircut, clothes and talk of the zoot suit gang. He let his hair grow almost to his shoulder, cut in that exaggerated fashion of the true pachuco. All his clothes, both work clothes and good clothes were cut in the zoot drape.⁹⁴

West Los Angeles

Opler prepared several reports describing the experiences and attitudes of evacuees at Manzanar from the West Los Angeles area. One report was based on an interview with a Nisei who had been born and raised in Hawaii. After graduating from high school this man had moved to northern California where he worked as a farm laborer. Several years later, he migrated to West Los Angeles and became a gardener. The report stated:

He was doing better than average in making a living and by this time he was married and had a son. His wife was a proprietress of a beauty shop in West Los Angeles and things were going along very smooth until the notice of evacuation. . .

According to Opler, this Nisei

never realized that the United States government would allow such abridgement of citizenship rights of Niseis. This fellow was totally Americanized so he couldn't think that the Army could make us evacuate. Later he thought that the United States government would pay indemnity to evacuees for property losses. But when he finally realized that the retribution wasn't going to be paid to evacuees, he became pretty bitter.

He said the Army didn't even give the Niseis a chance to show their loyalty to this country, instead they shoved us in here [Manzanar]. This man also remarked

94. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, January 25, 1944, Report No. 147, "'Zoot Suit' Boys at Manzanar (From an Evacuee)," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File No. 61.318, No. 8.

that prior to evacuation he was willing to fight for this country, but not any more.⁹⁵

Venice

At least four of Opler's reports were devoted to the study of Venice, a truck farming community near the coast south and west of Los Angeles City from which many evacuees at Manzanar originated. The most comprehensive report relating to this area, entitled "Mr. O., A Farmer from Venice, California (By an Evacuee Research Assistant)," was prepared on August 24, 1944. In his introductory comments, Opler observed that this account was "in part autobiographical, in part a mirror of a region and of a section of the West Coast population of Japanese ancestry before and during evacuation." It was "the story of an individual whom we shall call Mr. O., a successful farmer of the Venice, California area." The materials presented "were obtained in the course of a number of interviews with Mr. O. After the various interviews were organized and paraphrased, the data was submitted "to the narrator for comment and correction."

The report included Mr. O.'s impressions as he and his family left Venice for Manzanar on April 27, 1942. The evacuation experience was "like sinking down to the gloomy, colorless abyss of a foggy, damp morning." He related further:

. . . . One by one the buses, filled with heartsick, discouraged and humiliated evacuees, rolled away. The occupants craned their necks to see their homes, perhaps for the last time. All the energy used to build up what they had simply disappeared like a mirage in the cloud of dust and the carbon monoxide of the buses. . . .

The evacuees who arrived [at Manzanar] on Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday, April 26, 27, and 28, 1942, came from the Santa Monica bay area, Sawtelle, San Fernando Valley, Burbank and Glendale. . . . After engine trouble and a flat tire, Mr. O's group arrived, only to be met by a famous Manzanar dust storm. Anguished tears stung their eyes as they thought, 'Haven't we gone through enough without having to face this too?'

Mr. O.'s father had emigrated to the United States via San Francisco in 1907. After meandering throughout the western states, he returned to Japan to attend to a family emergency. After marrying, he returned to America in 1911, and the family, which now included a baby daughter, settled in Elysian Park, a spinach-growing area on the north side of central Los Angeles where Mr. O. was born the following year. During the mid-

1920s the family had moved to the Venice area and established a truck farming enterprise.

The account of Mr. O.'s prewar experiences continued:

95. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, November 18, 1943, Report No. 95, "What a 'No' Nisei Told Me (From an Evacuee)," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File 61.318, No. 5.

The oldest son, Mr. O., took over the family farm when he was 16 years of age. Luck was with the family, for in 1929 they hit the 'jack-pot,' — they had an exceptionally good year. From then on, farming was easier. Young Mr. O. says he could not claim to be a seasoned farmer until he was 21 years of age. Before evacuation, he had twenty acres of land, leased, which was yielding on the average from three to four car loads of celery an acre or sixty to seventy car loads a year. This does not include other crops. One refrigerated car carried 340 crates, the half-crate type, field packed.

He specialized in celery raising from 1926 to 1942. His twenty acres of it brought him \$16,000 to \$18,000 gross per year.

During his Venice High School years, his ambition was to become a doctor of medicine. He majored in mathematics and foreign languages. Since his father could not work as he used to, Mr. O. had to take all the responsibilities of the family onto his young shoulders. So his dreams of becoming a doctor faded. Instead, he sent his younger brother to a medical college. . . .

Mr. O is now 32 years of age. He has an attractive wife and three children. He met his wife, a Kibei, in Ise, Japan, on one of his three visits to that country.

Mr. O. was one of the oldest Nisei farmers in the Venice district, though there were a few Kibei farmers who were near his age. All the Nisei seemed to prefer white collar jobs. . . . He says, 'The Californians should not be afraid that the persons of Japanese ancestry are going to be tough competitors in the field of agriculture, because even before the war, the Nisei were leaving the farms for the city. The Issei, because of the lack of education, did not go into business, but chose the farm, the back-breaking manual labor. The Nisei have seen the work their folks have gone through, and they do not wish to go through the same thing. The younger generation prefers the easier and cleaner jobs.'

Concerning activities in Venice prior to the war, the report stated:

. . . . everybody was busy all the time; there just did not seem to be much time for leisure. Mr. O. did belong to the Young Men's Association and was at one time a cabinet member of this organization composed of persons of Japanese ancestry. He, also, was a member of the Judo club.

There were yearly prefecture picnics, as well as picnics with the Pacific Fruit and Produce Company employees (Caucasians) and the farmers of Japanese ancestry in Southern California. This was a bright and true way for better racial understanding.

In answer to charges that the Japanese farmers exploited Mexican laborers in the Venice area, the report noted:

All the Mexican laborers who were hired to work on the various ranches in California were members of the Mexican Union. If the wages were low, they would strike. The Mexican consul would help them. It has been charged often

that the Japanese people always were close to their consulate, but the Issei had to have some group to look after their rights since they could not become citizens of this country.

It is understood that the Japanese never took unfair advantage of the Mexican laborers. Wages paid during the pre-evacuation days were \$.50 per hour; now they are probably \$.85 per hour.

The report described the financial condition of the Venice farmers at the time of evacuation:

At times when the celery crop was good, the people in the Venice area were swamped with salesmen from various companies. In those years, they bought the best and most modern kitchen equipment, household furniture and nice automobiles. For an example, in 1941, luck was with them. In a competitive spirit, all the neighbors bought new 1941 Pontiacs, Chryslers, Fords, and Buicks. Everyone tried to out-do the other fellow. And when there were picnics, rows of shining new automobiles with window license stickers still on were to be seen.

Also new tractors and farm equipment were bought. Everything was perfect. Although the homes looked shabby from the outside, this contrasted sharply with the interiors. Money was not spent on the outside of the houses because the places were rented, and the tenants never knew when the landlords would decide to sell out. If they, the Issei, had been able to buy land, then naturally the exteriors of the homes would have been made more presentable. . . .

The "good times," however, came to an end with the coming of war. The report discussed this chaotic period:

When war was declared all the leaders of the Venice district were interned; the Japanese language school teachers and the Japanese school committee members as well as those who were members of the Japanese Association. . . .

. . . . much hardship was suffered by the Venice farmer when the five mile travel limit and the curfew were enforced. Whenever he had any business to do, he had to go to the local WCCA office or the police department for a travel permit. To get this, he had to wait in line, because there were many other persons who also wished to travel. Therefore he had to do his business the next day. This took much time and spoiled many business opportunities. The distance from Venice to Los Angeles is sixteen miles.

There had been so much talk of evacuation that the aliens were, in a hazy way, expecting it. But the citizens [Nisei] of the Venice area never thought for one instant that they would be evacuated too.

Mr. O. is a citizen, and he never met discrimination whatsoever in his line of work. He was confident that he would be allowed to stay. Had he not been deferred from selective service because he was an essential farmer? Because he was so optimistic, he put in much time, labor and money so that he would be

able to harvest and work his land for the duration. Thus, he lost his money. He was too confident of his rights as a citizen.

Mr. O.'s optimism was based, in part, on a letter that he had received from the Defense Board of the U.S. Department of Agriculture in Los Angeles on March 16, 1942. The letter stated that "the best possible evidence of the loyalty of Japanese persons to this country . . . is that they continue their farming operations." Opler's report continued:

This . . . letter . . . supposedly answered Mr. O.'s question of what to do with his crops as evacuation became imminent.

He received this letter and heard from the neighbors that they, too, were told that they would be considered saboteurs if they did not put in their money and make preparations to harvest the crops even though they would not be there to benefit from them. This furthered the feeling of unrest. If the fields were neglected, it was said the FBI would come and take them to jail. Of course, this frightened the farmers, for people were actually being picked up by the FBI constantly in the community for various minor reasons after the outbreak of war.

In March, 1942, when Mr. O. asked the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco what to do with the farm equipment he was purchasing on an installment plan, the reply was that he should make suitable arrangements with the dealers who had sold the machines to him.

One of the tractor company dealers said, 'We don't know whether you Jap boys will pay or not. You are going to a concentration camp. We don't consider people who go in there citizens of this state. So pay now; I can't tell if you will be able to later on.'

The tractors had to be stored in the company's garage. Mr. O.'s brother lost his tractor, even though payment for it was not due. Mr. O.'s bill for his tractor was not due until June of the following year but he still had to pay for it then. He had hoped for a moratorium.

A group of Venice men finally asked a lawyer to draw up a petition to General DeWitt asking permission to stay a little longer than the time set for their evacuation, so that they might harvest the celery. But DeWitt did not even answer them. The farmers had to put in money to keep the farms going until the day of evacuation. They had to put up all ordinary costs, about \$600 at the minimum per acre. . . .

Meanwhile, the Venice truck farmers were trying to sell their crops as the time of evacuation drew closer. The report stated:

. . . . as the evacuation day grew nearer, people who were panic stricken harvested their crops early and took them to the markets at the same time. The markets were flooded with stock. Naturally the prices went down drastically. In April Mr. O. was able to sell the crops by himself, but one of the reliable companies signed a contract with him to harvest the crops in May and June. . . .

Because the evacuees were anxious to get rid of whatever they had, they sold cheaply or else lent farming equipment, land, or crops to their neighbors or other Caucasian farmers. The evacuees, it seemed, had lost all sense of balance. . . .

While at Manzanar, Mr. O., as well as many other farmers, were angered by enactment of the Lowrey Bill, signed into law on May 18, 1943, by Governor Earl Warren. The law authorized the seizure of idle Japanese-owned farm machinery by the government for agricultural use. Some Caucasians who had taken over the Japanese-operated farms and stored Japanese-owned equipment reported the idle farm implements and machinery to authorities. Thus, many of the evacuee farmers were forced to sell or to run the risk of having their equipment seized. Mr. O. "decided that it would be better to sell his equipment, no matter how cheaply, than to have it seized." Accordingly, Mr. O. sold his equipment, despite his desire to keep and use them when he relocated. The report described the equipment and buildings that Mr. O. was forced to sell while interned at Manzanar:

Approximately 3800 nursery flats and 25 larger items were sold. Some of the more valuable items were as follows: one Chevrolet, 1939, 1 1/2 ton truck; one, 1940 Pontiac; one Farmall model 1941, cultivator; one Hardie High pressure sprayer, 1941 model; one caterpillar tractor, 1941; one John Deere plow, 1941 (late); one John Deere Disc, 1941; Land leveler, 1939; two hot houses with a capacity of 2200 flats each; two living houses; one garage; one barn; and one tool house.

The report stated that the Lowrey Bill "was a great blow in many ways." It

worked against the plans of the government, which was to get the evacuees [out of the relocation centers] and back to productive life again. This bill came at a time when plans to relocate were being made by farmers. The farmers do not wish to go out as common laborers. They desire to run their own farms as before. This bill, as well as the newspaper propaganda that went with it, led to a great deal of bitterness. A good many of the evacuees who were not farming also reacted to the harshness and cruelty of the Lowrey Bill and to the viciousness of the newspaper articles [associated with its passage]. The people felt persecuted. Farmers who lost their equipment abandoned plans for relocation.⁹⁶

Several other reports prepared by Opler indicate the level of anger and bitterness on the part of many evacuees from the Venice area. One report, entitled "The Venice Niseis (From a Los Angeles Nisei)," stated:

The Niseis of Venice region were very much urbanized, considering that they lived in rural homes. Most of them spoke good English and mingled with the

96. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, August 24, 1944, Report No. 243, "Mr. O., A Farmer From Venice, California (By an Evacuee Research Assistant)," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 348, File 61.318, No. 15. Further insight into the evacuation experiences, as well as the attitudes, of Venice area residents may be found in Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, February 16, 1944, Report No. 195, "The Background of 'No' Answers of Former Residents of the Venice, California Area" by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File 61.318, No. 10.

Caucasian children. Majority of them were so Americanized that their parents could not tell them what to do. The Niseis would argue back, saying that it's old fashioned to do things the Japanese way. Venice farmers were better off from the financial standpoint as compared to average farmers.

When the war broke out, the Niseis also were prevented from going anyplace, anytime, and they were not allowed to have in their possession cameras or firearms. In other words, the same restrictions placed on the enemy aliens were applied to the Niseis as well.

After being placed in a evacuation center, the Niseis were ridiculed as to their status as United States citizens. They were reminded that they were in the same boat with aliens and that their citizenship had done them no good. Most of these Niseis resent the fact that their citizenship rights were taken away. The fact that they were so Americanized and yet were suddenly placed in the category of aliens, and being constantly reminded of this by the elders made them pretty bitter.⁹⁷

Pasadena

Opler prepared a report on the impact of evacuation as reported by a Nisei gardener in Pasadena, a suburb northeast of Los Angeles. The Nisei, who lived with his wife and two-year-old son, noted that he was telling his story "to explain what my family and I went through during that critical time." The report stated:

At the out-break of war, some people were kind and some as ornery as could be. I had a Caucasian friend, a woman, who insisted that I remain put instead of voluntarily evacuating. My younger brother had volunteered to go to Manzanar on March 23rd, 1942 to help prepare the camp for later evacuees.

My older brother was working in a large American vegetable store in Alhambra [a suburb near Pasadena] when the restriction for traveling any distance was placed on people of Japanese ancestry. The distance from Pasadena to the store was just about five miles, maybe a little over, so he kept on his job, but when the curfew law was put in effect, he had to quit his job, as he was working nights only.

Now I was the only one working and I was not earning enough to support any large number of persons. So my only recourse was to evacuate with the rest of the family to Manzanar.

I went to the Los Angeles induction station to get necessary information regarding evacuation. This was at Seventh and Spring Streets. I wanted to find out if I could bring my radio, beds, and countless other appliances for daily use. The people working there passed the buck to each other in giving out information

97. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, October 30, 1943, Report No. 78, "The Venice Niseis (From a Los Angeles Nisei)," RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File 61.318, No. 4.

regarding things like that. They said that I could bring whatever I could carry. Now this didn't clarify my mission so I asked them to define 'all I can carry.' They said, 'Just what it means is all the explanation that is necessary.'

Now, I couldn't carry much nor could I expect my wife or son to carry anything. My wife was in a family way, so I devised ways and means to carry as much as possible.

The American lady friend offered to store some things until such time as they could be called for, so part of my problem was solved. Some things which we did not consider worthwhile storing we sold or gave away, such as projection films, music sheets, buckets, clothes-pins, pictures of Japan, some cooking utensils and countless other things that are used daily in average American homes.

April the second was the date set for us to evacuate to Manzanar. I made a contraption whereby I could pull a heavy load, carry the beddings on my back, and at the same time carry two suitcases on each side. The contraption was a 2-wheel, sledlike trailer and I expected to carry a big bundle on it. My wife was to carry a small suit case and my son was to carry a shopping bag filled with light things.

I will never forget the scene at the railroad station when I went to load our things on. Why, there were sewing machines and trunks and all sorts of bundles that a single person could not possibly carry by himself. It sure made me sore to see things like that. Maybe I trusted the government employees at the induction station too much. When I thought of the things I had thrown away I sure was sore. It took me a good 6 months to forget this.

This mass evacuation was handled in an orderly way, but what the evacuees suffered in property losses and rights can never be quite forgotten.

I personally thought, as my Caucasian friend did, that we niseis with citizenship would be out of the center within half-a-year. That kind of thinking probably made me sell and throw away a lot of things. I expected to go right back to Pasadena and work as a gardener. I sure was an optimist then but now I know better.⁹⁸

Burbank

On December 14, 1943, Opler prepared a report based on an interview with a young Nisei adult who lived with her mother and younger brother in Burbank, a suburban community north of Los Angeles in the San Fernando Valley, at the time they were evacuated to Manzanar on April 28, 1942. The family lived on a small estate owned by an upper middle class family where the interviewee's now deceased father and mother had settled

98. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, November 3, 1943, Report No. 81, "Evacuation Preparations During March 1943 (From an Evacuee)," RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File 61.318, No. 5.

in 1921 as caretakers. In addition, the parents had established a small flower enterprise, renting several acres on the estate on which to raise the flowers.

The interviewee described her school experiences in Burbank:

Going to school was something which I have always liked. I know that I was very happy going to school for thirteen years: kindergarten, grammar school, junior and senior high school. . . .

For junior high school graduation, I was selected as one of the five speakers. . . .

While in high school, I was a member of the scholarship society, and the exploration club. We had our parties, conferences, and trips. . . I think I led a very normal American girl's life. . . .

Although I heard that discrimination and prejudice existed, I never encountered them during my school years. My friends always treated me as an equal so that I always had a good time. . . .

The evacuee described her experiences after Pearl Harbor. On December 8, 1941, she and her brother went to school "with some anxiety." She observed:

. . . . Instead of ill treatment, there seemed to be a closer and more understanding feeling between us and the other students. On that day, the principal of the school spoke in assembly, telling the student body not to molest persons of Japanese ancestry. I was glad and grateful that he did but I don't think anyone would have done anything cheap towards us. After that day, all the days seemed to be the same. On occasions some people would look at us in a queer way but that would be all.

The evacuee described the fear that her family experienced as they read newspaper stories of Japanese persons being killed by Filipinos in Stockton and of the Terminal Island evacuation. "We wished that we could do something for them, but what?"

The evacuee also described the feelings of denial, helplessness, and fear experienced by her family as evacuation day for her community approached. She noted:

. . . . As the evacuation areas were being planned we thought that since we lived so far from the coast line we would not be evacuated. And in the first place, we smugly thought, the Caucasians would know that we wouldn't want to do any sabotage or espionage. In the first place, how, even if we had such ideas, could we get away with such a thing? Our complexions would give us away immediately. If we were white then maybe such a thing would be possible.

Alas, we learned that we were in the restricted zone. The voluntary evacuation was stopped and the curfew laws were enforced. All during this period and the weeks that followed, there was much emotional upheaval. The anxiety of not knowing what was going to happen next was oppressive. We were always in fear and felt like hunted animals or like escaped convicts. . . .

Before long, notices were posted and newspapers gave the complete restricted zones. We found that we had to move to Manzanar. We were told that we would be allowed to take only as much as we were able to carry with us. We, and I know many other families too, packed only enough to last for the summer and early autumn of the first year. Somehow winter weather was forgotten in the hustle and mad cap way of packing. Everyone felt that he would be lucky if he got away with his life. Therefore packing was done in a rather crazy, absent-minded fashion. All selfishness and personal thoughts were forgotten. We felt as though we were going to another world. People sold their belongings at outrageously low prices unthinkingly and some persons simply left their refrigerators, stoves, and valuable belongings standing. When persons stored their things in the churches and temples, they probably thought that they would be as well protected there as in any other place. As you have undoubtedly seen in the newspapers, vandals have stolen or destroyed much of the stored goods left in these places. Some Caucasians did travel from door to door, asking if anything was for sale. . . .

Finally the day of departure was at hand. My Caucasian girl friends gave me a farewell party and we told each other that I would be back soon. The day before departure, we drove around our community to see all the familiar landscape. . . . We were very depressed — depressed to be literally pushed out of this place, our home for over twenty-two years. . . . I tried to assure myself and the others that we would be back very soon. There was no reason why we should be kept in the camp when we were trustworthy. Why, we would be back by Christmas, 1942.

Yes, this evacuation is the first discrimination that I ever felt. And I felt it hard. We were evacuated and the Italians and the Germans were free. Many persons who were not anti-Japanese, that is, Caucasians, thought that evacuation was the best thing for us. Their argument was that we would be protected from mob violence. The way they spoke, it seemed as though they could not trust their fellow Americans. Isn't America civilized? . . .

The evacuee went on to describe her early experiences at Manzanar and their impact on her attitudes. She noted that her family rode on one of the 20 Pacific Electric and Greyhound buses that transported evacuees from Burbank to Manzanar on April 28. As they entered Manzanar, "a dust storm, the worst one that we ever encountered, met us." Their

hearts sank as we saw rows and rows of dismal tar-papered pre-fabricated barracks and wondered whether we were asleep or experiencing some horrible nightmare. The whole episode of evacuation still seemed unreal. The people who came to greet us were very hardy to come against the wind and the dust. They wore huge motorcyclist's goggles, bandannas, boots, and dusty clothes. We were examined by a doctor before we were allowed to get off the bus. We were officially inducted into this camp after we received our army blankets and were assigned to our quarters. Upon reaching our home to be, we found that we had to share our little room of 20' x 25' with another family. Counting all heads in both families, there were eight of us. The first night we slept on the floor. Tears slipped down my cheeks as I tried to sleep to overcome my disappointment. . . .

The evacuee related her struggles as she adjusted to her surroundings:

The first month of readjustment was the hardest. Although I was among many persons, I was still very lonely. Very homesick and miserable. Only the mountains were of comfort to me because they reminded me of the mountains back home. Because I am more of a small town girl, I suppose, the closeness of quarters seemed to make me wish for fresh air. It seemed as though I were going to suffocate. . . .

I hated the sight of everything here. In the beginning of last year [1942], the rooms were not lined with plaster board and linoleum. Whenever the cold spring wind blew down from the snow covered Sierra Nevada mountains, the blast of cold wind would come into the rooms through the large holes and spaces between the floor boards and the walls.

I know that I am not as bitter, lonely, nor as high strung as before. Until very recently, I tried to study to make the time go faster, but I could not sit still for a long enough period of time without the desire to be on the go. I was too restless. I did not even try to make friends here at first, but later I did. . . .⁹⁹

San Fernando Valley

Opler prepared two studies on evacuees at Manzanar that had come from the San Fernando Valley, approximately 20 miles north-northwest of the Little Tokyo-East Los Angeles area. One study, dated March 20, 1944, concerned the history and evacuation experiences of the Japanese flower growers, and the other, dated October 30, 1944, discussed the prewar community and evacuation experiences of the vegetable farmers in the valley.

For his study of the flower growers, Opler interviewed 17 representatives of the 32 Japanese growers in the valley, all of whom had been evacuated to Manzanar. The flower growers had approximately 600 acres under cultivation. They owned about 400 acres of land, cultivated and uncultivated, the remainder being leased. Most of the business was carried on with Eastern shippers, although some flowers were sold through Los Angeles area outlets.

During the early 1900s some of the Japanese who migrated to southern California worked as gardeners on the estates of wealthy Caucasians. While working, they experimented with flowers, a "natural tendency because of their love for beauty in nature." After finding that flowers grew well, some Japanese "decided to grow flowers in the Montebello, Glendale, and the beach areas." At first they worked on a small scale, packing flowers "into large woven suitcase-like containers which were carried to the street car line." By "street car they traveled to Los Angeles to sell the flowers." They "made a good income and others heard of their good fortune so they, too, decided to grow flowers."

99. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, December 14 1943, Report No. 100, "My Story," RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File 61.318, No. 5.

During World War I and the early 1920s the business of growing and selling flowers increased substantially. It was discovered "that the San Fernando Valley, because of its dry climate, was particularly suitable for flower raising in the winter and early spring when fresh flowers are very scarce and difficult to grow elsewhere." Thus, some Japanese moved to San Fernando from other parts of southern California to raise flowers.

The San Fernando Valley florists developed a distinctive community. According to the report, they

lived far apart from each other because they had to move to different localities in order to seek fertile land as well as good climatic conditions. Unlike the farmers, the flower growers could not live on one piece of land for more than 5 to 10 years. If they did, they would have to invest too much money in fertilizer, so that more money would be spent than they would make. . . .

In order to start a 10 acre field, one would need \$5,000 to \$6,000 for seeds, fertilizer, water pipes, etc. Unlike the farmers who irrigate by ditches, the florists need pipes, hoses, and sprinkling systems.

Opler observed that "hired laborers were necessary." In the early days. "Mexicans and Filipinos worked part time for 50 cents an hour while Japanese laborers worked full time for room and board and \$120 a month."

The Japanese florists were generally well received in the San Fernando Valley both prior to Pearl Harbor and between that time and the evacuation. The children attended public schools and took an active part in school affairs where prejudice "did not exist to any extent." Outside the school "the social activities of the younger set revolved about social clubs which they formed among themselves" for socials and athletics. The children attended a Japanese language school on Saturdays, "but the school hours usually turned into an occasion for the young people to have more social life." The Japanese community gathered once a year on July 4 for a picnic. This was "about the only time they could get together, for there was so little leisure time."

According to the report, when outsiders saw the florists, "they think that flower raising is a very profitable business." They "even envy the way the members of the family work side by side out in the fields raising beautiful and fragrant flowers." The growers, however, did "not have time to enjoy the fruits of their labor, for they are too busy working, crawling on the ground to pick weeds even when their backs and knees ache."

Approximately one-third of the flowers were sold through retail outlets in Los Angeles. The most significant such enterprise was the Southern California Flower Market, Inc., located on Wall Street between Seventh and Eighth Streets in central Los Angeles. Virtually of the Japanese flower growers were members of this market, which had 159 members before the war. The supply departments sold farm equipment, supplies, and seeds to the members at wholesale prices. In addition to this market, there were three other markets on the same street, two of which were run by Caucasians, while a smaller market was operated by the Japanese. The Caucasians usually sold roses, gladioli, bulb flowers, and greens, while the Japanese markets sold annual and perennial cut flowers, such as carnations, astors, chrysanthemums, anemones, snap dragons, gardenias, roses,

and potted plants. Individual annual gross incomes for the flower raisers amounted to \$5,000 for those who had 5-10 acres and \$10,000 to \$20,000 for those with 10-20 acres. Several of the flower growers, who operated farms having more than 50 acres, grossed \$50,000 a year.

The Junior Floriculture Society was organized about 1933 by the Nisei sons and daughters of the members of the Southern California Flower Market. The chief purpose of the organization was sponsorship of social get-togethers, which were held once a month. Besides socials, educational lectures were given, movies were shown, and field trips were conducted. The children of the San Fernando Valley flower growers were active participants in these events. The Issei took care of market business at members' meetings.

Two-thirds of the cut flowers from San Fernando Valley were shipped to southern, eastern, and midwestern cities such as Chicago, St. Louis, New York, and Cleveland, and several cities in Texas. Shipping of flowers proved to be more profitable because the flowers were ordered beforehand and the growers knew that their flowers would be sold. There were seven shipping concerns, two of which were run by the Japanese.

The San Fernando Valley flower growers were impacted seriously by the 8 P.M. to 6 A.M. curfews enforced after Pearl Harbor. Previously, the San Fernando growers had taken their flowers to Los Angeles market some 20 miles away between 3:30 and 5 A.M. However, the curfew, as well as downtown traffic encountered during the later hours, delayed the growers in getting their flowers to market. As the time passed after the opening of the market, the prices of the flowers would go down. As a result of the curfews, their competitors sold out and Japanese growers were left with many of their flowers. Some of the growers, rather than dumping their flowers, often took them to local hospitals.

Travel restrictions were introduced after Pearl Harbor requiring that travel permits be obtained. Each time a new restricted area was announced, another permit had to be obtained designating new routes to be used by the growers. Police often stopped the flower growers on the way to market, checking their travel permits and drivers' licenses, further delaying their arrival. Business began to lag, and by March 1942 only a handful of the 159 members appeared at the market each day.

During the first week after Pearl Harbor, the Issei were not able to attend the markets by themselves. Nisei, Filipino, Mexican, or Caucasian laborers were asked to drive them to the market and also to sell the flowers. Later Issei were allowed to drive to the market, but were allowed to stay only for the purpose of conducting their business. They were prohibited from holding meetings after business hours.

In summarizing the impact of the evacuation on the San Fernando florists, Opler observed:

Some of the San Fernando growers think the voluntary evacuation would have worked out if they had been given more time and if they had been given more trust. Others say that they had spent all their money on their land because they never thought that they would have to move, so that naturally they could not move voluntarily.

Some say that losing the time that had been put into their work is a bigger loss than the property or money that they have lost, for it takes years to gain experience, to prepare the land and to raise good seeds.

Due to the evacuation, the flower growers have lost much but many of them do not know really how much because some left their equipment and household furniture on the farm, thinking that they would be allowed to return shortly. Some have sold these belongings at a great sacrifice since. As for the flower crops, most were sold, but at sacrifice prices. The farm machinery was also either kept and stored in the barn or sold for ridiculous prices. . . . Those who sold their machinery, farm equipment, or stock could not get fair price for them as a rule.¹⁰⁰

On October 30, 1944, Opler prepared a second report on a group of evacuees at Manzanar from the San Fernando Valley. This report, based on interviews with the representatives of 14 farming families, concentrated on the pre-evacuation and evacuation experiences of the truck farmers in the valley.

Japanese farmers had settled in the San Fernando Valley during the early 1900s. By 1941 Japanese farmers were living in or near the valley settlements of Van Nuys, Canoga Park, Burbank, Roscoe, San Fernando, Pacoima, North Hollywood, Saugus, Sunland, and Hansen Heights. The Japanese did not live in concentrated groups in the valley, but were dispersed because of the need to move about for better land on which to grow their vegetables. Most of the Japanese in the valley had been gardeners, nurserymen, store clerks, and domestic workers prior to becoming farmers. These farmers did not come from the same districts in Japan, but were "a mixed group as far as their backgrounds in Japan were concerned."

The Japanese in Burbank, North Hollywood, and Pacoima raised bunch vegetables, such as carrots, green onions, and turnips. Lettuce, cabbage, cantaloupes, and tomatoes were grown in Canoga Park, San Fernando, and Van Nuys. A few farmers raised strawberries and potatoes. Farmers usually planted about three types of vegetables to minimize the risk they would be taking if one crop failed during the year. Irrigation was necessary because of the generally dry arid climate. The average cost of water per farmer during the summer months was about \$150.

The farmers in the valley did not make "much money," but "the people were able to live and were sure of being able to eat." The farmers depended upon Mexican, Italian, and Filipino laborers "to work their farms." The Mexicans "were hired in large numbers," because "they were good natured." During the years before the war, Nisei children had "grown up" and "graduated from schools," so they were able to help on the farms, but until then the only time the children were of any assistance was during the summer and during Christmas and Easter vacations." Women worked in the fields, took care of the children, and did the housework. The wages paid the laborers depended upon the crops that were in season. For instance, the wages for carrots were less than 35 cents an hour, the average wage for other crops.

100. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, March 20, 1944, Report No. 222.

The majority of the Japanese farmers leased pieces of land averaging from 10 to 50 acres in size, although one or two farmers had more than 160 acres. The farmers moved every 5 to 8 years, the longest period for most farmers staying in one spot being about 10 years. They moved because the land required "rest," the landowner decided to sell his property, or the lease was acquired by someone else. During the years prior to World War II, some Nisei had begun to purchase land in the valley, but "until then the Japanese farmers were Issei who were not able to buy land."

About half of the crops were shipped to Eastern markets, while the other half were sold through local Los Angeles wholesale produce markets. The farmers preferred to have their products shipped, because they received better prices and were assured of having their crops sold. Vegetables that were shipped were handled in two ways. One way was to have the vegetables taken to the shipper for packing and weighing. The other way was to construct temporary packing sheds on farms by the shippers. There were about five packing houses in the valley at the time of evacuation in 1942. By 1941 there were about 20 Japanese wholesale houses in the Los Angeles produce markets. To sell their vegetables at the wholesale produce market houses in Los Angeles, the San Fernando farmers leased "doors," which ranged in price from \$1,500 to \$3,000 annually. The houses loaned money to the farmers to facilitate their agricultural operations.

The San Fernando Valley Japanese farmers formed several associations to promote profitable market prices, encourage better understanding between the growers and laborers, and promote harmonious business relationships between Caucasians and Japanese. In 1917 Nogyo Kumiai, the San Fernando Valley Farmers Association, was organized. Later in 1926 Sangyo Kumiai, the Industrial Organization, was formed. It had between 100 and 120 members. In 1930 the Japanese farmers of southern California decided to form an organization to promote mutual self-help. All Nogyo and Sangyo Kumiais were united to form a Nokai Renmei, or Union of Agricultural Associations, in Los Angeles.

When rumors of evacuation began to circulate, some San Fernando Valley Nisei, who did not think such orders would affect them, acquired the leases for the "doors" that the Issei leased. When evacuation orders included the Nisei, they had little time to sell their leases or store equipment. Thus, many of them "suffered a total loss" as a result of the evacuation. Opler summarized the losses of the San Fernando Valley farmers and the closely allied Japanese wholesale houses:

The 20 markets lost tremendously. Six went bankrupt because of the evacuation; stores sold at cost; no money came in for the lease value; many of the farmers were not able to repay their back loans; merchants had to pay for the guaranteed fertilizer, lumber and rent. At the very best the houses broke even if the banks helped.

Opler also summarized the impact of Pearl Harbor and evacuation on the lives and livelihoods of the San Fernando Valley farmers. Based on his interviews, he observed:

The farmers and all the other people were confused and frightened and did not know what to do after Pearl Harbor. There were rulings that came in stating that aliens were not to go to the wholesale markets. Consequently the Nisei and

persons of other nationalities were hired to haul vegetables to the markets. The aliens did not suffer much except that those who formerly had taken their vegetables to the markets had to spend money to pay for the services rendered by the haulmen. But before long this restriction was lifted and life was almost normal again.

Many persons were said to have received letters and notices from the United States Department of Agriculture stating that they should go ahead and prepare to harvest their crops. The farmers did not think they would be evacuated until the harvesting was over because they lived so far from the ocean and they were in a valley surrounded by mountains. The farmers went ahead with their planting and thinning of crops, and put in fertilizer. When orders for evacuation came, some people thought they would be taken away for about a week or at the longest, a month. They did not pack their belongings but left them. Many had Caucasians look after their things.

The Caucasians in the Valley were very good to the people. One of the reasons for this might be that the majority of the Caucasians who lived in the Valley worked in the city. A few had stores or farms. The Japanese farmers did not offer any competition to them. The mayor of San Fernando, and the chief of police, and the manager of the Los Angeles War and Power for the Valley were said to be exceptionally good to the Japanese residents.

The children of the Japanese farmers attended the San Fernando, Canoga Park, North Hollywood, Burbank, and Van Nuys high schools, or went to elementary schools in these districts. Those who attended Japanese language schools went to the one in San Fernando, the biggest of the three, or to North Hollywood, or Glendale. [Approximately 6 persons from the valley had been picked up by the FBI for their association with these schools.]

The American schools treated the children well, even after the outbreak of war. And there was no discrimination. There might have been some prejudice out of school but not enough to hurt the feelings of the people.

The Caucasian neighbors were good to the farmers. They are true to them even now. At the time of evacuation, one of them offered to lend money to an evacuee family. Many, with solicitude, offered to help the evacuees. . . .

The San Fernando Valley people were evacuated on April 26, 27, and 28, 1942, from Burbank. The people had to get to the point of departure early in the morning. These mornings were cold. The Caucasians who lived in that section offered their homes to the evacuees to stay in while they waited for the arrival of busses which would take them to Manzanar. The evacuees who came from the country districts and these particular Caucasians probably had never met before, but, because there was no ill feeling, homes were opened to them and some persons served the evacuees coffee. . . .

Although the unlucky persons lost much, those who were lucky did not lose greatly except on the last crop that they could not harvest. But what the older

people regret the most of all is that this happened just as they had come to a stage when the Nisei were old enough to help on the farm and the elders were able to take life a little easier. At last good farm equipment had been collected and from this point on they thought the way would be smoother than ever before. The children would have been able to do better and bigger farming because of their knowledge of the English language, because of their educational background in business, and because they were able to get along with Caucasians. In other words they were at last on an equal footing with the Caucasians. The older people were ready to watch and enjoy the restful and more hopeful years roll by.

But the evacuation destroyed all of that. Now the old people as well as the young must start from scratch. . . .¹⁰¹

Florin

One of the last groups to arrive at Manzanar consisted of a contingent of 399 rural Japanese/Japanese Americans from Florin, an all-Japanese agricultural settlement established in the Fair Oaks vicinity just east of Sacramento during the early 1900s. Many of the early Japanese settlers in the Florin community were *burakumin* (literally, "people of the village"). In Japan these people constituted a class of "untouchables," comparable to those in India, who typically slaughtered animals for meat butchers, prepared meat, worked with leather, tanned hides, or made shoes. They were considered inferior, because they broke the Buddhist edict against killing animals and were thus shunned by other Japanese because they were unclean. The majority of the Florin people were small landowners, the Issei having purchased the land in the names of their Nisei children. The chief crops raised in this community were grapes and strawberries, and the size of the farms averaged about 20 acres.

On October 30, 1943, Opler prepared a report on "The Florin Evacuation," based on an interview with an Issei evacuee from Florin. According to the Issei, the Florin farmers

were the stay put kind. They had worked hard on the same land for many years. They didn't believe in going hither and thither to farm. This type of farmer usually hits a very good year once in a decade, and that good year was the very one when they had to evacuate. Just before evacuation the farmers in the Florin section were already thinking in terms of new cars and new tractors as the market prices for fruits were reaching new ceilings.

These farmers had but to pick the crops to realize their fortunes when the notice to evacuate came. The strawberries were ripe and ready to be picked. The grapes were later crops but everything was in readiness for harvesting. The Florin farmers saw their fortune whisked away right under their noses. . . .

101. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, October 30, 1944, Report No. 247.

. . . . The remaining work was simply to irrigate and to tie the vines up when the crops were to be harvested. In other words all the essential work and effort and investment had been previously put in.

After they arrived at Manzanar, some received letters telling them that grapes were bringing eighty dollars per ton. That meant if one acre yielded ten tons, each acre would have brought in eight hundred dollars. The strawberry price was also better than in ordinary times.

The rural Florin people, according to the Issei evacuee, were generally conservative and traditional people. They "brought up their children in the Japanese way," and the Niseis from that district were "better than average conversationalists in Japanese." The Niseis "read and write Japanese better than the average Nisei."¹⁰²

Opler prepared a second report on "The Florin People" on December 15, 1943, based on an interview with an evacuee woman who had married "a Florin boy whose father was one of the first to go to that section of California to farm." She observed that the "Florin people built homes, and all in all were a 'permanent community.'"

The evacuee interviewee provided a historical overview of the Florin settlement. According to this evacuee, the typical life of the Florin people before evacuation

was one of contentment and peace. They had come in, simple, ambitious people, to try to reclaim a land which the Caucasians had thought worthless and not worth the trouble to keep. These people recognized, and still admit the land 'isn't so good", but to them, at that time, and even now, it was something which they could build, with hard work, into something lasting, and which they could leave to their children as a heritage, to show that this was indeed, 'a land of opportunity.'

The average head of the family, before he came to Florin, worked for about three years in back-breaking labor, as a railroad section hand to save enough money to stake himself. Many of the people came here with practically nothing in the world but the clothes on their backs, and hope in their hearts. They tried first to make a little money so that they might go back to Japan for their wives if they were married, or to be married. After returning for their wives, they came back to America to farm, for in their travels as section hands, they saw likely places that they could farm.

With what little money they had after returning to America, they and their wives came to Florin, to work for the farmers around there. They became sort of share croppers, and eventually bought out the majority of the Caucasian farmers. But all this didn't happen over night. It took years of labor with their hands, and much sacrifice to get even a small plot of land. But that was one thing they were used to — hard work. And they were ambitious, ambitious for themselves, and for their children. Once they got that plot of land, they felt they 'belonged.'

102. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, October 30, 1943, Report No. 79, "The Florin Evacuation," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File 61.318, No. 4.

Almost immediately, they planned for the future, to think of building more stable homes, able to withstand the years. They built homes, painted them white, trimmed with green or any color they had a mind to. They planted lawns, trees, shrubbery and all in all made it a place to live in and in which to raise their children. With the years, they began to get out of the 'red', paying the last payments on the land. When the day came when they actually owned the land (through their citizen children), it was a day of rejoicing, for after their back breaking labor, they now had something to show for it, and there was no chance of being thrown out.

The evacuee described the sense of pride the Florin people took in the improvement and beautification of their property. She noted:

Since they owned the land they lived on, their first thought was for the improvement of their living conditions. They built homes to last, even planning for additional room space if it is needed. Usually it is, because the eldest son, after he marries, is expected to bring his bride home, and here raise his family. As the family increases, more room space is necessary. When the additional rooms are built on, they are not stuck on haphazardly, but with an eye to permanency.

There was always someone in the house with time enough to tend a flower garden. Plants, flowers, trees, and grass were kept in perfect condition. The trees were shade trees, so that in the summer, if they had any spare time, they could go out and lie on the lawn, under the shade of the trees for a while. Many families had elaborate fish ponds, cemented, and filled with whatever fish they managed to get. To them, a garden is not complete without these ponds. Great pains were taken in the building of them, so that there would be no chance of them cracking. No two ponds were alike in size or shape. Everyone had his own idea as to the manner in which they should be built. So, naturally, the outcome of these were quite elaborate and beautiful.

The evacuee also commented on the sense of ownership that characterized the Florin people and described their conservative financial approach to life as well as their gradual acceptance of modern conveniences. She observed:

Between 1925 and 1930 the majority of the Florin people had the land paid for, and were now working for 'themselves.' They started to save money for needed farm equipment, which, until now they felt they could not afford. Till then they had been doing the work literally by hand, or the more fortunate had horses to do the real hard work. But they knew motorized equipment would help them considerably, so they saved the money for it. When they had the money saved, they bought whatever they needed for personal convenience and comfort and not until then. They believed in buying only what they could afford, even when it came to household equipment.

When the new modern kitchen appliances came out, like refrigerators, electric mixers, etc., the men wanted their wives to have them, but only when they could afford it. Somehow, they didn't believe in the installment plan. They believed if you needed and wanted a thing bad enough, you will be willing to make a little

sacrifice here and there to save for it. But buy it they did, and many of them had all the modern appliances, bought and paid for. It all leads back to the feeling of 'ownership.' In the old days, they were so insecure, and had to work so hard for what little they had, and they knew and realized the value of ownership. If you owned and paid for something, you had it, and nothing, they thought, could take it away from you. They planned to stay here for the rest of their lives, to die here, and leave their property to their children, along with the lessons they taught of hard work, of earning what you make, keeping what you have, and knowing the value of the land.

The evacuee described the devastating impact of evacuation on the ideals and sentiments of the rural Florin people. She commented:

Just before evacuation, many of them were making more money than they had in the previous years. . . .

The crops being good, and the money coming, they felt they could invest more of their money in new and modern farm equipment, new cars, and give the house a new coat of paint. All these things had materialized, and they had barely had time to enjoy them, when they were notified that they were to be evacuated. Many of them, after years of nursing the old car along, had bought new cars. Not extravagant cars, but modest Chevrolets, Plymouths, etc. Not only had they bought new cars, but tractors, pick-ups, and other needed equipment.

After planning for years for these things, to have to give them up so suddenly, and many times at a loss, was a great blow to them. These things were paid for and were as good as cash on hand, and to sell them at loss, sometimes at a figure that was not even half what they were worth, was shocking to their long years of frugal living.

But aside from the things they had bought, and owned, they had their farmers' pride at stake. At the time of evacuation they had their crops planted and they were ready to be harvested. To see them lying in the fields, rotting just because they were not allowed to pick them, hurt them just as badly as evacuation itself. They begged to be allowed to pick them, not thinking of the money involved, for they said they would wait for it at the convenience of the Association, for to a farmer to see the crops lying on the ground, not harvested, is to see his life going to ruin.

Perhaps they were too attached to the land, but that is the way of most of these old people. They had come to this land of opportunity, from a country where their lot was much worse, and by hard work and sacrifice, they had managed to save a little to keep themselves and their children. They did not ask for anything that they didn't deserve. They were always willing to help their neighbor, and be law-abiding people, for they knew that in this country they had seen the realization of their most cherished hopes.

But evacuation was the dashing of their hopes, for many of them know they are too old to start over again, and they know they 'can't take it' as they used to in

their youth. And too, something has gone out of them that they can never again recapture. I guess you would call it ambition, but I would say faith — faith in an ideal. They believed if you worked hard enough, and were law-abiding, doing nothing to shame their race, they would be left in peace and contentment, but that has been taken away, not only from themselves, but their children, and they see their children growing day by day more discontented and disheartened — and worst of all — unambitious.¹⁰³

Stockton/French Camp Area of San Joaquin County

The last large contingent of evacuees to enter Manzanar were those from the French Camp area, a small farming community south of Stockton in San Joaquin County in the northern section of California's Central Valley. On April 22, 1944, Opler prepared a report, entitled "Autobiography of a Nisei From the Stockton Area," detailing the experiences of a young man from that vicinity. The majority of the report, according to Opler, "was taken down by me exactly as it was dictated."

Born in San Francisco, this Nisei had lived with his family in San Raphael, a small community north of the city on the west side of the bay, from the age of 2 to 19. His father had operated an independent gardening business. As the only Japanese family in San Raphael, he and his family members had not experienced discrimination. After graduating from high school, he went to work first as a general farm laborer and later as a warehouse and ranch foreman and mechanic in the machine shop of the Weyl-Zuckerman Company, a large farm on McDonald Island in the San Joaquin River in the Stockton/French Camp area. The principal crops raised on the farm were potatoes, sugar beets, and onions.

The Nisei discussed some of his prewar experiences on the company farm. He noted:

. . . . This was the first time I ever met any Filipinos. Well, to me they were just the same as other people. I had no feeling of discrimination against them. I didn't know what the word discrimination meant until I got on this job. Then I found out. Then for the first time I found out that my looks were different from some other people's. The Japanese people on the farm told me so. They told me that I should not mix too much with Caucasians and that I should learn to speak Japanese.

Then they discriminated against me themselves. This was a kibe group. They are not all bad but I just happened to run into the wrong ones, I guess.

. . . . Their reasons for their advice to me were that no matter where I go I won't be treated as a Caucasian anyway and won't have the rights that a Caucasian has. They would make fun of me and would not accept me in their circle. . . . This was mostly because I couldn't speak Japanese. I told them that I couldn't help it; it wasn't my fault. My parents had just never brought me up that way.

103. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, December 15, 1943, Report No. 108, "The Florin People" by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File 61.318, No. 6.

Also I found out for the first time that Japanese people gossip. My parents never gossiped. I was taught not to. But here the old issei would come around and tell me this and that. It was the first time I realized that Japanese people were like that.

After working on the farm for three years, the Nisei had saved enough money to purchase, along with his brother and brother-in-law, "a five-acre plot with a house on it at French Camp." His parents and two sisters moved from San Raphael to the newly purchased property, while he stayed and worked on the Weyl-Zuckerman Company farm. His father was in poor health, and thus farmed only part of the five-acre property, raising "chickens enough to meet the family expense."

The Nisei described the Japanese community in the French Camp area and his family's experiences in the community. He stated:

In French Camp my mother joined the Parents-Teacher's Association. She had been Vice-President of P.T.A. in San Raphael before this. Two of my sisters were going to school in French Camp.

My two younger sisters' lives have been a little different from mine. They were sent to a Japanese language school as well as to public school. They got along and mixed quite well with the Caucasian children in French Camp, however.

We are Presbyterian. My father was a Buddhist in Japan but he didn't pay any attention to the Buddhist religion. He is a Presbyterian now. My mother is a Presbyterian too. We have been Presbyterians for about 20 years. My mother was a Buddhist when she came to this country but she changed too. Although we think all religions are the same, stand for the same things, it is better to know one well than to know none of them well. . . .

The average person of Japanese ancestry in French Camp was a farmer. In Stockton the Japanese were business men. They ran hotels and restaurants. Some were doctors and lawyers. Some were produce men, I guess.

As for their living accommodations and way of living in French Camp, the average was fairly good. They brought up their children in the American ideas as much as possible, as much as they knew how to, I guess. There was a fairly good-sized Japanese community.

The farmers raised quite a few strawberries, carrots, and other things. It's truck farming. They sent things to the Stockton market, shipped up to San Francisco and all the way down to Los Angeles. Also, they shipped to Sacramento. . . .

The Nisei's brother was one of the first Japanese Americans in the French Camp community to volunteer for the U.S. Army in January 1941. Commenting on the reaction of his family and community, the interviewee observed:

When conscription first started I noticed that the nisei group were all for it. Quite a number of kibe group were against it. The idea was that they didn't like the

idea of army life at all. Some of the kibeï came over from Japan to avoid the draft there. I know one kibeï fellow who went mentally unbalanced worrying about conscription. But some kibeï were for conscription and even volunteered for the army. As for the issei, they didn't give too much thought to conscription but they were proud that the nisei were able to join the U.S. Army. . . .

The Japanese people of French Camp gave him [his brother] a big send-off when he volunteered. The Japanese and the Y.W.C.A. and the Y.M.C.A. and the Japanese section of the P.T.A. helped with the send-off party. They had the party in the Japanese Community House in French Camp. . . .

Before my brother entered the army he talked it over with the family. Of course it was more or less up to him whether he wanted to volunteer or not. My parents were for his volunteering; they thought it was a good idea.

At this time the tension between Japan and the United States was already present. The Japanese as a group saw war with Japan coming. Nevertheless the nisei felt they should volunteer and even some kibeï felt the same way. Most nisei were perfectly willing to be drafted into the U.S. Army then even though they saw trouble with Japan coming.

The Nisei interviewee described his reactions and experiences after the Pearl Harbor attack. He stated:

When Pearl Harbor was attacked by Japan it made a good many nisei like myself mentally ill. Our attitude was that Japan wouldn't be able to last one year. . . .

When I went to eat lunch in the Japanese mess-hall [at the company farm], some of those kibeï and issei said that Japan would win the war. Soon I got into an argument with some of them and I told them to wait until the finish comes before they decide who is going to win. Since they knew I didn't speak Japanese and wasn't familiar with the Japanese way of living, they laughed at me, made fun of me and told me that my brother would be killed within one month. I know I didn't feel so very good about it, but I didn't feel like arguing since I don't argue very much. So I let them do most of the talking, but I did tell them that people like them will soon receive what's coming to them. To some of those people I asked, "Why are you here in this country if you like Japan so much? Why don't you go back if you don't like America?" They answered that they want to make as much money as possible and that the American way of living was easier and the American way of making money was easiest. . . .

Of course there were some nisei fellows like myself. We just sat and listened and felt hurt to know that some people had such an attitude. Sometimes I felt that I should report them to the FBI. I don't know just why I didn't. Maybe it was because some of them had families and I felt sorry for the kids. I hate to see people go to jail anyway. Besides I knew they were just ignorant little people with no power. It was all talk and none of them would dare to do anything but talk.

W-Z and Company had mostly issei and kibe working for them. You see, the issei would naturally take to the kibe because they understood something about the Japanese way of living and they can talk more easily to them than to the nisei.

The Nisei interviewee then made a number of observations on the Issei and Kibe farm laborers on the relatively isolated McDonald Island and their differences when compared with the more Americanized Japanese communities at French Camp and Stockton. Among other things, he observed:

I don't like to discriminate against my own race but I will say that on the W-Z farm the issei and kibe followed too much the Japanese way of living. So when the Caucasian mechanics on the farm take a dislike to those people, I just don't blame them in a way. The Caucasian objected mostly because they thought that the Japanese were talking about them in the Japanese language. Or when the mechanic made a little mistake or couldn't get a job done on time, the Japanese foreman would report it to Mr. Z. The way I had it figured out, the Japanese issei were trying to run the Caucasians out from the Z. farm. They were trying to form a little Japan, I guess, because every little mistake the Caucasian mechanic would make would be reported. But Mr. Z. didn't pay any attention to that.

This farm was situated on an island, McDonald Island, in the San Joaquin River. Those farms out there are mostly islands. The children of these issei were isolated there and were unable to mix with Caucasian children. So they were brought up in the Japanese way. Of course they had a Caucasian teacher. But they would have Japanese flags, at least two, in their houses. They were sent to Japanese schools and they spoke nothing but Japanese except when they spoke to Caucasians to me or to my brother . . . There were about 200 or more Japanese on that island. . . The children were brought up to believe that the Emperor was a living god. They made a celebration of Boy's Day (May 5) and Girl's Day (March 3). They heard about the Emperor from the parents, who would sort of impress them, and they heard about him in the language school. There is a big difference between this group on the island and the French Camp group and the Stockton city Japanese. The last two groups were more Americanized. In French Camp or in Stockton some parents might tell the children about the Emperor, but the children would not pay any attention to it; they just don't pay any attention to Emperor.

And another thing I noticed. They disliked me at McDonald Island because I liked to attend night school and I used to read books, books that I thought would help me out, like sociology books, law books, psychology books — just about any kind that I thought would help me. I even read medical books. They didn't think it was necessary. They thought that all that studying is a waste of time. They think it is experience that counts. But what I told them was this: if anyone had an education plus experience it would help him more, but if he doesn't have enough intelligence to acquire knowledge, education won't do him much good.

They respected education, all right, this McDonald group, providing it is Japanese education. . . . They approved of learning more of Japanese history, Japanese

background and anything that pertains to the Japanese Emperor. Of course they learned arithmetic and things like that. Some of them had been there on the island for a good many years. They were pretty isolated. They didn't get away much. They averaged about once a week for going into Stockton.

This is how I noticed that the two groups were different. The people in French Camp and Stockton didn't mind my not knowing Japanese. They didn't tease me about it; didn't make any wisecracks about it.

The Nisei interviewee also commented on the various minority groups on the island and the manner in which they related. He noted:

There were about 200 Filipinos on the island too. They did the same kind of work. They were not allowed to become foremen though. The Japanese foremen saw to that. Mr. Z. listened to the foremen. I was kept from being a foreman in the same way for some time. The Filipinos are foremen since the evacuation though. . . .

There were quite a number of Mexicans on that farm too. There would be over 1000 Mexicans there at harvest time. A few stayed on steadily. . . .

Another thing I disliked. The Mexicans were treated as low by the issei and kibe. The nisei on the island always tried to treat them fair to make up for the way they were treated by the other groups. But only about 5 percent of the Japanese were nisei.

Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, according to the Nisei, "there was no trouble at all among the [various racial] groups" on the island. The Filipinos and the Japanese "got along as before." Even in Stockton "I didn't see any real trouble." "I know there were two killings, but I didn't see any riots, any mass fights or anything like that."

The Nisei interviewee did not know how the Japanese people would be treated after Pearl Harbor, but he "sort of thought that the issei would be put in camps." His observations, according to Opler, were marked by a tolerance and lack of resentment in regard to evacuation that were rare among young men of his age group. This may have been the result of his family being spared many of the personal hardships which evacuation brought to others. The Nisei observed:

. . . . I talked with a lot of nisei. Most said that if their parents were taken to a camp they would rather go with them than stay behind. Of course, some of the nisei said they would like to stay back and run the business, but they sure didn't like the idea of having their parents sent off without them.

The curfew came in and it included everyone of Japanese ancestry. So from then on we did have a feeling that perhaps we'd be taken out of our homes too.

Our family had no unpleasant experiences. We went around, we went in shows and restaurants as usual. We went to dances. . . .

In April, I think it was, the nisei had to give up contraband. I had to give up my flashlight. I had to have the shortwave cut out of my radio. I had some rifles that I had to give up. I gave them to my Caucasian friends, sort of as a souvenir or remembrance. I expected all this. Our family had no special plans for getting out of the West Coast. We didn't have any place to go. We were just going to stay there until the army moved us out.

When we knew that we were going to be evacuated, my father asked a very good Caucasian friend that he could rely on to take care of the property. The little crop we had left in the field we harvested until the day or so before evacuation. We let this Caucasian friend live in our house without any rent. The agreement is that he will keep up the property and pay the taxes for the duration. We have a written agreement with him about this. He is pretty reliable. He writes to us once in a while. He works at the paper mill in Stockton. This land is in the name of my brother and brother-in-law. It's all paid for. It was carrots and green onions that we were harvesting at the end. . . .

For a while we thought that we were going to be in a free zone and would not have to be evacuated. When the restricted area was drawn up, a highway just outside of French Camp was used as the dividing line. All on the west side of the highway were moved out in March. We happened to be living on the east, that is, the town side, and so were not affected at first. However, later the place where we were was declared a restricted zone, too, so we were moved in May — the 26th of May, I think it was.

We stored all of our furniture in one room in the house, since this man who was going to take over the place wanted to bring his own furniture over to the house. When the time came for evacuation we were supposed to leave Manteca at 4 P.M. We had one of our friends take our baggage down to the train depot and the man who is now living in our place drove us down in his car. We were stared at by Caucasians that were gathered around the depot but we thought nothing of that.

There were only 40 of us left in French Camp. In the train we were in two coaches and we were restricted; we were only allowed to go up and down within these two coaches. On the way down we played cards and various games. We didn't think anything about coming to Manzanar. There were no hard feelings. In fact we were planning our future here in Manzanar and what we would do when we did arrive. . . .

The journey took 16 hours. The trip was pleasant. We arrived at Lone Pine at 7:30 A.M. We got on a bus and arrived here at 8 A.M. The people of Manzanar were out watching us come in. We were stared at by them just as much as we had been stared at by the Caucasians before coming. . . .

The Nisei interviewee went on to describe his reactions and feelings upon arrival at Manzanar. According to Opler, his adjustment to camp life was relatively easy, probably because he had lived on a large-scale farm enterprise which housed and fed its agricultural laborers much like the evacuees were cared for in the center. The Nisei observed:

My first thought when we came was, 'Well, so this is Manzanar!' I was wondering if I'd ever get tired of the place. . . .

The first thing that attracted my attention was the barracks which would be our living quarters, as I thought at the time, for the duration. . . . Still, we had to make the best of what there was. . . . In fact I am inclined to believe that this sort of life is better than what some of these people had before the war. . . .

It wasn't long before we became quite accustomed to this camp life and I made a few friends while working in community activities. I was invited by various clubs and groups to their socials. In fact I believe I like this kind of life for a change. .

104

Bainbridge Island

The only group of evacuees at Manzanar that was not from California was the 227-person contingent from Bainbridge Island, a 200-square-mile island in Puget Sound eight miles west of Seattle, Washington. This group, evacuated under Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1, arrived at Manzanar on April 1, 1942, having been transported directly from Seattle by train because the Puyallup Assembly Center on the Washington state fairgrounds was not ready for occupancy and Manzanar was the nearest reception or relocation center to their homes that was in operation. The Japanese/Japanese-

American community on the island was evacuated because of the island's proximity to the strategic Bremerton Naval Base. At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, the island had a population of about 10,000, the majority of the residents being Caucasian truck farmers, small-town business owners or tradesmen, or white-collar commuters to jobs in Seattle. The scenic island was also dotted with summer resorts and country clubs.

Because of discrimination and frequent inability to obtain meaningful employment in Seattle, persons of Japanese descent first went to the island during the 1910s to take advantage of employment opportunities in the lumber mills, but they found the soil so rich that many turned to farming, specializing primarily in raising strawberries. The majority of the Japanese settlers had come from the Hiroshima Prefecture, a predominantly agricultural region in Japan. By 1941 there were 43 Japanese-operated farms on the island, 27 of which were owned or partly owned by Japanese and 16 of which were leased. The strawberry farms covered a total cultivated area of 620 acres. The total value of the island's strawberry crop in 1941 was \$246,000, and the Japanese controlled 80 percent of the production. One-fourth of the crop was sold locally, the remainder being shipped to the eastern United States via Seattle. The Japanese strawberry farmers generally had modest incomes, employing migrant Filipino and Indian laborers to help with the farm work.¹⁰⁵

104. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, April 22, 1944, Report No. 231, "Autobiography of a Nisei from the Stockton Area," RG 210, Entry 16, Box 348, File 61.318, No. 13.

105. House Report 2124, pp. 131-33, and Interview of Ikuko Amatatsu Watanabe by Arthur A Hansen, July 24, 1974, California State University, Fullerton, Oral History Program, Japanese American Project, O.H. 1363, pp. 4ff.

At its request, the Bainbridge Island evacuees were transferred to the Minidoka War Relocation Center in Idaho in February 1943. Thus, they were no longer at Manzanar when Opler arrived at the center to commence his community analysis studies. Among the best sources of information on the background of the Bainbridge Islanders, however, is a transcribed oral interview of Mrs. Ikuko Amatatsu Watanabe, conducted on July 24, 1974, by Arthur A. Hansen, a Professor of History at California State University, Fullerton, as part of that institution's Oral History Program Japanese American Project. Watanabe, a Nisei who had been born and raised on a strawberry farm on Bainbridge Island, provided insights into the nature of the island's prewar Japanese/Japanese American community and its experiences during evacuation to Manzanar.

According to Watanabe, the Japanese/Japanese American community on Bainbridge Island, while scattered throughout the island, had a Japanese American Association and a language school that sponsored quarterly socials and parties for young people. Prior to the outbreak of the war, however, Nisei were beginning to rebel against study of the Japanese language. Periodically, the community would meet to view Japanese movies, and once each summer the entire community would hold a picnic to which Caucasians and Japanese from Seattle and Tacoma would be invited. There was little overt or virulent discrimination on the island. Because of continuing discriminatory practices in some areas, however, the community stuck together and avoided places and activities where they might be put down. Despite the discrimination, however, there were no Japanese stores or restaurants, and the scattered Japanese residents generally conducted business with Caucasian entrepreneurs. Concerning the community, she noted:

... as a community, we didn't have a specific place where you could say, 'This is 'Japanese Town,' or the Japanese community. I believe there were some sixty families on Bainbridge Island at that time, and we were all scattered. In fact, I would say that ninety percent of them had their own homes; the average age on Bainbridge would be about twenty years old. Many of the Issei families had purchased land in some other person's name, because they couldn't own land themselves and their own children were too young.

Following the Pearl Harbor attack, about a dozen men, including Watanabe's father, were taken by the FBI to Seattle and subsequently interned. Regarding her own experiences as a senior in high school immediately following the attack, she noted:

... it was an uncomfortable feeling to go to school the next day. I guess all the students had to bow their head and look to the East and give a silent prayer and such. An then, of course, the principal was talking about how he felt that there were Japanese in the group and we were all students and not to get reactionary and so forth. So it was a good thing for him to caution everybody.

Although there were some instances of hostility against the Japanese on the island following Pearl Harbor, some elements of the Caucasian population aided the Japanese. Watanabe observed:

The people that we were friends with felt real badly because they, too, didn't know. So those that would be friends for life, you really knew right then and there. . . . our Christian friends and neighbors took over some of our things for

us that we valued. Although I will have to say, my family had the Samurai swords due to my dad being the oldest, and I know one of those was missing. Well, those things were taken right away, unfortunately. Also, the government took our radios, cameras, et cetera. We had a couple of violins in the family and they were gone. So, unfortunately, things that just meant a lot to us were gone. But, other than that, I would have to say our Christian friends were tremendous and stayed with us and helped us in every way possible.

Watanabe also discussed her evacuation experiences. The group was evacuated on March 26 and arrived at Manzanar by train six days later on April 1. She noted:

. . . . I would have to say our evacuation was a little more humane [than that of Terminal Island], because I think we had approximately two weeks notice. We could only carry two suitcases, however. When you think of teenagers and two suitcases, that does present a problem. Without the head of the household and with four girls, we were kind of leery and were kind of . . . I wouldn't say scared, but maybe apprehensive about not knowing where we were going, for what reason, and for what length of time, and then to leave familiar surroundings, school, friends, and all our animals. . . . We were fortunate enough to have a Filipino come and stay in our home. We had a newly wedded minister's daughter, and she used part of our furniture and so in that event, when we came back they were intact, too. . . .

. . . . we had some exploitation, but not to the same extent as on Terminal Island. Terminal Islanders had to sell everything like pianos and ice boxes for around five dollars, and people were there just for the taking and making fun. I think that's terrible! But as far as we were concerned, most of our homes were taken care of by someone who worked for us or say, maybe a young couple who didn't have a home yet. When the Bainbridge Island people came back, most of the people had their homes to come back to.

During the train trip one soldier was assigned to each of the 63 families on the train. Watanabe related:

. . . . each soldier was from back East someplace, because we used to kid them and talk about 'Toity-Toid' Street and all this because their language seemed so strange to us. And they, in turn, found out that we were human beings. They thought that we were the 'buck toothed' and the 'slanted eyed' people and were very dangerous. They had their guns right there with them at the beginning and all, but toward the end they knew we were just like they were. So, when we finally did part in Manzanar — after traveling together for the three or four days — I know that most of them cried.

. . . . The soldiers felt that this [evacuation by train] was very unjust themselves, and yet, they never knew a Japanese person personally. I think we all took a collection since we knew that a soldier's pay wasn't much, and we gave them money as gifts. They, in turn, sent us some things that they felt we didn't have. Looking at the camp, they really wept because they thought it was very unfair

since it wasn't even up to the specifications that they were accustomed to; the camp wasn't finished by the time we got there.

The Bainbridge Island people were given quarters in Block 3, which had just been completed, at Manzanar. Watanabe briefly described her impressions upon arrival at Manzanar, including the unfinished camp, inadequate and crowded quarters, and sand and dust. She also observed that the volunteers from Los Angeles that had arrived at Manzanar prior to the Bainbridge Islanders "had grown beards and were unkempt." We were so unaccustomed to seeing Japanese people in that condition, that I think we were actually frightened!" Since most of the volunteers were single men, the Bainbridge girls were frightened by their abrasive manners. When they took showers, for instance, "we had to have some of the Bainbridge boys come and guard the shower houses."

Watanabe also discussed the differences between the Bainbridge Island strawberry farmers and other groups of evacuees at Manzanar. She noted:

I would have to say that the Bainbridge Islanders were freer people [than those from San Pedro, Terminal Island, Little Tokyo-East Los Angeles, and Florin]. Sometimes I feel it's not fair to bring up the Terminal Islanders and say how they were, because I know they lived in a confined area where there were all Japanese, so they had a tendency to be more Japanesey than, say, the Bainbridge people, who were the minority on the Island. Bainbridge people helped one another, I will say, as a community. It was share and share alike, where people came and helped plant the berries — this is the Japanese population I'm speaking of now.

[It was] a mutual aid arrangement, and yet there was a big party-like atmosphere. The women went to cook the feast, and the men all went out in the fields; the children helped, too, to plant strawberries. So it was quite a community-spirited group. I would have to say we worked and played together to the extent that we got to know one another a lot more. The other groups, perhaps, were amongst themselves so much that some of their spoken language might be mixed with Japanese and English, where, perhaps, Bainbridge people didn't have that problem. We were more integrated than Terminal Islanders and people from Florin, California.

. . . . At first, it was hard to believe that we spoke the same language. They [Terminal Islanders] spoke a little bit of pidgin English, they were somewhat rough, and they did have some of their gangs and such. But when we got to know them individually, we found out that they were just like any of us. . . . Unfortunately, I think that Terminal Islanders were in this clustered group and their way of speaking and such was a little different. And the funny part is, when we went to Minidoka, our kids, just for fun, acted like the Terminal Islands [sic] kids. They went with their pant leggings like zoot suiters. Luckily, the Seattle people knew the Bainbridge people before, or they would have been frightened of the Bainbridge people coming from Manzanar.¹⁰⁶

106. Interview of Watanabe by Hansen, California State University, Fullerton, Oral History Program, Japanese American Project, O.H. 1363, pp. 1-27.

CHAPTER TEN: OPERATION OF MANZANAR WAR RELOCATION CENTER — MARCH-DECEMBER, 1942

During the period from March 21 to June 1, 1942, Manzanar was administered as an assembly/reception center under the Wartime Civilian Control Administration (WCCA), the civilian arm of the Western Defense Command. Pursuant to an memorandum of agreement signed on May 17, administration of the Manzanar camp was turned over to the War Relocation Authority (WRA) on June 1. Henceforth, Manzanar would be operated as a war relocation center under the WRA, an independent agency established to administer the ten relocation centers and implement the government's relocation program. During the first six months of WRA administration of the relocation center, the agency attempted to establish a stable working community amid increasing tensions that reached a violent climax in what would become known as the "Manzanar Incident" or "Manzanar Riot" on December 6.

MANZANAR UNDER THE WCCA

Organizational Structure

On March 11, 1942, DeWitt established the Wartime Civil Control Administration as part of the Civil Division of the Western Defense Command to oversee the evacuation of persons of Japanese descent from the west coast and to operate the assembly and reception centers. The WCCA was composed of Army personnel, former Works Projects Administration staff, and Public Health Service personnel (all on loan), as well as other personnel employed directly by the WCCA. The first persons of Japanese descent entered Manzanar on March 21, 1942. These evacuees, commonly known as the volunteer group, were of the opinion that because they had volunteered to help establish the center, certain concessions would be made to them in its operation.

Shortly after its establishment, the WCCA requested Central Administrative Services of the Office for Emergency Management to assume its administrative services. The Central Administrative Services office was located in the Furniture Mart Building in San Francisco. Consequently, it took considerable time for administrative functions at Manzanar to be performed, thus tending to reduce efficiency and foster misunderstanding. To operate the assembly and reception centers under WCCA administration, it was necessary that most of the operational functions be performed by evacuees. Because of the distance between the WCCA main office and Central Administrative Services from Manzanar, numerous administrative decisions were delayed. For instance, it was not until mid-May before evacuees were advised of the salaries they would be paid. Furthermore, the center was in operation for nearly two months before a uniform time keeping system was adopted. As each supervisor had been keeping his own time in his own way, there was considerable dissatisfaction on time reporting. Although the volunteer group went to work in March 1942, no payment for services was made until June 1942.

During the 10-week period that the WCCA operated Manzanar, the camp was operated "by practically two separate and distinct staffs." The first group of administrators, known as appointed personnel, was sent from San Francisco. After a short time, however, the

WCCA decided to recruit another group of administrative personnel from southern California to handle the supervisory functions of the center. In addition to this "one practically entire change of personnel," there were continual changes in personnel. Because of the instability in the WCCA staff, few of the appointed personnel were able "to give intelligent answers when questioned by evacuees." Thus, when the WRA assumed control of the center on June 1 it had the formidable task of organizing "a Center filled with evacuees who had become disillusioned, confused, and incredulous."¹

Status of Center Operations on June 1

When the WRA assumed administrative control of Manzanar on June 1, George H. Dean, a WRA Senior Information Specialist, visited the center and prepared a report, entitled "Conditions at Manzanar Relocation Area, June 1, 1942." This report, which was referred to in Chapter Eight of this study, provides an overall review of Manzanar's administration and operation during its first ten weeks of existence. The report, according to Dean, was "designed to be factual and objective," and there was "no intention of casting reflection or criticism upon any individual or agency." Rather, it was "intended to be a guide post by which we can gauge our own progress in fashioning and operating this community for the best interests of the commonwealth and of the 10,000 Japanese evacuees for whom this will be home for the duration of the war."

Dean observed that evacuee morale "generally speaking, was very good." Among those who were working at occupations for which they had been trained or had a particular aptitude or liking, it was excellent. For those who had not yet found a satisfactory niche for themselves in the camp's activities or occupations for one reason or another, it could be rated as somewhat better than fair.

With few exceptions, the evacuees, according to Dean, had "shown a strong desire to improve their surroundings to the best of their abilities."

At Manzanar, the WRA, according to Dean, had acquired "a plant consisting of 724 wooden barracks buildings, a hospital group and a children's center" to accommodate the total evacuee population of 9,671. In many instances

especially on those days when heavy arrivals of evacuees occurred, assignments to the barracks have been made perhaps inevitably in an indiscriminate manner, resulting in serious overcrowding in some of the buildings. Many cases existed of eight and ten persons of various ages being housed in a single apartment, sometimes two and three separate family units. This has resulted in a health and sanitation problem, and in some scattered instances in an unsatisfactory moral problem.

Floors and walls of the barracks reflected considerable deterioration. Linoleum and felt padding had been ordered for installation in the barracks and mess halls, and these materials had been completed in the messes. About three-fourths of the barracks had been

1. "Administrative Management Division," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. IV, pp. 1,547-49, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 73, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

supplied with steps before lumber supplies were shut off. There were no partitions in the men's and women's lavatories. Considerable difficulty had developed from sticking plumbing valves. Improper electrical installation and line overloading because of the large usage of electrical devices by the evacuees were creating an extensive number of daily fuse blowouts as well as serious fire hazards in the barracks. The center's fire protection apparatus, however, consisted of one 500-gallon fire engine loaned to the camp by the U.S. Forest Service.

The center's water supply system was not completed. Tests conducted in May had revealed a "rather high degree of pollution and a trace of B. coli." There had "been a comparatively high incidence of dysentery within the project," and studies were underway "to determine whether this was attributable to pollution of the water supply." Dishwashing equipment was "inadequate and unsanitary," and because of an inadequate supply of hot water, the "dishwashing situation" was considered to be the "most serious health menace in the project" by the chief of the "5th Public Health District." New dishwashing equipment had been ordered, and its installation was underway on June 1.

Sewage was siphoned from the camp under the Los Angeles Aqueduct east of the camp and spread over open land, pending completion of a disposal plant. Sectional drainage problems existed, and water was collecting under some of the barracks. Garbage was "dumped in an open pit east of the project, burned and buried." No attempt was "made to use the wet garbage but plans were being drawn for hog and chicken projects to utilize this waste." Paper was "baled for future sale." Tin cans were "segregated, some being used in handicraft and plant propagation projects."

In all phases of the project, Dean reported that there "existed a serious shortage of equipment." Equipment shortages included

the mess halls, the farm and other project operations. In preparing 100 acres of land for cultivation only one plow was available and it was necessary for the evacuees to work three shifts in order to make maximum use of the limited equipment, and to supplement this with a high proportion of hand tilling, to get the planting done before too late in this comparatively short growing season.

Prior to June 1, little landscaping work had been accomplished with the exception of "a limited, voluntary improvised project in front of the guayule experiment and plant propagation stations." The absence of landscaping was due to the lack of both equipment and stock. In this respect, according to Dean, the project was

substantially as it was when the land first was cleared of the native sagebrush growth. Neither had steps been taken looking towards dust palliation. The project possessed no sprinkler wagon and a limited amount of hosing was done by hand. With the destruction of the natural ground cover, the dust problem is acute on windy days. Plans have been drawn for the restoration of the ground cover with alfalfa and other grasses.

Of the 9,671 evacuees at Manzanar on June 1, nearly one-third (3,165) were employed in "operations, services and functions within the project." About 125 were employed in

agriculture, while only seven were involved in "industrial projects, with the exception of the staff in the economics planning section."

The "great bulk of the project employment was in community services" which were "being handled on June 1 by an all-Japanese corps working under J. Mervyn Kidwell." Incoming inductees were met "by members of the Volunteer Service Corps who escorted them to their barracks and informed them of the essential facts regarding the camp." Recent "arrivals of evacuees" had been handled smoothly and with little confusion, "though earlier inductions left much to be desired."

Residents of the center were kept informed of announcements "by bulletins posted on boards in each block and each mess hall," and published in the *Manzanar Free Press*, a six-page mimeographed camp newspaper issued tri-weekly. Bulletins, all signed by the project director or assistant director, were posted both in English and Japanese.

All "inquiries, complaints and suggestions" were made to a "Japanese-staffed information department." This staff held daily morning conferences to handle "simple" matters, while "policy" matters were referred to the project director who attempted to settle all questions promptly. Complaints were made by the camp residents to the Japanese information service, and verbatim copies were made and transmitted to the proper project section. The information service also took care of personal matters for the evacuees, such as writing letters, aiding them in filling out forms, selective service questionnaires, and other documents. This service maintained a principal office and five sub-offices throughout the camp.

Recreational activities were conducted "under severe shortages in equipment." No funds had been "expended up to June 1 for the purchase of athletic or other equipment," and activities "were conducted with facilities which had been donated to the project or had been provided by the evacuees themselves." Although there was "no dearth of desire to participate in athletics, arts and crafts, music, dancing and other such pursuits" among the evacuees, the "limitation was the absence of sufficient means to keep them engaged."

Japanese arts and crafts instructors worked with their own tools and material and in some instances furnished them to their pupils. The baseball and volleyball equipment in the camp was donated, as were the equipment and toys for the nursery schools. Simple toys, small benches, and tables were made from scraps of wood gathered around the newly-erected barracks. Definite locations for softball and baseball diamonds were impossible to establish. They had been laid out in the firebreaks, but had to be moved frequently just ahead of farm or maintenance equipment which had come to level and prepare the ground for planting. Notwithstanding these obstacles, the evacuees quickly organized a variety of recreational activities.

The overcrowded conditions existing "in a large number of the barracks had fostered many problems in family relationships," which, according to Dean, were "being handled by a Japanese evacuee, Mrs. Kikuchi." Juvenile situations, however, "were comparatively few and most of the cases coming to the attention of Mrs. Kikuchi involved child disobedience and recalcitrance apparently arising out of the changed surroundings, the lack of education facilities to occupy them and the heterogeneous composition of the people residing in the same apartments."

Self government by the evacuees at Manzanar was, according to Dean, "little more than an embryonic state." Block leaders had been elected, and they had organized a project council which, in turn, had elected its officers. A constitution for community government was being prepared, but no evacuee-conducted judicial system had been established to deal with "offenses of a comparatively minor character."

Dean observed that Manzanar housed "an undetermined number of professional and other gamblers." Fifteen evacuees were arrested and pleaded guilty on June 1 before Justice of the Peace C. H. Olds of Inyo County Township who held court in the center's police building. Olds had been brought from Lone Pine "in the absence of any internal judicial setup in the project." This development was the "only instance since the opening of the camp in which evacuees were involved in an offense sufficiently serious to justify the services of a civilian justice." Each of the 15 evacuees was fined \$25 and sentenced to 30 days in the county jail. All but \$5 of each fine was suspended, subject to good behavior. Olds indicated that his lenience was due to the fact that it was the defendants' first offense, but he warned that in the future punishment would be more severe. According to Dean, no "liquor nor narcotics have been in evidence in the area."

Considerable criticism, according to Dean, had been voiced by evacuees relating to the "procedure followed in permitting evacuees to receive visitors." Outside visitors, mostly white, were allowed by the WCCA to "see the Japanese only on Saturday afternoons and Sundays and then in the police headquarters in the presence of a police officer." On June 1 the WRA issued new visitation policies "permitting the evacuees to receive visitors in their quarters, after automobiles are parked in the police area."

In response to evacuee complaints that they had been "separated from their furniture and other family possessions," the WRA promptly asked evacuees to prepare inventories of their belongings and conducted a survey to determine the amount of warehouse space available. Of the 40 warehouses constructed at Manzanar, eight or nine were available for this purpose. Many of the warehouses, however, were not being utilized to their fullest capacity "because of the danger of overloading the flooring and causing it to collapse."

Dean observed that the WCCA's "evacuation and resettlement program" did not provide for the inauguration "of a full education program for the Japanese until this autumn." Although no "regular" schools were in operation on June 1, classes in English and in arts and crafts and music were underway. Americanization classes had been organized with an enrollment of about 250 aliens.

Dean noted that under the WCCA, passes to outsiders for admittance to the camp were handled by both the police department and the project director. When the WRA assumed control of the camp, however, orders were issued immediately that all passes must be signed by the director. All passes issued to Japanese on errands outside the camp were signed by the project director and the Japanese were required at all times to be accompanied by a Caucasian.

Twenty mess halls were in operation on June 1, each accommodating approximately 500 persons. Sixteen additional mess halls, although constructed, were inoperative because of the lack of plumbing facilities and mess equipment. Messes had not been built for the hospital or appointed personnel.

Dean found the rate of flow of supplies from the warehouses to the mess halls was satisfactory, the menus adequate, and the food well prepared. Food and other supplies, however, were frequently "issued from the warehouses without proper requisitions resulting in a large amount of confusion in accounting and inventories."

Because of the sixteen inoperative mess halls, there was "considerable overloading of the messes" in operation. It was necessary for the evacuees to stand in line for 20-45 minutes in temperatures averaging around 90 degrees. Thus, the WRA immediately took steps "to evolve a staggered system of meal hours until such time as the additional mess halls can be opened."

Dean reported that there was no system of identification in effect which would require persons to take their meals in the mess hall in their particular blocks. Menus in the operating mess halls were not standardized. Thus, there was a "considerable 'shopping around' for the mess hall that served the meal most to their liking, resulting in overcrowding of some messes and slight underloading in others." There were numerous cases "of persons doubling up on their meals from one mess hall to another, particularly at breakfast."

Different menus were in effect for the appointed personnel's "Mess No. 1." This mess "was obviously much better than the menus served to the evacuees," resulting in "considerable dissatisfaction on the part of the Japanese who observed the fact or were informed of it by the white personnel." Steaks and other elaborate dishes were served at a cost of 25 cents per meal. Accordingly, the WRA took immediate steps to standardize the mess menus "between the Japanese and the staff personnel."

Dishes, utensils, and cooking equipment were in short supply. Table service was generally satisfactory, although "greatly overstaffed." There were an insufficient number of sinks and occasional shortages of hot water. Two more sinks were necessary in each mess hall for the proper disposition of dishwater. Careless disposal of dishwater resulted in an unsanitary condition in the vicinity of the mess kitchens.

On June 1 the hospital facilities at Manzanar consisted of a "10-bed improvised hospital in one of the barracks buildings, an isolation ward, an out-patients' clinic and a children's ward." Ninety-two patients were hospitalized. Of these, there were 42 cases of "uncomplicated measles," three cases of "German measles," and nine cases of "chickenpox." Under normal circumstances and with proper residential facilities, these cases "might have been treated outside a hospital." The other 38 cases "in the professional judgment of Dr. James M. Goto, chief of the medical staff, hospitalization was absolutely necessary."

Syphilis and tuberculosis "were known to exist among the evacuees, probably in about the same proportion as among the general Japanese population." No personnel with sufficient training, however, were available to conduct a comprehensive survey. No syphilis nor typhoid tests had been given to any of the persons employed in the mess halls. Immunization of all evacuees for smallpox had been nearly completed by June 1, but diphtheria immunization had just begun and no vaccine for whooping cough, which was "quite prevalent" in the camp, had been received. Immunization for other communicable diseases was not contemplated because of the lack of sufficient staff and facilities.

Respiratory ailments "showed a tendency to spread among families housed in overcrowded apartments." In some instances, "where eight or ten persons" had been housed in the same unit, "severe respiratory diseases" had "afflicted as high as five or six members of the family."

Manzanar did not have a trained dietician or sanitarian as of June 1, although several students had received some training and were acting as "sanitary inspectors under the direction of Dr. Togasaki." Prenatal and post-natal work was carried on by the hospital staff, and formula and immunization was provided for babies under two years of age and special diets for children under five years.

"A rather high incidence of athlete's foot existed" at Manzanar, the source of "infection apparently being in the shower rooms." Dysentery "was occurring at a sufficiently high rate to indicate there was some contamination of the water supply." Investigations by the state health department indicated the "probability the contamination occurred east of the intake." The water supply line traversed "an area through which pass bands of sheep on their way to the mountains." A chlorinator had been installed prior to June 1, but it apparently had not been in constant operation.

Since its opening, Manzanar had "had three deaths." The deaths included "one from advanced tuberculosis, one from a heart attack probably attributable to the altitude, and a third from a kidney ailment of long standing." This number was "considered low for a community of this size."

According to Dean, approximately 100 acres had been prepared for cultivation and about 75 acres had been planted "to diversified vegetable crops, including fifteen acres of tomatoes." "Crops on sixteen acres were above ground." Some 125 Japanese were employed in "the plowing and planting, working three shifts a day with a single Fordson tractor and plow." "About 1,000 fruit trees, mostly apple and pear, which were on the property when it was taken over by the government" were "being revived and will bear some fruit this fall, though they had not been watered for nearly fifteen years except by the ordinarily scant precipitation of the area."

A propagating nursery was in operation at Manzanar, "chiefly with plantings from native seeds, and seeds brought into the relocation center by the evacuees themselves." Seeds for landscaping stock were on order.²

MANZANAR UNDER THE WRA

Organizational Structure

The War Relocation Authority assumed full administrative responsibility for the Manzanar War Relocation Center on June 1, 1942, with a skeleton staff, consisting only of a project director, assistant project director, administrative officer, supply and transportation officer,

2. "Conditions At Manzanar Relocation Area, June 1, 1942, by George H. Dean, Senior Information Specialist, Approved, June 5, 1942, Roy Nash, Project Director, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 293, File No. 41.080 #1, May — June 1942.

procurement officer, and telephone operator. At that date, the WRA had not made a decision as to what staff was necessary for the operation of the center. Thus, the WCCA agreed to leave some of its employees at Manzanar until June 15 to permit the WRA time to determine its administrative needs and recruit a staff.

On June 1 there were approximately 55 WCCA employees at Manzanar, most of whom had come from the Works Projects Administration. Twenty-five were temporary as work foremen (6), Caucasian police (10), Caucasian firemen (4), and truck drivers (5). Of the remaining 30, Nash recommended the employment of 14, five of which were approved by the WRA office in San Francisco by June 6.³

On June 6 a master chart for the administrative organization each of the relocation centers was issued by the WRA. This chart provided for a project director as the chief administrative officer of each center. He was assisted by an assistant project director who had direct supervision of the transportation and supply, maintenance and operations, employment and housing, and administrative divisions. The transportation and supply division included motor pool, mess management, and warehousing sections.⁴ The maintenance and operations division included building and grounds maintenance and garage sections. The employment and housing division supervised the occupational coding and records, quarters, and placement sections. The administrative division included procurement, property control, personnel records, office services, and budget and finance (cost accounting, fiscal accounting, and audit units) sections.⁵

This organizational chart remained in operation until October 1, 1942, when an agency reorganization plan was implemented. At that time three divisions at each center — employment and housing, transportation and supply, and administration — were placed under the supervision of the assistant project director. The maintenance and operation section was discarded and the motor pool, warehousing, equipment maintenance, and mess operation units were placed under transportation and supply. The building and grounds maintenance section was transferred to the public works division which was under the direct supervision of the project director. This organization remained in effect until December 15 when the entire staff at Manzanar would be reorganized in the wake of the "Manzanar Riot."⁶

3. Telephone Message to Mr. Fryer From Colonel Cress — Saturday, June 6, 1942, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 293, File No. 41.080 #1, May — June 1942.

4. The motor pool fleet at Manzanar as of June 1 included five sedans, five panels, 20 Army-type 1/2-ton pickups (4 x 4 feet), 14 Army-type, 1 1/2-ton pickups (4 x 4 feet), 12 commercial-type 1 1/2-ton stake side trucks, five standard rented pickups, and three rented dump trucks. In July the following vehicles were made available from the Pomona Motor Base — six sedans, four coupes, one panel, three pickups, and two stake trucks. These vehicles had been purchased from evacuees by the Army and distributed to various relocation centers. "Motor Transport and Maintenance Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. IV, pp. 1122-23, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 73, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

5. "Supply Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. IV, pp. 1291-92, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 73, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

6. "Administrative Management Division," Vol. IV, pp. 1,549-50, and "Supply Section" Vol. IV, p. 1,292, *Final Report, Manzanar*, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 73, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

Appointed Personnel

The WRA encountered serious problems in recruiting administrative staff for Manzanar throughout 1942. Aside from an acute manpower shortage on the west coast during the war, other contributing factors included: (1) higher rates of pay, plus overtime and double-time, in west coast war-related industries; (2) isolation of the project; (3) adverse climate; (4) temporary nature of employment (Many felt that project would close long before it did.); and (5) the fact that some people did not wish to work with persons of Japanese ancestry.

Staff recruitment at Manzanar "was made extremely difficult" since prospective employees had to be approved by the 12th Civil Service District that administered the entire west coast. The center was from two to three days by mail service from the San Francisco office of the Civil Service Commission, making it virtually impossible to obtain approval of an assignment in less than one week. The Civil Service Commission offered Manzanar its cooperation, but it often did not have applicants interested in working at Manzanar.

Thus, the burden of recruitment was left largely to center management. Recruitment of Manzanar staff was conducted by the assistant project director through personal contacts, by the personnel officer through contacts principally in Los Angeles, and by soliciting the cooperation of project staff members who referred to the personnel management section persons they could interest in employment at the center.

Despite these problems, the WRA recruited a total of 229 employees during 1942. Of this number, 209 were new employees and 20 were transferred from other government agencies. The staff at Manzanar averaged about 200 during its first six months under the WRA.

At the time of their appointment new employees were given considerable information on the purpose and philosophy of the WRA. However, there was never time or sufficient personnel staff to arrange for more than one such conference with each new employee "to learn how they were adjusting to their assignments and their new surroundings, and whether they were properly placed."

Recruitment for various positions was difficult because salaries established by the organizational chart in accordance with Civil Service classification procedures were inadequate when compared with salaries being paid for similar work on the west coast. This problem was illustrated by the position of elementary teacher. In an attempt to staff the elementary school, Manzanar camp administrators wrote letters to every known teacher placement bureau in the United States. The majority of the elementary teaching staff was recruited from the South and Middle West where the salary scales were less than that established on the Manzanar organizational chart. Most of these teachers, however, taught for only several months at Manzanar and then transferred to public school systems in California where the pay scale and living conditions were more attractive.

Housing for appointed personnel also posed a problem for recruitment and retention at Manzanar during 1942. On August , housing quarters for administrative staff at Manzanar consisted of nine housekeeping apartments and 16 bachelor quarters. The latter were adequate for two single employees each. It was obvious that the quarters provided were

not sufficient for a staff of approximately 200 people. The problem was met during 1942 by the decision to house employees and their families in the evacuee barracks, thus exacerbating the already overcrowded housing conditions in the camp. Families of three or more persons were assigned to two-bedroom apartments, while two-person families received one-bedroom apartments. Single women were housed in dormitories, and single men in bachelor quarters two to an apartment. The only exceptions were for single section heads who received one-bedroom apartments and single employees who secured medical certificates from the Principal Medical Officer showing that they required diets different from those served in the administrative mess. The latter were assigned to one-bedroom apartments with the understanding that each share the same with another single person.

Another problem that hindered recruitment and retention of appointed personnel was related to the issue of recreation at Manzanar. The camp was located 5 miles from Independence and 12 miles from Lone Pine. Those employees who had their own transportation, even with gas rationing, had access to various forms of recreation in these small towns. However, many employees had no means of transportation, and no recreational facilities were available to them, thus contributing to their sense of isolation and low morale.⁷

New Manzanar Administrator

On May 20, 1942, Roy Nash, former superintendent of a large Indian agency in California, arrived at Manzanar to assume the office of Project Director for the War Relocation Authority, replacing Clayton E. Triggs, the former WPA administrator who had served in that position under the WCCA since inception of the camp in March. This change of administration, while the camp was still being constructed and evacuee contingents were still arriving, was, according to the "Project Director's Report" in the *Final Report, Manzanar*, prepared by Brown and Merritt, "a confusing time to 'switch horses.'" The evacuees, beset by scores of petty, as well as fundamental, problems and worries, and the camp management struggling to help resolve those problems and cope with administrative issues, were "just beginning to understand one another and to understand a few things which should be done to put the machinery of management in high gear."

The War Relocation Authority brought in new organizational ideas and new managers who, according to Brown and Merritt, had "no knowledge of the road already traveled." Although not the "best strategy," this operational methodology was "understandable when one remembers WRA set up new centers, ready for occupancy, and staffed before any evacuees were sent there, in all instances except Manzanar." While the WRA had "a new start with each other group of people," at Manzanar it "took over a going institution, stopped most of the wheels at one stroke, and started off on a new track." The abrupt change in camp administration would have repercussions for both camp management and the evacuee population during the coming months.⁸

7. "Administrative Management Division," Vol. IV, pp. 1582-84, and "Personnel Management Section," pp. 1,175-79, *Final Report, Manzanar*, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 73, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

8. Project Director's Report," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. I, p. A 17, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 71, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

Only six persons in supervisory or managerial capacity were carried over from the WCCA management to the WRA management. The WCCA managers who were replaced were generally bitter about being terminated, and they spread rumors about the WRA in nearby Owens Valley towns. The rumors left the impression that the WCCA, as a result of its connection to the Army, knew how to handle "Japs," but the WRA was a "social welfare outfit who will coddle 'em'." Before leaving Manzanar, some of the outgoing WCCA employees destroyed "valuable records" and sowed seeds of dissension, stirring up their evacuee assistants and helpers by spreading other rumors — "especially one they would not get paid by WRA for what they had done." According to Brown and Merritt, the WCCA employees "left the place in a bad state of confusion."⁹

Policies of Project Director Nash

According to Brown and Merritt, the decision by Nash to remove virtually all WCCA employees, even though there were no immediate replacements, was indicative of his "determination and ability to make quick decisions." Nash, a dynamic personality, had a "tendency to make fast decisions" and a determination "to carry these out in the face of any amount of difficulty." Some of his decisions "were faulty and some excellent," but "no course could be charted by any regularity of goodness or badness from that time out." Two other developments early in Nash's tenure as Project Director illustrated his tendency to make snap decisions that would have repercussions for camp operations during the ensuing months.¹⁰

In his first public address, Nash informed the evacuees at Manzanar that they could take advantage of the Sierra Nevada Mountains, some ten miles west of the center. This statement was received "with loud cheers by the evacuees who had their eyes on the streams and lakes of the region," but it was also received "with loud cries of protest by the local people who feared more than anything lax control by the new management." Individuals and organizations immediately telegraphed DeWitt and the Western Defense Command, and "a reprimand came flying back to the new Director — who had acted in good faith, but blindly — which made him countermand his order of allowing visits to the mountains." Describing the impact of this matter on the evacuee population, Brown and Merritt observed:

Although many of the residents understood the situation, still it was a bad start for the new management. To have the green fields of heaven thrown open with unrestricted invitation on one week, and then to have these same fields barred forever the next week was a bitter pill to swallow . . . and even those who understood were heard to mutter, ' I wonder if it was done on purpose?'¹¹

According to Brown and Merritt, the rumor started by the fired WCCA employees on wages began "to bear fruit shortly after the new management took over." Many evacuees had money in savings accounts, but they were running out of available cash needed to

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*, pp. A 17-18.

11. *Ibid.*, A 18-20.

purchase "simple incidentals." Some who had lost most of their possessions in the evacuation, such as those from Terminal Island, were "in acute need for simple necessities such as toothpaste, soap, tobacco, and cosmetics." The lack-of-pay rumor, starting first as a whispering campaign but later growing to a rumbling storm, disturbed the new WRA administrators. As continuing discussions at the highest levels of the federal government resulted in no immediate solution to the amount and method of pay checks for the evacuees, Nash "on his own responsibility made an agreement with the Canteen to honor script to the extent of five dollars per person, the script to be redeemed later when these persons received their first pay checks." Nash immediately had "five-dollar script coupons printed in the local printing establishment and 'paid' all workers the five dollars on account," thus temporarily relieving tensions and placing the "new management back in the confidence of the people."¹²

Deteriorating Morale and Public Relations at Manzanar

On June 6 to 8, at the end of the first week of the WRA's operation of the Manzanar camp, Colonel C. F. Cress, deputy director of the WRA, visited the relocation center to observe its operation and gain firsthand knowledge about the progress of the WRA takeover of the camp. Although he felt that the WRA was making "satisfactory progress," he was concerned about the deteriorating morale both in the camp and the surrounding region. He observed:

that the situation in the Owens Valley Area may suddenly become very unsatisfactory or even dangerous, due to the attitudes of individuals of any one of four groups. These groups are: The civilian residents of Owens Valley, the disgruntled discharged employees of WPA still in the Valley, the employees of WRA and the Japanese themselves. In my opinion, words alone can do immeasurable damage at this time.

Cress observed that the Owens Valley residents felt

that the Federal representatives have not kept their promises that the Relocation Center should cause no additional expense to Inyo County and that the Japanese would be kept under close guard and thus cause little inconvenience to the local inhabitants. In this connection Congressman Leland Ford emphasized to his constituents during his visit on May 5th that the agreement between Congress and the War Department called for 50 Caucasian civilians to be kept as internal police and for a close guard of the Japanese at all times.

According to Cress, the Owens Valley residents also maintained

more than a slight interest in the WPA project personnel who have lived among them for over three months. When WRA assumed control at Manzanar and discharged certain WPA employees, the local paper charged politics. However, the Editor's definition of politics was - the running in of a new gang while using the Civil Service gag and the cut in salary racket to force efficient WPA

12. *Ibid.*, pp. A 19-20.

employees out. This feeling was intensified by the fact that the local residents have strong prejudices against Bureau of Indian Affairs personnel.

At this time the policy of our organization with reference to Owens Valley people should be close mouths and no speeches or loose promises. We should also seek to have WCCA formally declare the Manzanar relocation area a military area and to work out, ourselves, some procedure whereby the expenses to Inyo County will be minimized and the possibility of Japanese voting in this county eliminated.

Cress also commented on the disruptive influence of some discharged WCCA employees that were still in Owens Valley. He noted that some

of them are bitter over the loss of their jobs and have expressed their feelings to both the local residents and the Japanese. They are the potential interpreters of any loose talk by WRA employees, or any untoward incidents.

Cress also described the problems caused by the new WRA employees and managers at Manzanar during the first week of the WRA's administration of the camp. He stated:

Our own WRA employees at Manzanar are not yet an integrated group. Our greatest weakness is a lack of procedures and policies and a tendency to make changes rapidly. There are leaks in our organization. I felt that some of our employees still have a paternalistic attitude rather than the idea of helping the Japanese help themselves. However, this idea is not shared by the Project Director.

One incident, according to Cress, had caused "considerable confusion related to project area restrictions." Echoing the aforementioned observations by Brown and Merritt, Cress noted:

. . . On May 17th at public meeting of the Japanese in Manzanar, Mr. Triggs and Mr. Nash made speeches. Mr. Triggs announced that WRA would make some relaxation of the confining restrictions on the Japanese. Mr. Nash then told the crowd that Colonel Magill, Provost Marshall, Fourth Army, had agreed that there would be a freeing of the limits; that a fence would be erected along the front of the relocation area and half way along each side and that the back area would be left open, although patrolled by military police, so that the Japanese would be free to wander from camp to the mountains if they desired. The following Sunday some of the Japanese went out of camp toward the mountains and were brought back by the military guards. Either the Japanese misunderstood or they were trying out the management. Shortly before, a military police guard had shot a Japanese who attempted to pass beyond the camp limits and who failed to obey his order to halt. These two incidents alarmed the residents of Owens Valley and caused considerable repercussions among the Japanese.

Cress also noted that the Japanese evacuees had been "disturbed by the situation, " observing that they "do not understand why the management of their camp was changed, nor why their Caucasian friends were fired." The urgent needs of the evacuees were "relief

from the present overcrowding in quarters and the materials to fix up their homes." In addition to these tensions, there was general alarm in the camp because of the "possibilities of an epidemic" "when the fly and mosquito period begins."

Cress sensed that "we have a number of Japanese evacuees sniping at us." This sniping could "easily be turned into active opposition and into positive acts, if we provoke it." On the other hand, the "bulk of the evacuees want their problem of satisfactory living to be solved and will welcome constructive action."

Cress was "convinced if WRA stops talking and gives the Japanese a chance to help themselves, the situation will be solved." However, he was "also satisfied that all of the explosive elements are present in Owens Valley for real trouble." Policy changes "must be placed into effect slowly and with due regard to the public reaction of the various groups concerned."¹³

Brown and Merritt also discussed the declining morale in the camp and its deteriorating public relations in Owens Valley in their "Project Director's Report" in the *Final Report, Manzanar*. According to their assessment, much of the goodwill in Owens Valley communities that had been developed by Triggs during March and April 1942 was dissipated during the early weeks of WRA management as a result of "the failure on the part of the Project Director to understand the position of the local people." During his first week of administration, Nash had a brief visit with Merritt, chairman of the Citizen's Committee, but he had no further contacts with that organization. Several months later, after public relations with the valley towns "were completely severed," he asked the committee to meet. When the members "pointed out the true state of affairs and suggested the Committee disband," Nash "was in hearty accord with the decision."

In an effort to restore outside community and camp management relationships, Brown arranged for Nash to speak at several luncheon clubs. The speeches, however, only served to antagonize the communities because the general theme of the talks was that "Most of these people are American citizens and are entitled to all the rights you enjoy, but other American citizens, including you people, want to deny them these rights."

Public relations with Owens Valley communities, according to Brown and Merritt, reached rock-bottom after two incidents which received considerable publicity in the local press. Nash authorized the Chief of Community Services to take a number of evacuees up one of the canyons west of the camp for a picnic. The group was eating lunch on the porch of a cabin owned by a local man who arrived unexpectedly to find it "swarming," to use his words, "with Japs." Later Nash, accompanied by an Army colonel, took Dr. James Goto, the chief evacuee doctor at Manzanar, and his wife to a restaurant in Lone Pine "where a too-obvious display was made of serving cocktails and the 'de luxe' dinner."¹⁴

13. Memorandum To: Mr. M. S. Eisenhower, Director, from C. F. Cress, Colonel Cavalry, Deputy Director WRA, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 293, May-June 1942, File No. 41.080 #1.

14. "Project Director's Report," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. 1, pp. A 20-21, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 71, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

The deteriorating public relations also resulted from the fact that the Army and WCCA had contracted much indebtedness in the nearby communities, none of which had been paid by June 1. After the WRA takeover, the center finances were handled by Central Administrative Services in San Francisco. Payment of project obligations was so slow that most of the community did not desire to deal with the project, and some merchants went so far as to indicate that they did not desire the business of the appointed personnel.¹⁵

On June 26, less than a month after the WRA took over administration of Manzanar, George Savage, editor of the *Inyo Independent* and a member of the original local advisory committee for the camp, wrote a stinging editorial rebuke of Nash and WRA management policies. Prior to this time, his editorials had provided strong support for the Manzanar camp, but Nash's activities had turned that support to disgust and frustration, if not outright opposition. This editorial reflected the growing widespread opposition to Manzanar by the Owens Valley populace, and, according to Brown and Merritt, that disgust was "to be found with the employees at the project and was beginning to infiltrate in the evacuees." Among other things, Savage observed:

Milton Eisenhower, Director of the War Relocation Authority . . . is reported to have resigned last week as Director. . . .

We wonder if Mr. Eisenhower hadn't come to realize that the WRA is a hot potato, just a little too warm to handle with bureaucratic tongs.

The WRA, with its social service approach to Japanese problems plus its very evident examples of maladministration, already had two strikes against it. . . .

We believe wholeheartedly that the administration of the Japanese, in all camps, whether they be relocation areas or assembly centers, should be under direct charge of the United States Army, with an agency like the WCCA, which was directly answerable to the Army. . . .

In regard to the present administration at Manzanar, we cannot understand how Director Roy Nash can completely ignore the people of this county on the policies he is establishing there.

He is releasing Japanese to go on picnics and parties to points other than in the relocation area. A number of Japanese were taken last Sunday to Seven Pines and Kearsarge Valley. Another group was on George's Creek, fishing.

In view of the fact that federal jurisdiction has not yet been settled, insofar as Manzanar is concerned, and that Army responsibility is being ignored in permitting Japanese to leave the camp, Mr. Nash can hardly expect to have his program welcomed with open arms by the people of Inyo.

We would like to ask why Mr. Nash has not been more cooperative with the Ross Aeronautical School, which is seeking a small water supply for Manzanar airport

15. "Administrative Management Division, *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. IV, p. 1577, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 73, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

use? Does Mr. Nash and the WRA think it more important to ignore the training of pilots for Army service in favor of the Japanese who have been evacuated here? . . .

Mr. Nash promised some time ago to discuss local problems with the Board of Supervisors. To date he had not done so.

We would like also to ask why Mr. Nash hung up the telephone on the Inyo county deputy district attorney recently? A good administrator is at least courteous.

And why is it, Mr. Nash, that a truck laden with Japanese, can go almost a hundred miles round trip from Manzanar to near Darwin to secure a Joshua tree for use in adorning a rock garden being built at Manzanar. And here we are joining with the nation in a scrap rubber drive to secure rubber to keep the needed wheels of our nation moving. Maybe it's more worth while to get Joshua trees by driving many miles on valuable rubber than it is to conserve rubber.

But, this is only one sample of the kind of waste one sees every day in and around Manzanar.

Why is it that Manzanar has to be in such a state of turmoil? Queer, isn't it, that most of this has occurred since Mr. Nash and WRA arrived on the scene.

We are thoroughly disgusted with the whole deal.¹⁶

MANZANAR CAMP OPERATIONS DURING 1942

Despite the declining morale in the Manzanar camp and its worsening public relations with Owens Valley residents, the new WRA staff began to assemble at the center during early June 1942. Although construction of the camp was not complete, the many facets of its operation, elements of which had first begun under the WCCA in March, slowly developed throughout the remainder of 1942.

Reports Division

The Reports Division at Manzanar, which evolved out of the "Information Service," was the first administrative unit to be developed at any assembly or reception center during the evacuation program under the WCCA.¹⁷ The first evacuees arrived at Manzanar on March 21 in two busses containing 84 people. In this group were two former newspapermen who had been, respectively, the assistant editor and the English section

16. *Inyo Independent*, June 26, 1942, quoted in "Project Director's Report," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol I. pp. A 21-23, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 71, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

17. Unless otherwise noted, material in this section is based on "Reports Division," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. I, pp. 1-23, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 71, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

editor of a daily Los Angeles Japanese newspaper. The day following their arrival, the two men offered their services to the Project Director, recommending that they set up an information booth where all incoming evacuees could get instructions and information and where administrative notices could be posted. The plan was accepted by Project Manager Triggs and on March 23 Manzanar's Information Service was established.

Earlier on March 15, 1942, Robert Brown, executive secretary of the Inyo-Mono Associates, was appointed as Public Information Officer for Manzanar. His duties included public relations with the small communities in Inyo County as well as the dissemination of information within the camp. Thus, supervision of the Information Service became his responsibility.

Manzanar Free Press. As evacuees began pouring into Manzanar in late March and early April, the need arose for some means of disseminating information throughout the center in addition to the efforts of the Public Information Office. Brown recommended to his superiors in San Francisco, after obtaining the concurrence of the Project Director, that a daily mimeographed newspaper be established. The suggestion was forwarded to DeWitt who denied permission to print a newspaper. In spite of the denial, the need for dissemination of information became so great at Manzanar that the WRA's Chief of Public Relations in the San Francisco and Robert Brown "decided to launch a newspaper on their own authority and present the accomplished fact to the office of the General, hoping that the product would be so good that it would force that office to recognize the need and accept the answer to the need."

The name, *Manzanar Free Press*, was suggested by the Chief of Public Relations in San Francisco. According to Brown, it "was hoped that the name would give the people who were later to work on the paper a feeling of pride and that they would strive to uphold the best in newspaper tradition in writing news honestly, fearlessly, and with complete freedom of mind."¹⁸

The first issue of the *Manzanar Free Press* was printed on a mimeograph press on April 11, 1942, when the center had, according to the headline, 3,302 residents. This newspaper was the first of its kind to be printed in an assembly or relocation center. It was a two-sheet, four-page, two-column edition, put together by a hastily recruited staff of five evacuees by Brown whose work records showed some experience on newspapers.

A small article on page one of the newspaper was addressed to DeWitt, complimenting him on his understanding and humane operation of the mechanics of the evacuation.¹⁹ According to John D. Stevens, an associate professor of journalism at the University of Michigan who researched assembly and relocation center newspapers, these were the "first and only kind words which ever appeared in an evacuee publication about the man most" evacuees "blamed for their removal." A week later DeWitt, perhaps influenced by the

18. Togo Tanaka, an evacuee at Manzanar, would later scoff at suggestions that the *Manzanar Free Press* enjoyed any real freedom from censorship. Stating that some censorship was overt while some was unseen, he noted that the Issei generally distrusted the paper, while the Nisei viewed it as workers look at a publication produced for them by their employers. John D. Stevens, "From Behind Barbed Wire: Freedom of the Press in World War II Japanese Centers," *Journalism Quarterly*, XLVII (1971), p. 284.

19. *Manzanar Free Press*, April 11, 1942, p. 1.

article in the *Manzanar Free Press*, gave official blessings to issuance of newspapers in all centers.²⁰

According to Brown, during the first several months of the newspaper's publication, various individuals representing groups within Manzanar attempted "by every method from persuasion to threat" to gain control of the newspaper. Despite these attempts, Brown asserted that "at no time did any special interest or special group 'control'" the newspaper, although he believed that prior to December 6 "its pages and its editorials were aimed perhaps too exclusively at the Nisei." In its earliest days, "when it was accused of being totally Nisei, the FREE PRESS had served a greater cause, as many of its editorials were reprinted in daily papers from coast to coast enlightening thousands of readers to whom the evacuation was merely a wire-service dispatch from the West Coast."

The first issue of the *Manzanar Free Press* contained an editorial describing its editorial policies. The editorial noted:

We don't have a 'policy'. . . . Politics are out! We don't have to worry about what our advertisers think! We will have no circulation department worries This to a newspaper man or woman is plain Utopia. We should be able to devote all our creative effort to make this sheet one of the liveliest ever printed and one of the most democratic So far we don't even have an editor to worry us, so without this last bothersome detail, we should have a lot of fun. . . .²¹

According to Brown, this editorial was "written purposely to allay fears that the paper was a 'voice of the management,' or the 'voice of the Nisei,' or the voice of anything." There was no editor, because management "was slowly feeling its way toward solving the complexities of leadership." Soon after the first issue, an "editorial board" was established consisting of the original four reporters — Joe Blamey, city editor; Sam Hohri, feature editor; Chiye Mori, news editor; and Tomomasa Yamasaki, editorial.²² On May 19, six weeks after the first issue Yamasaki, was named the editor.²³

After two weeks as editor, Yamasaki was elected a Block Leader. He left the newspaper, and the editorial board again functioned as a group.

On June 9 the *Manzanar Free Press* printed an editorial announcing a "new policy." The editorial stated:

We want to repeat again that the Free Press belongs to the people of Manzanar, that, instead of being merely the outpiece of the administration, it strives to express the opinions of the evacuees in the solution of immediate and foreseen problems.

20. Stevens, "From Behind Barbed Wire," pp. 280-81.

21. *Manzanar Free Press*, April 11, 1942, p. 1.

22. *Ibid.*, April 18, 1942, p. 3.

23. *Ibid.*, May 23, 1942, p. 2

If possible, we want to be the open forum for discussion of administration policies because these policies will directly affect every individual here. We know that the administration will welcome a healthy and active interest on the part of the residents as it is only with harmonious cooperation that our Shangri-La can be built.²⁴

On July 22 the *Manzanar Free Press* was the first relocation center newspaper to change its format and become an independent journal, changing from a mimeographed sheet to a four-page printed newspaper in tabloid form. Chiye Mori became the new editor and served in that capacity until the December "incident."²⁵

Since the newspaper staff members were able to relocate with relative ease, there was a continuous turnover in its staff. Because of this turnover it was necessary to carry on a program of in-service training. Young untrained people came to the newspaper office for training at the same time doing a day's work for the organization. During the first year the Brown gave considerable personal attention to training. Journalism classes were organized and held at night, using daily copy as text material. Shorthand classes taught by one of the secretaries on the staff were also offered. The chief mimeograph operator took one untrained person a month to train on mimeograph work. The head artist held weekly classes in illustrating and use of the stylus on stencils. Typists were coached in form and style by the senior typists.

From the beginning of the newspaper, many Issei evacuees at Manzanar complained that, because the newspaper was written exclusively in English, it was only for the Nisei and that it meant nothing to them since they could not read English. For a period it was felt that this might be a means of inducing those Issei who could not read English to study the language, but, according to Brown, "it was soon discovered that this was an idle dream."

Both camp management and the editorial staff of the newspaper understood the difficulties of issuing a Japanese edition of the *Manzanar Free Press*. Most of the Nisei on the newspaper could not read Japanese, and those who could cautioned against issuing such an edition because of attempts which might be made to write with "double meaning."

Nevertheless, camp management realized that only the younger people in the center were being reached by the newspaper. Efforts were undertaken to find some means for issuing a Japanese language supplement which would be a "strict translation of the English version, but which would get the news across to the older residents." In May and June 1942 two persons joined the appointed personnel who could read Japanese. In July the Catholic Church appointed a priest to aid the Catholic congregation at Manzanar who could also read Japanese. Using these staff members as a "board of censors," management felt it could begin issue of a Japanese language edition. An editorial board, composed of an Issei, Kibei, and Nisei, was chosen for this section of the newspaper. Copy had to pass

24. *Ibid.*, June 9, 1942, p. 2; and Memorandum, George Dean to Edwin Bates, June 18, 1942, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 69, File, "Miscellaneous Reports."

25. *Manzanar Free Press*, July 22, 1942, p. 1.

all three for clarity, form, and content before it was submitted to the appointed personnel board and printed.

The WRA office in San Francisco was informed of the decision to publish the paper in Japanese. That office informed various security agencies and requested that management forward copies of all Japanese language editions to these agencies. The newspaper published 11 issues with Japanese sections in June 1942 before Washington ordered it to stop. The section resumed August 21, but like similar sections in other centers, it was supposed to carry only translations of material published in the English section. That policy changed on October 1 when it was announced that the four-page Japanese language supplement would publish original as well as translated material subject to WRA guidelines.²⁶

The goal of the newspaper's original staff was to replace the mimeographed format with a printed sheet as soon as finances could be found to fund such an operation. When the Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises was established in June 1942, the newspaper staff approached the cooperative's board, asking that it underwrite the cost of six printed issues with the understanding that (1) as outside advertising came in, the cost would be reduced to the cooperative, and (2) that advertising space would continue to be available until the initial underwriting cost was absorbed. It was agreed that if advertising revenue did not cover the cost of the paper, the cooperative would absorb the difference. In return, the newspaper would make available to the cooperative enough space to balance the cost at regular advertising rates. This space could be used for an educational or news column with material exclusively aimed at developing interest in the cooperative movement at Manzanar. Outside advertising revenue was not sufficient to cover the entire cost for each issue, and the cooperative continued to underwrite or take enough advertising to keep the newspaper in printed form until near the closing of the center in 1945.

After this agreement with the cooperative, the masthead of the newspaper carried a statement that described its publishing status. The statement — "Official Publication of the Manzanar Relocation Center Administration, and Newspaper of Manzanar Community Enterprises." According to Brown, this differentiation between editorial control and ownership continued until the end of the publication — "not without its struggles, by any means — but the status was maintained."

The newspaper was supplied free of charge to all evacuees. Extra copies sold at five cents each, while initial mail subscriptions and subscriptions to appointed personnel were six dollars a year or 50 cents per month. Advertising rates initially were 35 cents an inch. At its height, circulation reached 3,700 copies, and mail subscriptions covered virtually every state in the nation. The financial support provided by the cooperative, which was in effect owned by the residents, made it possible to produce a newspaper at a cost of less than one cent per person per month. Advertisers included many local firms in Inyo County that sold merchandise to the cooperative and many national firms such as Sears, Roebuck and Company, the Wool Trading Company of New York, and the Golden State and Borden milk companies.

26. Stevens, "From Behind Barbed Wire," p. 283.

The Chalfant Press, owned by George Savage in nearby Lone Pine, printed the *Manzanar Free Press* from July 22, 1942, onward. Difficulties developed because the newspaper's evacuee editors could not leave the center to go to the print shop when the copy was ready for printing. Nor was it possible to run proofs to bring them back to the center to make up a dummy for retransmission back to the printer. The printer, in turn, was handicapped by a small staff.

These difficulties were worked out by careful editing of typewritten copy and by giving the linotype operator and printer a concentrated education in Japanese names and phrases. The linotype operator edited most of the copy as he cast the slugs, and the printer filled in where he missed. The cooperation of this firm "went far to make the paper the success that it was from a layout and production standpoint."²⁷

Documentary Reports. Soon after the WRA assumed administrative control of Manzanar on June 1, 1942, Brown recommended that a documentary record be started that would be more of a summary of the life in the center than was being documented by the *Manzanar Free Press*. He believed that the reports should be written to provide background for events or currents in center life, and that they should emphasize the evolving life of evacuees in the camp, provide an interpretation of life in the center, and occasionally provide evacuee opinion sampling.

Joe Masaoka, an evacuee who as a Japanese American Citizens League leader had gained considerable recognition before the evacuation in newspaper circles in Southern California as a result of his cooperation with military and naval authorities, was chosen to prepare the documentary reports. As his assistant, he chose Togo Tanaka, the prewar English-language editor of the Los Angeles-based *Rafu Shimpo* newspaper. According to Brown, as "events turned out, the wisdom of choosing the latter could be questioned, but the choice of the former paid good dividends to the management of the Center and to the national program."

This team turned in its first report on June 9, 1942. Reports, written in a "news-magazine style," were submitted at a rate of two or three a week until December 7, 1942. Excerpts from the reports, or at times the complete reports, were sent to the WRA Regional Office in San Francisco to keep that office apprised of events at Manzanar. After the December 6 incident, the authors of the special documentation were relocated for their protection. Thereafter, a system of reporting from the blocks was instituted, which "probably gave a better overall picture of daily events, but which lacked the color of the earlier reports."²⁸

Daily Block Reports. The aforementioned Information Office was destined to play a vital role in the early administration of the Manzanar camp. Under the general supervision of the WCCA's Welfare Section, the Information Office established four branches in the center, employing 57 people, and performing a variety of services. The office handled inquiries and complaints, translated letters for residents from Japanese to English and vice versa. For a period, it handled mail before establishing an independent mail system within the center. It wrote all bulletin material in both English and Japanese, and handled a

27. War Relocation Authority, *Second Quarterly Report*, pp. 39-40.

28. The reports by Masaoka and Tanaka may be found in RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 70, File, "Project Reports."

"Volunteer Service Corps" which grew to include 450 persons who worked without pay helping incoming evacuees to get settled.

Shortly after administration of the center was taken over by the WRA, the first attempt at representation within the blocks was started. Block Leaders were appointed by the administration from candidates who were nominated by the block residents. The Block Leaders met and elected a chairman. Out of this came a "Town Hall" organization and a weekly meeting of Block Leaders with the Project Director.

Conflicts arose between the Block Leaders and the managers of the Information Service. The residents had become comfortable with taking their problems to the Information Office, and the staff had either answered questions and complaints or forwarded the questions to the camp administration for discussion with officials. Because the system worked smoothly, residents were slow to take their troubles to the newly-elected or appointed Block Leaders.

On May 20, 1942, supervision of the Information Office was transferred from the Welfare Section to the Information Office. By June 1, when the WRA took over, it was apparent that the conflict between the Block Leaders and the Information Office workers had to be settled. A plan was developed to break up the Information Office as a unit and transfer its personnel to the Block Leader organization. In the new organization they would act as clerks for the Block Leaders, carrying on the type of work they had been doing, while the Block Leaders were left free to work with people in the blocks, attend meetings, and supervise the work of their assistants.

The two top men of the Information Office were offered positions, one as chief clerk in the "Town Hall" or main office of the Block Leaders, the other as assistant to the reports officer. It was determined that the clerk in the Block Leaders' office would make daily reports of happenings, conditions, complaints within each block. The reports would be forwarded to the chief clerk in the Town Hall, who would answer most questions, discuss questions of importance with the reports officer and his assistant, and prepare a daily summary of activity which the reports officer would circulate to staff members and forward to the Regional Office in San Francisco.

Approximately half of the staff of the old Information Service joined the new Block Leaders' organization which continued until the center closed in 1945. This organization served as a two-way channel of information — from the residents to Town Hall and the management, and from the management, through Town Hall, back to the residents.

The daily reports of the Block Leaders are one of the principal sources of information for an understanding of the daily activities, concerns, and issues facing the evacuees at Manzanar. A digest of the block reports for October 1942, for instance, states that the "35 Block Managers turned in 424 daily reports" during the month — "an average of 12 reports for each block for 27 business days of the month." The digest indicated that (1) improvements to the barracks and a variety of recreational programs were underway, (2) some evacuees were requesting an explanation of the WRA's organizational structure and demanding to know how soon their private furniture would be delivered from private storage, (3) evacuees were interested in having photographic and watch repair shop

services as well as weekly movie entertainment established in the camp, and (4) one of the principal problems facing the evacuees was what to do with their leisure time.²⁹

Administrative Reports. When the Washington Office of the WRA developed standard monthly report forms in late 1942, the Reports Division handled this routine duty. Two evacuee staff members were detailed to work with division and section heads to prepare the forms for mailing to Washington. Material for the standardized reports was generally forwarded in rough draft form or telephoned to the Reports Office, and the forms were compiled and edited by the reports officer.

Mess Hall Operations

Under WCCA. On March 19, 1942, Joseph R. Winchester began work at Manzanar as Chief Project Steward, a job he would hold throughout the duration of Manzanar's operation under both the WCCA and the WRA. The next day food was unloaded from trucks and stacked on the ground under "military guard." Stoves and kitchen equipment were stacked beside partially-constructed Mess Hall 1 where they would remain for several days.

While talking with the "volunteer" evacuees on March 21, Winchester met "an alien Japanese who had managed a restaurant." Within two hours, about 30 evacuees "with restaurant experience or a willingness to do kitchen work temporarily placed a stove in the middle of the first mess hall, prepared food there, and served the first camp meal," composed of "canned goods, Army 'B-type rations.'"

Perishable food was not acquired for almost a week, except for bread which was delivered on March 21. To protect the bread from the ever-present Manzanar dust, Winchester placed it "in a panel truck." Mess hall 1 was completed on March 22, and Winchester instructed his embryonic crew, because 710 evacuees would arrive the following day via a motor caravan from Los Angeles.

Dishes were washed in small household-type dishpans in water heated on coal stoves, some of which were set up in the open. Water was trucked from "a well half a mile away." Not until "about April 4, when there were 3,286 people in residence and the sixth kitchen was open, were sinks, sewers, and water-main connections completed."

To find additional help for the expanding mess operations, Winchester, with the aid of an interpreter, met arriving evacuees and questioned them as to their work experience. Those selected for mess operations were allowed a day to unpack and settle before starting work. An evacuee typist was hired for clerical work, and an appointed storekeeper was employed to handle food supplies.

Around April 18, when ten mess halls were in operation, Winchester was sent to other assembly centers to aid in organization of their mess operations. A newly appointed staff employee, having been trained for mess management at another center, assumed charge

29. Memorandum, Edwin Bates to E. R. Fryer, Regional Director, San Francisco, California, November 12, 1942, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 69, File, "Miscellaneous Reports."

for a short time at Manzanar. He, in turn, was replaced by another steward who came for a week's training before taking over the mess operations.

The first kitchens each fed an average of more than 600 people per day. To feed incoming evacuees, the messes remained open until after midnight during the early months of Manzanar's operation. Newcomers ordinarily arrived so late that their processing was not completed until "10 or 11 o'clock and sometimes later." The practice was to feed them before they were assigned to their quarters for the night, thus resulting in long hours for the mess workers. Two crews, totaling 60 men and women, were needed to staff each mess hall.

When new mess halls were opened, Winchester selected "a capable-appearing cook" with orders to organize a crew for the mess hall. Men were chosen for the new crew largely from operating facilities, while replacements were made from among the new evacuee arrivals.

By early April food storehouses were established beside the mess halls. Several months later, warehouses at the edge of the residential area were allocated to the Mess Operations Section.

Under the WCCA, Army B-type rations that were served to the evacuees included a "few perishables such as milk, potatoes, bread, and lettuce." There was no refrigeration at the center until around July 1; thus, two refrigerator cars were placed on the railway siding at Lone Pine to serve that purpose. A contract was made with the Lone Pine Ice Company to re-ice these cars every morning. Two trips a day were made by truck from Manzanar to the refrigerator cars for food supplies.

While Manzanar was administered by the WCCA, food was supplied by the Army Quartermaster Corps "in accordance with needs as the Army saw them." This at first produced some difficulties. The Quartermaster Corps, for instance, purchased large quantities of cottage cheese and buttermilk for the evacuees, but the residents, "unaccustomed to these foods, would not eat them." Instead, they wanted rice. According to Winchester, "It took several weeks to convince the Army that the rice requirement would range upward from a half-pound per day per person."

Under the WRA. When management of the center was transferred to the WRA on June 1, there was little change in mess operations except that the Chief Project Steward was replaced temporarily by a new man. A Mess Operations Section was established "to secure food supplies and to feed the evacuees." This section operated 36 mess halls, a kitchen in the hospital, and another in the Children's Village. The block kitchen next to the hospital was a special diet kitchen for the care of ambulant persons who, for reasons of disease or ill health, required special feeding, but did not need complete hospitalization. In addition, because the camp was isolated from ordinary community facilities, the section supervised "a cooperative dining-hall for appointed staff personnel who did not find it possible or desirable to eat in their living quarters." Food and labor at the appointed personnel dining hall were paid for by those who used the facilities. The Mess Operations Section also supplied the military post adjoining the camp with perishables and all supplies until 1944.

Under the WRA, food for the Manzanar mess halls continued to be requisitioned from the Army Quartermaster Corps, although for a time each requisition required approval from WRA officials in San Francisco. This practice, according to Winchester, resulted in difficulties, "because people away from the Center did not appreciate the eating habits of evacuees," frequently substituting "an un-ordered item for an ordered item." For instance, officials in San Francisco "considered it good business to accept 110 tons of cracked wheat which was obtainable in return for the payment of freight and handling charges." The evacuees did not care for cracked wheat, and the shipment arrived marked "unfit for human consumption." The result was that it was fed to poultry and livestock. Similarly, dried figs were substituted for other fruits "for so long that they were refused by tired appetites and a dangerously large over-supply accumulated on the Project." In August 1942, San Francisco approval of requisitions was no longer required.

Construction of the kitchens and mess halls was slow and equipment was often inadequate. When Winchester returned to his position as Chief Project Steward at Manzanar on July 1, only 23 mess halls were open. Although construction of the others was complete, a shortage of equipment delayed their opening. All of the mess halls were placed in operation, however, during the succeeding weeks. Winchester commented on some of the early problems facing operation of the mess halls:

From the first, and in spite of makeshift facilities, mess halls functioned smoothly. Supply was not always perfect but there was never a shortage of good wholesome food. Great concern was felt, however, because of inadequate facilities for sanitation, and this condition was watched closely and with considerable fear. Fortunately nothing developed except two very mild epidemics of diarrhea.

A problem in food arose out of conflict in food tastes between the desires of the first-generation Japanese and their American-born children. The older people were accustomed to, and desired, larger amounts of rice and Japanese food than were acceptable to the younger people. Limitations on the money granted for food, made it possible for the older people to have things more nearly their way, for Japanese food is economical.

Policies: Cost — The policy of the Mess Operations Section, governed by a WRA administrative instruction issued on August 24, 1942, was to "provide good wholesome, nutritious, palatable food at a daily cost of not more than 45 cents per day per resident, and to maintain high standards of sanitation and cleanliness." During 1942, consumption of "a large quantity of home-produced vegetables" enabled the section to more than meet that cost policy. The Mess Operations Section purchased these home-grown vegetables and melons from the Agriculture Section at Manzanar at approximately Los Angeles market prices.

Policies: Menus — Menus at Manzanar, as at all centers, were based on those prepared by the Subsistence Section of the Service of Supply Division of the Army. An attempt was made to satisfy both the Americanized tastes of the second-generation evacuees and the predominantly Asian appetites of their alien elders. Fancy grades of provisions, however, were expressly prohibited, and rationing restrictions were strictly enforced.

Meals at Manzanar averaged from 2,800 to 3,500 calories per person per day during 1942. With the exception of short periods when ration-point values were very low, meat consumption remained "approximately at the level allowed by rationing." Although "Japanese menus" contained "a greater amount of starch" than was "customary among Americans in general," every effort to provide palatable foods was made by the evacuee stewards who prepared menus which the Chief Project Steward approved." A considerable part of the menu consisted of "rice, sukiyaki, miso, tofu, chop suey, chow mein, shoyu sauce, and pickled vegetables of all kinds."

Special facilities were established for feeding of babies, nursing mothers, invalids, and hospital cases. Because of acute dairy shortages, fluid milk was served ordinarily only to evacuees, such as the aforementioned, who had a need for special dietary treatment.

Policies: Sanitation — The sanitary conditions in the kitchens never satisfied the Chief Project Steward. While some kitchens maintained high sanitation standards, others did not. To improve conditions, regular inspections were conducted by evacuee inspectors. When the position of sanitarian was filled by an appointed staff member, he assumed the inspection task. Signs, posters, and meetings with chiefs "all played their part in a campaign for greater cleanliness." As a result, a few unsatisfactory kitchens were closed down for several days to enforce better conditions.

Service — Food was served cafeteria style "on heavy restaurant-ware dishes." A gong announced meal times, after which lengthy lines formed. In good weather a long line formed outside and in poor weather inside. At times, problems arose as some persons attempted to "get ahead of their neighbors."

One kitchen in four was staffed with two to three nutrition aides who, on doctors' prescriptions, prepared formulas for babies, and special meals at 10 and 2 for children too young to eat the regular center diet. Supervised by an evacuee woman, this service was at first under the technical guidance of the hospital, but later it was placed under the direct management of the Chief Project Steward.

Food Supplies: Procurement — At the request of the Army, and in an effort to conserve transportation facilities, food for Manzanar was obtained largely in carload quantities. The WRA attempted to keep a 90-day food supply on hand. Staple products were purchased through quartermaster depots of the Army, while perishable commodities were bought generally on the open market or produced at the center. Each morning the mess hall chef turned in a requisition for supplies that would be needed the following day. The Chief Project Steward and his assistants went over the requisitions, making deletions or additions to conform to the menu planned. Food was then withdrawn from storehouses and delivered to the mess halls.

Food Supplies: Warehousing — Supplies arrived at Manzanar by truck and were tallied in to one of nine warehouses, one of which was reserved exclusively for rice. When an invoice was received, a receiving report was made and submitted to the Fiscal Section for payment. For each commodity a bin card was kept at the place of storage, and a property card was kept at the office to show all receipts and withdrawals. To insure accuracy, a daily check was made between the two cards.

Food Supplies: Refrigeration — Perishable foods were stored in two refrigerating rooms constructed at the center about July 1. One refrigerator was for vegetables and the other for meat which was received in the whole carcass. In a connecting butcher shop the meat was cut to fill requisitions, and efforts were undertaken to insure that each mess hall received a "proportionate share of good cuts."

Personnel: Appointed — When the WRA took over, two persons, the Chief Project Steward and an Assistant Steward, were the only staff appointed to supervise the activities of the Mess Operations Section. In November 1942, however, a second assistant steward was hired to supervise the operation of the mess halls. This assistant made daily trips to each mess hall to inspect supplies and sanitary conditions and observe whether rules and regulations were complied with, such as those governing hours of employment and rates of pay. In August 1942 a head butcher was employed to supervise the recently-constructed meat refrigerator, butcher shop, and cutting and distribution of meat.

According to Winchester, "The major part of inspection and all supervision involving the issuance of direct orders was the responsibility of the appointed staff insofar as central control was concerned."

Personnel: Evacuee — Attached to the office of the Chief Project Steward were six evacuees in supervisory positions, five of whom held the title of senior steward. Each had specialized responsibilities relating to labor, menu preparation, warehouse supervision, food and cleaning supply distribution, and technical supervision of chefs. Each mess hall was under the supervision of a chef "who had complete charge" and was "responsible for the satisfactory operation of his kitchen and dining room."

When Winchester returned to Manzanar as Chief Project Steward on July 1, he found that the staff in each of the mess halls had grown to 50-60 workers even though long hours were no longer necessary to take care of late arriving evacuees. Accordingly, he made minor cuts in personnel in each kitchen. As new mess halls were opened, he recruited the new staffs from operating facilities. When all 36 mess halls were opened he made an additional cut of two persons in each kitchen. At intervals this process was repeated until a staff of 28 was allowed for every 300 persons to be fed. An additional worker was allowed for each 20 in excess of 300, and one worker was removed for each 20 under 300. This ratio was maintained throughout the rest of the war.

According to Winchester, the majority of the workers in the mess halls were aliens, and "as time went on the preponderance of aliens over citizens gradually increased." The workers were generally older, "a number of them being in their 70's." Many were women "who spoke only Japanese and who had never previously been employed outside of their own homes."

The WRA undertook efforts to train young people as cooks. Under the "job title of junior cook," new workers with a desire to acquire a knowledge of cooking were given "practical on-the-job training" beginning in 1942.³⁰

30. "Mess Operations Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. IV, pp. 1,322-44, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 73, File, "Manzanar Final Reports." Also see War Relocation Authority, *Second Quarterly Report*, p. 35.

Fire Protection

Under the WCCA, a Fire Protection Section, consisting of trucks provided by the Motor Pool and a small crew, was established soon after the camp opened under the supervision of the Assistant Project Director in charge of operations. The equipment consisted of 50-foot sections of 3/4-inch garden hose, water buckets, and long-handled shovels. Hydrants were constructed by the Corps of Engineers who supplied 2 1/2-inch firehose and nozzles.

When the WRA assumed administration of Manzanar on June 1, the fire department crew consisted "of a fire chief, three Caucasian captains and thirty Japanese firemen split among three eight hour shifts." The camp had no fire alarm system or inter-barracks telephone system "over which the occurrence of fires might be reported." At night, the camp was patrolled "by one Japanese for each area of three blocks." To report a fire, the patrolmen had "to go by foot to the fire station." Each squad was drilled one hour daily "in the use of the fire equipment and extinguishers."

Foamite extinguishers had been installed "in the hospital units, each boiler room, laundry building and mess kitchen." Buckets of sand had been placed in the boiler room in each block. All "available water barrels with buckets" had been placed "at strategic locations throughout the center," and residents had been instructed in the use of "the improvised equipment until the fire department" arrived.

Locks had been ordered for fuse boxes "to prevent solid fusing with pennies or other devices." Open fires were not allowed without a permit, and no permits were issued "on windy days after 2 P.M."³¹

Under the WRA, the Fire Protection Section was expanded, and on July 11 the U. S. Forest Service provided a Ford V-8 pumper with a capacity of 500 gallons per minute. During the summer, a Fire Protection Adviser attached to the San Francisco office of the WRA visited Manzanar, inspecting the equipment and assisting the center fire departments in the removal of fire hazards.³²

The WRA expanded the firefighting force at Manzanar. From July 1 through December 31 the average number of evacuee firemen on regular duty was 28, while the number of volunteer fire fighters was 34. Twelve fire inspectors conducted 30,449 inspections, identifying 782 fire hazards and issuing 755 violation notices. The fire department provided technical advice on 27 occasions and conducted 34 fire drills. The WRA increased the amount of training that the regular firefighters received. Regular firemen received an average of 5-6 hours of training, but the volunteer firemen received none. During this period fire reports indicate that the fire department responded to 27 (11 grass; 7 mess halls; 4 living quarters; 4 service buildings; 1 other buildings) fires in the camp in which \$120 worth of property was lost. The principal causes of the fires were defective oil

31. "Conditions At Manzanar Relocation Area," June 1, 1942, by George H. Dean, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 293, File No. 41.080 #1, May-June 1942.

32. War Relocation Authority, *Second Quarterly Report*, pp. 36-37.

heater stoves, open lights, flames, and sparks, defective or overheated chimneys and flues, smoking, electrical appliances, matches, and sparks on roofs.³³

Postal Service

When Manzanar opened in March 1942, the problem of mail delivery for the evacuee population became immediately apparent. As the WCCA was dominated by the Army, a system was worked out with the U.S. Post Office Department that was similar to mail installations in military camps. Under this system, mail would be delivered by the Post Office to the center, and the responsibility for its distribution to individuals was the responsibility of the center's management.

The U.S. Post Office Department established the Manzanar Post Office within the center, making it a substation of the Los Angeles Post Office. The acting postmaster at Manzanar and his first assistant were postal employees of the Los Angeles Post Office assigned to the center. When additional help was needed, the Manzanar Post Office employed residents of the surrounding communities as substitute clerks.

All incoming evacuee parcel post, freight, and express were opened and inspected for contraband by the military police. When a package arrived, the evacuee, was sent a notice. When he called for his package, a member of the military police inspected it in his presence.

The post office maintained a main office and five substations in the offices of the Information Service. Before carrier service was begun, residents of the center frequently waited for four or five hours in line to obtain their mail, and those on work detail often did not receive their mail. After numerous complaints, carrier service was initiated, and three carriers were assigned to every six blocks for daily mail delivery.

The postal unit installed drop boxes throughout the center. Before closing time at the Manzanar Post Office, mail clerks collected this mail and delivered it to the Post Office.

The initial organization of the postal unit was carried out by an evacuee who had many years of experience as a postal clerk with the Los Angeles Post Office prior to evacuation. Thus, the organization was made along the lines used in the various post offices in the U.S. Post Office Department. This system was continued by the WRA when it took over administration of the camp.³⁴

The Manzanar Post Office provided the residents with all regular postal services such as money order, mail registry, C.O.D., and sales of United States war bonds. Evacuees handling mail were employed by the WRA under the regular employment program at Manzanar. These employees consequently were not bonded and were not permitted to sell

33. "Fire Protection Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. IV, pp. 1,081, 1,092-98, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 73, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

34. "Supply Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. IV, pp. 1,312-14, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 73, File, "Manzanar Final Reports," and Conditions At Manzanar Relocation Area, June 1, 1942, by George H. Dean. RG 210, Entry 16, Box 293, File No. 41.080 #1, May-June 1942.

money orders, register mail, or handle sales of war bonds or stamps. All such postal services were available at the main postal unit where non-Japanese civil service employees of the Post Office Department were on duty.³⁵

Community Government

Under the WCCA. Within ten days after the first evacuees arrived at Manzanar on March 21, the first of a number of temporary "Block Leaders" were appointed by WCCA administrators.³⁶ The Block Leader was envisioned as a "combined boarding-house manager and liaison officer." It was intended that "he would represent the people [of his block] on a community council, that he would see that the tenants got along peacefully together, that the plumber and electrician were called when needed and that toilet paper and mops were provided as required." He would explain and interpret to the residents the policies and regulations of the administration and bring to the administration "a knowledge of the problems of the people."

Duties and responsibilities of Block Leaders, as well as a definition of their place in the community, were to be more fully defined in a "constitution." A draft document was prepared by evacuee committees and was sent to evacuees in another assembly center for comment. However, the document was never finalized "due to a change in policy after the WRA took over."

On April 13 qualified residents of each occupied block were called into meetings to nominate, by secret ballot, three candidates for the position of Block Leader. From these nominations a staff committee selected the Block Leader and an alternate for six-month terms. The selections were announced to the camp on April 22. Other blocks, as they filled with evacuees, had nominee elections. Suffrage was allowed both aliens and citizens who had attained the age of 21.

Representatives of the WCCA administration "bowed to the Japanese respect for age and in the majority of cases" selected as Block Leaders "older people, who were, by that fact, aliens and in many cases non-English speaking people." The *Final Report, Manzanar* observed that although "most of the previously acknowledged alien leaders in Japanese communities had been interned by the Justice Department at the outbreak of the war, these first Block Leaders appear to have been capable persons."

During the first two months of Manzanar's existence, the Block Leaders operated "without formal organization." Nevertheless, as a group they established a \$45 loan fund through contributions, recommended that the police give protection to children playing ball in living areas, considered the problem of whether the Japanese custom of presenting monetary gifts to bereaved families should be maintained in an assembly or reception center, and brought pressure upon the administration for a Japanese-language edition of the *Manzanar Free Press* and for the immediate payment of wages to employed evacuees.

35. War Relocation Authority, *Second Quarterly Report*, 41-42.

36. Unless otherwise noted, material for this section is based on "Community Government," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 963-88, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

The administration asked the Block Leaders for help in easing the growing tensions between Nisei and Kibei and deferred several other problems until the constitution could be completed.

During the early days of Manzanar's history, the Information Office had been established to aid the new evacuees in making adjustments to camp life. After the arrival of the first large group of evacuees at Manzanar on March 23, the administration building had been swamped by evacuees, seeking answers to questions concerning their new life. Two evacuees, Roy Takeno and Dave Itami, saw the need for facilities to provide the information sought by the evacuees. Their plan for such an organization was accepted by Camp Manager C. E. Triggs, and on March 25 the first Information Office was opened in Block 1, Building 9, Apartment 1. Under the WCCA, the Information Service was attached to the Service Division under the direction of J. M. Kidwell, who planned to organize one Information Office for every 1,500 residents. Six offices were ultimately established.³⁷

The principal function of the Information Service during its early days was to act as an intermediary between camp management and the residents "by relaying information and instructions on behalf of the management to the residents, and by relaying complaints and suggestions on behalf of the residents to the management so that the latter may be able to improve facilities or remedy any shortcomings, if they had merits for consideration." This included handling complaints and taking applications for employment; issuance and posting of bulletins in both English and Japanese; writing letters in English for elderly Japanese who spoke little or no English; conducting a lost and found department; and operating a Voluntary Service Corps to aid evacuees in getting settled.

As arrival of large groups of evacuees occurred during the early period, the Voluntary Service Corps was organized by the Information Service. This corps consisted of young men who aided newly-arrived evacuees in carrying their baggage, and guided them to their assigned quarters. By the end of May, this Corps had reached an enrollment of 450.³⁸

With the emergence of the Block Leaders, the similar and sometimes overlapping functions of the Block Leaders and the Information Office, began to create problems for WCCA administrators. The Information Office, staffed primarily with Nisei young people many of whom were early volunteers, had organized more quickly and at first provided better service than did the older people, most of whom were Issei, in the Block Leaders offices. As a result of their efforts, many of the information clerks and leaders were viewed as community leaders by the evacuees. Nevertheless, when the Block Leaders and other sections of the center administration were able to assume the functions of the Information Office, the WCCA began steps to dissolve its organization. Many of its personnel, however, which reached a peak of 50 in six offices, went to the Block Leaders' organizations where they served as assistants.

Under the WRA. When the WRA assumed administrative control of Manzanar on June 1, it found that "individual and group insecurity had grown rather than lessened," thus

37. Rice, "The Manzanar War Relocation Center," pp. 39-40.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

undermining support for community self-government. The rising insecurity, according to Merritt, was due to "growing apprehensions of residents for their status as detainees, and accentuated by the construction of a barbed-wire fence to enclose the living quarters and watch towers with search lights constantly flashing over the Center at night," "failure of the Administration to settle on a wage policy and to provide furnishings for apartments, that had been promised," and the "loss of status" felt by each "authoritative family head" when his wife and children were no longer dependent on him for their living. The change of center personnel and management policy brought by the WRA on June 1 heightened "the feeling of insecurity of the evacuees and brought into focus the difference in status of citizen children and alien parents which lead [sic] to the subsequent struggle for power and control."

When the WRA took over administration of Manzanar, the Block Leaders did not have the general respect of many evacuees. Many evacuees felt that the Block Leaders were mere "stooges" or "messenger boys for the administration," because they were appointed by the administrative staff. Residents failed to understand the limitations of the Community Council which then consisted of 36 individuals. Although it was understood that the council was to have a say in the government of the community, its position was "purely advisory." Yet the evacuee population of the camp tended to blame the council for the failure of the administration to immediately satisfy the demands and meet the pressing needs of the camp residents. Thus, it became the aim of the WRA to raise the prestige of the Block Leader.

In a June 5 memorandum addressed to all Project Directors, the Director of the WRA outlined in detail the plans for temporary self-government to be established as soon as possible in each relocation center. This temporary government was intended to be a laboratory for testing of evacuee ability and of WRA social ideals, and it was felt that this form of government would not only serve to educate evacuees in the workings of government but would also demonstrate the degree of ability of evacuees in self-government.³⁹ Each center would have a "Community Council" composed of American citizens elected by American citizens. The council would have no power to enact ordinances; rather it would make recommendations to the Project Director on matters relating to health, welfare, recreation, education, and other matters relating to center operations. Within the council, an executive committee of from five to seven members would consult with the Project Director on resolutions and recommendations of the council. A judicial committee was prescribed, but the executive committee might also serve in this capacity. This committee would cooperate with the Project Director in dealing with disturbances of the peace and law and order issues. Other committees, as deemed necessary, could be established by the council.

The prohibition of aliens from elective positions did not appear realistic to many evacuees or to staff members, because "the oldest people among the evacuee group had always carried the greatest responsibility." Merritt later elaborated on this issue in the *Final Report, Manzanar*:

. . . . Among the Japanese, all authority reposes in the family head and on his death, in the oldest son. With this in mind, it is easy to understand the respect for

39. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

age that has grown up among the Japanese people. Very few of the citizens had reached an age which demanded respect in a Japanese community. At Manzanar, no Nisei male was over 54 years of age and only eight were over 50. Forty-four more were between 39 and 50. While it is frequently mentioned that two-thirds of the Japanese group are American citizens, it is seldom noted that at Manzanar, at least, only 14 percent of the group were citizens of 25 years or older.

Accordingly, Project Director Nash "made no general announcement of this temporary policy excluding aliens from participation in community government because he feared the effect it might have and because he hoped for a change in the rulings of the Washington Office." Meanwhile, elections for Block Leaders at Manzanar continued to include alien voters and office holders.

Ignoring the directives from WRA headquarters, Nash convened in mid-June 1942 the existing Block Leaders at Manzanar, many of whom were Issei, "as a temporary Community Council." Representing Nash, the Assistant Project Director led the meeting, pointing "out the aims and the problems of the Project as a whole" and discussing "the significance of the contributions which the Block Leaders could make to a successful self-government program." The Assistant Director outlined the duties of the Block Leaders, which included responsibility for looking after the welfare of each individual in the block, seeing that all block facilities, such as kitchens, mess halls, wash rooms, and latrines, operated satisfactorily, distributing supplies and mail, supervising night checkers who were responsible for government property, and taking a nightly population count. The Block Leaders voted unanimously to accept their responsibilities. In turn, they were to be placed on a full-time work basis as of June 15. At their first meeting, the Block Leaders agreed with the Assistant Project Director that, for the time being, at least, the administration would continue to appoint Block Leaders. Later, in the same meeting, however, they reconsidered and directed the chairman to ask the Project Director that "elections be democratically conducted and the persons receiving the largest number of votes be named Block Leaders without selection by the management." The request was approved, and after June 19, Block Leaders were selected following that procedure. Suffrage was continued for men and women of 21 years of age and over. Several weeks later, however, in response to pressure from younger Nisei, the age limit was lowered to 18, although Nisei had asked that it be dropped to 16.

Direct election of Block Leaders by the evacuees increased the prestige of the office. Greater interest was shown in the elections, and average voting participation increased from 44 to 87 percent during the summer of 1942.

The final democratization of the Block Leader selection process took place in mid-August, when direct elections were held to fill these positions in Blocks 1-6 and 9-12. Prior to the elections, these blocks had been represented by leaders chosen under the system of appointment by the camp administration. New leaders were also chosen in four other blocks.⁴⁰ The election results showed a great deal of volatility among the evacuees. With

40. *Manzanar Free Press*, August 17, 1942, p. 1.

1,915 out of 2,422 eligible voters going to the polls, eleven new block leaders were elected, while only three of the ten incumbents being reelected.⁴¹

Regardless of continuing criticism, the Block Leaders had sufficient support to consolidate their position, assume duties formerly conducted by the Information Office, and increase the personnel of their offices. While they did not receive approval from all residents, their leadership was accepted by most evacuees.

On June 26 the Assistant Project Director informed the Block Leaders that he was planning a trip to the WRA Regional Office in San Francisco "to do everything he could to obtain a review of the proposed policy that aliens could not hold elective office." This was the first semi-public announcement of the WRA policy, and the Block Leaders were led to believe that the provision would be changed. The constitutional committee, in fact, was proceeding under the belief that the provision would be altered.

By July 20, however, the WRA policy remained unchanged, prompting Project Director Nash to write the Regional Director that the Issei had not been permitted to become citizens. Among the aliens at Manzanar were "strong characters of conservative, sober judgment, who have been of untold help to the administration in every crisis where cool heads were in demand." To disenfranchise this group or prevent them from holding office "would cause more dissension in Manzanar than almost any one decision that could be made."

The Block Leaders, under the direction of the camp administration, continued to meet as a representative council. The council consisted of "17 aliens" and "10 citizens." Not until September 4, however, would the evacuee population be aware of the limitations placed upon the franchise of aliens by WRA headquarters in Washington. When the evacuees became aware of this WRA policy, a storm of protest was triggered which will be detailed in Chapter 11 of this study.

Meanwhile the temporary council (although beset by a variety of divisive issues that will be examined in Chapter 11 of this study) continued to hold weekly meetings during the summer of 1942, dealing with issues related to day-to-day living problems in the camp. These issues included concerns over the selection of men to staff the police department, recruitment of labor for the camouflage net factory project, failure of the administration to provide furniture for evacuee quarters, the wage scale, and the desirability and need for a clothing allowance.

Late in June, the council elected a chairman and an executive board from among its members. The board was to meet with and advise the Project Director on significant problems facing the evacuees, but these meetings never took place.

The council prepared, and the administration approved, a proposal to establish a judicial committee to be comprised of three appointed staff members and three evacuee members. The evacuees were to be elected from the center at large by the residents. The committee would be advisory in nature and final action was the responsibility of the Project Director. The committee was to study traffic regulations and rules governing the behavior of

41. *Ibid.*, August 24, 1942, p. 1.

evacuees within the center and to hear minor cases of disturbance of the peace. All offenses against state and federal government statutes would be referred to the appropriate outside authorities.

Administrative Instruction No. 34, dated August 24, 1942, instructed each of the relocation center project directors to immediately establish community councils of citizen representatives in accordance with the director's memorandum of June 5, until regular community government could be established. The project directors were instructed to appoint commissions to prepare a plan for community evacuee government for each center "in accordance with the controlling provisions of this instruction." The instruction outlined the duties of a council of representatives to be elected by persons 18 years of age and over. Elected representatives had to be 21 years of age and citizens of the United States. Only American citizens could hold office, but aliens could vote and serve in appointive positions. Actions of the council would be subject to veto by the project directors. The plan of government included a judicial committee or commission to hear cases and apply penalties for violation of laws and regulations prescribed by the council, but its decisions were subject to review by the project directors. Although private enterprise had been forbidden within the centers, the plan provided for licensing evacuee businesses by a newly-created charter commission. Aliens were eligible for membership only on the judicial committee and other appointive boards and commissions established by the council.

In accordance with the administrative instruction, Project Director Nash, on September 12, appointed a 17-man commission to draw up a charter of community government for Manzanar. His appointments were made after consultation with staff members and evacuees. The commission immediately drew up a charter, although its work was limited to describing the electoral districts, provisions for recall, definition of a quorum, naming of time and place of meetings, provisions for filling vacancies, and voting procedures. Duties and responsibilities of the council, as well as eligibility for office holding, were defined in accordance with the WRA's administrative instruction.

Meanwhile, the Block Leaders were called into special meeting on September 30. Looking forward to establishment of the new community government, it was suggested that the temporary council be dissolved and they resign as Block Leaders and accept assignment as Block Managers. The new assignment would carry no representative or legislative authority or responsibility. The Block Leaders approved these recommendations unanimously.

The Block Managers, with the knowledge of the administration continued to meet and discuss center problems during October and November. Responding to mounting tensions in the center, they called for and obtained an explanation of the distribution of sugar; recommended that the charter include a provision for removal of inefficient and dishonest appointed personnel; requested evacuee representation at administrative staff meetings; and adopted a proposal that evacuee representatives should review the financial records of the center administration. By late November the camp administration had largely ignored the demands of the Block Managers, thus contributing to declining morale of the evacuee population and deteriorating relationships between the evacuees and the administration.

During the course of these events, the charter commission approved the charter in early October and designated November 9 as the date on which the charter would be voted upon by the evacuee population at Manzanar. The charter, with introductory notes, was mimeographed in English and Japanese and released as an "instrument of self-government." Early reaction to the charter was not favorable, and it appeared likely that it would be rejected. As a result, the commission resigned, and the election was postponed by the camp administration. Instead, an election for a committee consisting of two men from each block was held on November 22 to undertake further work on the charter in the hope that this would gain additional support before a final community government charter was submitted to the people. Any person over 18 years of age was eligible to vote in this election and to serve on the committee. Among the reasons given for the postponement of the voting on the charter were questions relating to licensing of private business, restrictions against the Issei, and fears that Japan might object if Japanese subjects contributed to their own government under the circumstances, as well as to allow time for the return of the 1,000 residents on seasonal farmwork furlough.⁴²

The results of the election on November 22 were announced in the *Manzanar Free Press* on November 28. It was noted that a wide-ranging series of reactions to the election had occurred. Of the 35 blocks voting, two recorded no votes, and two recorded sentiments of outright disapproval of the charter. A fifth block postponed the election. Blocks showing fairly good response were Blocks 9, 23, 1, 17, and 19.⁴³

In late November the representatives elected on November 22 met with the new Manzanar director, Ralph P. Merritt, to discuss a community government plan. Of the 60 representatives elected, only 33 attended. The tone of their general attitude toward the proposed charter was exhibited when a vote was taken on the charter. Of the 33 delegates, one voted in favor of the charter. In the ensuing discussions, the lone supporter, Fred Tayama, a prominent pro-American Nisei who had been an active JACL member before evacuation, was subjected to vigorous questioning. When the meeting broke up, a unanimous vote against the charter was recorded.⁴⁴

The final meeting of block representatives was held on December 3, 1942, with Merritt, to discuss the formation of a charter for community government. In this meeting Merritt proposed three recommendations for consideration by the evacuee representatives: (1) that the charter as it stood be accepted by them and be voted upon by the residents of the center; (2) that with minor changes within the limits of WRA policies, the charter be determined acceptable; and (3) that, even with revisions and additions, the charter be deemed unacceptable and not be submitted to the residents. Merritt stated that should the third view prevail, ". . . it is up to me as Project Director to state the terms on how we should live together." The meeting produced no action other than a statement that,

42. *Ibid.*, November 19, 1942, p. 1.

43. *Ibid.*, November 28, 1942, p. 1.

44. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, July 15, 1944, Report No. 241, "A History of Internal Government at Manzanar, March 1942 to December 1942," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 348, File No. 63.318, No. 1.

following further study of the charter and WRA instructions, the representatives would meet with Merritt on December 10.⁴⁵

Internal Security

The Western Defense Command issued a proclamation on May 19 that designated all relocation centers, either established or projected, in any of the eight far western states as military areas subject to external military control. Under this proclamation, protective services around the exterior boundaries of each operating center were provided by a company of military police (See Chapter 13 of this study). Maintenance of security and order within reach center, however, was left largely in the hands of the evacuee residents working under the direction of WCCA and WRA internal security offices.⁴⁶

Under the WCCA. The Internal Security Section, or camp police force, at Manzanar was originally organized under the WCCA.⁴⁷ Three Caucasian police officers were appointed who organized evacuee police into patrol units. For this work, volunteers were called for and more than 100 men and boys were recruited. Their only training was in routine patrol work, to which duties they were assigned under the supervision of the three Caucasian officers. Patrols were conducted over a 24-hour schedule, the men working on foot, while extra patrols were conducted by car and truck. By June 1, there were 14 Caucasian officers on the Manzanar police force, and the WCCA had plans to expand that number to some 40 men. The trucks used by the police were half-ton vehicles once used by the Civilian Conservation Corps. In addition, the police inspected all baggage of the newly arriving evacuees, and rechecked all persons and cars that entered or left the camp, duplicating the work of the military police. A jail was built at the rear of the main office in the police station, consisting of a room 20 feet square in which was installed a double tank rented from the sheriff of Inyo County.

Under the WRA.

The Police — As soon as the WRA took over Manzanar on June 1, 1942, efforts were undertaken to reorganize the camp police force on a more professional basis and active recruitment efforts were initiated to attract trained appointed personnel. Although a policy covering internal security at the centers was not issued by the WRA until August 24, the police department at Manzanar was "well on the road to organization prior to that date." By September the three Caucasian officers hired by the WCCA had either resigned or been terminated, and two new men were recruited by the WRA to replace them. On September 7, a Chief Internal Security Officer was appointed. At the time of his appointment, he was the "head instructor in the police school at Sacramento Junior College." Less than one week later, an officer from the Palo Alto Police Department took over duties as assistant to the chief. On October 20, a second assistant to the chief was appointed. He had served as an officer at Manzanar under the WCCA, and prior to that he had been a traffic officer in

45. *Manzanar Free Press*, December 5, 1942, p. 1.

46. War Relocation Authority, *First Quarterly Report*, p. 32.

47. Unless otherwise noted, material in this section is based on "Internal Security Section," *Final Report*, *Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 906-62, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

Santa Monica. On November 27, the Chief Internal Security Officer left the camp to become Acting National Director of Internal Security in Washington, D.C. The assistant chief at Manzanar was made Acting Chief of Internal Security. No more appointed personnel were employed on the Manzanar police force until after the "Manzanar Incident" on December 6.

The duties of the appointed internal security officers at Manzanar were based on Administrative Instruction No. 30, a WRA directive to all relocation centers issued on August 24, 1942. The instruction stated that internal security was the "responsibility of the Project Director." Each project was to have one or more "Caucasian internal security officers," but it was the intention of the WRA "to make as great a use of evacuee personnel as possible in providing internal security." The Chief Internal Security Officer under the direction of the Project Director, was to be responsible for "organizing, recruiting, training, and supervising an adequate internal police force." The force was responsible for enforcement "of regulations adopted by the Community Council and provisions of the federal, state and local laws or regulations specifically applicable to the relocation center." Under the policy statement, the internal security force at Manzanar was responsible for handling misdemeanor cases, while felonies were to be turned over to outside authorities.⁴⁸

In September 1942, when the newly-hired WRA Caucasians officers took over, there were more than 100 evacuee men on the camp's internal security payroll. These men remained on duty during the "changeover," when the section was reorganized as a "regular police department." In keeping with the policy of self-government which the WRA was introducing, a chief of police with two assistant chiefs, a captain, a desk sergeant, and a patrol sergeant for each shift were elected. The entire department cast votes for the chief and his assistants, and each shift voted for its own captain and sergeant. All orders to the evacuee policemen were issued through the evacuee chief or his assistants who were responsible to the Chief Internal Security Officer.

To aid in the selection of "suitable candidates" for the police force, the WRA administered observation tests to the evacuee policemen. Those failing to pass the tests were terminated. By December 6, the number of evacuee police had declined to 81.

Under the WRA, patrols of the center were conducted on foot, with "check-ups by the patrol sergeant in a car." Constant patrol was maintained "in sections" of the camp "that had the most trouble and violations."

A training program for the evacuee police was organized, and a school was started on November 1, 1942. Among the first training classes provided were sessions on criminal investigation, description of persons and property, report writing, traffic procedure, and patrol work. The classes, presented on a periodic basis, averaged 15 to 20 minutes in length, and followed "the common practice used in police schools." First, there would be a lecture, followed by a hypothetical case based on material covered in the lecture. This was followed up by discussion and correction. Where possible, an attempt was made to appeal to the students' interest by combining actual field work with the subject covered. A

48. War Relocation Authority, *Second Quarterly Report*, p. 36.

beneficial, but unscheduled, test of the training program resulted from a murder and a suicide committed in the center during the fall.

An evacuee officer assisted in giving the lectures. As many of the men could not follow lectures in English, an evacuee officer, selected as an interpreter, repeated them in Japanese. Examinations were set periodically, and many of the papers were written in Japanese. These papers were translated into English by an evacuee and graded by the instructor.

Arrests were made by both appointed personnel and evacuee policemen. No arrest was made unless a person was "caught in the act" or unless a warrant had been issued. Warrants were not issued without a complete investigation, and "a high degree of certainty that the person named in the warrant was the true offender." As a result, the person charged "generally pleaded guilty" and was ready "for punishment." There are no records of persons charged being found "not guilty."

Written reports were prepared by the officers making the case investigation. Evacuee police were allowed to write their own reports, with the appointed personnel assigned to follow up on the cases to see that they had been handled properly.

The first means of identification used by police in Manzanar was an armband with the word "Police" painted on it. While this served as a temporary means of identification, it "was not adequate when the officer had to work in crowds or in the dark." Accordingly, police uniforms were ordered from the Manzanar sewing factory in November 1942. The uniforms consisted of "a wine-colored shirt and green pants." Caps were ordered from "a mail-order house," and badges were purchased from a Los Angeles company. Because the workers in the sewing factory "lacked experience," many of the police uniforms "fitted poorly, but bad as they were the men were glad to get them."

The Program: Evacuee Attitudes Toward Cooperation with Police — At the start of the internal security program under the WRA, the evacuee population was reluctant to make reports to the police. At times, reports would leak back to the police department after incidents occurred. This meant that fights could take place or gangs could create disturbances without fear of their activities reaching the police until well after the incident. The evacuees' refusal to report "arose, at least in part, out of an inborn fear of the law," as well as "fear of retaliation from fellow evacuees."

Throughout 1942 the police department fought "a losing battle." Arrests were made, fights broken up, and disturbances quieted, but these incidents were "mostly cases the police had 'run across.'" A number of persons were brought before the Judicial Committee for trial and punishment, and long jail sentences were imposed, but the disturbances and thefts continued. Thirty days in the Manzanar jail for minor disturbances and as high as six months in the county jail for theft was "the rule."

Manzanar's original jail, located inside the police station with windows opening on a road, was "an easy place for prisoners' friends to visit and to pass articles through its windows." Instead of being a location for punishment and detention, it became "a spot in which to rest and have fun."

Nevertheless, because of the long sentences imposed by the "Project court," a feeling of "resentment against the police and the Judicial Council" mounted among the residents. Policemen were looked down upon and were referred to as "dogs" and "stool pigeons." Several police were "beaten up" when off duty. Cooperation from the residents was lacking, and when the police worked with the FBI and other outside law enforcement agencies, "popular feeling ran especially high," thus preventing law enforcement from being "an effective reality."

The Program: Gangs — Several gangs of boys operated continuously in Manzanar during 1942. One of these was the "Terminal Island" group, made up of boys and young men who had come from the working class neighborhoods of that island community. "If an insult, real or fancied, was leveled against any member of this gang, immediate action was taken by the rest of them." The Terminal Island boys, as they came to be called, "lacked the polish of polite society having been schooled in fishing boats and fish canneries." As a result, they were not "ordinarily invited to the social gatherings that were held in the Center." Consequently, a group of the Terminal Island boys "would often crash the gate at dances and parties given by more select groups." Disturbances and fights "arose when the attempt was made to stop their gate-crashing." While no fights occurred between the police and the Terminal Islanders "as a group, most of the evacuee police feared them."

To improve relationships, a series of meetings was held during 1942 between the police department and the leaders of the Terminal Island families "through the medium of some Terminal Island men who were on the police force." A clubroom was established for the Terminal Island boys, where "entertainments" were planned for them. Although the clubhouse helped matters, the Terminal Island boys continued to resent other groups for not giving them invitations to their "regular entertainments." When the gate-crashing continued, sponsors of other dances were urged to invite the Terminal Islanders. The "suggestion was acted upon at a school dance, with results to be expected — the boys attended, stood around a while, and left without further disturbance." Upon the recommendation of the police department, an educational program was initiated for the Terminal Island boys in which they were "taught to dance and to conduct themselves acceptably at social gatherings" with beneficial results.

Older members of the police department held meetings with "the old men of the Terminal Island group and placed on them the responsibility for maintaining peace among their people." After these meetings were completed, "very little trouble emerged." The boys gradually accepted their responsibility and assisted in maintaining peace among other gangs. As a result of these efforts, during the December riot, the Terminal Island boys were "one of the most cooperative groups" with law enforcement authorities. Instead, "in the interval that followed the 'incident' and until peace was declared in the Center, the Terminal Islanders maintained picket lines around their block and prevented others from passing through except on essential business."

The so-called "Dunbar Gang," a well-organized group of boys and young men primarily from West Los Angeles, posed more serious problems for the police. This gang had been operating in the Los Angeles area for some years prior to evacuation. Many of its members, which ranged in age from 15 to 24, had Los Angeles police records ranging from petty theft to burglary. Many gang members were at Manzanar "without a family or

family training." The gang managed "to get room assignments together in one of the barracks."

As early as May 1942, members of this gang were brought before the WCCA's Judicial Committee for crimes ranging from petty theft to burglary and malicious mischief. In June some were convicted of petty theft and placed on probation by the committee. In November, three were sentenced to six months in the Manzanar jail for breaking windows and "other malicious mischief." The boys were noisy in their quarters, and when fights occurred in the center, some of "their number were sure to be around." When some of Dunbar Gang left on furlough to work on farms in Montana during the summer of 1942, one was caught and convicted of burglary while away from the center.

After the police failed to obtain cooperation from this group, they requested the assistance of the Project Director. The strength of the gang was broken by depriving it of its leadership. Several of the ringleaders were sent to Boys' Town, while others were sent to jobs in the Middle West. After removal of the leaders, the remaining members were called to the police station and placed on probation under the direct supervision of families in the camp. After these events, "very little subsequent action against them became necessary."

The Program: Juvenile Delinquency — Most cases of juvenile delinquency, which "remained at a minimum throughout the operation of the Center," were handled by the Welfare Section at Manzanar. Police notified the Welfare Section of problems and turned cases over to for handling. If it became necessary for a juvenile to appear before the Judicial Committee for a hearing, the session was closed with the parents present to assist in development of "corrective plans."

The Program: Recreational Groups — In their crime prevention efforts at Manzanar, the police assisted community activities directed toward "guiding the young people of the Center." During 1942, the police, under the guidance of the WRA, began taking "a long-range view of the situation" and "gaining the cooperation of the residents as a whole and the young people in particular." Recreational programs designed for youth will be described later in this chapter.

Community Welfare

Under the WCCA.

Organization — According to the *Final Report, Manzanar*, community welfare at Manzanar "was organized to give attention primarily to the family life in the Center."⁴⁹ The "basic conditions of life in individual families had been disrupted" with evacuation. The report stated further:

49. Unless otherwise noted, material for this section is based on "Community Welfare Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. II, pp. 410-65 RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports," and War Relocation Authority, *Second Quarterly Report*, pp. 38-39.

. . . . Some families had been separated in the evacuation. Heads of many families, often those who had been community leaders, were interned. Related family groups which had not before been living together had elected to evacuate together because of feelings of insecurity, and were even living in the same apartments. Young married couples were housed for the first time with their parents. Because of inadequate housing space, the Center was over crowded.

Normal family life seemed almost impossible. In the beginning there were no partitions in the apartments, and no privacy was possible. In contrast meals were in mess halls, and families could not easily arrange to eat together as families. Normal family discipline was difficult. Previous patterns of work, school, and church life were broken.

Although the evacuees had before lived in somewhat segregated districts, they had been part of American communities. In coming to Manzanar on the basis of their Japanese ancestry, they were forced to live with others of similar ancestry in an artificial community whose members had not come together by choice, either economic or social. There was a wide range of background, habits, and social status.

On April 6, 1942, slightly over two weeks after the first evacuees arrived at Manzanar, the first consultation was arranged with the Chief of Community Services regarding the creation of a Family Relations Section to function under the Community Services Division. The work of the Family Relations Section was tentatively outlined as the task of looking after the "sociological needs and problems of Manzanar families."

The Family Relations Section was established on April 22. Staff, including one evacuee supervisor, Mrs. Miya Kikuchi, and field and office workers, were selected. The duties of the section were noted as "responsibility for Information Centers, notices, and bulletins, consideration of family relations, care of lost and found department, and voluntary helpers' corps."

By May 26, the Supervisor of the Family Relations Section reported a staff of 21 — five social workers, one stationed at each of the five information offices in the camp, four field workers, and two stenographers. The staff was approximately one-half Issei and one-half Nisei, all of whom had been college students.

The section's organization outlined six information officers, each to cover six blocks. In each Information Office, one social worker and three field workers would be placed. A central office would be established for the supervisor, her assistant, and two stenographers.

Early Duties — Soon after organization of the Family Relations Section, the unit determined that the unit would focus on six principal divisions of work. These were juvenile problems, family problems, inter-family problems, aged persons and invalids, personal service, and assistance to needy families. In addition, the section had to deal with many other problems related to stabilization of family life and establishment of minimum normal \ conditions of housing, food, clothing, work, and health.

Assistance to needy families concerned the section employees immediately. They began to study family budgets, and since no funds for grants were as yet available, they received voluntary contributions, which they dispensed as loans. They established an advisory committee to aid in selecting loan recipients.

By May 1942, the section estimated that about 200 families were in need of public assistance. Many of these were families in which the father was interned after Pearl Harbor. Of these cases, 30 were considered to be major cases — one morals case, 12 family quarrels, and two divorce cases. In addition to these families, it was reported that 700-800 single persons who had come to Manzanar as volunteers to help establish the center in March, and who had as yet received no wages, were without money for daily personal expenditures. The need for clothing, especially children's clothes, shoes, babies' diapers, layettes for expectant mothers, and work clothes for men was already apparent. To help care for the blind, infirm, and convalescent cases, the section worked with the hospital and public health staff to develop a housekeeping aide system.

The Family Relations Section met daily for discussion, consultation, and training. The section worked with the camp administration and the evacuees and block leaders to cope with the crowded housing conditions. Other daily problems that affected daily family life, and that the section was expected to resolve, included questions relating to mess hall procedures, lack of sweets for children, lack of food appropriate for invalids and babies, permits for milk, teaching young girls to cook, issuance of four bars of soap per half month to each apartment, need for clothes, sewing machines, and clothes lines, lack of partitions in latrines, and high prices at the camp canteen.

Although there was no provision for schools under the WCCA, the Family Relations Section made a preliminary educational survey in May 1942 that indicated that there were 3,123 persons from infants to college age in the camp. The section enrolled voluntary teachers, corresponded with schools about textbooks, and started some voluntary classes.

Under the WRA.

Establishment of Community Welfare Section — On June 5, Thomas Temple arrived at Manzanar to become Chief of Community Services, a WRA organizational unit that would provide supervision for the WCCA's former Family Relations Section. Two weeks later, Dr. Genevieve Carter became the new Superintendent of Education at Manzanar, and the Family Relations Section relinquished its responsibility for a voluntary school program to her organization.

As the WRA took over Manzanar, one of the principal problems facing the Family Relations Section concerned the need of many evacuee families for clothing and public assistance. When these needs were publicized, the San Francisco YMCA, Christian Church Federation, various womens' groups, American Friends Service Committee, and interested individuals sent new and used clothing, blankets, and comforters to Manzanar. In addition, out-dated army uniforms were sent to the camp in late June.

During late June, the centers former information offices were disbanded, and the social workers in these offices was discontinued. On June 26, the Family Relations Section staff was consolidated in one office with their duties "concentrated on strictly welfare matters."

On July 6, Mrs. Margaret D'Ille arrived to become Supervisor of the Family Relations Section, Mrs. Miya Kikuchi having resigned because of family responsibilities. Two days later, on July 8, the name of the section was changed to the Community Welfare Section, and placed under the Chief of Community Services.

The central office of the Community Welfare Section was established in Block 1, Building 10, Apartment 1. This small office, which served as the central office for four months, was equipped with "one cupboard, two long tables, and benches, with a corner for private interviews behind two screens." There were no desks, chairs, files, or telephone, and only one typewriter.

During 1942 the Community Welfare staff usually met each day to discuss its work and policies. A training course with lectures and discussion about social work philosophy and policy was conducted by Harry and Lillian Matsumoto, superintendents of the Children's Village, which was opened at Manzanar in June to house Japanese American orphans and abandoned children.⁵⁰

According to the *Final Report, Manzanar*, the staff meetings and training programs of the Community Welfare Section were hampered by "the language handicap." In "a community where the older persons spoke or read for the most part only Japanese, while many of the younger persons spoke and read only English, a bi-lingual Welfare staff would have been desirable." Since this was "not possible," the "nearest approach to this was a combination of Issei and Nisei staff, and the use of translation where it was especially important." "Even so, perfect understanding was tardy, open and free discussions hard, and much time had to be allowed to accomplish results."

Language and cultural questions, according to the Community Welfare Section's portion of the *Final Report, Manzanar*, was "a constant consideration for staff and for residents." The report stated further:

. . . . How far Japanese language, culture, ideals, and manners should be recognized in a community whose background was Japanese but which should increasingly be a part of American life, came up for repeated consideration. The Welfare Section had to attempt to unite both cultural patterns but had constantly to work toward future American understanding.

In the early days of Center life, the Nisei took a very active part in community leadership. Many Issei leaders were still interned when the Center started. Many were paroled to Manzanar during 1942. To get a combination of Issei and Nisei leadership was extremely difficult. At meetings where Issei were present, Nisei

50. The three buildings for the Children's Village were completed in June 1942. On June 23, children were taken by bus to Manzanar from the Maryknoll Home and the Japanese American Children's Home, as well as other orphanages and foster homes, in Los Angeles. Children from the San Francisco Salvation Army Home arrived at Manzanar a week later. The first contingent consisted of 61 children, but 101 children would eventually be housed at the Children's Village at different times. For more information on this topic, see Wilbur Sato, "Manzanar Children's Village," Files, Pacific Great Basin System Support Office, San Francisco, and Dr. T. G. Ishimaru, "Children's Village, Manzanar Relocation Project," January 22, 1943, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 68, File, "Community Management — Welfare — Children's Village, Manzanar, 1943.

felt loath to speak, since their Japanese was inadequate. Issei found it hard to accept any Nisei advice or opinion on its merits. At the same time many Issei were fearful of their future and unwilling to express their ideas or take responsibility.

The Welfare Section encountered great difficulty in the realm of the conflict in families between old Japanese cultural ideas and those of modern young Japanese Americans. The close life under crowded housing conditions aggravated this clash of ideas. Grandparents wished to control their grandchildren in discipline, manners, food, and sleeping habits. Parents' control of selection of their children's mates was accentuated in the Center. Young peoples' social life was constantly under the eye of older persons, their parents and others. Children had difficulty about space, time, and quiet for homework for school. There were strong differences of opinion between the older and younger groups in churches.

In some cases conflicts between old cultural patterns and new ideas resulted in family separations and tragedy. In certain cases wives used the opportunity of economic freedom to insist upon actual separation from their husbands. There were disagreements about questions such as repatriation and relocation. In difficult triangle cases, in cases of the future of illegitimate children, in questions of divorce, it was very difficult to get families to discuss and decide questions on the basis of what seemed right or best. It was even hard to get a recognition of American codes of law. The tendency always was to discuss what had been the old Japanese way or what was understood to be the American or modern way, and to contrast these two ideas. . . .

The Welfare staff had to stand between the old Japanese thinking and extremes of modern ideas, with an effort to unite family life and development. They tried to urge preservation of the best in both ways, and the need for preparation for the future on the basis of reality and not prejudice. . . .

Activities During 1942: Clothing — The work of the Community Welfare Section during the summer and autumn of 1942 emphasized family visiting and counseling, with daily staff meetings for reports and training. As a result of daily visitation, two principal programs developed — one was concerned with clothing while the other focused on grants in aid. Other functions that normally would have fallen under welfare were directly administered by the head of Community Services and not turned over to welfare until early 1943.

To meet the pressing clothing needs at Manzanar during 1942, the Community Welfare Section first developed a system to distribute new and used clothing privately contributed to the center. A small amount of clothing was purchased and distributed, and donated surplus out-dated army clothing was distributed. Since virtually all military clothing was too large, a sewing room was established for the alteration of garments as well as for making new garments. Although all army clothing was for men, women of the center were as needy as the men, especially as the autumn cold approached. Thus, "pea-coats" that required alteration were also issued to women. •

A warehouse and distributing center was assigned to the Community Welfare Section. An ironing room was equipped as a sewing room with electric machines. Two sewing machines were assigned to each block for family use.

In November 1942, the WRA announced a new program for clothing allowances and grants. This program provided for an automatic monthly clothing allowance for workers and their dependents, supplemented by a clothing grant for unemployable families based on a monthly determination of need. Thus, the surplus stock in the Community Welfare Section's warehouse was offered to the Cooperative Enterprises at cost. What they did not take was later turned over to Property Control for purchase by workers in the camp. Later, the Welfare sewing room workers were transferred to the Industrial Section where they worked and received training as power machine operatives.

About November 15 the Community Welfare Section began preparation of Basic Family Fact sheets to provide the necessary information to implement the new clothing program. A "new physical house-to-house check" was conducted "by blocks, barracks and apartments." Before the completion of the cards, the "Manzanar Incident" on December 6 interrupted the life of the center. The cards were taken over and completed by the Fiscal Section, thus delaying authorization of the first clothing allowances until December 31, 1942.

Activities During 1942: Public Assistance Grants and Unemployment Compensation — The first public assistance grants were authorized at Manzanar in July 1942, but they were not paid until September. The grants were issued to each of the children in the Children's Village and to center families on the basis of need (e.g., illness, father interned, insufficient income, separated from husband, six minor children, etc.). Under a policy adopted on August 24, the WRA provided for grants to deserving evacuees who were not in a position to benefit either from the center's employment program or from unemployment compensation. These evacuees included: (1) persons who were unable to work because of illness or incapacity; (2) dependents of physically incapacitated evacuees; (3) orphans and other children under 18 without means of support; and (4) heads of families with a total income from all sources inadequate to meet their needs. By the end of 1942, public assistance cases at Manzanar numbered 162, in addition to 63 children at the Children's Village.⁵¹

Under WRA employment and compensation policies adopted on September 1, 1942, provision was made for unemployment compensation. Any evacuee who applied for work and was assigned a job or who was laid off through no fault of his own could apply to the WRA for unemployment compensation covering himself and his dependents. Rates of unemployment compensation were established at \$4.75 per month for men age 18 and older; \$4.25 for women 18 and older; \$2.50 for dependent children between 13 and 17, inclusive; and \$1.50 for dependent children under 13.⁵²

Administration of the public assistance program at Manzanar was affected by traditional Japanese attitudes toward public assistance and their acceptance of conditions for granting

51. War Relocation Authority, *Second Quarterly Report*, p. 34.

52. *Ibid.*

aid. Prior to the war, Japanese communities in the United States had generally taken care of their own needy cases. As a result, almost no Japanese were on public relief rolls before evacuation except for chronic patients in hospitals and mental institutions and children in orphanages.

After evacuation to Manzanar, when it was discovered that some evacuee families and some aged persons without relatives and widows with children were in need, the welfare staff "followed the traditional Japanese method to relieve them temporarily." A small fund was privately collected and dispensed as loans. Throughout the operation of Manzanar there would be a small fund at the disposal of the welfare staff made up of voluntary contributions by people in the center. This fund was used in cases of need that did not come under rules of eligibility for public assistance grants.

At the beginning of the authorization of grants in aid, it was necessary, through careful work of the family visitors with evacuees, to explain that the acceptance of public assistance did not carry a stigma, and that it was "essentially an extension of the old idea, familiar to them all, of the responsibility of family members for their own relatives, of friends for each other and community members jointly." Despite these efforts, however, some needy families refused to apply or to accept grants.

Activities During 1942: Handicapped Children — In October 1942, family visitors from the Community Welfare Section met with personnel of the Health Section and school officials to consider the question of what should be done with deaf, handicapped, and crippled children. As a result, a crippled children's diagnostic clinic was established on November 16. Appointments were scheduled for 38 children, the oldest being 20 years of age. The types of conditions to be evaluated included orthopedic, heart, eye, hearing, spastic, and orthodontic. Attempts to have deaf children sent out of the center for instruction were unsuccessful. Later a school for handicapped children was developed by Miss Eleanor Thomas of the Education Section in one ward of the hospital.

Activities During 1942: Churches — Soon after the first evacuees reached Manzanar, outside churches assisted the residents in both material and spiritual ways. As soon as the camp was established, key persons from many religious groups visited Manzanar to find out what could be done and later assisted the evacuees in the centers as well as with relocation outside. In late March 1942 the Federal Council of Churches of Los Angeles and the Maryknoll fathers, sent church equipment, money, and other items to assist the evacuees in establishment of church life.

It was realized by many religious groups that public sentiment for the evacuees throughout the nation should be improved. It was important that the outside church become expert in public relations. Prominent clergymen went on record as deploring attacks on the Japanese population on the basis of ancestry. An early movement sponsored by outside churches consisted of programs, such as scholarships, housing, and employment, to relocate college students from the relocation centers.

The first religious group to hold services in the center were the Methodists. They met on March 29 with Rev. Frank Herron Smith of the Methodist Board of Home Missions preaching in Japanese and Rev. Hideo Hashimoto translating in English. Later the Catholic and Protestant groups began holding services and organizing activities often under lay

leadership. Under the WCCA, the only religious services permitted at Manzanar were those "of the Catholic faith and under the direction of such Protestant ministers as were certified by the Federated Church Council." No Buddhist worship was permitted, and all services were required to be conducted in the English language. Religious services were held in the recreation halls.⁵³

The WRA issued a policy statement regarding religious worship at the relocation centers on May 29, just prior to assuming administrative control of Manzanar, and again on August 24. The policy stated that "the right of freedom of religious worship in WRA centers is recognized and shall be respected." Under this policy, evacuees of all religious groups, including Buddhists, were permitted to hold services in the centers and to invite outside pastors in for temporary visits with the approval of the Project Director and the community council. Despite the policy permitting religious freedom, State Shinto was barred on the grounds that it involved worship of the Japanese Emperor. Restrictions against the use of the Japanese language in religious services were removed by the WRA.⁵⁴

Early provisions for religious worship at Manzanar were hardly adequate for a community of 10,000 people. Administrative Instruction No. 32 stated WRA policy for church facilities:

At each relocation project the WRA will provide material for the construction of one building to be used as a general center of worship by the several denominations represented in the community. Suitable altar furnishings will have to be provided by each denomination and a schedule of periods of worship will have to be arranged.

In compliance with this directive, WRA camp administrators planned to construct one church building at Manzanar, but because of the difficulty of procuring building materials and a lack of agreement regarding the joint use of the building when it would be constructed, it was decided temporarily to continue allotment of recreation buildings for church use. Later the plans for building a joint church were abandoned, and block recreation buildings and mess halls became permanent churches.

The connection between church groups and the camp administration was effected at Manzanar through the Community Welfare Section, because many functions of welfare were closely connected with church life. On September 30, 1942, the Community Welfare Section made several decisions regarding the establishment and operation of churches at Manzanar. It was agreed that facilities for Buddhist, Catholic, and Protestant churches would be provided, and it was determined that the various sects of the Buddhist faith would function jointly and the various Protestant denominations would meet as a Community Protestant Church.

53. "Conditions At Manzanar Relocation Area, June 1, 1942," by George H. Dean, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 293, File No. 41.080 #1, May-June 1942.

54. U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *Story of Human Conservation*, p. 107.

Until January 1944 ministers, priests, and sisters were listed on the Community Welfare Section payroll as family counselors, thus entitling them to compensation for their services. As professionals, they were paid 19 dollars a month. These religious leaders met frequently with the rest of the welfare staff, and they were called upon particularly when special cases indicated that advice from an appropriate church leader would be helpful.

A religious affiliation census was conducted at Manzanar in August 1942. The results were: Buddhist, 4,048; Catholic, 454; Protestant, 2,684; Shinto, 21; Other, 21; No religion, 2,321. Several months later, weekly attendance statistics showed that 1,800-1,900 persons were attending Buddhist services, while approximately 500 and 1,550 were attending Catholic and Protestant services, respectively. Appointed personnel attended and took part in services.

The Buddhist Church was at first under suspicion regarding allegiance to the United States because Caucasians knew little about its religious beliefs and values. Over time the community-conscious Buddhists participated in many events in the life of the camp, interpreting their church programs and thus disproving suspicions of special allegiance to Japan.

On June 21, the Buddhists held their first services. The congregation consisted of Buddhist followers, principally from Southern California, the Sacramento area, and Bainbridge Island, Washington. Mr. L. Mihara acted as chairman on the opening day and sermons were delivered by Mr. Junzo Izmuida and Mr. Sangoro Mayeda, while Mr. Eizo Masuyama participated as the ceremonial speaker. In August, the Rev. Shinjo Nagatomi arrived from the Tanforan Assembly Center in response to an invitation from the Manzanar Buddhists, accepting pastoral responsibility of the Buddhist Church activities and duties at Manzanar. The Nyubutsu ceremony, or the dedication of the church shrine, was held on September 13, 1942, with Rev. Nagatomi as the dedication speaker.

The Buddhist Church was divided into four sects. The Shinshu sect, for which the Rev. Nagatomi officiated as head and was assisted by Mr. Mayeda, held its services at the head church. The Nichiren Shu held its services in Block 27, Building 15. The other sects, Daishi Ko and Kannon Ko, held their services in Block 13, Building 15.

The regular services of the church represented a combination of American and Japanese influences. Two regular Sunday services were held morning and evening. The morning service was for the young people and the evening service for adults. Sunday school classes were held regularly for children and young persons. Besides the regular services, memorial services, funerals, and weddings were conducted as necessary.

Three organizations were affiliated with the Buddhist Church. These included the Buddhists Block Representatives Council with 150 members, the Young Buddhist Association with 900 members, and the Buddhists Women's organization with 1,000 members. The Buddhists were community-conscious and contributed to many social, cultural, and ceremonial events in the life of the camp.

Father Clement arrived with the first large contingent of volunteers at Manzanar in late March 1942 and conducted the first Catholic mass before the end of the month. Although Father Clement returned to the camp periodically to hold masses, the Manzanar Catholic

Church did not receive a regular pastor until July 1942 when Father Steinback returned from internment in Japan. He remained at the center until it closed in November 1945.

Father Steinback was assisted by Sisters Bernadette and Suzanne, Japanese nuns. They held study clubs, taught classes for all ages, organized a choir, and counseled families and individuals. They established two membership clubs — the Senior Sodality and the Holy Name Society.

The Catholic Church was the smallest religious group at Manzanar, but it was reportedly "the one most closely knit." During the three-year internment period, more than 230 persons in the camp were converted to Catholicism.

As there were many followers of various Protestant denominations at Manzanar, the Community Welfare Section determined that all would be united under one organization called the Manzanar Christian Church. The stated purpose of the church was "to make God a reality in daily living."

With the arrival of the evacuated pastors from the West Coast and the WRA's lifting of restrictions against the use of the Japanese language in preaching, organized Protestant church work began to take shape. The first official body formed was the Christian Council. At the opening meeting in June 1942 more than 70 members were assigned as representatives of the adult council. In August, the church was dedicated in Block 15, Building 15. Later three additional worship centers were located conveniently in the center. The program included services in English and Japanese on Sunday morning and evening. During week days, the program included prayer meetings, club meetings, Bible study, and choir practice. A church school was established, the upper division open to children of elementary and high school age and the lower division to children of preschool age. Church-related social clubs included the Young People's Fellowship, the Young Adult Forum, and the Adult Council.

Activities During 1942: YWCA and YMCA — As early as April 1942 correspondence was carried on between the Business and Professional Girls Club of Los Angeles and some older girls at Manzanar, former members of the club, regarding establishment of a "Y" in the center. As a result of the efforts of interested individuals, a group of women concerned with the formation of Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) chapter at Manzanar met in the center with two secretaries from the National YWCA and one from Los Angeles on August 5. Mrs. Miya Kikuchi was chosen as the first president of the YWCA board and Miss Alice Asaka the first general secretary. Additional officers included an office secretary, a Girl Reserve secretary, older girls' secretary, and a house mother for the organization's dormitory. At first, all personnel of the organization were paid through the Community Welfare Section at the regular camp wages of \$19 and \$16. The administrative board was composed of evacuee and appointed personnel.

To encourage the membership of Buddhists and Catholic girls in the "Y", it was decided that the matter of religion would be left to the church and its officials. Thus, this organization was at first known in Manzanar at the Young Women's Association (YWA).

The WRA allotted one barrack, Block 19, Building 15, for the office and club rooms of the YWA. Furnishings were contributed by the Japanese branch YWCA in Los Angeles, the national office, and individual YWCA branches throughout the country.

By October 1942, the YWA had established seven older girls' clubs and nine Girl Reserve clubs at Manzanar. A dormitory for single girls had also been started. The clubs began playing an active role in various community programs at the camp, including assistance to school committees and PTA groups, as well as the adult education program, Community Activities Section, and churches. That month a national secretary led a conference at the camp under the theme "To Give and Find the Best." In November the YWA played a significant role in World Fellowship Week activities at Manzanar with Miss Ruth Woodsmall, World YWCA general secretary, and Mrs. Edna Moore of the national staff present.

The Manzanar Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) was organized in the early autumn of 1942 at the request of men and boys who had been members of the YMCA before coming to Manzanar. The first meetings on organization were held in the apartment of the Chief of Community Services, and the formation of the groups was sponsored by him and aided by the girls interested in a sister organization for the YWA. A clubhouse and dormitory were assigned to the YMCA. A board, consisting of Issei and Nisei and appointed personnel, was established. Clubs were organized, and two secretaries were employed. These staff members, like those of the YWA, were at first carried on the payroll of the Community Welfare Section.

The YMCA activities at Manzanar never became as extensive as those of the YWA, primarily because young men were generally the first to leave the center on seasonal leave, trial leave, and final relocation. Thus, the YMCA leadership and membership at the camp were constantly changing.

Activities During 1942: Red Cross Unit — The first meeting to organize a Red Cross unit at Manzanar was held in April 1942. It was decided to request assistance from the Los Angeles Red Cross in establishment of the unit. Many of the evacuees in the camp had been members of various Red Cross chapters in Los Angeles before evacuation. However, Los Angeles would take no responsibility for Red Cross work in the camp. Thus, authority to organize a Red Cross unit was provided by the San Francisco area office.

By early autumn of 1942, interest in Red Cross activities at Manzanar had decreased except for request for first-aid and home-nursing classes. Home nursing was taught by a Red Cross itinerant nurse from the San Francisco area office. Camp administrators encouraged the home nursing course because women who passed the course could serve in the Manzanar hospital as nurses' aides as well as provide home nursing services for patients dismissed from the hospital. Of the 200 persons who attended these classes, several continued as nurses' aides until the hospital closed in October 1945. Several home nursing classes were taught by public health nurses at the camp. These classes were registered with the San Francisco area office, and students who passed were issued certificates.

First aid courses were encouraged by the camp administration, because there were few telephones at Manzanar and medical services were hampered by limited staff. During the

fall of 1942, the center's schools required that one teacher in each block have a first aid certificate. All nursery and kindergarten teachers were required to have certificates, while firemen and policemen were encouraged to have them. Although the Red Cross unit experienced difficulty in finding teachers who were fluent in both Japanese and English or translators who could understand the subject to make teaching practical, more than 100 persons completed the first aid course. First aid and home nursing text books were sold to those taking the courses by the local Red Cross unit.

Statistics

When the WRA took over administrative control of Manzanar on June 1, the organizational unit that would later become known as the Statistics Section existed as two separate units. A group of clerks in the Housing and Employment Division formed one unit, while the other, the Census Office, was an independent unit that had just been established by Washington.

Registration and Records Unit. At first, no special subdivision of the Housing and Employment Division was in charge of record keeping, but on June 18 a memorandum from the Employment Officer to an evacuee on his staff placed her in charge of a unit to be responsible for this work. During the summer of 1942, this unit was known by various names (chiefly as Personnel), but in August it became known as the Registration and Records Unit. No standards were set up for the guidance of this work either by the WRA offices in Washington or San Francisco. Thus, methods and procedures were adapted from the former office experience of the local staff.

The first records kept were family folders, family record cards, and individual cards with work classification information for the use of the Employment Section. The family folders contained documents pertaining to the family or individuals within the family group, papers concerning the release of a parolee from an internment center, travel permits, and correspondence. As each family arrived in Manzanar, it was assigned an identification number, and data regarding the group was entered by hand on a family record card (824-M). Besides the family name, head, identification number, Manzanar residence, and previous address, these cards noted family relationship, sex, citizenship, date and place of birth, schooling, and health data for each member. On the reverse side of the card was space for pre-evacuation work history and names of those required to continue at school. This information was later typed on WCCA Form R-1, a card "practically identical with 824-M except rearranged with a space for remarks." These cards contained the notation, "Old Id. #—." These were numbers given groups when they registered preparatory to evacuation, which had become known as Social Data Registration numbers.

From the beginning, the Registration and Records Unit functioned as a depository and disbursing center for information concerning evacuees to other units at Manzanar as well as various WRA offices. While a part of Housing and Employment, the unit occupied desk space in the office of the division, "a 20- by 24-foot apartment designated as 1-2-1" (Block 1, Building 2, Apartment 1). About September 1, the second-hand desks and files were moved to Block 1, Building 5, Apartment 2, where the unit became the sole occupant of a 20-foot x 20-foot apartment. The work was under the general supervision of the Employment Officer and more directly under the junior placement officer. About the time

the office was moved to 1-5-2, it was placed, together with the Census, under the direction of an Employment Officer from the WRA Regional Office in San Francisco.

Census. The Census was a temporary project initiated by the WRA's Washington office to gather information about the evacuees. A mimeographed pamphlet of instructions for interviewers was prepared on May 30, and the work began in June. Appointed personnel from the Regional Office selected and trained the evacuee interviewers, and one remained for some time to supervise the work. After her departure, an evacuee was placed in charge. As of July 9, the Census employed a staff of 67 evacuees.

While the interviewing was in progress, the Census moved from block to block for the convenience of the residents. Master housing lists were compiled and maintained as a means of obtaining complete coverage of the blocks. Interviews were scheduled for all family members 14 years of age or older.

After all 36 blocks had been visited by the Census, the office was established at 1-5-1 about September 1. A selected corps of interviewers translated the occupational histories into the terms and codes used by the U.S. Employment Service and filled out an Employee Record Card for the use of the Employment Section. This service to Employment, later known as Personnel, was continued by the interviewers as long as interviewing was underway. The work was not completed until January 1943.⁵⁵

Evacuee Employment

Under the WCCA. During the early weeks of Manzanar's operations, recruitment of incoming evacuees for employment in the center was conducted in "a more or less haphazard manner." Various functions had to be performed, such as operation of mess halls and organization of community facilities and services. Amid the chaos of the evacuation process during the spring of 1942, efforts to place each person in the position for which he "was best fitted was at first almost an impossibility.

Nevertheless, the WCCA embarked on a program to employ the Manzanar evacuees until such time as they were relocated. The assignment of jobs to evacuees was delegated to the Personnel Section of the Finance Division. Under the supervision of this section, all employable persons at Manzanar were registered and classified beginning in April 1942.⁵⁶ The registration and classification were used to find and recruit qualified persons to fill the numerous jobs needed to operate the center as well as to serve as an aid to relocation.⁵⁷ As this registration and classification process neared its final stages, regulations and directives were issued in regard to employment. No evacuee was given a job without a "work order" authorizing employment issued by the Personnel Section, and no evacuee could quit one job and apply for another without a release from the Personnel

55. "Statistics Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. IV, pp. 1,412-17, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 73, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

56. *Manzanar Free Press*, April 22, 1942, p. 2.

57. *Ibid.*, April 25, 1942, p. 2.

Section. Five consecutive absences would result in dismissal of the evacuee from his assigned job.⁵⁸

Evacuee employment at Manzanar advanced rapidly under this system. By the first week of May 1942, the population of Manzanar had increased to some 7,200 persons, of which some 2,300 were assigned jobs. Approximately 150 work orders were issued each day. Many of the early job assignments were of a temporary nature, and adjustments accounted for a sizable portion of the daily work orders.⁵⁹

A census of evacuee employment at Manzanar taken in mid-May demonstrated the number and diversity of jobs in which evacuees were employed. The employment list showed the following breakdown: executive office, 11; finance division, 24; timekeeping and payroll, 59; personnel section, 32; heating and plumbing maintenance, 83; fuel oil detail, 30; electrical maintenance, 45; machinist crew, 8; carpentry detail, 36; sewage plant, 15; water works, 15; garbage and rubbish disposal, 49; ground and street improvement and maintenance, 140; office personnel, 28; fire department, 95; police department, 128; stenographers, 4; bedding, moving, and checkers, 36; housing, 45; hospital, health, and sanitation, 263; laundry staff, 33; ambulance drivers, 5; night watchmen, 12; janitors, 15; gardeners, 10; kitchen staff, mess, and food warehouses, 1,562.

Of the 9,671 evacuees at Manzanar on June 1, nearly one-third (3,165) were employed in "operations, services and functions within the project." Of this number, about 125 were employed in agriculture.⁶⁰

While evacuee employment was increasing at Manzanar, the issue of wages continued to be a significant matter of concern to the workers. When the first evacuee volunteers arrived to work at Manzanar, many were under the impression that prevailing American wage scales would be applied to them. As time passed, however, the WCCA failed to make any statement concerning wages as a result of internal agency debates over the issue. Official announcements were periodically made, however, that a wage policy was being formulated.⁶¹ The announcements, however, created confusion as contradictory announcements regarding policies were forthcoming from the Army, the WCCA, and the WRA. From a public relations standpoint, it seemed unwise to pay evacuees at the centers a higher wage than the minimum wage of the American soldier, which was \$21 a month. On the other hand, in fairness to the evacuees, the scale had to be set sufficiently high to provide some incentive for productive work, and to enable the workers to purchase needed items not furnished in the camp. Finally, on May 14, nearly two months after work programs started at Manzanar, the WCCA unexpectedly announced the wage scale that was to apply to operating assembly and reception/relocation centers. The policies were continued by the WRA and formalized in WRA policy adopted on September 1. Monthly wages ranged from \$12 for unskilled or semi-skilled labor, to \$16 for skilled

58. *Ibid.*, April 22, 1942, p. 2.

59. *Ibid.*, May 9, 1942, p. 1.

60. "Conditions At Manzanar Relocation Area, June 1, 1942," by George H. Dean, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 293, File No. 41.080 #1, May-June 1942.

61. *Manzanar Free Press*, April 18, 1942, p. 3.

labor, to \$19 for professional work or supervisory responsibilities. The wages would be paid to all employees, and in addition they would receive food, shelter, and medical and dental care. Clothing would be issued to those in need, and a gratuitous issue of money would be made to all persons for the purchase of personal necessities.⁶²

The low wage scale was not well received by the evacuee population at Manzanar, many residents charging the WCCA with "broken promises" when it was learned that the workers would not be paid wages prevailing on the outside.⁶³ Similar charges were leveled when the evacuee employees were forced to wait to be paid the sum due them for their work to date. It was not until the last week in June, nearly one month after the WRA assumed administrative control of Manzanar, that payment was begun for work done in the month of March. Two weeks later payment was started for work performed in April.⁶⁴

Under the WRA. In its *First Quarterly Report*, the War Relocation Authority outlined its policies that governed evacuee employment in the relocation centers. In order to provide employment at the centers and hold down the costs of program administration, the WRA early determined that each relocation center "should be as nearly self-sufficient as possible." One step in that direction was selection of areas with agricultural potential so that evacuees with farm experience might produce "a maximum of the foods needed for their own community kitchens." Another was the planning of government-sponsored manufacturing projects to produce articles needed by evacuees (such as clothing) and goods required by the camps as a whole (such as school furniture). A third step was employment of evacuees in: (1) construction of buildings other than basic housing, (2) a range of community service occupations at the centers; and (3) various clerical and other phases of project administration and maintenance.⁶⁵

Under the WRA, an Employment Office was organized at Manzanar with a staff of evacuee interviewers and occupational analysts. Evacuees were required to register with the office, and an Employment Record Card was developed for each evacuee. When the employment record cards were completed, the Employment Office established a file of occupational classifications, including those persons too aged, feeble, or young to work; housewives; and those physically handicapped or in poor health. From the file of those available for employment, an effort was made to place in useful employment as many people as could fit into a specific job classification. The purpose of this process was to maximize the utilization of individual evacuee skills wherever possible.

Although section heads sometimes recruited prospective employees that were then processed through the Employment Office, the most satisfactory method of recruitment, and the one eventually adopted by the Personnel Office, was known as the "referral method." The placement unit of the Personnel Office maintained a list of people who had

62. *Ibid.*, May 14, 1942, p. 1; War Relocation Authority, *First Quarterly Report*, pp. 16-17; and War Relocation Authority, *Second Quarterly Report*, p. 49.

63. "Project Director's Report," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. I, pp. A 15-16, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 71, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

64. *Manzanar Free Press*, June 27, 1942, p. 1, and July 9, 1942, p. 1.

65. War Relocation Authority, *First Quarterly Report*, pp. 15-16.

inquired about employment. If no particular type of job was available at the moment, the person was told that he would be notified. His employment record card was taken from the file and checked for occupational classification, and as soon as a job was available, a referral card was immediately sent to his quarters, usually by personal delivery to facilitate the contact. The employing officer interviewed the referred person, and action was taken on his suitability for the job.

By September 30, the number of evacuees employed in full-time jobs at Manzanar had risen to 4,159 (approximately 80 percent of the employables). The largest number (1,503) were working in the mess halls, while more than 1,000 men and 30 women evacuees were engaged in the sugar beet fields of Montana and Idaho.⁶⁶

Opportunities for private employment outside the centers developed on a significant scale during late May and early June 1942. The growing wartime-related manpower shortage in agricultural sections of the West was beginning to be acutely felt, and the need for labor in the sugar beet fields was especially urgent. At the suggestion of public officials in some of the principal sugar beet producing states, plans were developed by the WCCA and WRA and the U.S. Employment Service to recruit groups of evacuees in assembly and relocation centers for agricultural work. Under the plans, recruitment during May and June was handled on a voluntary basis by the Employment Service in cooperation with representatives of the sugar companies.

To protect the interests of both the evacuees and the general public, the WRA and the WCCA established definite requirements that had to be met before evacuees could be employed in an agricultural area outside the centers. These stipulations included: (1) written assurance from the state governor and local law enforcement officials that law and order would be maintained; (2) provision by the employer for transportation from the assembly or relocation center to the place of employment and return; (3) payment of prevailing wages; (4) provision that local labor would not be displaced; and (5) certification by the U.S. Employment Service that satisfactory housing would be provided to the evacuees without cost in the area of employment. Although these conditions were established jointly by the WRA and the WCCA (because much of the recruiting took place in assembly centers), the actual operation compliance phase of the program was handled by the WRA. As a result of the program, large acreages of a vitally need crop were saved. According to the WRA, this work was probably the most direct and positive contribution to the war effort made by the evacuees during the early months of the evacuation process.⁶⁷

The WRA policy on employment and compensation adopted on September 1, 1942, provided for automatic enrollment in the War Relocation Work Corps of all evacuees assigned to jobs in the relocation centers. Under this policy the WRA administrators at Manzanar initiated efforts to enroll employed evacuees in the center's Work Corps. The Work Corps was designed to have a Representative Assembly elected by all of the various work groups on the basis of one representative for every fifty workers or fraction thereof.

66. "Personnel Management Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 1,180-83, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports," and War Relocation Authority, *Second Quarterly Report*, pp. 10, 64.

67. War Relocation Authority, *First Quarterly Report*, pp. 17-18.

In addition to the Representative Assembly, the WRA policy directive called for a Fair Practices Committee and a Merit Rating Board to aid in the solution of the center's labor problems. This committee would be composed of three members from the professional or executive staff, and one each from the Industrial, Agricultural, and Mess sections, as well as one member selected by various other projects acting together.⁶⁸

Election of representatives took place late in September, but the results showed only a mediocre interest in the Work Corps. Nevertheless, organization continued and the nomination committee advanced names for election to the Fair Practices Committee.⁶⁹ The election of the Fair Practices Committee took place on October 23, but the Mess Section failed to take part in the election. This group, led by Harry Ueno who would play a vital role in the "Manzanar Incident" on December 6, distrusted the Work Corps, believing that it was a tool of the administration. Led by Ueno, the mess workers formed their own Kitchen Workers Union, the stated purpose of which was to wring concessions from the administration rather than have the administration wring more work out of the evacuees as they believed would happen under the Work Corps. Nevertheless, the Fair Practices Committee chose candidates for the organization and prepared a tentative constitution and by-laws. The organization, composed of candidates elected from those selected by the organizing committee, met and approved a constitution and by-laws and elected a chairman as well as other officers.

As stated in the constitution, the purpose of the Manzanar Fair Practices Committee was "to afford Manzanar with a democratic representative organization within the work corps in order to maintain fair employment practice." All persons on "acceptance of employment automatically" became a member of the Manzanar Work Corps. The membership consisted of the executive staff, or those with direct supervisory responsibility to an administrative official, and all others defined as "project employees." The immediate aim of the organization was "to settle employment grievances and problems through proper channels to establish coordination between the administration and the members of the Work Corps, and to assist in relocating the evacuees." The ultimate purpose of the organization was "to provide for successful rehabilitation of evacuees."⁷⁰

Despite the lofty goals of the Manzanar Work Corps, distrust of its program was not limited to the Kitchen Workers Union but was widespread throughout the center. Many of the evacuees were wary of the Work Corps because those associated with its formation and leadership were primarily Nisei who were labor conscious and active politically within the center. The organization attempted to function at Manzanar, but soon after the "Manzanar Incident" it resigned as a body, citing "as the primary reason the fact that it did not have the support of the people of Manzanar."⁷¹

68. *Manzanar Free Press*, September 4, 1942, p. 1, and October 19, 1942, p. 3; and Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, July 15, 1944, Report No. 241.

69. *Manzanar Free Press*, October 15 1942, p. 1, and Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, July 15, 1944, Report No.241.

70. Manzanar Relocation Center, community Analysis Section, July 15, 1944, Report No. 241.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 56, and "Personnel Management Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 1,197-98, 1,244-66, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File "Manzanar Final Reports."

Manufacturing/Industry

Development of industrial projects to provide employment to large numbers of evacuees held "a prominent place in the early discussions of WCCA officials on the organization and administration of the Centers." When it became apparent in May 1942 that the WRA would take over the administration of the program, however, the WCCA took little further action. To provide work opportunities for evacuees with manual skills, the WRA explored a wide range of comparatively simple industries that might be established at relocation centers. The primary objective of these projects was to meet the needs of the evacuee population and the requirements of the centers, while a secondary goal was to produce items that were needed in the war effort and which were not being turned out in sufficient quantity by the private industry in the nation.⁷²

Camouflage Net Factory. With the assistance of the Corps of Engineers, however, one industrial project was initiated by the WCCA — the manufacture or "garnishing" of camouflage nets.⁷³ When the WRA assumed administration of Manzanar, the Army engineers were completing four large open-faced structures designed to house the camouflage net project. To meet the Army's request that this industrial activity be commenced, and also to foster its goal of industrial development in the relocation centers, the WRA established an Industrial Division in its regional office in San Francisco. At the same time, the WRA established Industrial sections in the various relocation centers, the first of which began to operate at Manzanar in June 1942 with a senior manufacturing superintendent and one assistant in charge. The camouflage net project operation at Manzanar on June 10, 1942, under the supervision two individuals with technical assistance and advice of the Corps of Engineers, who also provided guidance for similar projects at the Santa Anita Assembly Center and the Gila War Relocation Center.

The camouflage net project at Manzanar operated until early December 1942, employing "at a peak some 500 evacuees, and producing nets at the rate of from 2,000 to 10,000 a month in direct proportion to the number of persons employed." The project involved the manufacture of simple camouflage nets with colored pieces of fabric in summer, winter, and desert patterns.⁷⁴

Since provisions in the Geneva Convention of 1929 prevented aliens from being conscripted for war work or working on projects involving production of goods for the nation's armed services, WRA administrators ruled that Japanese nationals or aliens were ineligible to work on the Manzanar camouflage net project, because it was considered direct "war work." Although the Geneva Convention applied specifically only to prisoners of war and was not ratified by the Japanese government, both the United States and Japan had recently agreed through neutral diplomatic channels to extend its applicable provisions to cover alien civilians who were interned in either country as well as Japanese subjects in the United States who were quartered in relocation centers. This ruling excluded Issei but not the American-born Nisei and Kibei from being eligible as

72. War Relocation Authority, *First Quarterly Report*, pp. 22-23.

73. Unless otherwise noted, material for this subject is based on "Industrial Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 1,065-67, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

74. War Relocation Authority, *First Quarterly Report*, p. 23.

camouflage net workers. Some Issei, who wished "to do their part" for the nation's war effort were irritated by this decision. Other Issei, including some of the Terminal Island fishermen, were more capable than the Nisei at producing nets because of their experience with netting.⁷⁵

The *Final Report, Manzanar* detailed some of the problems that resulted from the camouflage net project. It noted that there was

a constant focus of contention between certain factions of the evacuees and the management of the Center. Indeed, it was through studying the cause of this contention that the management first began to understand the existence of what was later popularly known as the 'pro-Japanese' element among the evacuees. . . . With this ruling, and actual work on the nets, a first "cause" was provided for the various groups within the evacuee population to work 'for' or 'against.' Here, for the first time, the management became aware of the degree of domination which parents held over their children of all ages, many well past their 18-to-21 birthdays. Differences between Kibei and Nisei also came into focus. 'Patriotic' American families began to disassociate themselves from 'Japanese' families.

The standard wage scale . . . was applied to the camouflage net work. This brought out the first labor agitation and labor agitators who, under the pretext that the Army was getting 'slave' labor or 'prisoner' labor to do a war emergency job, urged slowdowns, strikes, poor work, and other standard ideas of protest. . . .

On August 12, the WRA announced that the net factory would close pending a reorganization. The cause of this announcement was trouble that had arisen over the eight-hour day regulation of the WRA. When the factory opened, the Army had set a quota of five nets for each crew per day. The evacuee crews found that, as time passed, they became more efficient and could complete their quota before the day was through. Thus, they began going home when they had finished their quota for the day. This resulted in complaints from other evacuees, and also embarrassed the administration, which had been ordered to maintain an eight-hour day. The administration met considerable resistance when an effort was made to enforce the eight-hour day, finally closing the factory on August 12.⁷⁶

The net factory reopened on August 17 under a reorganized method of operation. The reorganization involved initiation of training classes in some of the more detailed work connected with the project, as well as classes in first aid. Thus, the eight-hour day was maintained by having the crews report for instruction classes when they finished their daily quota.⁷⁷

Less than one month later, the net factory closed again. On September 11, it was announced that the factory would close, ostensibly because of the loss of workers, many of whom were going on furlough or seasonal leave to work in the sugar beet fields in the

75. *Manzanar Free Press*, June 11, 1942, p. 2, and War Relocation Authority, *First Quarterly Report*, pp. 23-24.

76. *Manzanar Free Press* August 12, 1942, p. 1.

77. *Ibid.*, August 17, 1942, p. 1.

western states. With the beginning of the school term it was anticipated that many workers would also leave. On September 14 the net factory registered new workers under new regulations which included an eight-hour day and a forty-four hour week. The following day the plant resumed production with a much-reduced workforce of 370 workers.⁷⁸

Despite resumption of the operations, factory production fell from 15,354 nets in August to 7,512 in September. The reduced workforce, resulting from the fact that many workers were leaving to take other jobs in the center that had been vacated by the seasonal leave workers, was an indication of the growth of unpopularity of the net project. One reason for the increasing unpopularity, according to one historian, was that the net factory "was very zealously supported by Nisei who were well known politicians, and who were quickly becoming unpopular throughout the camp." The struggle over hours placed a stigma on the work. In addition, the unfavorable conditions of work in the lint-filled air of the factory were increasingly blamed for respiratory problems experienced by the workers. Many who worked in factory believed they should receive war industry wages rather than the \$16 per month they were receiving.⁷⁹

In November 1942, the Corps of Engineers announced plans for turning the camouflage net project over to a private contractor who would operate the factory at Manzanar and pay the evacuees "standard wage rates." Because the Nisei and Kibei were the only ones who would benefit by this arrangement, the Issei charged that they were victims of discrimination, and they immediately exerted pressure on workers "to keep them from participating in the new project." As a result of this labor dissension, the WRA center management announced that net workers would receive a \$10 dollar bonus over their pay if 1,000 square feet of netting were produced per day by each worker. Any amount over 1,000 square feet produced by a worker would provide him an additional bonus of one-tenth of a cent a square foot. Before this wage decision could be implemented, however, the "Manzanar Incident" occurred on December 6, and the WRA suspended operation of the net project, a decision concurred in by the WRA's central office in Washington.⁸⁰

Clothing and Furniture Factories. Besides operation of the camouflage net project in 1942, the Industrial Section at Manzanar planned future operations and surveyed "industrial possibilities which could use the skills known to exist in a Japanese community." While various plans were rejected, it was determined to commence clothing and furniture factories.

In August 1942, the clothing factory began operation in the ironing room of Block 2.⁸¹ At first, six "domestic electric sewing machines" were used, "at which women operators made "dust masks and arm protectors for the workers on the camouflage net project." They also

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* September 11, 1942, p. 1; September 14, 1942, p. 1; and September 17 1942, p. 1.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, September 28, 1942, p. 3, and October 5, 1942, p. 1, and Rice, "Manzanar War Relocation Center," pp. 32-33

⁸⁰ *Manzanar Free Press*, December 7, 1942, p. 1.

⁸¹ Unless otherwise noted, material for this section is based on "Industrial Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 1,070-73, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

made uniforms for nurses in the hospital and for operators in "Manzanar's first 'beauty parlor.'"

In November, the domestic sewing machines were replaced by power machines, and the factory was reconditioned. Thereafter, the clothing factory operations expanded rapidly. A canvas of skills among the evacuees disclosed that only one person had ever operated a "power machine on a production line." This female evacuee was employed as the first "chief operator" in the reconditioned clothing factory to aid in teaching the trade to others. The superintendent of manufacturing, having supervised garment factories for years, took personal charge of the operation and helped to train new operators as they were recruited. Inexperienced workers were trained to be designers, pattern makers, cutters, machine operators, floorladies, and machinists, all of whom were reportedly "skilled workers capable of handling any type of power machine on any type of production line in the garment industry."

A variety of garments, ranging from baby layettes to tailored suits, were produced during 1942. Items manufactured included camouflage masks, beauty shop smocks and uniforms, kitchen aprons, waitresses' uniforms, towels, denim coats, and policemen's shirts. The largest orders, however, were for overalls, coveralls, hospital uniforms, children's dresses, and shirts and blouses. The clothes were produced for the camp administration and furnished to laborers as work clothes, or they were produced for the Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises which paid the WRA wholesale prices and then sold the articles to the evacuees in the camp's general store. The factory, which would employ an average of 65 persons, made a profit throughout its history, "even in the early stages when much time was spent in training operators."⁸²

Machinery for the furniture factory or shop, consisting of saws, planers, joiners, drills, and lathes, was obtained from the National Youth Authority. Because numerous articles were needed immediately for development of the center, the shop was placed under the supervision of the Engineering Section. Later in February 1943, the shop would be turned over to the Industrial Section.

Community Alterations Shop. Soon after the opening of Manzanar, several hundred bales of clothing were obtained from "federal surpluses." Some of the clothing consisted of "Army outer garments left over from World War I, some were woolen jackets, some were Navy 'P' coats." The original intention of the WCCA had been to furnish clothing free of charge to the evacuees, but that idea was changed during discussions between the WCCA and the WRA concerning evacuee wage policy. However, a number of persons at Manzanar were "welfare cases and could qualify for free clothing." In later months, some of the clothing was offered for sale to the evacuees through the Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises store.

Most of the clothing was too large for the evacuees, and "for a few months the evacuees tried to alter the clothes themselves." This proved impractical, however, and the Welfare Section started a unit for the alteration of clothes to be given to needy cases. This

82. War Relocation Authority, *[Third] Quarterly Report*, p. 50.

alteration unit, which employed 17 persons, would later be turned over to the Industrial Section in 1943.⁸³

Typewriter Repair Shop. Typewriters were scarce at Manzanar during its early months of operation. An evacuee, who had operated a typewriter rental service in Los Angeles, rented his typewriters to the WRA and was employed at evacuee wages to keep the typewriters in repair. As the center developed, this operation "grew to a sizeable service." Later, the evacuee requested his typewriters back, and transferred to other work in the center.⁸⁴

Sign Shop. Among the early arrivals at Manzanar were several young evacuees who had been employed as commercial artists in motion picture studios. One was employed by the Engineering Section of the WCCA to paint emergency signs for the center. After moving into one of the engineering warehouses, he developed "a worthwhile service in sign work."⁸⁵

Food Processing Units. During the first six months operation of the Manzanar center, evacuees asked for and received permission to develop food-processing projects to make foods they were used to eating. As a result, shoyu, bean-sprout, and tofu plants were started. These units were largely directed by evacuees with little administrative supervision.

Shoyu, a "highly appreciated condiment among the Japanese," was a sauce made from soya beans. Employing three employees, this factory, which began operation in November 1942, produced some 1,500 gallons per month at a cost lower than the Mess Section could procure in the outside market.

A bean sprout plant was commenced in October 1942. Employing four men, it produced an average of 7,000 pounds of bean sprouts per month.

Tofu, a small cake made from soya bean meal, was produced in a factory opened at Manzanar in August 1942. By early 1943 it would employ eight persons and produce an average of 10,000 one and one-fourth pound cakes per month.⁸⁶

Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises

Army Canteen under the WCCA. During late March 1942, as the population of Manzanar was rapidly increasing, a canteen/general store, offering necessities to the evacuees not

83. "Industrial Section, *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 1,0073-74, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

84. *Ibid.*, pp. 1,074-75.

85. *Ibid.*, p. 1,075.

86. *Ibid.*, pp. 1,076-78.

furnished by the Army, was established under the auspices of the WCCA Service Division.⁸⁷ The original canteen and general store located in Block 8 carried a limited supply of items that had a quick turnover and which were in immediate and constant demand. These items included newspapers and periodicals, smoking supplies, confections, soft drinks, ice cream, wash basins and tubs, laundry boards, soaps, limited clothing, canned goods, fruits, and sunglasses. Purchase of supplies were made through the procurement officer of the Supply and Accounting Section of the San Francisco office, and receipts were placed to the credit of the United States Treasury.

During April there were suggestions that a "swap shop" be established to supplement the services of the canteen/general store and that solicitors be allowed to sell merchandise and services for pay at Manzanar. However, the WCCA determined that Manzanar was an Army camp and refused to allow private enterprise to operate in the center. All business in the camp was to be transacted through the canteen/general store, and any person found soliciting private business would be stopped.

On April 15 it was announced that plans for a new commissary building for community enterprises "to house a soda fountain and clothing department" had been developed and would be under construction in the center of the camp that week. Among the items that the commissary planned to have in stock were "basins, tubs, seasonal sports clothes, stationary, toilet supplies, hardware, goggles, washboards, hats, and small household items." Plans were also announced to establish small soft drink counters throughout the camp. "Due to the shortage caused by the supplying towns of Lone Pine, Los Angeles, and Fort Ord," however, articles "such as washboards, tubs, pans, and buckets" were not available. It was anticipated, however, that the "shortage problem" would be "relieved soon."

While no structures were built specifically for stores, canteens, or private enterprise, there was considerable discussion of undertaking such efforts during the early months of the center's operation. A plan, however, was approved by those managing the business enterprises and by the project management either to erect a group of buildings in one of the firebreaks or to move some of the standing buildings to such a location and convert them into a community shopping and service center. The plan never materialized, however, because of labor and building materials shortages.

Manzanar Community Enterprises under the WCCA. The Army canteen/general store operation was replaced on May 24 by a new business organization named Manzanar Community Enterprises, organized by the Community Enterprises Section under the authority of the WCCA procurement officer. Under this new organization, the canteen/store was managed by an appointed staff manager who selected his evacuee assistants. The profits from the new canteen were to be used for welfare needs and improvements in the camp. Six evacuees, experienced in merchandising, were selected to serve as an oversight board in the operation of the business. Because of their prior business connections, and with the backing of the camp administration, the trustees were able to purchase goods on an open book account basis for sale at the canteen. The trustees and other evacuees at Manzanar had stocks of goods in storage in the communities from

87. Unless otherwise noted, material for this section is based on "Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises Inc.," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 647-710, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

which they had been evacuated, and they were "more than willing to have these brought to Manzanar to stock the shelves in the canteen." "Through the prompt payment of invoices they were able to enhance their credit and enlarge the business by building up larger stocks and offering for sale a greater variety of goods."

On May 24, the first day of business for Manzanar Community Enterprises, the new canteen had 8,182 customers. Sixteen clerks rang up total sales of \$1,847.18. On the first two days of business, the canteen sold 4,200 bottles of soda pop daily.⁸⁸

As part of this new enterprise, the fish market which had originally been located in the canteen was moved to a nearby ironing room in Block 8. The odor of the fish, its affinity for flies, and the general messiness associated with its operation prompted management to transfer the fish market. Prices in the fish market were comparatively high contrasted with those to which the evacuees had been accustomed in Terminal Island and Los Angeles. The markup was high, about 50 percent, to counterbalance spoilage and shrinkage. However, there was no other way in which the evacuees could purchase fish, and the market continued to be well patronized on the two days per week that it was open. Some fish was served in the mess halls, but this was insufficient in quantity and inferior in quality.

In May the general dry goods section of the canteen/store was transferred to Block 21, and those commodities belonging to a general store were removed from Block 8. This move enabled the canteen/store to expand its services to include the sale of more clothing, yard goods, toys, rationed shoes, and drugs. After this date, the canteen/store in Block 8 confined its sales to food items, confections, smoking supplies, newspapers and periodicals, stationary, and drugs. The general crowded housing conditions in camp made it impossible to secure additional space. There was "a dire need for other types of service besides those provided in the canteen and store," such as a barber shop, shoe repair shop, and watch repair shop. However, the question of who should provide these services — the government at no cost for service to residents, or the business enterprises at nominal charges for services — was debated without resolution while Manzanar was under the WCCA. The government was reluctant to undertake such services, but the most evacuees felt that it was the duty of the government to do so since they had been removed unwillingly from their former communities and many had suffered considerable financial hardship. In addition, no wages were paid to any of the evacuee workers until the first payroll allowance arrived on June 19 in the form of printed script to be used or cashed at the canteen/store. Thus, many evacuees complained about their inability to keep "shod," get their hair cut, and have their glasses changed. Some evacuees terminated their employment in the center, because they did not receive the personal services they felt they needed and deserved.

To alleviate these difficulties, the canteen/store tried several plans. It attempted to send shoes to Los Angeles for repair, but this service proved to be slow and costly. The facilities in the neighboring towns were already overtaxed and unable or unwilling to provide much relief for the Manzanar evacuees. As a result, evacuee barbers began to flourish under unsanitary conditions in the camp as early as mid-April, but largely

88. *Manzanar Free Press*, May 26, 1942, p. 2.

because of the wrangle over whose responsibility it was to provide such services, no community-wide business projects were established.

Manzanar Community Enterprises under the WRA. When the WRA took over administration of Manzanar on June 1, management of Manzanar Community Enterprises passed into WRA hands. The business operation continued to expand. By August 31, some 39 evacuees were employed in the canteen and 41 in the general store. On October 1, Manzanar Community Enterprises employed 110 evacuees in the canteen, general store, warehousing, and administration.

Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises under the WRA. The WRA considered Manzanar Community Enterprises as "an interregnum period" preceding establishment of center cooperatives by evacuees to carry on private enterprise initiatives. The WRA believed that it was necessary in a temporary community with an unlimited labor supply to find an outlet for the ambition and resourcefulness of the people. Having their own businesses in the form of a cooperative, according to the WRA, created a feeling of self-reliance and independence. Knowing they were working for themselves added to the self-respect which the WRA hoped to inculcate in the evacuees. Thus, an associate Superintendent of Community Enterprises, who was an appointed WRA staff member, arrived at Manzanar on June 14, 1942, to supervise the existing enterprises (canteen and store), enlarge the services offered, and promote the organization of other business enterprises into a cooperative.

Under his leadership, a cooperative, based on Rochdale cooperative principles, was encouraged and educational programs were inaugurated. On June 16, study groups examining consumer cooperatives were organized. Establishment of the Japanese-language section of the *Manzanar Free Press* on June 20 provided a medium for reaching the non-English reading evacuees in the camp. Sponsored by a 14-member Education Committee, a series of articles on the operation of consumer cooperatives and future plans for the canteen was begun in the newspaper in July. Literature was distributed, and meetings were held in the mess halls under the direction of the associate superintendent of Consumer Enterprises to discuss the proposed cooperative for Manzanar. The stated purpose of the cooperative was to supply the evacuee community with goods and services which the government did not provide at the lowest possible price.

Some evacuees opposed establishment of the cooperative. Some people were skeptical about the liability imposed on members if the proposed cooperative should fail. Others distrusted the management of the canteen under Consumer Enterprises and was concerned that the same management would remain in control. Some charged that even the Block Leaders' chairman had profited financially from the operation of the canteen. Still others maintained that it was the duty of the government through the WRA to supply, at no charge, many of the services that the proposed cooperative was planning to provide.

Once the opposition was quieted, plans for the cooperative moved quickly. On July 30, a cooperative congress was elected, each block electing three delegates to represent the voice of the people of the community in the establishment of the cooperative enterprise. A WRA-appointed Superintendent of Consumer Enterprises began duty at Manzanar on August 1, and he convened the first meeting of the cooperative congress on August 8.

Articles of Incorporation were adopted by the congress on August 18, and four days later a board of directors was elected, consisting of eight Nisei and 7 Issei evacuees. The newly-elected board held its first meeting on August 25 during which the papers of incorporation were signed.

On September 5, a charter was granted to Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises, Inc., by the Secretary of State of California. The charter stipulated the power to engage in the sale of goods and services, to borrow money, provide memberships, engage in manufacture of commodities as it deemed desirable, and to carry any other authority necessary for the transaction of its business. Furthermore, the charter granted authority to issue not more than 15,000 memberships at \$5.00 each. It stipulated a capital of at least \$20,000 with which to begin business. The members of the board of directors would serve six-month terms. The directors had the power to distribute earnings, provided ten percent was set aside for a reserve fund and until a 30 percent reserve would be reached, after which further reserves might be accumulated. Each member would have one vote, and no proxies would be allowed. Later on September 21, by-laws that were drawn up by the board of directors were approved by the cooperative congress.

The organization, finances, and personnel of Manzanar Community Enterprises were transferred to Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises, Inc., on October 1, 1942. The assets that were transferred consisted of: (1) \$38,865 in earned income since May 24 after the Army canteen was discontinued, subject to various taxes and claims by the WRA for rent, utilities, and clothing allowances; (2) \$46,244 in inventories; (3) \$8,121 in fixed assets; and (4) 110 personnel on the payroll. A financial statement for Manzanar Consumer Enterprises between May 24 and September 30, 1942, indicated that gross sales of the canteen had been \$142,609.00, while those of the general store had been \$93,446.00. The inventory of the canteen on September 30 amounted to \$16,624, while that of the general store amounted to \$29,620. The net income amounted to 19.31 percent of sales.

As of October 1, when the cooperative took over the business of its predecessor, several services were being offered. The canteen was selling newspapers, periodicals, tobacco products, candy and other confections, nuts, school supplies, canned goods, and various food items not on the ration list, such as coffee, honey, dried and fresh fruits, eggs, fish, ice cream, paper goods, soda drinks, punch, and a variety of other edible items. The general store was selling clothing, shoes, yard goods, toys, and notions.

In addition to the operation these two enterprises, the cooperative was to assume the obligation of subsidizing the *Manzanar Free Press* in its printed form, as had been done by its predecessor since July 15. This expenditure was later limited to \$300 monthly to cover the cost of printing — less advertising revenue — at the shop of the Chalfant Press in Bishop.

The commencement of the printed issues of the newspaper made it possible for the publication to accept advertising from both persons and enterprises in Manzanar and from the "outside." Such revenues helped defray a large part of the cost of printing. For example, the cost of printing the newspaper in November 1942 was \$795, the revenue from advertising was \$509, and the net charge to the cooperative was \$286.

As the business of the cooperative expanded, more facilities were needed. It was not possible, however, for the cooperative to have the amount of floor space required during 1942 because of crowded conditions in the camp. The management of the cooperative, as well as many residents, continued to hope that a shopping center would be provided by the erection of special buildings in one of the firebreaks.

In addition to continuing the services of Manzanar Consumer Enterprises which it took over on October 1, the cooperative initiated new services in response to evacuee demands. These new services, including such conveniences as check cashing and mail order services and establishment of barber and beauty shops, were commenced by the cooperative during October 1942 in various locations wherever space could be found throughout the center. The dispersal of its operating units throughout the center required relatively more supervision, travel, and trucking, and some duplication of equipment and personnel. For the evacuees it meant more traveling, some confusion as to where each service was located, and loss of time by not being able to perform several errands in one shopping trip.

Check cashing services were opened in the Administration Building in Block 1. At first, the Bank of America sent a representative from its Lone Pine branch to Manzanar to enable residents to open new accounts, make deposits and withdrawals, and cash checks. Eventually this service was discontinued and the cooperative took over the task of cashing checks.

A barber shop was established in Block 21 to supplant the private barbers that were operating in private barracks. Only hair cutting and shaving services were offered. The fee was 15 cents for hair cuts, and 10 cents for shaves. Caucasians paid 35 cents for haircuts and 25 cents for shaves.

A beauty parlor was established in Block 15 . A complete line of services was offered at prices below those charged on the outside. The evacuee price was in turn lower than that for the appointed personnel.

Mail order service was established in Block 10. The department was opened and operated under an agreement with Montgomery Ward. Those using this service were given a ten percent discount on their purchases.

In addition to these four services, the cooperative began showing motion pictures in November 1942. Because there was a demand for motion pictures by the evacuees, a few films, provided by evacuees or through interested welfare, charitable, or educational institutions, were shown in the camp prior to this time using a borrowed projector. After it was found that an evacuee had projection equipment stored in Los Angeles, he was permitted to have his equipment transported to Manzanar. He began showing a variety of films that were borrowed free of charge. When the cooperative took over the sponsorship of all public motion picture shows in November, it paid the evacuee at the project rate of pay and kept his machines in repair. Later, when the cooperative decided to purchase equipment, some of that belonging to the evacuee was purchased and another projection staff was hired at the project rate of pay. The complete cost of building, equipping, and operating the outdoor theater in the firebreak between Blocks 20 and 21 was paid for by

the cooperative. No admission fee was charged; the sums needed were taken from the cooperative's general fund.

Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises became a member institution in the Association of California Cooperatives and later joined in establishing the Federation of Center Enterprises, both actions enhancing its credit rating and purchasing contacts. The cooperative's management was able to secure some goods hitherto unobtainable by the camp through these two channels.

The mark-up on goods sold by the cooperative varied with the nature of the item and the frequency of its turnover. The general mark-up for most items was between 15 and 25 percent, the average being 20 percent.

The basic objectives of Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises were synonymous with those of the Rochdale principles. These included open membership, one member, one vote, limited interest on capital loans, patronage dividends on purchases, cash sales at market prices, neutrality in race, religion, and politics, continuing education, and constant expansion.

All of these principles, with the exception of two, were fully applied at Manzanar. Open membership was not fully attained. Early in 1943 every evacuee resident in the camp over 16 years of age was declared a member, but appointed personnel and their family members were denied membership. Some prices charged were in excess of the prevailing market in the stores in neighboring towns.

Agriculture/Food Production

The arid climate and sandy soil conditions at Manzanar posed problems for agricultural production. At an elevation of approximately 4,000 feet, temperatures at the center ranged from 10 degrees below zero during some winters to highs of more than 100 degrees above zero nearly every summer. Desert winds of high velocity blew much of the time from early March until late June. Average yearly precipitation amounted to only about 4 1/2 inches of rain and snow.

Soil at Manzanar was "of a light sandy type, lacking in sufficient nitrogen, potash, and phosphoric acid" to produce good vegetable crops. Supplemental fertilizers and irrigation were necessary to produce crops.

Farm field acreages were established on wastelands that had not been farmed for about 15 years. Having stood idle for such a lengthy period, the fields were "covered with brush and badly hummocked with dunes caused by hard winds."

As the Western Defense Command went forward with its plans to establish the Manzanar camp in March 1942, the City of Los Angeles registered its opposition, and actively fought the establishment of the center on its land. With the city in the lead, various groups in Los Angeles started a newspaper campaign to sway public opinion to their side. In order to frighten the public into opposing the project at Manzanar, they used the Los Angeles Aqueduct as a weapon. Emphasizing that the aqueduct ran parallel with and adjacent to

the center, opponents of the project led the residents of Los Angeles to believe that the evacuees might poison or contaminate the city's water supply or sabotage the aqueduct.

This quarrel impacted agricultural development at Manzanar in a variety of ways. Difficulties were encountered concerning the manner in which the city wanted irrigation water utilized at Manzanar. This water was drawn from streams flowing down from the mountains and from two wells located in the camp. The city lodged complaints concerning the use of commercial fertilizers used on Manzanar's farm fields. During 1942 the city refused to approve a hog project, even though the WRA agreed to locate it at least one mile from the aqueduct. The city's rate for irrigation water on the project was based on the price for domestic water in Los Angeles, thus forcing the WRA to pay higher prices for water than other farm and ranch owners in Owens Valley.

Under the WCCA, approximately 100 acres of land at Manzanar were cleared and partially leveled for agricultural use (primarily for vegetables) with evacuee hand labor during the spring of 1942. Because planting was late and there was a shortage of heavy farm equipment, four volunteer evacuee crews worked six-hour shifts around the clock to prepare the ground and plant the crops in May.

From March until August the only powered equipment available for agricultural use at the camp was a rented Ford tractor, plow, and cultivator. After the WRA assumed administrative control of Manzanar on June 1, ten mules were purchased to aid the agricultural efforts. The WRA immediately began purchase of farm equipment, but the machinery did not arrive at Manzanar until about August 1. The new equipment included four used 35-horsepower track tractors, four new small Case wheel tractors, and five new Ford wheel tractors. All pulled farm equipment obtained for the track tractors was secondhand, but that for the Case and Ford tractors was new but limited in amount.

In June 1942 the WRA placed six appointed personnel in charge of overseeing agricultural operations at Manzanar, including a farm superintendent and five senior foremen. Each foreman had charge of an evacuee crew that went outside the fenced enclosure of the camp to work the center's adjacent fields. The evacuee crews comprised some 300 workers.

In June about 100 evacuee farm laborers quit the Agriculture Section in protest against the use of Caucasian foremen as escorts for work crews traveling to and from the fenced enclosure around the camp's residential area to work the center's adjacent field areas. The senior foremen were not experienced in farm work, and served mainly as escorts and overseers. The evacuees resented the presence of the senior foremen. After several months of negotiations with the Army, the Western Defense Command approved a WRA request in the fall to allow farm workers to go to the center's outlying fields and return to the fenced residential area at evening without Caucasian escorts. Work relations and production improved as the senior foremen were replaced by evacuee foremen. Thereafter, the only Caucasian workers in the Agriculture Section were the farm superintendent and the assistant farm superintendent.

The Manzanar farm, consisting of 120 cultivated acres, produced 800 tons of vegetables by the fall of the first growing season in 1942. As the growing season lasted only from 120 to 180 days, it was necessary to dry store, dehydrate, and process vegetables to assure

maximum tonnage for winter use. Nearly \$25,000 worth of vegetables, melons, and tomatoes were produced, and three "carloads" of Swiss chard and two of watermelons were shipped to other relocation centers. The neglected orchard of "600 apple and 400 pear trees" at Manzanar was rehabilitated (pruning, spraying, irrigation) and produced nearly \$2,000 worth of fruit.

While farm operations went forward in 1942, the WRA developed policies that would guide expansion of agricultural production during the remainder of the war. WRA agricultural goals at Manzanar were to produce food for the subsistence of evacuee residents of the center as economically as possible and at the same time to provide employment for some of them in a productive undertaking. Production of food for use of the center permitted the WRA to avoid the more costly course of purchasing food on the outside market. Such production obviated the necessity of drawing upon the Quartermaster Corps for supplies that were critically needed by the Army. Center farm production materially reduced overall project transportation costs and released the common carriers for more urgent war tasks — a matter of importance in view of the scarcity of trucks and the high cost of hauling to Manzanar's isolated location.

Farm production at Manzanar was confined primarily to the production of foodstuffs for center needs. The WRA did not wish to compete with private growers and producers. At times, small surpluses of vegetables were sold on the open market rather than allow them to go to waste, but such instances were rare and in some cases served to relieve current market shortages. More than 78 of the 800 tons of vegetables produced in 1942 were shipped out of the center for sale.

Evacuee participation and responsibility for farm production was encouraged by the WRA. Inasmuch as local production was locally consumed, evacuees were allowed to choose such crops "as best suited tastes so long as such vegetables could grow well in [the] Manzanar soil and climate."⁸⁹

Guayule Experiment

During the spring of 1942, an experiment in guayule rubber culture was undertaken at Manzanar. Administrators at the camp, including both WCCA and WRA personnel, as well as interested evacuees promoted the project both as a chance to develop scientific work and educational opportunities for trained evacuee scientists and as a means of demonstrating that the evacuees were contributing to the war effort by attempting to meet the nation's rubber production shortage. The objectives of the experiment were to provide a "larger reservoir of growing guayule plants which can be drawn upon for experimental work; to devise a practical method for the rooting of cuttings; to study the dependence of

89. War Relocation Authority, *First Quarterly Report*, p. 21; War Relocation Authority, *Second Quarterly Report*, p. 65; War Relocation Authority [Third] *Quarterly Report*, p. 51; "Agriculture Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. IV, pp. 1,102-19, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 73, File, "Manzanar Final Reports;" War Relocation Authority, "Report On Food Production Plans At Manzanar," May 18, 1942, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 69, File, "Miscellaneous Reports;" and "Production Section, Report of Activities, Actual and Proposed of the Manzanar War Works Division," May 26, 1942 RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 225, File No. 51.000, "Report of Activities, Production Section."

growth and rubber production on watering; to produce, by breeding or selection, varieties of guayule which yields large amounts of rubber per acre, or which produce maximum yield in shorter time than the present varieties; and to produce varieties which are adapted to marginal or desert lands, and to be able to yield rubber in such land instead of rich valuable soil on which the present varieties appear to give the best yields."

Under the guidance of Dr. Robert Emerson, a faculty member at the California Institute of Technology at Pasadena, waste cuttings and seeding culls of guayule plants were delivered to Manzanar from Salinas Valley nurseries in April. By June 1, four shipments of guayule plant seedlings had been sent to Manzanar, and 169,000 had been planted in sand beds and soils. Twenty-one nursery men and three evacuee chemists were employed at the project, having put in "approximately 6,000 man hours of work."

To provide facilities for the guayule experiment at Manzanar, a lath house and propagating beds were built at the southwest corner of the camp, a chemical laboratory was installed in the ironing room of Block 6, a cytogenetics laboratory was opened in the hospital, and field plots were located at various points around the camp. Experiments were conducted on the extraction of rubber from guayule cryptostegia and other less promising rubber bearing plants using a new and rapid method developed at Manzanar. Early samples of the tested rubber varieties were vulcanized in Los Angeles and proved to be of good quality. Scientists from Stanford University, the University of California, Los Angeles, and the California Institute of Technology, interested in monitoring the progress of the experiment, visited the guayule project at Manzanar in increasing numbers during the latter months of 1942.⁹⁰

Recreation

Recreation under the WCCA.

The Program — As the evacuees began arriving at Manzanar during the spring of 1942, the *Final Report, Manzanar* stated that the "desire and need for organized leisure-time activities" became "marked." The report described the lifestyle of the interned evacuees as of early April:

. . . Even the few evacuees, employed by the administration, felt a strong need also for something to do in the evenings. The shock of sudden separation from the 'American way of life' to which they had become accustomed, whether 'loyal' or not, had made them restless and desperate for something to occupy their time. It may be hard for people who have always lived according to the American pattern to comprehend the full import of the term 'nothing to do,' but to 3,000 men, women, and children, confined within a quarter-square mile barbed-wire enclosure [by early April 1942 the 3,000 evacuees were confined to 12 blocks within a quarter-mile barbed-wire enclosure] it was only too real and full of meaning. . . . No going anywhere to see or do anything! With the exception of the project canteen which 'specialized' in lukewarm pop, there were no stores and no

90. *Manzanar Free Press*, March 20, 1943, p. 6, and "Conditions At Manzanar Relocation Area, June 1, 1942," by George H. Dean, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 293, File No. 41.080 #1, May-June 1942.

attractions of any kind. True the high Sierras on the west and the Inyo range on the east beckoned, but they were out of reach for they were each eight miles away.

A typical day's program was made up of three meals in the block mess hall with the rest of the time given over to looking at family or neighbors, who, too often, lived in the one room. Yet it was not the dullness or the inconveniences that worried most of the evacuees. Rather it was the imposed idleness, the emptiness of the present, and the hopelessness of the future which made them afraid. The evacuees were men and women who had led busy, industrious lives. What would this emptiness and idleness do to their hands and minds and those of their children?

Thus, the "introduction of a community recreation program found the evacuees receptive and ready to cooperate." Getting the evacuees to attend activities was never a problem, "for most of them were determined to use their time in as constructive and beneficial a manner as possible." The principal problem for the WCCA was to find leadership and facilities for the many who wished to participate in recreational program. On April 9, 1942, Aksel G. Nielsen entered on duty at Manzanar as Chief of the Recreation Section. Several evacuees who had prior experience in recreation supervision approached him, expressing a desire to be allowed to help set up a recreation organization.

Those interested in starting a recreational program inspected the availability of building facilities. Each block had 20 barracks, of which 14 were used as residences and one (Building 15 of each block) was designated as a recreation building. This building was left unpartitioned. No provisions as to material or labor were made for having it divided into small rooms. Thus, it quickly became apparent this building could not be reserved for exclusive recreational use by its block, such self-sufficiency resulting in "near chaos."

Inasmuch as the center did not provide school or other activities, the leaders of the fledgling recreation organization determined that it would be necessary to keep the recreation buildings open seven days a week from after breakfast to about nine or ten o'clock at night, thus necessitating several shifts of workers.

The recreation staff established an organization consisting of evacuee department directors and specialists — preschool activities, men's athletics, women's athletics, director of Boy Scouts, Music, Dramatics, Chief Librarian, handicrafts, director of gardening — who served in an advisory capacity and without actual authority over the workers in the block recreation halls. Authority was delegated to zone directors who supervised the workers within their zone which constituted four blocks. Three of the four buildings under the zone directors were staffed by a leader, two assistant leaders, and one attendant who was responsible for cleaning and keeping up the building. The fourth building, used as a branch library, had only one assistant leader instead of two.

The heads of two departments, music and gardening, had staffs directly under them.

Because of objections to the noise of musical instruments, the music program was concentrated in Building 15, Block 14. Thus, the whole staff could be supervised directly by the director of music who was present in the building for the entire day. The Japanese

music program remained scattered throughout the center, since objections focused primarily on "occidental music." Gardening was also concentrated in one location and could be supervised directly by one person.

While Manzanar was fortunate in having several persons with some college training in recreational subjects, the center apparently was less fortunate than other centers in the number of college-trained people it received. In arts and crafts, however, trained leadership was more plentiful. Although these artists and craftsmen were proficient in their fields, their training and experience had not been provided from a recreational point of view. Rather, the emphasis of their experience had come through business, where they had made things for production rather than for teaching others how to enjoy the activities as an arts-and-crafts leisure-time activity.

While it was hoped that these department heads would be able to provide in-service training, most "proved too inexperienced or too immature for such an assignment." The need for in-service training of leaders became especially urgent as preschool centers were organized. Consequently, a WPA arts and crafts supervisor from the state office in Los Angeles was loaned to Manzanar for two weeks. The WPA supervisor showed preschool and arts-and-crafts leaders how to take advantage of scrap material "so plentiful on the Project." The in-service training, however, went beyond instruction in handicrafts alone. Techniques and methods were also discussed, with the result "that renewed hope and ambition were instilled in most of the people attending the training sessions."

Manzanar also received valuable help and in-service training from traveling instructors sent from Los Angeles by such commercial agencies as "Leisurecraft." Regular staff meetings with training and guidance as the keynote were held twice a week by the chief of the Recreation Section to discuss immediate as well as long-term plans.

To much of the staff, the objectives and ideals of recreation were new and needed clarification and emphasis.

It was also determined that a "satisfactory indoor program, to satisfy the varied interests of both sexes and all ages" should include "art, crafts, music, dancing, reading, and social activities at all levels from small children to grown adults." These demands made it apparent to the block managers that, much as they would like to have their blocks remain independent of one another, a plan should be agreed upon in which the use and purposes of all recreation buildings in the center would be centrally administered.

Each group of four blocks formed a natural unit or zone by virtue of its separation from others by firebreaks. Recognition of this grouping led to the decision to operate such four-block zones as independent units. The four recreation barracks in each zone were to be used as follows: one for arts and crafts; one for children's activities; one for adult activities; while the fourth was set aside as a branch library where reading and quiet table games could be enjoyed. Later it was found necessary to specialize further and to designate central buildings for music and an older girls' center, and under the WRA for the exclusive use of three church groups. When it was found that the ironing rooms were little used because evacuees preferred to do their ironing in their barracks, several of these rooms were devoted to recreational use.

Prior to the time when all 36 blocks were occupied as residences, it was possible to borrow an unused mess hall for a dance, party, show, or social activity. As the center became filled to capacity, however, all mess halls were needed for serving meals three times a day, thus curtailing this opportunity. Thereafter, block mess halls could be used for recreational purposes on special occasions only. In spite of his difficulty and the ever-present need for a large social hall, building space was fairly adequate during the summer of 1942. It was not until the autumn, when school opened and it became necessary to convert nearly half of the recreation barracks into schoolrooms that recreation "felt a real pinch."

Since the residents could not go outside the confines of the center "proper," the only outdoor areas available for sports activities were the firebreaks between the blocks. Two firebreaks ran north and south and three east and west. The firebreaks were 300 feet wide, with the exception of the central one, which was 600 feet wide. Camp management prevented the installation of permanent improvements in the central firebreak because of proposed plans for constructing two elementary school buildings and some business buildings. Except for a few spots, the soil in the firebreaks was loose sand, too poor to grow a surface covering of grass or alfalfa. Thus, athletic fields were laid out in the firebreaks which "became really and truly 'sand-lot' games."

Under the WCCA, no money was spent for recreational purposes except for evacuees' salaries and some equipment, such as manuals, rope, compasses, first-aid kits, pup tents, fire-making sets, bugles, pennants, a flag staff, flags, and wood-carving sets for the Boy Scouts. All other equipment and supplies, such as athletic equipment, games, toys, playground equipment, furniture, and pianos used during the early months of Manzanar's operation were secured through donations from private individuals, churches, and public and semi-public agencies in southern California or by personal purchase by instructors. A large proportion of these donations was hauled to Manzanar by two men, Rev. Fred Fertig and Rev. H. V. Nicholson.

The evacuees gathered scrap and waste materials and turned them to use. Scrap lumber from the barracks still under construction was collected by the truckload. Yet the number of articles that could be made from this salvaged material was limited since "2 x 4's over 3 feet long" were not allowed to be taken. Nails which had been dropped by the carpenters engaged in building construction were collected and filled several barrels.

Using these scrap materials, parents of preschool children made tables, benches, and chairs for the centers. Friends of the churches constructed benches and stools for the congregations. Goh and shogi players made benches for the halls where those games were played. Members of the music staff made stools from scrap lumber and music stands from sheets of plywood. When the music activities settled in Block 24, Building 15, the musicians built several small practice rooms with celotex purchased by the musicians and their friends.

Activities: Preschool Program — The first preschool centers to be opened at Manzanar in April 1942 were for children between the ages of three and six. Mothers were requested to bring their children to the centers for registration on April 11. Very young children were to be brought to the centers each morning and be picked up at lunch time. Two centers, each intended to serve a zone of four blocks, were organized in April. Each center had an

average attendance of 50 children. As the camp filled to capacity during 1942, the number of centers was gradually increased to eight. The preschool work was headed by an evacuee who received her training in kindergarten administration at the University of Hawaii. Assisting her was a young woman with an A.B. degree in kindergarten teaching. Difficulty was experienced in finding more trained leaders, but by May 9, fifteen evacuee teachers were working in the centers.

The success of the preschool program led to requests by evacuees that something similar be done for older children. Thus, during the afternoons and evenings the centers were opened to older children for free play. While a shortage of qualified leadership prevented establishment of an organized program, some zones did establish simple programs for children of elementary-school age.

Activities: Athletics — Of all the sports offered during the spring of 1942, softball proved to be the most popular. Starting with an exhibition game between two teams, made up of Nisei and Kibei, the softball program, although hampered by lack of equipment, expanded to include more than 100 teams by the end of the summer. The sport was popular not only with the players but also with the evacuee population in general, some contests attracting several thousand spectators on weekends to watch the better teams. The majority of the players were males, but by June 1 a girls' softball league that included 14 teams had been established.

Other sports included five boys' and five girls' volleyball teams. Five boys' teams held several track meets during late spring and the early part of the summer. Membership on these teams was determined by the evacuee's place of residence prior to coming to Manzanar, such as Bainbridge Island, Terminal Island, Los Angeles, and other localities. In the absence of a track, the running events were conducted around the blocks, while the field events took place in the firebreaks. Boxing was popular, with 75 men practicing this sport nightly in two of the recreation halls. Wrestling was carried on "intermittently on a 'catch as catch can' basis, and was participated in mostly by members of the police force."

Activities: Arts and Crafts — The first arts-and-crafts program enjoyed the benefit of assistance from several artists who were among the first evacuees to arrive at Manzanar. These evacuee painters began at once to give lessons in painting and sketching, the equipment and supplies for the classes being furnished by themselves. Soon the program was augmented by assistance from leaders of other activities. During 1942 several expert sewing teachers, who had operated a sewing school prior to evacuation, gave lessons to more than 1,100 individuals. Three recreation centers were devoted to sewing activities. Expert instructors in flower-making taught their popular art to hundreds of students. Because "real" flowers were absent from Manzanar, this activity was "the more appreciated." Expert performers set up classes in knitting and embroidery. A course was offered in puppetry to make puppets and to present entertaining puppet shows.

Several "Japanese-type" arts and crafts activities were also offered in 1942. An evacuee taught Japanese brush-lettering or artistic painting of Japanese letters and characters, while evacuee taught the "fine art of conducting a Japanese tea service in combination with flower arrangement."

Activities: Music — Manzanar's music department was first headed by an evacuee who entered Manzanar as a volunteer in March 1942. A graduate of the Cincinnati Conservatory of Music, he and his staff experienced much difficulty in trying to establish a music program. Facilities were "extremely unfavorable," and "sympathy and understanding on the part of most of the residents" was "lacking." Forced to move from one barracks to another during the early months of Manzanar's operation and faced with the fact that none of the recreation barracks had partitions, the music department was "compelled to produce all types of instrumental music in one room 20 x 100 feet."

Despite these difficulties, the music staff slowly acquired popularity. By the end of the summer several hundred interested students were attending lessons at the music hall. The students provided their own instruments or used whatever instruments the department was able to obtain.

Voice and glee clubs also proved to be popular. The *Final Report, Manzanar* stated: "Contrary to the general belief that oriental people are not psychologically suited to sing the occidental scale, Manzanar as a community produced an unusually large number of good singers."

Activities: Social Activities — Dances were held once or twice a week in the recreation halls, but sometimes as many as three dances were held on one Saturday night. As the center's population increased, public dances were generally held in the mess halls which were twice as wide as the recreation halls.

Classes in social dancing were offered to both men and women, the dancing being done to recorded music. Instruction was also offered by competent instructors in ballet, tap, and special dancing.

The Issei were little interested in ordinary American social activities, the majority "preferring to spend their time playing goh and shogi." These Japanese table games were somewhat similar to checkers and chess, respectively. Some Issei joined poetry clubs, where under the leadership of an experienced instructor, they learned "to express their thoughts in rhyme and blank verse."

Belonging to a club "soon became something of a fad" at Manzanar. Most clubs were social or athletic in nature, few being "mixed" or made up of members of both sexes. Some 40-50 such clubs were organized during the first few months of Manzanar's operation.

Activities: Gardening — The firebreak between Blocks 17 and 18 on the north and Blocks 11 and 12 on the south was one of the few to have "black soil suitable for gardening." The firebreak was subdivided into small plots varying in size from 10 feet x 50 feet to 30 feet x 50 feet, and each interested family was given a plot. A few larger tracts were set aside as community gardens for certain blocks. The work in the block gardens was done by volunteer labor recruited from the block residents.

Gardening was pursued by the Manzanar evacuees for various reasons. Some did it as a hobby, while others wanted fresh vegetables and flowers that they personally raised. Some wanted to experiment and perpetuate plants which they had brought with them to the center.

The firebreak chosen for the garden was covered at one end with thousands of wild rosebushes. During the summer, Kuichiro Nishi, an evacuee, volunteered to bud and cultivate the wild roses if the WRA would obtain some cultivated plants and buds. With the cooperation of the procurement office, four plants of 50 different varieties of roses were purchased. After receipt of these plants, Nishi budded approximately 15,000 wild shoots.

Activities: Libraries — Since no government funds were allotted to purchase books and magazines while Manzanar was administered by the WCCA, it was necessary for the evacuees to write to libraries and request surplus books for the center. The Manzanar library started in April 1942 with a gift of 17 books and 80 magazines made available in a part of one evacuee's living quarters. The first community library was opened on May 4 amid the spartan conditions in Block 7, Building 15, when 1,000 discarded books were received from the Los Angeles Public Library. Several weeks later, an evacuee librarian who had studied library science at the University of California arrived to set the library in operation. Within two months, more than 15,000 volumes were received, most coming from libraries in Los Angeles City and County. Individual donors also provided books and magazines, although many of the latter were back copies which the evacuees had read prior to evacuation. Prospective donors were reminded that they could send subscriptions to current magazines, and many responded to this request.

Under the leadership of the evacuee librarian, the main camp library was later established in the recreation hall in Block 22 because of its central location in the camp. This building served as headquarters for the librarian and her assistant, and it was used as a training center for girls working in the branch libraries. All books were received, classified, and sorted in the main library, and selections were sent to the smaller branch libraries scattered throughout the center.

Activities: English Instruction — The adult English department, under the direction of Mrs. Elizabeth Nishikawa, was established on May 15 with a staff of five instructors teaching ten well-attended classes of Issei and Kibei men and women. Some of the classes were held regularly in the evening so that evacuees with daytime jobs could participate. Other classes met in the afternoon which was a more convenient time for men and women without regular jobs. By June 1, some six evacuee teachers were providing 18 classes in English instruction to approximately 300 Issei and Kibei men and women. Classes, which included an Americanization program, were held in mess halls between meal servings. There were no books or supplies except mimeographed material prepared by the evacuee teachers.

Special Events and Programs: Flag Pole Dedication — A flag pole was installed in front of the Administration Building located in Block 1, Building 8, on April 17. Boy Scouts supplied a color guard, a color bearer, and four buglers. The dedication speech was given by the Assistant Project Director. After the flag-raising ceremony, the camp manager christened two burros as camp mascots.

Special Events and Programs: "I Am An American" Program — The "I Am An American" program was held on May 17 in the firebreak between Blocks 2 and 3. After several musical numbers were presented, speeches were given by the departing WCCA camp

manager and by the new WRA project director, the latter being introduced to the evacuees for the first time.

Special Events and Programs: Memorial Day Service — Attended by several hundred people, the Memorial Day program on May 30 began with a parade, led by the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the American Legion, both of which had members among the evacuee population in camp. These groups were followed by the Manzanar police, firemen, and finally by more than 100 Boy Scouts. The ceremonies were held in front of the Administration Building with two trucks serving as a stage.

Special Events and Programs: Arts and Crafts Exhibits — Two exhibits of art and handicrafts prepared by evacuees in the camp were held at Manzanar during its first two months of operation. The first exhibit, held on May 3, was visited by 1,216 people, while a two-day exhibit in early June drew approximately 5,000 people.

Special Events and Programs: Variety Talent Shows — A variety talent show, using both Nisei and Issei talent, was held outdoors on May 10, for which a temporary wooden stage was constructed adjoining Block 8, Building 15. The show was attended by several hundred spectators.

Recreation under the WRA. The change in administration of Manzanar from the WCCA to the WRA on June 1 had considerable impact on recreational programs at the camp. Organizationally, the name of the Recreation Section was changed to Community Activities and the title of its appointed head was changed from Chief of the Recreation Section to Supervisor of Community Activities.

The WRA found that the original plan of having two specialists serve as recreational advisers, with actual supervision and authority resting in zone directors, was impractical. Thus, the recreation program was reorganized to reflect the evacuees' wishes. Under the new organization, the heads of departments were given direct authority over the people they hired to work with them and over whom they had jurisdiction. Ten departments — hobby garden, music, arts and crafts, amateur profession, librarian, children's activities, men's and boy's athletics, women's athletics, adult social activities, scout activities (four Boy Scout troops were organized) — were established, each with its own head. Activities were organized so that all employees, no matter where their barracks, came under the one department head. In some instances, it was necessary to have more than one activity in a recreation building. Generally, three different types of arts and handicrafts — painting, woodwork, or other crafts, and needlework or sewing — were offered in one recreation hall.

The WRA continued most of the existing WCCA recreational programs and expanded many of them. The WRA hired additional evacuee personnel to operate the program. As of September 15, 1942, 151 evacuees were employed to administer recreation in the center. The largest categories of recreation workers were adult activities — 46; children's activities — 19; gardening and landscaping — 15; music — 14; men's and boy's athletics — 13; entertainment — 12; and sewing and needlework — 11.

During the months of July to September 1942, participation in the various recreational activities at the center remained high. The number attending sewing and needlework

classes was more than 1,100. Some 1,600 men and boys were involved in 12 softball leagues, while three track teams involved 90 individuals. Three boys' hardball teams were formed, but the lack of proper equipment and facilities hindered development of that sport. Girl's and women's softball involved 250 individuals on 19 teams in three leagues. Weekend softball contests sometimes attracted 3,000 to 4,000 spectators. Some 180 girls and women were involved in 14 volleyball teams in two leagues, and 100 participated on seven basketball teams. An estimated 7,000 children attended children's activities, including eight preschool centers. Sunday evening recorded concerts (American music) attracted 700 to 2,000 persons, while approximately 3,000 persons attended Wednesday evening recorded concerts (Japanese music). These music programs, known as "Symphony Under the Stars," were made possible by the use of a public address system owned and operated by three of the evacuees at the center. Approximately 100 couples attended weekly dances, 8,000-9,000 people attended motion pictures (two showings), and 5,000 attended periodic variety shows.

Some 120 families worked plots in the "Victory" garden, and six larger tracts were worked on a community basis. Approximately 1,000 persons attended weekly music classes, including piano (300), saxophone and clarinet (200), voice (100), mandolin and guitar (200), trumpet (40), violin (60), and viola, cello, tuba, trombone, and oboe (100).

Upon taking administrative control of the camp on June 1, the WRA immediately purchased equipment and supplies, particularly for arts and crafts and athletics, to facilitate and expand the recreation programs at Manzanar. The purchased items included tempera paints and brushes, baseballs, bats, volleyballs, basketballs, footballs, tennis nets, and basketball hoops.

According to the *Final Report, Manzanar*, as the evacuees began to understand that the center would operate for the duration of the war, they began to show increasing interest in developing a sense of permanence in regard to their home. This interest included a growing desire to obtain as many recreational facilities as conditions would permit. Many residents gave their time and sometimes their money to develop facilities. Within several months, Manzanar "had practically all the recreational facilities which could be found in any other American city of 10,000 persons."

Recreational Facilities — During the early summer of 1942, the sentry line was moved back about 100 yards behind the last line of barracks to the south of the camp residential area, thus placing Bairs Creek within the center. After the WRA assured the evacuees that the creek could be used as a picnic spot both day and evening, evacuee volunteers started landscaping the area and constructing walks, bridges, and open-air fireplaces. The area became so popular as a picnic area that it became necessary to issue permits so that picnic parties would be assured an opportunity to use a fireplace.

Several evacuees who had brought their golf clubs to Manzanar formed a golf club which pledged its members to help construct a course. A 100-yard-wide area southwest of the center was selected as the site for the course. Sage brush and other growth were removed, and a 9-hole course was laid out. Because the course could not be watered, the greens "were of necessity made of sand."

Each block had a space within its borders east of the men's showers that was left vacant. These spaces were quickly converted into recreational areas for the block residents. Most blocks put up volleyball posts, and the majority of them constructed basketball courts with backboards, hoops, and other features. Playground equipment, including swings, teeter-totters, and slides, were installed. These facilities were constructed by volunteer labor from within the blocks and entirely at a block's own expense.

Tennis courts were laid out using clay soil located by the Owens River approximately four miles east of the center. More than 150 truckloads of claylike dirt were hauled to the center to construct four tennis courts in the eastern part of the firebreak between Blocks 8 and 14. Salt was mixed with the clay to improve its texture, but the soil proved unsatisfactory. Hence another 50 loads of clay, this time a reddish composition, was hauled to the center and resurfacing was continued. The wire around the courts, nets, and posts were purchased with WRA funds.

Judo contests could not operate in the low-ceilinged barracks. With WRA approval, judo enthusiasts determined to take up a collection and from the funds pay for construction of a floor. The floor was covered with sawdust, and canvas was stretched over the sawdust to keep it in place. During the autumn, voluntary subscriptions were taken to defray costs for the construction of a 40-foot x 60-foot building with additional shower-room space.

The firebreak between Blocks 8 and 14, where the tennis courts had been constructed, was designated as a sports field complex by the WRA. Several basketball and volleyball courts were built adjacent to the tennis courts. The volleyball courts consisted of little more than posts for the nets, with a ridge stretched on the ground to indicate boundary lines. The basketball courts were surfaced with the reddish claylike soil used to resurface the tennis courts.

Two football fields with goal posts were laid out, and nearly all the firebreaks were used as softball diamonds. Material for backstops was scarce, but some old wiring was found in the farm area and put to use for this purpose.

Landscaping and Parks — During the fall of 1942, the wild roses that Nishi budded were dug up and transferred to the firebreak between Blocks 23 and 33. About 100 different species of flowers were seeded and planted in this new garden area in addition to the roses. A Japanese tea house was constructed, and the beginnings of Rose Park were laid out.

One of the Manzanar evacuees was a former nursery owner and producer of Japanese cherry trees. He offered to donate several thousand trees to Manzanar, provided that all the trees would be planted in one location and that this location would be set aside as a Japanese Cherry Park. The WRA accepted his proposal, and the cherry trees, together with hundreds of Wisteria trees, were hauled to Manzanar and planted in the firebreak in front of the Children's Village. Volunteers dug wide shallow holes for pools, but as water was still at a premium in Manzanar, these pools would eventually be seeded with grass.

Outdoor Theater — Evacuees at Manzanar voiced the need for an outdoor amphitheater to accommodate various recreational programs during the early months of Manzanar's operation. Under the WRA, "a spot just outside the center beyond the southeast corner of

the camp" was selected for an outdoor theater, because it had a natural slope required for such a facility. With the aid of a power blade, the natural slope was improved so that from 3,000 to 5,000 persons could witness performances. A concrete stage, 40 feet x 60 feet, was constructed using voluntary evacuee labor. Sand and gravel were secured from nearby Bairs Creek. Benches, with seating space for 2,000 persons, were constructed. The expense for most of the work and lumber was defrayed from profits derived by the early canteen/general store before its operations were taken over by Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises.

This theater was used for only two occasions during the fall of 1942. These events included an address by Dillon S. Myer, director of the WRA, to the opening high school assembly and a dedication ceremony for the theater about a week later. Because of the outdoor theater's distance from the camp's residential area, it was decided to hold outdoor shows on a temporary stage in the camp. Later a new permanent 20-foot x 30-foot stage would be built against the wall of the recreation hall in Block 16.

Relationship with Schools — When the schools opened in fall 1942, adjustments became necessary between the education and recreation programs. The Community Activities Section had been chief promoter of all activities for which there was a need. To fulfill its obligations, the section had taken over operation of all recreation halls (Building 15 in each block).

Some of these buildings, although designated as recreation buildings, were converted for use as schoolrooms during the later summer of 1942, because no school buildings had been constructed. Consequently, one-half of the Number 15 buildings were taken over by the Education Section for schoolrooms and education offices.

The Education Section budget allowed appointed personnel to administer and supervise some of the activities which had been conducted by the Community Activities Section. Thus, some activities were transferred to the Education Section in July. The activities that were transferred included adult English classes, the preschool program, and the camp library. It was also agreed that the adult education department would promote all adult English classes, as well as all commercial, vocational training, and other classes that were primarily educational. The Community Activities Section, on the other hand, would promote all programs that were primarily recreational, including sports, arts, crafts, music, dramatics, gardening, social activities, and special events.

During the fall of 1942, 18 units of nursery school and seven kindergartens were organized. Of the nursery school units, six were afternoon sleep sessions. All preschool units were housed in regular elementary school buildings scattered throughout the community. Almost 1,000 children between the ages of three and six had an opportunity to share experiences in an environment that emphasized health, safety, social and emotional adjustment, and mental development through selected play materials. This was accomplished by trained leadership, parent education, use of English in speech, and teaching socialization skills.

The parents of all children enrolled in the preschool automatically became members of a specific parent club that functioned in connection with a specific nursery or kindergarten unit. A central board, made up of the chairmen of the individual units, the preschool

parent-coordinator, the preschool supervisor, and the president of the board selected at large, coordinated all phases of the preschool parent activities. All parents held membership in the national Parent Teachers Association. Parents shared in financing the preschool program, paying a monthly fee of ten cents per parent and holding fund raisers for specific projects. They also contributed many hours of service in maintaining playground equipment and beautifying the play environment.

In September 1942 the adult education department was transferred from the Education Section to the Community Services Division, with an office established in Block 35, Building 15. Charles K. Ferguson, an appointed WRA employee, became its first director.

The first general registration for the entire program of adult education courses was held on September 7. Class offerings included carpentry, English, and tailoring. Week by week new classes were added to the list. Approximately 3,000 students showed interest in attending classes in English, commerce, history, science, and sewing during the remainder of 1942.⁹¹

Education

Under the WCCA assembly and reception/relocation centers had no budget provisions for buildings, trained personnel, or supplies for establishment of schools. Educational efforts, which could be developed by the evacuee population, however, were encouraged. Thus, the only formal educational activities that were commenced at Manzanar under the WCCA were the preschool and adult English class programs.

During the spring of 1942 parents with children at Manzanar began to explore ways to continue the education of their children while in the center. The older parents began "by calling in the college Nisei to work out some type of school program to occupy and settle the children who were 'running wild' in their new surroundings." Many children had brought their school books with them. Plans for studying by mail were encouraged among the college group, and several evacuees began correspondence courses.

Thirteen seniors from Bainbridge Island completed the correspondence work outlined for them by their former high school. On May 25 they received their diplomas in a small graduation ceremony presided over by the Project Director.

Approximately 200 high school seniors had reached the closing weeks of their senior year at the time of evacuation. Most of them had been given their diplomas before they left for Manzanar, while others received theirs by mail when their classmates graduated in June.

On June 1, 1942, the date on which the WRA assumed administrative control of Manzanar, officials from the WRA Regional Office in San Francisco, accompanied by two consultants

91. "Education Section," Vol. II, pp. 203-05, 247, and "Community Activities Section," Vol. III, pp. 803-51, *Final Report, Manzanar*, RG 210, Entry 4b, Boxes 71 and 72, respectively, File, "Manzanar Final Reports," and War Relocation Authority, *Second Quarterly Report*, pp. 64-65. In his book entitled *Exile Within: The Schooling of Japanese Americans, 1942-1945* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1987), Thomas James explores the philosophical underpinnings and pedagogical practices of WRA schools.

from the State Department of Public Instruction, arrived at the camp to select a site for school buildings. Conferences were held with the Superintendent of Schools of Inyo County, who was "politely cooperative but not at all in sympathy with the problems involved in educating Japanese-American children."

Summer Program of 1942. Because of continued pressure from parents for a summer school program, the WRA's Social Welfare Section soon began a block census to determine the number of school-aged children in the center. Since most of the children had missed the last two months of the school term, parents were worried about loss of academic credit resulting from evacuation. Willing evacuees offered to serve as teachers and to provide an academic program to children who wanted to attend classes during the summer months.

Genevieve W. Carter, who would become Superintendent of Schools at Manzanar, visited the camp on May 19 when she was sent as a staff member from the University of California to document the progress and impact of evacuation for its department of sociology. As Manzanar's superintendent of education, she reported to the project for work on June 15.

Before a survey could be made in preparation for the fall school term, a summer program, already developed, was thrust on Carter. Nearly 1,000 pupils were enrolled, and 50 evacuee tutors had volunteered to teach and were ready to meet their classes. An opening date had been announced for the following week, and the evacuees were prepared to enter immediately upon a summer school program which would cover 12 grades. Plans for the summer program had been developed without the guidance of an experienced school administrator.

Carter immediately began working "on the problem of setting up a program without supplies, buildings, or experienced teachers," while at the same time recruiting teachers for the fall term. As a result of Carter's efforts, three credentialed teachers were brought to the center within two weeks.

A form was prepared for children to use to send to the schools from which they had come, requesting that textbooks and assignments required to complete their semester's work be sent to them at Manzanar. At the beginning of the summer tutoring classes, nearly 800 high school students were enrolled, but of these only 484 had completed their courses and received credit from their "home" schools. Volunteer tutors were grouped into departments, and these were headed by subject supervisors. Final grades and evaluations were prepared during joint conferences involving tutors, subject supervisors, and the credentialed teachers.

The former schools from which the evacuee children had come cooperated "wholeheartedly" in lending books and furnishing study outlines, and in many cases prepared final examinations. Of the 65 high schools represented at Manzanar, all except one gave full high school credit to the students who satisfactorily completed their courses.

The summer high school classes were held in empty mess halls, day and evening, in temperatures ranging from 100 to 120 degrees. No partitions separated the classes from

one another. Instead, students grouped around mess hall tables and "competed with one another in noisy recitations."

The elementary summer program of 1942 accommodated about 300 children who were grouped by grades and given instruction in the skill subjects, art, and group singing. On August 20, the elementary summer school held an "open house" for parents, and exhibited the work completed by the children.

Orientation for WRA Schools. On July 13 the WRA Regional Director of Education and Recreation called an Education Planning Conference in San Francisco. The purpose of the conference was to establish a "community school philosophy" to guide all relocation center education programs.

The education department at Stanford University offered its services in establishing proposed curriculum procedures for the relocation center education programs. Superintendents and principals who were not familiar, or in sympathy with, the "community school concept," were briefed with lectures, discussions, and reading materials. All WRA Education Sections were directed to gear their schools to this curriculum pattern.

School Organization for the Fall Term. The problems associated with organizing the embryonic school system at Manzanar during the hectic summer months of 1942 were described by Carter in the *Final Report, Manzanar*. The report stated:

Along with the problems of running a summer school for which no one was prepared, continuous adjustments had necessarily to be made within the Center between the Administration and evacuees, on the one hand and among incoming WRA personnel on the other. Sectional lines were not well defined at this time. Project personnel were limited in number to 105, and of these a large part were engaged in construction work. It was necessary at one and the same time to expand in my directions to cover many needs of which buildings, personnel, supplies, and equipment were the most urgent. Requisitions for supplies were prepared, only to find that no established procedures existed for bringing the supplies into camp.

Frequently, too, questions were raised as to who had authority to recruit personnel. Since schools had not been planned for at the time the incoming evacuees had been assigned to their housing, it became a necessary step to move people into barracks already crowded, in other blocks, in order to make room for schools. These problems were desperate ones with no one apparently armed with the authority to open up avenues along which the school plans could proceed.

During the summer of 1942 a memorandum of understanding was drawn up between the WRA Regional Office and the California State Department of Education to govern the educational programs at the Manzanar and Tule Lake relocation centers. The memorandum anticipated legislation which would bring the Manzanar school area under state control by establishing a special school district for it. Only California-credentialed teachers would be employed, and all records were to conform to California standards.

Because of rising resentment of the WRA program by late summer of 1942, however, the legislation was never introduced, making teacher recruitment "doubly difficult."

Carter established a teacher ratio that allowed one teacher for each 35 high school students and one teacher for each 40 elementary school students. The teaching load was to be reduced by use of evacuee teachers who had already completed their training in education and who had partially completed practice teaching.

By mid-September 1942, 22 secondary school and 13 elementary school teachers had been hired and were housed at Manzanar. At the elementary level, the problem of recruitment was more serious because the \$1,620 salary offered by the WRA could not meet the competition of public schools which were paying better salaries for a teaching year that ran only 9-10 months.

In addition, recruitment of teachers at Manzanar was hindered by the "mechanics of Civil Service employee" practices. Two or three weeks passed before an applicant could receive official notice of his teaching appointment. Frequently, the prospective teacher had accepted another offer by that time. As a result of the lengthy bureaucratic process of recruitment, it was found that for every 50 letters or notices that were sent out from Manzanar, "perhaps two [teachers] would actually arrive on the Project and be assigned a teaching load."

After it was determined that Manzanar schools would not come under the state program, it was possible to recruit teachers who held credentials from states other than California. Problems still existed with recruitment, however, as the *Final Report, Manzanar* noted:

Yet the manner of recruiting had to be continued after the list of the available applicants in California had become exhausted. Most the of the applicants came from states that paid lower salaries than California did. During the early months the procedure for recruiting personnel changed a number of times. Administrators of education could never be sure as to how much liberty they were allowed in recruiting teachers.

One of the principal handicaps to teacher recruitment during the summer of 1942 was the lack of housing. Throughout 1942 teachers were forced to live "four to a room, in the same type of barracks as those assigned to evacuees." The teachers' quarters were located in Block 7, which had been vacated for high school classes. This meant that the teachers had to use two latrines in common with 1,300 high school students. Furniture for the teachers' quarters was also lacking. When a portion of the Empire State Hotel furniture was sent from San Francisco to Manzanar, teachers unloaded the furniture from boxcars in Lone Pine and hauled it to Manzanar in Army trucks. There was not enough furniture to go around. At one time it was found that four teachers were sharing one dresser and one chair. If one teacher received a mattress, another would be assigned the matching box springs. Since there were no bedsteads, the box springs were placed on the floor. As a result, many resignations were submitted, because "no teacher had to endure such hardships, with so much wartime employment available from which he could choose a job."

One of the first problems in making space for schools at Manzanar was to win the cooperation of the evacuees living in Block 7 so that the block could be converted for school use. Negotiations with evacuee leaders, however, led to the move from Block 7 "without serious difficulties." The partitions which had divided each barrack into four family apartments were retained, and the apartments were converted into classrooms. These rooms, each only 25 x 20 feet, however, proved to be too small to accommodate high school classes that generally ranged from 25 to 45 students.

Securing classrooms for the elementary schools was less difficult, because the grades could be scattered throughout the camp. Twelve recreational halls were assigned to the Education Section for elementary school classroom use. These buildings housed nursery schools, kindergartens, and six elementary grades. The recreational barracks were "100 feet long, with bare rafters, floors, and walls, and no equipment." Three to four classes were grouped in each building. With each group having to compete with the next group to make itself heard, "concentrated study or quiet work, was almost impossible."

The *Final Report, Manzanar* described the feverish efforts undertaken to improve the designated buildings for school use. The report stated:

Requisitions, conferences, memorandums, telephone calls, threats of resignation — everything was used in an effort to secure physical improvements for the school buildings. The authority for direct purchase of essential school needs was so bogged own and buried in red tape that attempt after attempt ended only in a blind alley. Sufficient plasterboard was available to line and partition residential barracks but there were no materials for the number 15 barracks which made up the classrooms. Requisitions were prepared for textbooks commonly used in high schools and elementary schools in California. Delays, changes in procurement procedures, Regional Office approval, and other handicaps held up these orders.

Although the WRA had established the "community school curriculum" as the basis on which WRA schools should be operated, the Manzanar educators thought it "advisable for the education administration in the camp to follow a curriculum similar to that from which the school children had recently transferred." Since about 85 percent of Manzanar's students came from the Los Angeles area, the Manzanar educational program was based on that of the Los Angeles schools, thus simplifying "program-making in the high school" and making it easier "to evaluate credits for seniors about to graduate."

Sample textbooks, state bulletins, curriculum outlines, and units of work secured from several typical California schools in the Los Angeles area provided the basis for Manzanar's first school program. Committees, made up of teachers who arrived early, worked under the school principals and the superintendent, developing the camp's "first course of study."

A primary, as well as difficult, task was to obtain an accurate school census. The project records were "in a state of flux," and the formal records and statistics section had yet to be established. Family visitors from the Social Welfare Section made a block-to-block canvas of the camp, but with "so much shifting and moving around" the school census did not "get accurately established until some time after school opened."

During August and early September 1942, letters were sent for "about 2,300 boys and girls to their former schools, asking for verification of grade placement and high-school transcripts." Most schools responded promptly, but others waited until the fall before sending the information. It was necessary, therefore, in the case of many students to arrange programs "on their own accounting of grade placement and credits earned." As a consequence, many children enrolled in the first grade were later found by verified birth dates to belong in kindergarten.

Teacher Training Program — The memorandum of understanding between the State of California and the WRA permitted teachers who did not meet state requirements but who possessed preliminary certificates to serve as practice or cadet teachers at the camp under supervision. The WRA guaranteed that it would request universities approved by the State Board of Education to institute an accredited teacher training program at Manzanar and Tule Lake. Under the agreement, it was contemplated that approximately 80 percent of the teachers employed would be Caucasians and 20 percent would be of Japanese descent.

A supervisor of teacher-training was selected at the recommendation of the University of California, Berkeley. Plans were immediately set to conduct a teacher-training program and to recruit possible teaching candidates from among the Manzanar evacuees. About 60 college-trained evacuees responded to the recruiting call. During the last two weeks of August, a demonstration school, using three levels of classes, was conducted to allow evacuee teachers observation and practice.

The Chief of the Elementary Division, State Department of Education and the Supervisor of Teacher Training at UCLA were invited to conduct a short institute for appointed and evacuee teachers at Manzanar. Several sessions were held in various mess halls, and the visiting educators "made a fine contribution in initiating a progressive philosophy and in opening the way for a teacher-training program for the evacuee teachers."

After the teacher training program was laid out, the number of evacuees interested in continuing the training declined to 23. The program, which was offered through the extension division of the University of California, Berkeley, included the following courses to be offered during the 1942-43 school year: history of education, psychology 1A, educational psychology, American institutions, industrial arts, tests and measurements, music methods, zoology, and secondary education. The courses were taught by qualified appointed personnel, most of whom had previous experience teaching at the college or university level. In each case, the University of California approved the instructor and course outline so that it would match a corresponding class offered at the campus. The evacuee students were registered in these courses at reduced rates since the University of California did not have to carry the cost of instruction.

Evacuee Teachers — In order to start school in the fall of 1942, it was necessary to assign full responsibility for a classroom to some of the evacuee teachers. The original plan had been for the evacuee teacher to be in the same room with, and under the direct supervision of, a state-credentialed teacher. When school opened, however, only one-half of the required number of appointed teachers had arrived. Thus, it became necessary to use evacuee student teachers as regular classroom teachers. This practice would continue until the evacuees were relieved or assisted by credentialed teachers who continued to be recruited. A policy was established whereby one credentialed teacher was placed in each

school barrack, where he/she could supervise two to three evacuee teachers. The elementary school principal and the student-teachers' supervisor cooperated in outlining all student-teaching work and in guiding and supervising instruction within the parameters of the general elementary program.

At the high school level, the evacuee teachers entered specialized fields, such as physics, chemistry, art, woodshop, agriculture, physical education, and farm mechanics. Such specialized evacuee teachers came under the supervision of the student teacher-training program, but, because of the nature of their specialized subjects, they did not required less counseling and oversight than did the elementary teachers.

According to the *Final Report, Manzanar*, the evacuee teachers "seemed to fit rather easily into the secondary school program where skill in presenting subject matter is so highly important." The evacuee high school teachers were "well qualified young people who quickly won the respect of their students." Although needing some "assistance in methods, their accomplishments with the students reached a fairly high level."

During the early months of the school year, the *Final Report, Manzanar* noted that Manzanar school officials found it "necessary to educate the parents and the community to accept and cooperate with the evacuee teachers." In some instances, the evacuee teachers had a better educational background and were "stronger" teachers than the appointed teachers who worked in the same building. In spite of this, however, cases "frequently occurred in which parents requested that their children be transferred from an evacuee to a Caucasian teacher." Such requests grew so numerous that it became necessary "to freeze all transfers and to begin a program of interpreting the evacuee teacher to the parent." An excerpt from the *Manzanar Free Press* on October 10, 1942, printed less than one month after the elementary school opened and five days before the high school program would begin, noted:

Many heated words have been bandied back and forth about the inferiority and superiority complexes of the Japanese race. Psychologists have long contended that a Napoleonic ego and Casper Milquetoast manner are one and the same thing; that they are only different expressions of a basic lack of confidence.

This lack of confidence in their own leaders and people is again demonstrated in the discrimination of parents and students against teachers of their own race. Students unanimously prefer Caucasian teachers and show great reluctance in signing up for classes conducted by Japanese teachers; this, despite the fact that many of these Japanese teachers are admittedly superior to some in the Caucasian teaching personnel. Dr. Genevieve Carter, Superintendent of Education, expresses the full confidence in these trained Japanese pedagogues, even to the extent of entrusting her own youngster to a Japanese teacher. She points out that many of these Japanese teachers are highly qualified and some have had more actual teaching experience than the younger Caucasian teachers. Many Issei repeat that time-worn race superiority theory. Yet when the education and welfare of their children are involved they seem to prefer Caucasian teachers. This presents a strange conflict in practice and theory, which obviously refutes their contention of racial superiority.

Nevertheless, this works an unnecessary hardship on the Japanese teachers who are willing to face the petty criticisms that accompany the job, to do their share.⁹²

School Opens — The elementary schools opened on September 14, 1942, with 1,001 registered students, and the high school began classes in Block 7 on October 15 with 1,376 registered students. Although teachers (36 appointed and 4 evacuee compared with 19 appointed and 12 evacuee for the elementary school) had been successfully recruited for the high school, nevertheless the process of scheduling classes and arranging programs on "a half-year promotional basis for pupils, who had come from 206 different high schools," presented an overwhelming problem to Leon C. High, principal of the Manzanar high school.

Elementary schoolrooms were scattered throughout the camp with classrooms in 12 different blocks. Manzanar's first elementary school principal met an untimely death in an airplane accident on October 9, and was quickly succeeded by Clyde L. Simpson. There were no playgrounds, no playground equipment, and no chairs, tables, books or supplies. Many of the children brought little benches which their parents had made from scrap lumber picked up while the Army was building the barracks. Children carried these stools back and forth to school, because at seats were needed in their quarters in the evenings. A few school buildings had mess hall tables, but since they were required for mess hall operations, it was not possible to obtain many of them for school purposes.

High school rooms were in much the same condition as the elementary schools except that classrooms were partitioned, thus making it possible to shut off most of the noise from adjoining classes. In regard to textbooks and supplies, the high school fared no better than did the elementary school. There were no stoves in the rooms and no linoleum to cover up holes and cracks in the warped floors. After school started, the windstorms, sandstorms, and cold spells sometimes made it impossible to conduct school. Stoves were not installed in schoolrooms until some time after the cold weather began.

In October the school libraries were organized. The high school library was established first. Books from the camp library were transferred to the mess hall in the high school block being used as a study hall, thus setting up the study hall library. The supervisor of student teaching organized a small professional library consisting of more than 200 books in her office. These volumes were classified and loaned to student teachers and to regular teaching staff in the elementary and secondary schools. In November, children's books were ordered for the elementary school library. When these books arrived, they were placed on shelves in the elementary teachers' study room, and teachers borrowed them for use in their classes.

In October two meetings were held to organize parents into a group to work closely with the school staff. Prior to evacuation few parents at Manzanar had experience with Parent-Teacher Association (PTA) groups. Thus, they were unprepared, under their own leadership, to carry on the responsibility of a PTA. The first PTA president elected at Manzanar was the wife of a WRA appointed personnel staff member.

92. *Manzanar Free Press*, October 10, 1942, p. 2.

At the two relocation centers in California — Manzanar and Tule Lake — plans made to obtain free textbooks by having the schools incorporated as special districts in the regular public school system of the state were frustrated through an adverse ruling by the state's Attorney General. Thousands of used textbooks, however, were obtained from schools in California, such as those in Los Angeles which formerly had heavy enrollments of Japanese American children. The first allotment of textbooks, supplies, and school equipment began to trickle into Manzanar around November 1. By that time, a central warehousing system had been established in the camp, but it was not operating efficiently. Thus, much needed school materials often arrived at the camp, only to be buried in central warehouses, resulting in delivery delays until later discovery.⁹³

According to the *Final Report, Manzanar*, the disorganization in the schools during their early weeks of operation in the fall of 1942 paralleled the "the general progressive disorganization within the [Manzanar] community." The chaos in the schools was avidly described in the report:

Teachers having been frustrated, were exhausted and irritable. An endless amount of time and energy had been required to get even the smallest things done. For example, families had moved from barrack to barrack, with children being correlatively reclassified as to grade and ability. School lists had continually to be revised as students changed their locations. Classrooms were cold, the only blackboards were home-made, and chairs were available for only two-thirds of the pupils. With only half the number of textbooks needed, instruction had been left largely to the ingenuity of the teachers who were already exhausted from their work load and the almost intolerable conditions of living in camp.

Neither had the attitude and conduct of pupils recompensed them for their teaching efforts. . . . Children had walked out of study hall without permission, with their supervisor unable to find out who they were or where they had gone. Hysterical outbursts of pupils had occurred at every grade level. A child in the fourth grade had burst into tears, screaming 'I hate you. I hate all Caucasians.' High-school students had kicked in doors and torn tar paper from off of buildings. To all reprimands for such conduct, the answers had been: 'I hate this kind of school.' 'This isn't a real school.' 'I had a good school in Los Angeles, and now they put me in a place like this.'⁹⁴

College Education — Because the WRA provided educational programs only through the high school level at relocation centers, special arrangements were necessary to provide for continuance or commencement of college and university studies for interested persons. Since the early days of evacuation, non-governmental organizations, most notably the American Friends Service Committee, began working on the issue. With the formation of

93. War Relocation Authority, *Second Quarterly Report*, p. 30.

94. Unless otherwise noted, material in this section on education is based on "Education Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. II, pp. 202-05, 229-30, 234-37, 242-43, 247-48, 277, 337, and 369, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 71, File "Manzanar Final Reports." For further data on the operation of Manzanar's schools, see Rollin Clay Fox, "The Secondary School Program at the Manzanar War Relocation Center" (Ed. D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1946), and Charles Wollenberg, "Schools Behind Barbed Wire," *California Historical Quarterly*, LV (Fall 1976), pp. 210-17.

the National Student Relocation Council in late May 1942, the efforts of these groups were coordinated.

The National Student Relocation Council, established with the approval of the WRA and the WCCA, was composed of a number of college presidents and other prominent educators who rounded out a formal organizational framework during meetings held in Chicago on May 29. John W. Nason, president of Swarthmore College, was elected chairman, and the council's national headquarters were established in Philadelphia. During June, the activities of the council were carried forward by two cooperating groups. The West Coast Subcommittee, operating under the leadership of Joseph Conard, concentrated its efforts on registration of students wishing transfer out of relocation centers and examination of their academic fitness and financial status. An eastern group, headed by President Robbins W. Barstow of Hartford (Connecticut) Theological Seminary as executive secretary, directed its efforts toward determining which colleges or universities outside the evacuated area would accept evacuee students and how many evacuees might thus be transferred. Clearance of colleges with the War and Navy Departments was handled by the WRA.

While the council was pursuing its goals, the WRA explored the possibility of establishing extension or correspondence courses in the relocation centers with various state college and university officials. Such a program would provide for the needs of students unwilling or unable, principally because of inadequate funds, to transfer to outside institutions. Although such talks continued, these programs were developed in 1942.⁹⁵

Health

Under the WCCA. Under the WCCA, insufficient clinical facilities, personnel shortages, inadequate space, and procurement difficulties limited medical care at Manzanar.⁹⁶ Several days after the first evacuees entered Manzanar in March 1942, the first "hospital" was opened in a barrack in Block 7. The original medical personnel were evacuees, consisting of one doctor, one dentist, and one registered nurse, all of whom had volunteered to evacuate to Manzanar. Dr. James M. Goto, a graduate of the University of Southern California and a former physician at the Los Angeles County Hospital, was the chief medical officer in the camp. Later in March, another doctor, a registered nurse, and two student nurses joined the embryonic camp medical staff. No Caucasian doctors or nurses joined the staff until October 1.

95. War Relocation Authority, *First Quarterly Report*, pp. 28-29,, and War Relocation Authority, *Second Quarterly Report*, p. 31.

96. Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section is derived from "Health Section," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. III, pp. 749-60, 768-75, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports." For more information on this subject see Michelle Gutierrez, "Medicine In A Crisis Situation: The Effect of Culture on Health Care in the World War II Japanese American Detention Camps," (M. A. thesis, California State University, Fullerton, 1989), pp. 73-153, and Yoshiye Togasaki, "Public Health Report, Manzanar, California, March 21 to September 30, 1942," RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 68, File, "Community Management — Health."

Two rooms in the "hospital barrack" were equipped for use, one serving as a first-aid station and operating room and the other containing five cots for in-patients. One refrigerator, one operating table, several tables for instruments, and five cots comprised the hospital equipment. Running water and sterilization facilities were not available at the time.

The U.S. Public Health Service provided a limited supply of drugs, instruments, and needed equipment to Manzanar. A doctor representing that agency spent two days at Manzanar at the time of the hospital opening, providing valuable assistance to the medical staff.

During March 1942 nine in-patients were hospitalized, and 251 cases were examined in the out-patient department. Of the cases treated in the hospital, two were for gastro-intestinal upsets and the remainder for upper respiratory ailments. This low number of hospital cases was a remarkable development "considering the lack of sanitary measures" in the camp. Medical services were rendered despite extremely cold weather and inadequate heat. From the beginning, emphasis was placed on the idea that preventive care was synonymous with clinical care. Within weeks of the camp's opening, various types of public health clinics were held each morning. The medical staff initiated instructions for sanitary inspectors, and a regular schedule of camp inspection and reporting was developed. During the first month of the camp's operation, the medical staff administered 14,750 typhoid inoculations and 6,968 small pox vaccinations to the incoming evacuees. A dental clinic was established under the guidance of an evacuee dentist working solely with the equipment he had brought with him.

Ground was broken for a new 250-bed hospital during late April. During that month, the medical staff increased by one doctor, two registered nurses, and four student nurses.

Meanwhile, on April 13, the hospital moved from its temporary location into larger quarters in a 100-foot x 20-foot barrack in Block 7 which had been partitioned into a pharmacy, laboratory, kitchen, and operating, X-ray, sterilizing, linen, utility, record rooms, as well as space for a ten-bed hospital unit. This building was equipped with running water. The U. S. Public Health Service provided the equipment for the ten-bed unit, including instruments, X-ray equipment, and an autoclave sterilizer.

Four more standard barracks adjacent to this unit were acquired for hospital use in April to accommodate contagious disease patients. Running water was not available then, nor at a later date, in this new addition to the hospital.

As the medical staff increased, physicians and nurses were stationed at the entrance to the center to screen the new arrivals for communicable diseases. Those requiring hospitalization were admitted immediately in an effort to prevent epidemics from spreading through the camp population.

Through the month of April, the total out-patient load was 954. Numerous cases of acute simple conjunctivitis caused by dust storms were treated. The total in-patient load was 75, consisting mostly of communicable diseases and upper respiratory cases. The number of surgical patients totaled 11. One repair of a ruptured Achilles tendon and two

appendectomies were performed before April 13, when the hospital was moved to its more adequate accommodations.

In May, the camp's medical staff increased with the arrival of two doctors, three dentists, and one registered nurse. With the exception of the lay hospital administrator, the entire hospital staff was composed of evacuee personnel.

During May, the medical staff administered 558 dental treatments, 16 surgical operations, and eight baby deliveries. There were 70 hospitalized cases for communicable diseases, including measles, chickenpox, whooping cough, and mumps. The out-patient department handled 2,300 cases that month. One case (hospitalized on March 22) ended in death from "hypertension with decompensation."

Other activities conducted by the medical staff during May included examination of 146 food handlers, 99 well-baby conferences, and 45 prenatal examinations. Nutrition aides were selected to develop instructions for those working in mess halls.

On June 1, when the WRA took over administrative control of Manzanar, the improvised and primitive hospital facilities in the camp were deplorable.⁹⁷ On some of the hospital beds there were no mattresses, "straw ticking being used." In the nursery which housed five babies, there was "one bassinet, a common cardboard box and three wooden cribs built by Japanese workmen in the center from discarded building materials from the new hospital construction." There were only 12 urinals for the hospital patients. There was a shortage of pitchers, and "tin cans were used in several instances to supply drinking water to the patients." Nurses were forced to go outside and use an open spigot to wash their hands between patients. Water from wash basins used in bathing or caring for hospital patients was disposed "of on the open ground around the barracks, creating a possible source for the spread of infection in Manzanar's blowing dust." No telephones had been installed in the hospital.

Although the supply of drugs and medicines was considered to be adequate, the operating table, lighting, and surgical equipment were unsatisfactory. Despite the inadequate equipment in the hospital, however, "operations of a delicate nature" had been "successfully performed, including fourteen appendectomies and the removal of a cancer of the cecum, all without a fatality." Sterilizing equipment was "new and wholly adequate, and one ward had an air conditioning unit donated by Manchester Boddy, the Los Angeles newspaper publisher. The floors of the hospital buildings "were of bare boards, uncovered, but clean by dint of constant scrubbing." Hospital laundry was sent to a private establishment in Bishop. Deliveries were made twice weekly, sometimes resulting "in a shortage of hospital linen." The hospital did not have its own kitchen facilities "for the preparation of special foods and diets for the patients."

Under the WRA. In June another nurse, and in July another doctor, joined the Manzanar medical staff, bringing the camp's total professional evacuee personnel to six physicians, four dentists, six registered nurses, and six student nurses. A large shipment of medical equipment and supplies was received in June from the Quartermaster Depot in St. Louis.

97. "Conditions At Manzanar Relocation Area, June 1, 1942, by George H. Dean, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 293, File No. 41.080 #1, May-June 1942.

By the end of June, the medical services rendered to the camp population since its opening in March, included the following list:

Service	Number of Cases
Outpatient department	6,528
Dental clinic	2,444
Typhoid inoculation	28,923
Small pox vaccination	11,475
Diet girls' physical examination	75
Food handlers' physical examination	496
Well babies attending conferences	113
Pre-natal clinic	69
Births	19
Deaths (none from communicable diseases)	5
Wasserman test	111
Hospitalization	568

On July 22, the new 250-bed hospital, which had been under construction since late April, was officially opened. The hospital continued to be operated with an exclusively professional evacuee staff. The Hospital Administrator, a member of the appointed personnel, was nominally the head of the hospital, but he was neither medically trained nor experienced in hospital management. He also served as a liaison officer between the hospital staff and the camp administrators.

Under the WRA organization, the Health Section was placed in the Community Services Division and divided into public health and hospital units. Each of these units duplicated various efforts, services, and supplies. In addition, a rift occurred between the staffs of the two units. The organization failed to function smoothly because of personnel friction and lack of coordination. Thus, a newly-appointed Caucasian Chief Medical Officer and his staff, along with the head of the Medical Section from Washington, arrived at Manzanar in October to investigate the hospital and public health operations in the camp. Their examination was followed by a reorganization of the hospital personnel and their responsibilities. The Health Section became a single operating entity in which all personnel from physicians down were rotated through both the hospital and public health services. The greatest aid to unity came when the physicians, "who distrusted public health on the ground that it offered an entry for socialized medicine," began to realize that proper preventive measures reduced the number of emergency calls.

The new organization provided for general supervision of all medical services under a Principal Medical Officer who consulted with his unit heads before making important decisions regarding their units. He had general supervision of the health program and overall responsibility for application of WRA health policies. Most responsibility for medical services were delegated to the Chief Nurse, who supervised all nursing services and personnel, and the Hospital Administrator, who oversaw operation of the hospital and related services, such as warehouse, clerical, telephone, laundry, mess, janitorial, and ambulance. Physicians performed all medical services expected of a general practitioner, while dentists made examinations, cleaning, fillings, extractions, and dentures. The sanitarian was responsible for checking the purity of the water supply, sewage disposal, garbage and trash removal, and sanitary conditions in the mess halls, latrines, and camp

in general. The pharmacist filled prescriptions, and a dietician supervised the preparation of and serving of meals at the hospital and the diet mess hall. Laboratory and x-ray technicians performed their respective jobs. The health section also had a medical social worker who interviewed patients as to their social welfare needs, and assisted the Welfare Section in the adjustment of evacuees in relation to their health problems.



Photo 42: Sign on west boundary, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California.



Photo 43: Camouflage net plant, Manzanar War Relocation Center, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.



Photo 44: Irrigation for Manzanar War Relocation Center farm; photo by Dorothea Lange, June 30, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.



Photo 45: Clearing land to south of residential area, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Dorothea Lange, June 30, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.



Photo 46: Guayule experiments, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Dorothea Lange, June 28, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.



Photo 47: Police station and evacuee police, Manzanar War Relocation Center, 1942.



Photo 48: Mess hall interior at mealtime, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Clem Albers, April 2, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.



Photo 49: Japanese checkers, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Clem Albers, April 2, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.



Photo 50: Art school, artificial flowers, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Dorothea Lange, June 30, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.



Photo 51: Boy Scouts at Memorial Day service, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Francis Stewart, May 30, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.



Photo 52: Hospital latrines for patients between barracks, serving temporarily as hospital wards; photo by Dorothea Lange, July 3, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.



Photo 53: Evacuee gardens, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Dorothea Lange, July 2, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.



Photo 54: George S. Takemura, landscape artist, building and wishing well, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Francis Stewart, May 24, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.



Photo 55: Block 19, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection; Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California.



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As the nation's principal conservation agency, the Department of the Interior has responsibility for most of our nationally owned public lands and natural resources. This includes fostering sound use of our land and water resources; protecting our fish, wildlife, and biological diversity; preserving the environmental and cultural values of our national parks and historical places; and providing for the enjoyment of life through outdoor recreation. The department assesses our energy and mineral resources and works to ensure that their development is in the best interests of all our people by encouraging stewardship and citizen participation in their care. The department also has a major responsibility for American Indian reservation communities and for people who live in island territories under U.S. administration.

Publication services were provided by Mary Ryan, visual information technician, Resource Planning Group, Denver Service Center. NPS D-3, Volume One, September 1996

